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ABSTRACT 
 
CONTESTED MAJORITY: THE REPRESENTATION OF THE WHITE WORKING 
CLASS IN US POLITICS FROM THE 1930s TO THE 1990s 
Christopher Cimaglio 
Carolyn Marvin 
This dissertation examines the representation of the white working class in US politics 
from the 1930s to the 1990s: how politicians, journalists, pollsters, pundits, political 
commentators, social movement groups, and others have studied, written about, and 
claimed to speak for white working class people and how this work has shaped American 
politics.  Most existing literature on the role of the white working class in American 
politics has examined political opinion and political identity formation among white 
working class people, too often treating the “white working class” as a homogenous 
group with uniform political views.  This project takes a different approach, focused on 
elite engagement with the white working class as a social and political category.  It traces 
how prominent elite-level understandings of white working class identity, politics, and 
culture—from progressive workers combating economic elites to culturally conservative 
“Middle Americans” opposed to liberalism—emerged and impacted political 
contestation.  In doing so, it stresses the importance of the white working class as a 
political symbol, one that has consistently been at the center of conflict around 
fundamental issues in US politics, including the nature of privilege and disadvantage, 
challenges to racial, gender, and class inequality, the state’s sphere of responsibility, and 
the contours of national identity. 
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Introduction 
 
On November 8, 2016, Donald Trump was elected President of the United States, 
an outcome that came as a shock for most professional political observers.  The dominant 
explanation for Trump’s win focused on his appeal to one specific group: the white 
working class.  “Working-class whites give Trump the White House,” read a CNN 
chyron. For ABC News, “A revolution against politics shook the country, [with] working 
class whites venting their economic and cultural frustration by lifting…Trump to the 
presidency.”1  By November, this frame was nothing new; for most of the campaign, 
Trump supporters and Trump opponents with almost nothing in common could agree that 
Trump’s candidacy was a bottom-up revolt of blue-collar whites against the political 
establishment.  One prominent Democrat called Trump the “staunchest champion of the 
white working class that American politics has seen in decades.”2  Signs reading “The 
Silent Majority Stands With Trump” were fixtures at campaign rallies.  Trump 
championed coal miners, factory workers, and cities and towns harmed by trade deals.  “I 
am your voice,” he promised “the forgotten men and women of our country.”3 
Donald Trump’s rise to the presidency was unique in recent American political 
history.  The symbolism around the white working class that accompanied it was deeply 
rooted in that history.  Trump’s promise to restore high-wage manufacturing jobs tapped 
                                                           
1 “Working-Class Whites Give Trump the White House,” as featured on “The Lead with Jake Tapper,” 
CNN, November 9, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/videos/tv/2016/11/09/donald-trump-white-voters-white-
house-2016-president-tapper-dnt-lead.cnn; Gary Langer et al., “Huge Margin Among Working-Class 
Whites Lifts Trump to a Stunning Election Upset,” ABC News, November 9, 2016, 
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/huge-margin-working-class-whites-lifts-trump-
stunning/story?id=43411948. 
2 William Galston, “Trump Rides a Blue-Collar Wave,” Wall Street Journal, November 17, 2015. 
3 Donald Trump, address accepting the Republican Party nomination for president, Cleveland, Ohio, July 
21, 2016, transcript at http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/22/politics/donald-trump-rnc-speech-text/index.html. 
2 
 
cultural memory of the period between the 1950s and 1970s, when a (usually white, 
male) worker with a high school education could securely support a family on a single 
wage.  “Forgotten Americans” is a longstanding trope invoked by politicians as diverse as 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Richard Nixon (the Trump campaign’s most obvious inspiration), 
and Bill Clinton.  Observers on the left and right have, over many decades, condemned 
journalists and political elites as out of touch with the (white) working class.  Present-day 
elite observers commenting on the political importance of working class whites tend to 
see their arguments as novel responses to the urgency of the moment.  From a historical 
perspective, patterns are very clear. 
White workers have long been central to elite political contestation in the United 
States.  Liberals have invoked them as chief beneficiaries of a liberal agenda, as the 
backbone of the liberal coalition, and (in more recent decades) as those voters most 
responsible for the rise of conservatism.  Conservatives have figured them as dupes of 
liberal elites and (in more recent decades) as the mass base for populist resistance to 
liberalism.  White workers have been, as consistently as any other social group, identified 
as “average Americans” and as representative of the “public.”  They have also been, more 
than any other group, symbolic of racism, nativism, and unease about modernity and 
social change.  In sum, representations of working class whites among US elites have 
been complex and ambivalent, marked by ascriptions of both normativity and inferiority. 
Even deeply negative representations have been often tinged with normativity, though, 
and positive ones with condescension. 
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Most existing literature on the role of the white working class in American 
politics has examined political opinion and political identity formation among white 
working class people.  Here, I take a different approach, focused on elite engagement 
with the white working class as a social and political category.  This dissertation 
examines the representation of the white working class in US politics from the 1930s to 
the 1990s: how politicians, journalists, pollsters, pundits, social movement groups, and 
others have studied, written about, and claimed to speak for white working class people 
and how this work has shaped American politics.  The project traces how prominent elite-
level understandings of white working class identity, politics, and culture emerged and 
impacted political contestation.  In doing so, it stresses the importance of the white 
working class as a political symbol, one that has consistently been at the center of conflict 
around fundamental issues in US politics.  Talk about working class whites has been a 
medium through which elites have grappled with and debated large questions about their 
own positions in society, the nature of privilege and disadvantage, challenges to racial, 
gender, and class inequality, the state’s sphere of responsibility, the legitimacy of 
capitalism, and more. 
This introduction lays the groundwork for the study and is divided into three 
parts.  First, a literature review details existing historical, ethnographic, and quantitative 
literature on white working class politics and frames my intervention in that context.  Part 
Two outlines the theoretical framework for the project.  It introduces Pierre Bourdieu’s 
work on class formation (the centerpiece of that framework), discusses how “white 
working class” is conceptualized in the context of this project, defines the key concept of 
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“elite public discourse,” and details how that concept was operationalized via the study’s 
methods.  Finally, Part Three provides a road map of the chapters to follow and a 
summary of the dissertation’s broad narrative. 
 
I. Literature Review 
This literature review outlines existing work focused on the white working class 
in American politics.  It is divided into two broad sections: a discussion of research 
focused on understanding the political and social views of white working class people 
and a discussion of predominant themes in existing writing about the representation of 
the white working class.  The central enduring theme in existing literature is the extent to 
which unease with cultural change, especially gains for people of color, drives the 
politics of a broadly drawn white working class.  Though scholars’ treatment of this 
theme has become more nuanced over time, the question of why white working class 
voters support conservative politics remains dominant in the literature.  There are clear 
limits to what research oriented around this question can explain, and a focus on how 
elites have talked about the white working class can open up new dimensions for 
analysis.  In existing work on the representation of the white working class, I argue 
below, there are two predominant themes—normative constructions of white workers 
defined against people of color and stigmatizing constructions of white workers on the 
part of white elites.  In existing writing, these perspectives sometimes appear opposed to 
one another, but they do not need to be: a synthesis of the two is both important and very 
achievable. 
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Research focused on the political and social views of white working class people 
Any understanding of existing work on the white working class in American 
politics starts with the concept of “backlash.”  In simplest terms, the backlash frame 
posits that white working class voters support a conservative agenda because of anxiety 
about or opposition to cultural change, particularly the advancement of people of color.  
Over many years, the concept of backlash has undergirded both historical analysis and 
analysis of contemporary politics. 
According to a longstanding narrative, political shifts among working class 
whites—to the left in the 1930s and to the right, as part of a backlash beginning in the 
1960s—explain a great deal of the political history of the twentieth-century US.  “The 
backbone of Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal Democratic coalition, working whites put 
Ronald Reagan in the White House,” one historian writes.4  In this narrative, the gains 
liberals made during the 1930s and 1940s were made possible by progressive views and 
political unity among working class voters.  Workers underwent a “gradual shift in 
attitudes and behavior” in which they rejected the individualistic ideology of the business 
class and placed their trust in an activist government responsible for its citizens’ 
security.5  They also united in a multiracial, multiethnic political majority, as the forces 
pushing them toward common ground, including the “culture of unity” cultivated by the 
industrial union movement, made possible collective action that overcame the racial 
                                                           
4 Kenneth Durr, Behind the Backlash: White Working-Class Politics in Baltimore, 1940-1980 (Chapel Hill 
and London: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 1. 
5 Lizabeth Cohen, Making a New Deal: Industrial Workers in Chicago, 1919-1939 (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990), 5.  For strong and representative academic accounts, see Steve Fraser and Gary 
Gerstle, eds., The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989); 
Jefferson Cowie, The Great Exception: The New Deal and the Limits of American Politics (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2016). 
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divisions exploited by employers. The New Deal coalition (African Americans, the 
Northern white ethnic working class, the white South, and professional-class white 
liberals) made Democrats the dominant force in American politics for thirty years. 
One of the most influential understandings of why the New Deal coalition 
collapsed, both inside and outside the academy, is what’s often called the “backlash 
narrative.”  The key period in most backlash accounts is the 1960s, when white working 
class voters left the Democrats as part of a reaction against the civil rights movement, the 
counterculture and radical left, and Democrats’ association with both.  The old 
Democratic coalition split into two opposing factions—“a coalition of blacks and middle-
class whites committed to an agenda of racial and sexual equality, social welfare, and 
moral modernism” and a group of “working-class and lower-middle-class 
whites…calling for a reassertion of such traditional values as patriarchy, patriotism, law 
and order, hard work, and self-help.”6  By exploiting the backlash and adopting “a 
populist stance around the issues of race and taxes,” Republicans were able to “persuade 
working and lower-middle-class [white] voters to join in an alliance with business 
interests and the affluent.”7  The result was a period of conservative dominance. In the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, as scholars sought to understand the decline of liberalism and 
                                                           
6 Fraser and Gerstle, introduction to The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order, xxi. 
7 Thomas and Mary Edsall, Chain Reaction: The Impact of Race, Rights, and Taxes on American Politics 
(New York: W. W. Norton, 1991), 13. Chain Reaction was a finalist for the Pulitzer Prize and had a 
substantial influence on both the elite-level political debate and the scholarly literature.  It remains the most 
important articulation of the backlash narrative.  See also the essays in Fraser and Gerstle, eds., The Rise 
and Fall of the New Deal Order, 1930-1980, especially Jonathan Rieder, “The Rise of the ‘Silent 
Majority,’” 243-268; Dan T. Carter, The Politics of Rage: George Wallace, The Origins of the New 
Conservatism, and the Transformation of American Politics (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995); Allen 
Matusow, The Unraveling of America: A History of Liberalism in the 1960s (New York: Harper & Row, 
1984); William C. Berman, America’s Right Turn: From Nixon to Clinton (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1998).  In the last fifteen years, the best-known text in the backlash tradition is Thomas 
Frank, What’s the Matter with Kansas? How Conservatives Won the Heart of America (New York: Henry 
Holt, 2004). 
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the rise of conservatism in the late twentieth century, this narrative became central to the 
academic literature.  Works in this backlash tradition largely took a top-down approach 
and stressed conservative politicians’ use of racially charged rhetoric to attract white 
voters, typically assuming a uniform reception. 
Importantly, the backlash frame has been applied consistently in reference to 
periods other than the 1960s, and it remains central to journalists’ and liberal pundits’ 
work on the white working class. What specifically is understood to have alienated 
working class whites has changed over time as issues enter and exit the discourse—
busing, Vietnam, affirmative action, illegal immigration, “God, guns, and gays,” 
transgender rights—but the argument remains basically the same: appeals to racial and/or 
cultural identity push lower and middle-income whites towards conservatism. The basic 
claims of the backlash narrative—that racial/cultural grievances altered the trajectory of 
American politics and pushed whites to the right—are clearly persuasive.  Because of its 
one-dimensional causal mechanism, in which non-elite white sentiment is almost wholly 
responsible for the rise of conservatism (or, in some cases, neoliberalism or mass 
incarceration), it cannot stand as a comprehensive explanation of any of these 
developments.  Rather, the backlash narrative’s ubiquity in elite public discourse owes to 
the fact that it can support inflections acceptable to both liberals and conservatives.  
Because it frames conservatism as driven by a bottom-up revolt against elite liberals, it 
can mesh with anti-elite populist conservative frames. When it understands conservatism 
as driven above all by racism and cultural bigotry, it accords well with liberal criticism. 
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In journalism and political commentary, the backlash narrative remains 
hegemonic; in the scholarly literature, its position is more complex.  It remains 
influential, and scholars continue to center it in their literature reviews—sometimes to 
define their work against it (as I am doing here).8 However, academic analysis over the 
last twenty years has pushed back on or superseded significant elements of the backlash 
narrative, without transcending its basic role in the symbolic construction of the white 
working class. Recent academic literature on white working class politics can be divided 
into three broad categories—historical work, primarily within the field of history; 
quantitative studies looking at voting and party affiliation, primarily in political science; 
and ethnographic and interview-based studies, primarily in sociology. 
A recent quantitative literature on white working class politics in political science 
and political sociology has primarily focused on testing central claims of the backlash 
narrative: whether the white working class supports the Republicans and whether social 
or economic issues primarily explain that support.  Several of the most notable academic 
critiques of the backlash narrative have come out of this literature: scholars (most notably 
Larry Bartels) have argued that Democratic support among working class whites outside 
the South has been flat or has even increased since the 1950s, with the decline in 
Democratic support within the white working class attributable to the breakup of the one-
party South.  It is important to stress, though, that Bartels’ argument relies on an overly 
narrow definition of the white working class: whites in the bottom third of the income 
                                                           
8 Joseph Lowndes, From the New Deal to the New Right: Race and the Southern Origins of Modern 
Conservatism (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2008), 3-5; Naomi Murakawa, The First 
Civil Right: How Liberals Built Prison America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 7-8; Kim 
Phillips-Fein, Invisible Hands: The Making of the Conservative Movement from the New Deal to Reagan 
(New York: W. W. Norton, 2009), x, 323ff; Vesla Weaver, “Frontlash: Race and the Development of 
Punitive Crime Policy,” Studies in American Political Development 21, no. 2 (2007): 238. 
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distribution.  More broadly, most of the debate in the quantitative literature on white 
working class politics rests on how the “white working class” is defined statistically: by 
income, education, occupation, self-identification as “working class,” or a combination of 
the above.9 An income-based definition yields the most progressive “white working 
class”; all other approaches suggest some degree of shift to the Republicans.  An 
education-based definition (whites without a four-year college degree, the metric most 
commonly used by journalists and pollsters) yields the most conservative “white working 
class.” 
                                                           
9 For the income-based approach, see Larry Bartels, “What’s the Matter with What’s the Matter with 
Kansas?,” paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, 
Washington, D.C., September 1-4, 2005; Bartels, “What’s the Matter with What’s the Matter with 
Kansas?,” Quarterly Journal of Political Science 1, no. 2 (2006): 201-226; Bartels, Unequal Democracy: 
The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), chapter 3; 
Jeffrey Stonecash, Class and Party in American Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000); Stonecash, 
“Scaring the Democrats: What’s the Matter with Thomas Frank’s Argument?,” The Forum 3, no. 3 (2005): 
1-5.  For education and occupation-based approaches, Alan Abramowitz and Ruy Teixeira, “The Decline of 
the White Working Class and the Rise of a Mass Upper-Middle Class,” Political Science Quarterly 124, 
no. 3 (2009): 391-420, gives the best sense of the conventional wisdom among political strategists; see also 
Jeff Manza and Clem Brooks, Social Cleavages and Political Change: Voter Alignments and U.S. Party 
Coalitions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); John McTague, “Contested Populism: The Cross-
Pressured White Working Class in American Politics” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Maryland, 2010); 
David Brady, Benjamin Sosnaud, and Steven Frenk, “The Shifting and Diverging White Working Class in 
US Presidential Elections, 1972-2004,” Social Science Research 38, no. 1 (2009): 118-133. A useful 
treatment incorporating multiple definitions of the “white working class” can be found in Lane Kenworthy, 
Sondra Barringer, Daniel Duerr, and Garrett Schneider, “The Democrats and Working-Class Whites” 
(unpublished paper, Penn State University, June 10, 2007), available at 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.361.1778&rep=rep1&type=pdf.  For public 
policy- or strategy-oriented treatments, see Ruy Teixeira and Joel Rogers, America’s Forgotten Majority: 
Why the White Working Class Still Matters (New York: Basic Books, 2001); Elizabeth Jacobs, 
“Understanding America’s White Working Class: Their Politics, Voting Habits, and Policy Priorities,” 
Governance Studies at Brookings, November 2012, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/05-america-white-working-class-jacobs.pdf; Robert P. Jones and Daniel Cox, 
“Beyond Guns and God: Understanding the Complexities of the White Working Class in America,” Public 
Religion Research Institute, September 20, 2012, https://www.prri.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/WWC-
Report-For-Web-Final-1.pdf; Andrew Levison, The White Working Class Today (Washington, D.C.: The 
Democratic Strategist Press, 2013); Daniel Cox, Rachel Lienesch, and Robert P. Jones, “Beyond 
Economics: Fears of Cultural Displacement Pushed the White Working Class to Trump,” PRRI/The 
Atlantic Report, May 9, 2017, https://www.prri.org/research/white-working-class-attitudes-economy-trade-
immigration-election-donald-trump/; Liz Hamel, Elise Sugarman, and Mollyann Brody, Kaiser Family 
Foundation/CNN Working-Class Whites Poll, September 23, 2016, available at 
http://files.kff.org/attachment/Report-Kaiser-Family-Foundation-CNN-Working-Class-Whites-Poll. 
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Scholars looking at significantly different populations, though, all generalize to 
the “white working class.”  Their investment in doing so suggests the high stakes and 
considerable meaning attached to the category, but it also illustrates the conceptual 
problems posed by treating a unitary category as the focus of research.  Studies whose 
findings do not actually conflict with each other are opposed to one another in literature 
reviews10, and it is necessary to read against the grain to get a sense of variation within 
the group.  The picture that emerges from considering the literature as a whole is more 
complex than the backlash narrative.  It suggests a decline in white working class support 
for Democrats large enough to be impactful but not large enough to support the thesis 
that the white working class “abandon[ed]” the party.11 The turn to the Republican Party 
appears to be larger in the South, among relatively high-income individuals without 
college degrees, among men, and among individuals working in traditional blue-collar 
occupations.  That trend is smaller among Northerners, relatively low-income people, and 
women.  Several studies suggest that a preference for Republicans’ managing of the 
economy has driven the conservative trend (an argument that has seldom appeared in 
journalism and punditry), while others emphasize race.  The importance some backlash 
                                                           
10 “On one hand, there is evidence that the White working class has shifted to vote Republican, and on the 
other hand, there is evidence that the White working class continues to vote Democratic.” Brady, Sosnaud, 
and Frenk, “The Shifting and Diverging White Working Class,” 119.  It should be noted that studies’ 
divergent findings are also partly explained by the years that they choose as starting points—starting in 
1964, an artificial high point for white support for Democrats due to Lyndon Johnson’s landslide, yields a 
much more dramatic decline than 1952, perhaps a low point, although Democrats did not win a majority of 
the white vote in 1952, 1956, or 1960.  African American voters were crucial to Democratic electoral 
success from the New Deal through the 1960s as well as from the 1960s to the present day. 
11 As Kenworthy et al. convincingly suggest, identification with the Democratic Party declined among 
working class whites from approximately 60% to 40% from 1970 to the early 2000s, a finding that holds 
across multiple measures of “white working class.”  Kenworthy et al, “The Democrats and Working-Class 
Whites,” 6.  For the “abandon[ed]” claim, Abramowitz and Teixeira, “The Decline of the White Working 
Class.” 
11 
 
accounts afford to “social issues” such as abortion has not fared as well in this 
literature.12 
Within the historical literature, the backlash narrative has been substantially 
decentered.  The basic construction of a unitary, anxious white working class has not 
been sufficiently problematized, though, and there has been relatively little emphasis on 
the white working class as a political symbol deployed by elites.  The literature on 
conservatism has grown a great deal since the key backlash works appeared in the late 
1980s and early 1990s.  It contains major strands that deemphasize working class whites 
and emphasize the efforts of professional- and upper class conservative social movement 
activists, religious conservatives, and business elites.13  However secure liberalism 
appeared from the 1930s to the 1960s, much of this work stresses, a significant 
countermobilization among powerful adversaries was taking shape.  Other more recent 
studies share the backlash narrative’s emphasis on white working class discontent as a 
key force behind the success of conservatism, but they argue that this began much earlier 
than the 1960s and that it is best understood as a local politics rooted in urban and 
suburban space.  In other words, white workers’ turn to the right was not a product of 
1960s liberalism’s strong association with African Americans; the same racial politics 
was evident on the local level decades earlier.  Homeownership and neighborhood, 
central to white working class identity for these studies, encouraged an ideology centered 
on maintaining segregated neighborhoods and schools, protecting property values, and 
                                                           
12 Morris Fiorina et al., Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America (New York: Pearson Longman, 
2005); Andrew Gelman, Red State, Blue State, Rich State, Poor State: Why Americans Vote the Way They 
Do (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009); Bartels, “What’s the Matter,” Quarterly Journal of 
Political Science. 
13 This discussion draws on Kim Phillips-Fein, “Conservatism: A State of the Field,” Journal of American 
History 98, no. 3 (2011): 723-743. 
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keeping taxes low.14  These essential studies take a nuanced and empirically grounded 
approach, moving past the model of isolated voters responding to conservative rhetoric to 
portray a bottom-up populist conservative politics. 
The literature over the last twenty years also includes a number of ethnographic 
and interview-based studies of white working class politics, primarily in sociology.15   
Consistent themes in these studies include the importance of homeownership, 
neighborhood, community, and work in shaping white working class people’s political 
                                                           
14 Thomas Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1996); Sugrue, “Crabgrass-Roots Politics: Race, Rights, and the Reaction 
against Liberalism in the Urban North, 1940-1964,” Journal of American History 82, no. 2 (1995): 551-
578; Robert Self, American Babylon: Race and the Struggle for Postwar Oakland (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2003); Becky Nicolaides, My Blue Heaven: Life and Politics in the Working-Class 
Suburbs of Los Angeles, 1920-1965 (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2002); Kenneth 
Durr, Behind the Backlash: White Working-Class Politics in Baltimore, 1940-1980 (Chapel Hill and 
London: University of North Carolina Press, 2003); see also Arnold Hirsh, Making the Second Ghetto: 
Race and Housing in Chicago, 1940-1960 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983); Amanda 
Seligman, Block by Block: Neighborhoods and Public Policy on Chicago’s West Side (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2005). Matthew Lassiter, The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), though its primary focus is not on working class whites, 
makes a related argument about homeownership-based politics. 
15 Classic studies include David Halle, America’s Working Man: Work, Home, and Politics among Blue 
Collar Property Owners (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984); Jonathan Rieder, Canarsie: The 
Jews and Italians of Brooklyn Against Liberalism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987); Lillian 
Rubin, Worlds of Pain: Life in the Working-Class Family (New York: Basic Books, 1976); Lillian Rubin, 
Families on the Fault Line: America’s Working Class Speaks about the Family, the Economy, Race, and 
Ethnicity (New York: Harper Collins, 1994).  More recent studies include Justin Gest, The New Minority: 
White Working Class Politics in an Age of Immigration and Inequality (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2016); Arlie Russell Hochschild, Strangers in their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the 
American Right (New York: The New Press, 2016); Katherine Cramer, The Politics of Resentment: Rural 
Consciousness in Wisconsin and the Rise of Scott Walker (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016); 
Monica Prasad, Steve Hoffman, and Kieran Bezila, “Walking the Line,” Politics & Society 44, no. 2 
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identities; the stress many white working class people place on morality and personal 
responsibility; resentment of and lack of trust in government and elite institutions; and 
the frequency with which white workers define themselves against African Americans, 
immigrants, Muslims, and other whites they consider dangerous or less deserving.  These 
studies underscore the extent to which economic and cultural issues are intertwined in 
political consciousness, with economic views informed by cultural constructions of the 
groups benefitting from government programs.  Broadly, studies differ less in their 
characterizations of white working class cultures than the tone they take to describe 
them—in other words, how sympathetically scholars treat the grievances they describe. 
Two recent studies—both cited by journalists and elite commentators as insightful 
in explaining the Trump phenomenon—give a good sense of the current dominant 
scholarly view of the white working class.  For sociologist Justin Gest, writing in 2016: 
I find that white working class people’s rebellion is driven by a sense of 
deprivation—the discrepancy between individuals’ expectations of power and 
social centrality, and their perceptions of fulfillment.  More specifically, white 
working class people are consumed by their loss of social and political status in 
social hierarchies, particularly in relation to immigrant and minority reference 
groups. Their politics are motivated and pervaded by a nostalgia that reveres, and 
seeks to reinstate, a bygone era.16 
 
For sociologist Arlie Hochschild, also writing in 2016: 
You’ve suffered long hours, layoffs, and exposure to dangerous chemicals at 
work, and received reduced pensions. You have shown moral character through 
trial by fire, and the American Dream of prosperity and security is a reward for all 
of this, showing who you have been and are—a badge of honor…Look! You see 
people cutting in line ahead of you! You’re following the rules. They aren’t. As 
they cut in, it feels like you are being moved back. How can they just do that? 
Who are they? Some are black. Through affirmative action plans, pushed by the 
federal government, they are being given preference for places in colleges and 
universities, apprenticeships, jobs, welfare payments, and free lunches…Blacks, 
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women, immigrants, refugees…all have cut ahead of you in line. But it’s people 
like you who have made this country great…You’ve suffered a good deal 
yourself, but you aren’t complaining about it.17 
 
In the most common view, the politics of the white working class is backward-looking, 
moralistic, and founded on a sense of unjustly lost normativity. 
Taken as a whole, existing work is very strong in documenting the existence and 
significance of white working class conservatism and capturing how conservative views 
arise among whites of modest means.  In existing literature, however, broad and rigid 
understandings of white working class identity and culture are asked to carry a heavy 
conceptual load, to the detriment of the analysis.  Take the following two representative 
claims in existing scholarly literature: “In the aftermath of the [1960s], white working 
people felt themselves to be coughing up their taxes to support the poor minority”…“The 
conservatism of America’s working people leads them to reject a social democracy in 
order to vote for officials whose policies favor laissez-faire economics and corporate 
interests.”18  These characterizations are certainly true—at least in broad strokes—of 
some portion of the group.  As even the authors would certainly concede, they cannot 
possibly be true of the entire group, but the language used implies it.19  To be sure, 
categorization is fundamental to scholarship, and there is no alternative.  It is also 
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important to avoid losing grasp on the power of race to shape perception and experience 
in consistent and identifiable ways.  But the suggestion that these views were shared 
universally within the group and are particular to, reflective of, or explained by white 
working class-ness (as opposed to, for instance, whiteness) works against well-rounded 
analysis. 
To be very clear, my intention is not to argue that these studies’ arguments are 
“wrong,” or that anti-liberal, conservative, nativist, and racist views are not prominent 
among white working class people.  They are, and they are prominent among Americans 
generally, especially white Americans—it is irresponsible to suggest otherwise.  This is 
not intended to be glib or dismissive of the consequences of those views, which are 
severe.  It is important to ask, though, how well the dominant approach to understanding 
the politics of the white working class situates them within a broader analytical picture.  
“Backlash encourages certain analytical practices of ‘finding’ racial power in a post-civil 
rights context,” Naomi Murakawa writes.20  It places the emphasis on conservatism rather 
than liberalism, on non-elite rather than elite whites, and on electoral politics rather than a 
broader structural view.  There are clear limits to what research oriented around 
understanding white working class conservatism can explain. 
That basic research question—why white working class people gravitate to right-
wing views—has likely been so common because the seeming incongruity of white 
working class conservatism calls out to researchers as a puzzle in need of investigation.  
Arlie Hochschild frames her recent study around what she calls the “Great Paradox”: 
anti-statism within struggling areas where “one might expect people to welcome federal 
                                                           
20 Murakawa, The First Civil Right, 7. 
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help.”21 “Why is it that many low-income voters who might benefit from more 
government redistribution continue to vote against it?” asks political scientist Katherine 
Cramer.22  New studies of the political views of white working class people, taking 
particular interest in their support for politicians like Trump, will likely emerge in the 
coming years.  A continued focus on different iterations of the same research question—
why (why are they alienated? why do they support conservatives?)—will likely yield 
results consistent with existing literature.  Put differently, the patterns in existing 
academic and nonacademic literature on the white working class encourage a circular or 
cyclical dynamic: research periodically finds the same attitudes within the white working 
class, prompting similar debates about how to respond to those attitudes.  In order to 
move the conversation forward, it is necessary to ask different questions. 
“Contested Majority” foregrounds one set of alternative questions, focused on 
how elites have talked about working class whites and what the white working class as a 
political symbol has meant within elite-level political and media discourse.  This 
approach opens up additional dimensions for the study of white working class politics.  
First, it brings a focus on media and communication into a literature where they are rarely 
present. Work in political and labor history has not placed very much emphasis on 
media23, and the media history literature known to communication scholars remains too 
siloed from mainstream historiography. As John Nerone argues, part of the value of 
communication history (and of other historical work conducted outside of the field of 
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history) lies in its ability to bring a different perspective to familiar material.24  My 
project reengages a familiar historical narrative—the rise and fall of New Deal 
liberalism—and places communication at the center of it.  In doing so, it seeks to 
contribute to an interdisciplinary communication history research agenda. 
Second, this approach sheds light on the importance of the white working class as 
a political symbol—to invoke an academic cliché, what political observers talk about 
when they talk about the white working class.  Elite-level debates about how to 
understand or appeal to the white working class generate so much conflict and attention 
because they are only partly (and often superficially) about the white working class.  
They have consistently touched on large, fundamental, and controversial issues: who has 
power in society and who is victimized; what responsibility the state has in combating 
inequality; what makes a good citizen. These discussions are also very often about the 
responsibilities and failures of elites—to maintain prosperity, to show fairness, to 
demonstrate awareness of and regard for non-elite groups. 
To my knowledge, there are not any book- or dissertation-length studies looking 
at the representation of the white working class over the full period this project covers.  
There is little work in this vein within the field of communication, though there are small 
literatures looking at representations of unions in news media, representations of workers 
in film and popular culture, and unions’ strategic uses of media.25  However, this is a 
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topic and a theme that has been the subject of important and pointed analysis within and 
outside the academy.  I am certainly not the first to emphasize the significance of white 
working class representation or to problematize elite constructions of a homogenous 
white working class. 
Existing perspectives on representations of the white working class 
Two predominant points of emphasis are most evident in existing writing focused 
on elite representations of the white working class.  One centers on the normativity tied 
up in representations of white workers, the other on stigmatizing views of white workers.  
Both are prominent in the present day, but both also have longer roots.  What follows is 
my work of synthesis; it should be read as an effort to capture two enduring lenses rather 
than as a straightforward presentation of the view of any specific scholar or group of 
scholars. 
One perspective, which might be called white working class normativity, 
emphasizes the valorization of white workers, especially at the expense of workers of 
color. In this framework, white elites have accorded white workers and their grievances a 
level of respect and legitimacy deeply tied up in the interpenetration of whiteness with 
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understandings of the democratic majority.  American history has seen a consistent 
“juxtaposition between the valid and even virtuous interests of the ‘working class’ and 
the invalid and pathological interests of black Americans,” Ta-Nehisi Coates argues in a 
2017 essay.  Where white workers were figured as “virtuous and just, worthy of 
citizenship, progeny of Jefferson and, later, Jackson,” black workers were figured as 
“servile and parasitic, dim-witted and lazy, the children of African savagery…The 
dignity accorded to white labor was situational, dependent on the scorn heaped upon 
black labor.”26  In the period between the 1930s and the 1990s, this dynamic manifests 
particularly clearly in the normative contrast drawn between a white working class 
culture centered on family, stability, hard work, and close-knit community and a 
“subculture…of the Negro American” marked by sexual pathology and dysfunctional 
family life.27 
Scholars root the valorization and recognition white workers have received from 
elites in the context of a bargain central to the history of race in America.  In a pattern 
beginning as early as the eighteenth century and repeating consistently thereafter, elites 
retained social control and staved off interracial working class revolt through a tacit 
contract with white workers: Working whites would never fall to the level of the “Negro” 
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and would be accorded respect as full members of the polity.28 W. E. B. Du Bois’ canonic 
formulation of the “public and psychological wage” received by white workers, for 
instance, centers partly on how elites talked publicly about working whites: “Their vote 
selected public officials, and while this had small effect upon the economic situation, it 
had great effect upon their personal treatment and the deference shown them…The 
newspapers specialized in news that flattered the poor whites and almost utterly ignored 
the Negro except in crime and ridicule.”29  Scholars and writers in this tradition stress that 
the bargain is ultimately a bad one for white workers, morally and materially, and whites 
in the power structure gain the most.  The bargain provides working class whites with 
real gains, however, from access to better jobs and housing to a sense of personhood. By 
far, those harmed most by this treatment of working class whites are workers of color. 
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A second perspective stresses the persistent stigmatization of the white working 
class on the part of white elites and professionals.  From a longer historical standpoint, in 
this framework, negative representations of laboring whites have served to prop up the 
political economic status quo by naturalizing inequality: Nancy Isenberg’s recent 
account, for instance, situates the classification of “poor whites…as a distinct breed” in 
the context of an enduring need to explain away class disadvantage in an ostensibly 
egalitarian society.30 Scholars and writers focused on stigmatization in recent decades 
have emphasized the construction of “the white working class as a discrete bigot class 
responsible for America’s social and political ills.”31  The majority of existing work on 
the representation of the white working class, often coming from scholars and writers on 
the labor/social-democratic left and in the field of working class studies, has focused on 
historicizing and critiquing representations of a racist, nativist, and/or conservative white 
working class, particularly among professional-class liberals.32  The historical narrative 
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that emerges from this work is one of decline: Professional-class (white) liberals who 
valued (white) workers’ contributions to society in the 1930s and 1940s turned during the 
1950s and 1960s to an image of these workers as affluent, bigoted, and unconcerned. 
In this framework, only white elites and professionals gain from the dominant 
cultural construction of the white working class.  There is nothing positive in it for white 
workers, who are subject to immense condescension and classism.  By emphasizing white 
working class bigotry, “elite whites” are able to “displac[e] the blame for racism” (or 
sexism or homophobia) onto the white working class, as “professional-class racism slides 
conveniently out of sight.”33  Put differently, by defining themselves against a retrograde 
white working class, white professionals enjoy all the privileges of whiteness without 
being marked as racists.  By attributing white workers’ disadvantage to moral and 
intellectual shortcomings, others stress, elites avoid placing scrutiny on capitalism or 
their own position within the status quo. 
As primary analytic frames, white working class normativity and stigmatization 
can yield very different and seemingly opposing takes. One clear example comes from 
present-day politics: the vast journalistic and pundit literature on white workers produced 
during and after the 2016 election.  For those who emphasize stigmatization, media 
coverage of white working class voters evinced the “moral superiority affluent 
Americans often pin upon themselves,” as it “routinely conflated” notions of “poor 
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whiteness and poor character.”34  “For the national news media, the working class hordes 
who were Trump’s base of support were a kind of malignancy, not a constituency,” one 
journalist writes. “They were racists. Jerks. An oddity, the Other, their problems to be 
examined with disdain.”35  For those focused on normativity, the problem was not that 
(predominantly white professional-class) pundits were unfair to working class whites, but 
that these pundits were too sympathetic and attentive to white workers, unjustly 
foregrounding white workers’ pain.  Articles “tell[ing women and people of color] to stop 
being terrified about the very sanctity of our bodies and listen to the plaintive whines of 
the white working class,” one observer contended, amounted to “telling the 
disenfranchised to pay more attention to the over-franchised.”36  In this view, liberals 
who took themselves to task for elitism falsely suggested that “Donald Trump is not the 
product of white supremacy so much as the product of a backlash against contempt for 
white working-class people”37; constant invocations of the white working class were a 
means through which concerns around race, gender, and sexuality could be dismissed as 
“identity politics” and decentered as progressive priorities. 
The tension between normativity and stigmatization in analysis of white working 
class representation reflects distinct views of white workers’ position within the social 
hierarchy: For some observers, what is most important is the status of white workers 
(especially white working class men) as junior members of dominant groups; for others, 
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what is most important is their status as members of a clear subordinate group, the 
working class.  The proper weight to give to distinct but intersecting vectors of power and 
marginalization has been and will continue to be the subject of intense, controversial, and 
difficult debate.  For the purposes of a study of white working class representation, it is 
important to stress that these two primary perspectives—white working class normativity 
and stigmatization—are compatible.  Both perspectives capture key pieces of the work 
done by representations of white workers.  Neither alone is sufficient for a 
comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon, but they are complementary—in the 
sense that each tends to miss what the other emphasizes.  As a political symbol, the white 
working class has been positioned in multiple overlapping and conflicting ways, figured 
as normative and inferior (sometimes at the same time). One of the primary goals of this 
project is to accomplish a synthesis of these themes in a nuanced, balanced, and 
comprehensive account. 
 
II. Theoretical Framework and Methods 
Part Two lays out the fundamentals of the theoretical framework and methods 
employed in this study.  It begins (in a section designated #1 below) by stressing the 
importance of the representation of non-elite groups in elite-level politics and outlining 
the major theoretical model that guides the analysis, Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of 
“classification struggles.”  Next (2), I define the “white working class” for the purposes 
of this project—a social category that actors can speak for or speak about and that has 
meaning within this discourse, independent of the actions of the people it designates.  The 
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next-to-last section (3) defines the key concept of “elite public discourse”—a mediated 
space of representation where elites discuss and debate politics for an audience imagined 
as comprised of elites and professionals.  The final section (4) details the methods for the 
study, focusing in particular on how texts were selected for analysis. 
 
1. Representing the White Working Class: An Alternative Framework  
How does political opinion and political identity formation among white working 
class people matter politically?  While this question is often not explicitly addressed in 
existing literature, the guiding presumptions can be usefully understood through an 
opposition between elite-level and grassroots-level politics.  Frameworks like 
micropolitics, infrapolitics, and the “grassroots” capture the political significance of 
everyday, informal, interpersonal interactions.38  This realm comprises family life, social 
relationships, the workplace (for non-elite workers), neighborhood, the day-to-day 
experience of being in the world.  At the other end of the spectrum is what might be 
called macropolitics, elite-level politics, or national politics: “the dimension of political 
life where the powerful are most dominant, and where the expression of politics in its 
institutional forms is most prevalent.”39  The realm of macropolitics includes the White 
House, Congress, the courts, major political parties, national media, and the apparatus of 
lobbying firms, advocacy groups, and think tanks seeking to influence elite actors.  For 
the purposes of this project, “elites” are those whose decisions impact the lives of a 
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significant number of people; those who can consistently communicate their views 
widely or to a select, powerful audience; and/or those with significant power, wealth, or 
professional credentials. 
In much of the existing literature on white working class politics, the connection 
between elite and non-elite realms is assumed to be straightforward and direct.  The 
conventional narrative of the rise and fall of New Deal liberalism accords non-elite 
whites substantial national-level political power.  They exercise that power through their 
vote—selecting candidates who speak to and represent their identity and political views.  
Public opinion places clear boundaries around what elites are able to achieve.40  In the 
less nuanced backlash texts, elite political rhetoric directly shapes white working class 
identity.  In many of the best studies of political identity formation among white workers, 
an identity primarily formed at the grassroots translates straightforwardly to how worker-
actors engage in national politics. 
At the other end of the spectrum is the enduring argument that there is very little 
connection between mass and elite-level politics.  In Walter Lippmann’s classic account, 
the voter “lives in a world which he cannot see, does not understand and is unable to 
direct.”41  As an extensive literature has documented, most voters do not consistently 
                                                           
40 Two examples help to illustrate how this framework shapes historical narratives. “For FDR to have any 
traction at all,” Jefferson Cowie writes, the “voters had to put aside their deep-seated individualism and 
their many antipathies and hatreds that historically had divided them in so many ways.” “The neoliberal 
revolution usually attributed to Thatcher and Reagan after 1979 had to be accomplished by democratic 
means,” David Harvey argues in his often-cited Brief History of Neoliberalism.  “For a shift of this 
magnitude to occur required the prior construction of political consent across a sufficiently large spectrum 
of the population to win elections.”  Cowie, The Great Exception, 7; David Harvey, A Brief History of 
Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 39. 
41 Walter Lippmann, The Phantom Public (New York: Macmillan, 1927), 14. For classic articulations of 
the limits of voter power, see also e.g. Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: Macmillan, 1922); Joseph 
Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1942); E. E. 
Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1960). 
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follow elite political discourse, do not have well-defined opinions on many political 
issues, and do not understand politics using the same frameworks that elites use.42  A 
recent literature also suggests that public opinion, for all income groups but the most 
affluent, has little to no influence on policy.43  Here recent American political history 
becomes, as Larry Bartels argues, “a story of powerful public officials pursuing their own 
ideological impulses, ignorant or heedless of the public sentiment.”44 
The framework that guides my analysis maintains a conceptual opposition 
between elite-level and micro-level politics while admitting a connection between the 
two realms.  Each can and in many ways does strongly shape the other, but there is often 
a profound divide between the two.  The connection between them requires work to build 
and maintain; it is not frictionless or assured.  For instance, political elites frequently 
invoke group identity with the aim of mobilizing mass support around it.  However, as 
Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper argue, scholars cannot assume that elite 
identification “will necessarily result in the internal sameness, the distinctiveness, the 
bounded group-ness that political entrepreneurs may seek to achieve.” A great deal of 
what happens in elite-level politics does not involve the input of non-elites in any 
meaningful way, and identity claims can have meaningful effects at the elite level 
independent of their reception within the broader public.  “Self-identification takes place 
                                                           
42 For discussions of this literature and the stakes see e.g. Michael Delli Carpini and Scott Keeter, What 
Americans Know About Politics And Why It Matters (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996); Arthur 
Lupia and Matthew McCubbins, The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need to Know? 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
43 See especially Martin Gilens, Affluence and Influence: Economic Inequality and Political Power in 
America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012); Bartels, Unequal Democracy; Martin Gilens and 
Benjamin Page, “Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens,” 
Perspectives on Politics 12, no. 3 (2014): 564-581. 
44 Bartels, Unequal Democracy, 198. 
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in dialectical interplay with external identification, and the two need not converge,” 
Brubaker and Cooper note.45  Similarly, the fact that a set of political views or social 
distinctions exists at the micro level is not in itself sufficient to bring attention to them at 
the macropolitical level.  There are a far greater number of subject positions than there 
are political identities deemed meaningful in national politics.46  Walter Lippmann’s 
classic depictions of the political world as distant and murky aptly capture the way many 
elites perceive the non-elite realm.  The evidence they have to work with—public opinion 
research, journalistic profiles of voters, election returns—is imperfect and subject to 
multiple interpretations and confirmation bias. 
This project understands the work of representation in this context: of making 
something outside elite-level politics present within it.  In order to shape elite behavior 
and elite-level discourse, non-elite opinion must be communicated, represented, or made 
binding in a way that is meaningful for that audience. I mean representation in the double 
sense of speaking for and speaking about, delegation and depiction. First, representation 
(speaking for) refers to political actors who claim to speak in elite spaces, or are 
designated to speak in elite spaces, on behalf of broader constituencies outside those 
spaces.47  Representatives in this sense include elected members of Congress, advocacy 
                                                           
45 Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, “Beyond ‘Identity,’” Theory and Society 29, no. 1 (2000): 14-16. 
46 Take, for instance, one woman’s explanation to a scholar of class distinctions within the trailer park 
where she lives: “Even in the trailer park, you have some people who think they’re better than others. The 
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47 On “representation” as standing for, see e.g. Hanna Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (Berkeley and 
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967); Adam Przeworski, Susan Stokes, and Bernard Manin, 
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groups, or labor leaders.  Second, representation (speaking about) in this project also 
refers to the work of actors who seek to understand and portray a non-elite 
constituency.48  Journalists, pollsters, strategists, and others engage in this work. 
This work of representation shapes the dominant view of the social and political 
world, including the nature of the groups that make up that world, their similarities and 
differences, what they seek to achieve, what alliances and coalitions are possible, and 
more.  While it is not the primary goal of this project to make strong arguments about 
what causes historical change, the representation of non-elite groups can motivate or 
shape elite actions—the policies candidates or parties adopt, the constituencies they 
choose to pursue—as elites respond to prevailing constructions of the political world.  
Even when it does not directly shape decision-making, this work of representation 
matters very deeply on a symbolic level—shaping how events are narrated and 
understood and which claims are recognized as true or legitimate. 
I want to suggest that a particularly productive approach for understanding group 
representation in elite political spaces can be found in the work of Pierre Bourdieu, 
specifically Bourdieu’s concept of “classification struggles.”49  While much of 
Bourdieu’s analysis of class (such as habitus) is at the level of everyday practice, this 
concept is focused at the level of production.  It’s important to note up front that 
Bourdieu’s analysis has clear limitations—it works based on the assumption that class is 
                                                           
48 For representation in this context, Stuart Hall, ed., Representation: Cultural Representations and 
Signifying Practices (London: Sage, 1997); Clive Barnett, Culture and Democracy: Media, Space, and 
Representation (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2003). 
49 Concise descriptions of the concept of “classification struggles” can be found in Pierre Bourdieu, 
Distinction: A Critique of the Social Judgment of Taste (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), 
481ff; Bourdieu, “The Social Space and the Genesis of Groups,” Theory and Society 14, no. 6 (1985): 723-
744; Bourdieu, “What Makes a Social Class? On the Theoretical and Practical Existence of Groups,” 
Berkeley Journal of Sociology 32 (1987): 1-17. 
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the only major vector of stratification, does not adequately address race or gender, and 
does not adequately capture the way identity is marked on the body.  It is very useful, 
though, for analysis of group representation in elite spaces.  The analysis gets at three 
guiding principles for this project: First, understanding the construction of and 
contestation around social categories is fundamental to politics.  Second, elite claims to 
speak for or speak about broader constituencies have an importance independent of their 
reception among non-elites.  Third, these claims can be understood in the context of 
political contestation among elites in the spaces where elites work. 
Bourdieu and classification 
For Bourdieu, classification is a fundamentally political act and an extremely 
important form of political power.  “Knowledge of the social world and, more precisely, 
the categories that make it possible, are the stakes, par excellence, of political struggle,” 
he writes.50  In democratic societies, multiple political actors compete for what is 
variously phrased as the power to “make groups by making the common sense, the 
explicit consensus, of the whole group,” “the power to make people see and believe, to 
get them to know and recognize, to impose the legitimate definition of the division of the 
social world,” “symbolic power as worldmaking power,” a “struggle to impose the 
legitimate view of the social world,” a “symbolic struggle over the production of 
common sense, or, more precisely, for the monopoly of legitimate naming,” a “struggle 
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for the monopoly of the legitimate expression of the truth of the social world.”51 
Classification struggles are contests in which opposing groups seek this power. 
This framework maps well onto established themes in analysis of media and 
journalism.  Media power can be understood as the “power to define, allocate, and 
display” the “scarce resource” of “reality,” as James Carey writes.52  Journalism, perhaps 
more than any other field, claims a monopoly on the legitimate expression of the truth of 
the social world.53  The news media serve as the chief arena where competing political 
actors seek to raise their constructions of reality to dominant status.  Investigative 
reporters, experts quoted in news stories, opinion writers, and critics of media bias or 
“fake news” are all engaged in promoting or contesting constructions of reality.  
Journalists can be said to “play a double role as purveyors of meaning in their own right 
and as gatekeepers who grant access or withhold it from other speakers.”54 
Actors who compete in classification struggles and seek visibility for their 
perspectives in media do not compete on an equal playing field.  While classification in 
democratic societies is subject to competition, it is strongly shaped by existing power 
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relations.  Existing power relations bear on the resources groups have to contend, and 
they bear on the way political actors see the world in the first place.  First, actors’ 
perceptions of the world stem from their positions in social space, even (or especially) in 
the case of those whose expertise gives them a claim to the universal—intellectuals, 
academics, or journalists.55 Second, groups are “very unequally armed in the fight to 
impose their truth,” and so actors who possess more capital have an advantage.56  
Typically (as a large literature in critical media studies suggests) “those who occupy the 
dominated positions within the social space are also located in dominated positions in the 
field of symbolic production.”57  While outcomes are not preordained, they are 
constrained by a basic paradox at the heart of any attempt to address structural power 
through mass communication—the distribution of the power to communicate depends on 
“the very structures of economic and political power that democratic processes of debate 
were intended to control.”58 
It’s important to stress that the concept of classification struggles focuses not only 
on meaning generally, but specifically on the existence and the nature of groups.  Groups 
are “made” through classification struggles, rather than simply existing prior to them; 
these are “not merely struggles between existing groups over how to interpret the social 
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world, but struggles that help form groups in the first place.”59  Groups (“real” or 
mobilized groups, as Bourdieu describes them) are formed when mass support coalesces 
around an identity.  Groups can also be formed, in this framework, in a manner more 
disconnected from non-elite opinion. 
First, when elite political actors make an appeal to or interpellate a certain 
political identity, they provide a language that others can use as a basis for self-
identification and mobilization. Any system of classification draws boundaries of affinity 
and difference in certain ways, so drawing those lines in a different way can open up new 
possibilities for movement- or coalition-building.  In this line of reasoning, the power of 
classification is akin to 
the evocative power of an utterance which puts things in a different light…or 
which modifies the schemes of perception, shows something else, other 
properties, previously unnoticed or relegated to the background (such as common 
interests hitherto masked by ethnic or national differences); [or] a separative 
power…drawing discrete units out of indivisible continuity, difference out of the 
undifferentiated.60 
 
Difference can be both produced and muted as part of this process. 
 Second, one of the major strengths of Bourdieu’s framework for the purposes of 
this project is its understanding of how individuals or institutions can claim to speak for 
groups independent of extensive mass support or mobilization.  This is aptly captured in 
Bourdieu’s detailed discussion, over the course of several articles, of whether (more 
appropriately, how) “the working class” exists.  The crux of the argument is as follows: 
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The mode of existence of what is nowadays called, in many societies (with 
variations, of course), “the working class,” is entirely paradoxical: it is a sort of 
existence in thought, an existence in the thinking of a large proportion of those 
whom the taxonomies designate as workers, but also in the thinking of the 
occupants of the positions remotest from the workers in the social space. This 
almost universally recognized existence is itself based on the existence of a 
working class in representation, i.e., of political and trade-union apparatuses and 
professional spokespersons vitally interested in believing that it exists and in 
having this believed both by those who identify with it and those who exclude 
themselves from it, and capable of making the “working class” speak.61 
 
At its most basic, this is a simple constructivist argument—the working class exists 
because large numbers of people believe it exists.  It does not exist in the sense an 
orthodox Marxist might dream—a homogenous, fully unified group—but it is “no less 
real.”  What I want to draw out, though, is the concept of the “working class in 
representation,” produced by a long history of intellectual work and political mobilization 
(an “immense historical labor of theoretical and practical invention”) and “endlessly re-
created through the countless, constantly renewed, efforts and energies that are needed to 
produce and reproduce belief.”62  
 The work involved in creating and maintaining a “working class in 
representation” takes several forms.  One is ascribing agency to the group in discourse: 
“Any predicative proposition having ‘the working class’ as its subject disguises an 
existential proposition (there is a working class).”  A second is “demonstration, a sort of 
theatrical deployment of the class-in-representation.”63  This implies real bodies in real 
space whose identification with the group is conveyed in a ritualistic fashion; an example 
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in the US context is an early twentieth-century Labor Day parade, with workers carrying 
flags and banners that underscore their affiliation. 
The most important work in creating a group-in-representation, in this framework, 
is performed by institutions or individuals who are understood to speak for the group as a 
whole.  The working class (in this case) “exists in and through the corps of mandated 
representatives who give it material speech and visible presence, and in the belief in its 
existence that this corps of plenipotentiaries manages to enforce.”64  Bourdieu goes so far 
as to suggest that no group can exist without a spokesperson: “A class exists insofar…as 
mandated representatives…can be and feel authorized to speak in its name” …“Any 
otherwise elusive social collective exists, if and only if there exists one (or several) 
agent(s) who can assert with a reasonable chance of being taken seriously…that they are 
the ‘class,’ the ‘people,’ the ‘Nation,’ the ‘State’ and so on.”65 This formulation raises the 
important question of who needs to “tak[e] seriously” the spokesperson’s claims to speak 
for the group.  Bourdieu’s conceptualization of the role of the spokesperson is focused 
primarily on actors speaking for subordinate groups in dominant political spaces.  In that 
context, and for the purposes of this project, “being taken seriously” means being taken 
seriously in the elite space where the spokesperson works. 
For members of the group represented, representation by a spokesperson creates a 
tradeoff that can be simultaneously empowering and disempowering.  On the one hand, 
the spokesperson brings the group’s concerns to an arena where they otherwise would not 
be heard, in a manner in which outsiders can understand them.  The spokesperson’s claim 
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works to “make public (i.e., render objectified, visible, and even official) what had not 
previously attained objective and collective existence and had therefore remained in the 
state of individual or serial existence—people’s malaise, anxiety, disquiet, 
expectations.”66  As a result, “the group represented…escapes from the powerlessness 
attached to serial atomization and…can mobilize all the force, material and especially 
symbolic, that it contains in potentia.”  The cost is twofold.  First, the group is understood 
as a single entity (“capable of acting and speaking ‘as one man’”67); it is flattened and 
treated as homogenous.  Second, the spokesperson gains substantial power that those the 
spokesperson claims to represent cannot easily check: 
Personifying a fictitious person, a social fiction, he raises those whom he 
represents from the state of separate individuals, enabling them to act and speak, 
through him, as one man.  In exchange, he receives the right to take himself for 
the group, to speak and act as if he were the group made man.68   
 
There is inevitably a “break with the ‘people’…implied by gaining access to the role of 
spokesperson.”69  The spokesperson works in the dominant political space, at a distance 
from group members, and has access to opportunities that they do not have—as a direct 
result of being recognized as a representative of the group.  If some within the group find 
their views and interests poorly represented, their only option is to contest the claims of 
the dominant spokesperson by putting forward a competing alternative. 
How does someone become a spokesperson?  Bourdieu at times phrases his 
argument in a way that suggests an element of agency is involved for the group as a 
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whole; the “mandators” can choose their “mandated.”  In other formulations, he 
understands spokespersonship as a claim made within the dominant political space.  “The 
‘people’,” as a political symbol, is “first of all one of the things at stake in the struggle 
between intellectuals,” Bourdieu writes, and the “principle of different ways of situating 
oneself in relation to the ‘people’…resides in the logic of the struggle within the field of 
the specialists.”70  In other words, to understand why elites claim to speak for and speak 
about the “people” in the ways they do, it is necessary to look at the dynamics of elite-
level politics.  This is the insight I follow here. 
As Sun-ha Hong notes, no political figure is “consecrated with a right to publicity 
or to public spokespersonship,” but rather “seize[s] it.”71 Political actors make claims to 
represent larger collectives, and those claims can be justified or evaluated based on 
multiple criteria, some of which have more of a connection to rank-and-file opinion of 
group members than others—correspondence between the spokesperson’s views and the 
views of group members as measured by polling or election results, the spokesperson’s 
personal history72, leadership in a mass membership organization. A substantial amount 
of mass support is not necessary, though Bourdieu points to the importance of “the most 
convinced fraction of the believers, who, through their presence, enable the 
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representatives to manifest their representativeness.”73  In this formulation, the 
appearance of mass support is most important in making those outside the group more 
likely to judge a spokesperson credible. It is “belief in the existence of the class,” not the 
specifics of non-elite opinion, “which is the basis of the authority of its spokesmen.”74 
The connection between representation in the sense of speaking for and 
representation in the sense of speaking about comes into play here as well.  In political 
conflict, Luc Boltanski argues, struggles “over social taxonomies and representations” 
play the critical role of “staking out the legitimate sphere of influence of each of the 
competing forces, that is, in practical terms, by defining which classes rival organizations 
or parties may legitimately claim to represent.”75  The way in which a social group has 
been defined impacts which political actors can credibly claim to speak for that group.  
Becoming accepted as a spokesperson, then, is wrapped up in the broader struggle to 
define the truth of the social world and to define the nature of groups. 
 This understanding of group formation points towards an alternative angle on the 
importance of the white working class in American politics.  Rather than focusing on “the 
ideological clash of liberalism and conservatism”76 as the two ideologies seek public 
support, this project foregrounds how liberals, conservatives, and others have claimed to 
speak for and speak about the white working class.  From this perspective, the white 
                                                           
73 Bourdieu, “Social Space,” 742. An activist at a press conference surrounded by several dozen supporters 
provides one example of how “believers…enable the representatives to manifest their representativeness” 
in this framework. 
74 Ibid., 727. 
75 Luc Boltanski, The Making of a Class: Cadres in French Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1987), 158.  Boltanski’s analysis in this book draws heavily on Bourdieu’s understanding of class 
formation. 
76 Brian Balogh, The Associational State: American Governance in the Twentieth Century (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), 2, in the context of a critique of this approach to political history. 
39 
 
working class is a group-in-representation, a category that has meaning within elite 
public discourse, connected to but not bound by the activities of the people it designates.  
Like the “working class-in-representation” described by Bourdieu, the white working 
class in this sense is the product of a long history of intellectual labor.  Groups often 
“present themselves with [the] air of eternity that is the hallmark of naturalized history,” 
Bourdieu writes, but “they are always the product of a complex historical work of 
construction.”77  The task of this dissertation is to uncover that “complex historical work 
of construction” in the case of the white working class. 
 
2. Defining and Conceptualizing the “White Working Class” 
The usage of “white working class” in this dissertation differs from the norm, 
reflecting the fact that this is a study of elite talk about white workers, not a study of the 
white working class.  In this project, I use the term “white working class” to refer to a 
social category that actors can speak about or claim to speak for and that has meaning 
within this discourse, apart from the activities of the people it designates.  I do not use 
“white working class” (or “working class”) to refer to an actor with agency.  When I am 
referring to white working class people as political actors, I use the suffix –actors (e.g. 
worker-actors). 
The project is framed around the representation of the “white working class” 
because that frame allows for the best intervention in present-day media and academic 
discourse, where “white working class” is used extensively.  It is also intended to counter 
the use of ostensibly race-neutral class categories, particularly “working class” or “blue 
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collar,” to refer only to whites, a longstanding (and continuing) bad habit in American 
political discourse.78 However, it’s essential to be very clear up front about the way I use 
“white working class” and the conceptual hitches, challenges, and concerns the “white 
working class” poses as a unifying concept for this project.  First, it is important to 
differentiate clearly between the “white working class” as a construct or symbol—the 
primary focus of this project—and the “white working class” as a way of naming people 
existing in the world and capable of acting politically.  Second, most of the actors this 
study spotlights did not primarily use the term “white working class”: the study has to 
navigate a range of related but not interchangeable categories. 
The real-life referent of the “white working class” 
While this study is focused on the white working class as represented in elite 
discourse, it is important not to lose sight of an understanding of whiteness as a 
historically constructed category that yields material and psychological “wages” for those 
recognized as white (a category that changes over time)79, or an understanding of class as 
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class” in present-day discourse are very well founded.  The term is used in a profoundly essentialist 
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a political economic category rooted in a shared structural position in the economy.  Here 
“working class” means a lack of power at work, precarity, wage work, low-paying and/or 
undesirable (monotonous, exhausting, or dangerous) work, and a lack of wealth or 
substantial economic/cultural capital.80  It is important not to treat the working class as an 
undifferentiated category (such that all working class people are on equal ground).  In 
many cases, access to jobs has been dictated so strongly by gender and race that white 
male worker-actors occupied a political economic position clearly distinct from the 
position occupied by working women and workers of color.  Whiteness has also meant 
greater opportunity to move out of the working class.  I am a middle class white man; my 
family, like millions of other descendants of European immigrants, reached the middle 
class in the midcentury era when the American state intervened very directly to the 
benefit of non-elite citizens through programs (veterans’ benefits, low-interest home 
loans) that either excluded or delivered far fewer gains to working class people of color. 
While reifying and ascribing agency to the white working class is conceptually 
problematic, white people who are in a working class position do have agency—they can 
vote, protest, form or join social movements, run for political office, and participate in 
                                                                                                                                                                             
manner, and when political elites are encouraged to respond to the “white working class,” they tend to 
focus on “white” rather than “working class.” No responsible politics can be built around an appeal to the 
“white working class,” but the term’s use in scholarship and political analysis is a different question.  
“White working class” needs to be used carefully, and it is made to do far too much work in present-day 
discourse, but I do not argue for eliminating it.  If used responsibly, it can capture divergence in 
experiences and political views along racial lines within the working class, and it helps to discourage 
commentators and journalists from using an unmodified “working class” to refer only to whites.  This 
project grapples with representational issues around the “white working class,” with an eye toward 
achieving a better public discourse about the actually existing “working class.” 
80 Debates about objective definitions of class generally or the white working class specifically are 
bracketed in my work. An introductory discussion can be found in Erik Olin Wright, ed., Approaches to 
Class Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Wright, The Debate on Classes (London: 
Verso, 1998).  Work in the field of working class studies is very useful for thinking through the multiple 
understandings of class.  See e.g. Sherry Linkon and John Russo, eds., New Working-Class Studies (Ithaca: 
ILR Press, 2005); Michael Zweig, The Working Class Majority (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000). 
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less formalized political activity.  A full assessment of white worker-actors as political 
agents between the 1930s and 1990s incorporates a range of efforts, from progressive to 
reactionary.  As voters, white worker-actors empowered some of the most progressive 
politicians of the era as well as politicians who appealed to their whiteness and promised 
to protect them from others of color.  Especially as members of unions, worker-actors 
took great risks and made sacrifices seeking change, both in periods conventionally 
associated with a progressive white working class and periods that are not.  The extent of 
workplace militancy in the 1960s and 1970s, for instance, was comparable to that of the 
1930s.  While the diversity in the white working class is obscured by conventional 
images of backlashing heterosexual males, white working class people took part in and 
supported the antiracist, antiwar, women’s, and queer people’s movements of the period.  
In periods where (white) workers were strongly associated with liberal politics, white 
worker-actors took steps to preserve their racial privileges in the workplace and in their 
neighborhoods, often through informal and organized harassment and violence.  In one of 
many incidents that followed the integration of all-white neighborhoods (this one taking 
place in early-1960s Philadelphia), mobs drove away a black family, the Wrights, 
chanting “Burn, niggers, burn” and throwing stones, eggs, and potatoes at the Wrights’ 
house, breaking the windows.81  During organized labor’s midcentury heyday, the hiring 
of black workers in previously all-white departments precipitated walkouts (“hate 
strikes”) and harassment; in one factory, “tools mysteriously disappeared, a Negro was 
                                                           
81 Misc. notes, Box 5, “Negroes” folder, Peter Binzen Papers, Special Collections Research Center, Temple 
University, Philadelphia, PA. 
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pushed into a machine, or other ‘accidents’ occurred,” such that “the Negro worker was 
either withdrawn or quit voluntarily.”82 
It is important to ask how this history should inform a study of white working 
class representation.  The most straightforward answer, in my view, is that an extreme 
constructivist position—in which what is said about white workers in elite discourse is 
only a product of elite invention—is unworkable.  It is irresponsible to take an agnostic 
posture on whether, for instance, the backlash reported in the 1960s “really” existed, or to 
argue that its interpreters invented it.  (An example of an irresponsible formulation is 
Barbara Ehrenreich’s claim that “the working class as discovered” in the 1960s—“dumb, 
reactionary, and bigoted”—was “the imaginative product of middle-class anxiety and 
prejudice.”83)  But foregrounding representation does not require this steep a claim.  As 
Barbie Zelizer writes, “Recognizing that there is a reality out there and that, in certain 
quarters, truth and facts have currency does not mean letting go of relativity, subjectivity, 
and construction. It merely suggests yoking a regard for them with some cognizance of 
the outside world.”84  This is the approach I seek to follow here.  Asking why a cross-
class backlash against 1960s dissent was understood in elite discourse as a white working 
class phenomenon, for instance, does not require a claim of racial innocence for white 
workers. 
                                                           
82 Contemporary observer quoted in David Lewis-Colman, Race Against Liberalism: Black Workers and 
the UAW in Detroit (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2008), 14ff. 
83 Barbara Ehrenreich, Fear of Falling: The Inner Life of the Middle Class (New York: Pantheon Books, 
1989), 101. 
84 Barbie Zelizer, “When Facts, Truth, and Reality are God‐terms: On Journalism’s Uneasy Place in 
Cultural Studies,” Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies 1, no. 1 (2004): 114. 
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The analysis in this project is framed around the claims prevalent in elite public 
discourse.  I ask questions that focus less on what is than on what is seen, how it is seen 
and why, how this changes over time, and why that matters.  What lenses did 
contemporaries use to understand politics, and how did those lenses influence what they 
saw and wrote?  Why were certain people or behaviors taken as representative of the 
white working class in one period and not another? These kinds of questions allow for a 
focus on representation and construction that retains a “cognizance of the outside world” 
and will not be entirely foreign to scholars with different methodological approaches and 
different source bases.  In this framework, journalism and elite discourse on the white 
working class cannot be dismissed as invented or pure ideology, but neither can it be 
taken at face value as an unproblematic depiction of reality. 
It is important to be clear that this is not a social history project.  My original 
research does not support any new claims about the political views of white working 
class people.  Though I refer to existing literature on that subject at certain junctures 
where I feel it would be irresponsible not to (as in the paragraph above), I have not 
comprehensively undertaken to compare a “real” white working class to the one 
envisioned by elites or to “fact check” claims made by the analysts I spotlight.  An effort 
to do so would raise problematic methodological questions in its own right.  To some 
degree, it is useful for perspectives that see social groups as necessarily constructed and 
perspectives that aim to describe the concrete behaviors, attitudes, and opinions of real 
people to sit alongside each other in a productive tension, as complements.  
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The challenges posed by terminology 
Over the period this study covers (the 1930s to the 1990s), observers used 
multiple labels and categories to describe blue-collar whites.  The meaning of “white” 
was not static in this period; the most important change was the incorporation of 
Americans of southern and eastern European descent (Italians, Poles, Greeks, Slavs, etc.) 
into a homogenous whiteness, a single category “white.”  Existing scholarship dates the 
culmination of that change in the 1940s, particularly the years around World War II.  
“White working class” has only been the term most commonly used by elites to refer to 
blue-collar or lower-income whites since the early 2000s, when it was widely adopted by 
journalists and pollsters.  It only began to appear consistently in the 1960s. The chapters 
that follow feature elites speaking about “workers,” “the workingman,” “the worker,” 
“the white worker,” “labor,” the “working class,” “working Americans,” the “middle 
class,” “Middle Americans,” the “majority,” and more. 
This presents a clear challenge for clear writing and conceptualization, and there 
is no ideal solution to that challenge.  Deemphasizing the differences between terms 
certainly risks oversimplification. However, overemphasizing those distinctions risks 
obscuring the relatively small and identifiable range of claims made about white workers 
in the discourse.  Problems of terminology are primarily addressed in a manner specific 
to each chapter and outlined in the introductory sections of the chapters.  As a general 
principle, however, this work posits (based on empirical research) that the differences 
between terms are modest enough to permit treating them as part of one narrative, the 
“representation of the white working class.” 
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The task of this project is to historicize a sense of groupness broader and more 
durable than a single term.85 A good way to get a sense of this durable sense of groupness 
is to look at the discourse itself.  When elite commentators refer to labels used in the past 
or to newly emergent labels, they typically treat them as different names for a familiar 
group of voters: “The angriest and most pessimistic people in America are the people we 
used to call Middle Americans” (2016)…“Think the ‘white working class’ sounds a lot 
like the ‘Reagan Democrats’? Exactly” (2002).86  Commentators also use seemingly 
distinct terms interchangeably to refer to the same group.  In one infamous piece from the 
2016 election cycle, National Review contributor Kevin Williamson jumps from “white 
working class” to “white middle class” to “poor white America” to “white American 
underclass” within four paragraphs as he decries “dysfunctional, downscale 
communities…[that] deserve to die.”87  In this usage, there is no meaningful difference 
between “poor” whites, the “white working class” and the “white middle class”; they are 
different labels pinned to the same set of tropes. 
 As a result, it is most important to differentiate between representations of 
different “kinds” of white workers, or different complexes of images—Northern 
urban/suburban industrial workers, rural Southerners, southern and eastern Europeans, 
Anglo-Saxon Protestants.88  This project focuses most on industrial workers, the source 
                                                           
85 For “groupness” see Rogers Brubaker, “Ethnicity Without Groups,” Archives Européennes de Sociologie 
43, no. 2 (2002): 163-189. 
86 David Frum, “The Great Republican Revolt,” The Atlantic, January/February 2016; William Schneider, 
“Say Hello to NASCAR Dads,” National Journal, July 13, 2002. 
87 Kevin Williamson, “The Father-Führer,” National Review, March 28, 2016. 
88 Compare, for instance, “blue-collar Catholics, the backbone of auto factories, construction crews, and 
police departments...who wrested citizenship from a nativist nation, rose from privation into the middle 
class, and swung the pendulum of ideology from left to right” to white working class Southerners whose 
“cultural markers” include “low Protestant churches and Dale Earnhardt Sr.…Scotch-Irishness and 
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of much of the iconic imagery around the white working class—union militancy, high-
wage manufacturing jobs, the middle-income family headed by a single breadwinner, the 
conservative “hard hat”—but is careful not to entirely neglect a broader picture of elite 
representations of laboring whites. 
 
3. Defining Elite Public Discourse 
Elite public discourse can be defined as a mediated space of representation 
distinguished both by who speaks and who is assumed to be listening—crudely put, a 
space where elites talk to other elites.  Most speakers within elite public discourse hold 
positions of influence (politicians, government officials, businesspeople) and/or speak as 
educated professionals with claims to expertise (journalists, pollsters, political 
commentators, academics).89  Speakers who make claims within elite public discourse 
often have the intention of, and have at least a chance of, shaping public policy or 
shaping debate within influential circles. They can at least expect to narrate or explain 
current events for an elite audience. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Jacksonian populism.” Samuel Freedman, The Inheritance: How Three Families and America Moved from 
Roosevelt to Reagan and Beyond (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 22; Jeffrey Bloodworth, Losing 
the Center: The Decline of American Liberalism, 1968-1992 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 
2013), 59. 
89 Empirical studies of mediated deliberation and media as a public sphere suggest that politicians, 
journalists, pundits, affiliates of political organizations, academics, and comparable professionals comprise 
the majority of speakers in public debate via the news media.  Benjamin Page, Who Deliberates?: Mass 
Media in Modern Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); Ronald Jacobs and Eleanor 
Townsley, The Space of Opinion: Media Intellectuals and the Public Sphere (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011); W. Lance Bennett et al., “Managing the Public Sphere: Journalistic Construction of the Great 
Globalization Debate,” Journal of Communication 54, no. 3 (2004): 437-455; Rousiley Maia, Deliberation, 
the Media and Political Talk (New York: Hampton Press, 2012); Myra Ferree et al., Shaping Abortion 
Discourse: Democracy and the Public Sphere in Germany and the United States (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002); Matthew Hindman, The Myth of Digital Democracy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2008). 
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Elite public discourse, importantly, is also publicly available to a non-elite 
audience.  Conversations behind closed doors or eyes-only memos are excluded—unless 
they leak to the press.  The majority of listeners may not belong to influential publics, but 
speakers assume they are in conversation with an attentive public whose members share 
their interpretative frames. Specific logics for talking about and understanding politics—
for instance, breaking voters down into the categories (including “white working class”) 
used by journalists and pollsters; understanding politics as a battle between competing 
ideologies—prevail within elite public discourse.  Those logics can be learned and 
mastered by consistent followers of the discourse, whether they can be termed “elites” or 
not.  Nonetheless, most speakers assume that the attentive relevant public is 
predominantly professional and college-educated.90 
I use the term “discourse” rather than “public sphere” to encompass the content 
within the space as well as the space itself, but this is not an attempt to create a radically 
new concept.  Elite public discourse can be understood as a subcategory of the broader 
public sphere (in Nancy Fraser’s definition, “a theater in modern societies in which 
political participation is enacted through the medium of talk…an institutionalized arena 
                                                           
90 Again, to be clear, this does not mean that speakers’ assumptions about their audiences are necessarily 
accurate—I’m instead making an argument about the kind of address that prevails in these spaces.  In the 
case of representations of working class groups, for instance, the address tends to assume that readers are 
not working class and do not have personal knowledge of the subject matter.  “For a lot of members of the 
WWC, [welfare] is personal in a way it just isn’t for the kind of people who read this blog,” one liberal 
commentator presumes.  A slightly more subtle trope in the discourse is the use of “we” to refer to a circle 
smaller than the broader public, where “we” are the people who pay attention to current events (“precisely 
the moment when we most need to deepen our understanding of America’s white poor”), most likely 
concerned professionals.  Kevin Drum, “Can We Talk? Here’s Why the White Working Class Hates 
Democrats,” Mother Jones, November 13, 2014; Richard Reeves, “If You Read Hillbilly Elegy, You 
Should Read This Paper Too,” Brookings, March 7, 2017. My understanding of “address” draws from 
Michael Warner, Publics and Counterpublics (New York: Zone Books, 2002).  
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of discursive interaction”91).  Analogous concepts include the “dominant public sphere” 
and what Ronald Jacobs and Eleanor Townsley call the “elite political public sphere”: 
“the public communicative infrastructure in which the elites of our huge, complex 
societies debate serious matters of common concern.”92 
The news media—particularly media institutions with the greatest claim to 
national-level stature—are the centerpiece of my understanding of “elite public 
discourse.”  (How the concept was operationalized in the research is discussed in the 
methods section).  News is the chief medium through which elite and non-elite observers 
follow and debate the daily developments of politics.  News media also hold a “specific 
role in circulating to a wider audience the knowledges of other, more specialized fields”: 
they aggregate a wide range of expert discourses, frame them in accessible terms, and 
distribute them widely.93  As a result, news media serve as the nexus for the other kinds 
of texts central to elite public discourse as defined here, including nonfiction books, 
pollsters’ reports, academic works, and public speeches by politicians.  Journalists have 
reported consistently on polls and political speeches; book reviews point readers in the 
direction of more in-depth material; pollsters have been consistently featured as political 
experts. 
The kind of discourse that prevails in these spaces is not monolithic, but it follows 
predictable patterns.  First, it is often superficial, as Ari Adut notes: this is a world that 
                                                           
91 Nancy Fraser, “Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing 
Democracy,” in Habermas and the Public Sphere, ed. Craig Calhoun (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992): 110. 
See also e.g. Jeffrey Alexander, The Civil Sphere (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
92 Ronald Jacobs and Eleanor Townsley, The Space of Opinion: Media Intellectuals and the Public Sphere 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 13. 
93 Nick Couldry, “Media Meta-Capital: Extending the Range of Bourdieu’s Field Theory,” Theory and 
Society 32, no. 6-7 (2003): 657. 
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“reduces singular beings to appearances and types.”  In the private sphere, we “relate to 
intimates in singular terms: they are not fungible, and it is cognitively and morally hard to 
reduce them to a type.”  By contrast, “people who appear in the public sphere instantiate 
types or represent groups for spectators—this synecdochic tendency being the stronger, 
the more social distance there is between those who appear and those who watch.”94 
Second, it is ordinary.  Elite public discourse exercises influence in an everyday 
and unexceptional fashion.  The concept is intended to get at the importance of the 
quotidian flow of the discourse, not only the most influential texts.  That ordinariness is 
aptly captured in James Carey’s description of the role of communication in “the 
construction and maintenance of an ordered, meaningful cultural world that can serve as a 
control and container for human action.”  Reading a daily newspaper, in this “ritual” 
view, is a situation not unlike attending a mass, in which “nothing new is learned but in 
which a particular view of the world is portrayed and confirmed…What is arrayed before 
the reader is not pure information but a portrayal of the contending forces in the world.”95  
Elite public discourse’s attentive publics encounter a familiar world filled with familiar 
actors who operate under a predictable set of rules.  When those rules do not seem to 
explain what is happening, a palpable sense of concern about where the conventional 
wisdom went wrong and how it can be fixed is visible in the discourse. 
Third, and perhaps most obviously, elite public discourse is skewed towards elite 
perspectives.  It displays identifiable biases and blind spots as a result.  As Michael 
Warner notes, dominant discourses (in contrast to counterpublics) often take on a 
                                                           
94 Ari Adut, “A Theory of the Public Sphere,” Sociological Theory 30, no. 4 (2012): 244.  
95 James Carey, “A Cultural Approach to Communication,” in Communication as Culture (New York: 
Routledge, 2009), 15-16. 
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universalizing tenor, not because speakers’ subject positions do not inform the discourse, 
but because speakers often do not recognize the particularity of their way of 
understanding the world. 
Most of the actors who are highlighted in this dissertation are professional-middle 
to upper class white men.  Over much of the period, they inhabited a realm where they 
were primarily in conversation with others like themselves and saw this state of affairs as 
natural.  In the primary source material, men unabashedly refer to the gendered division 
of labor implicated in intellectual work.  Scores of acknowledgements sections feature 
authors thanking their wives for typing the manuscript or managing childcare while they 
wrote.  A Newsweek reporter thanks “three pretty and talented Newsweek researchers” for 
their contributions to what wound up under his byline.  As the political circumstances 
changed and women and people of color had greater access to elite discursive spaces, 
they faced tokenism and were often positioned as representatives of a broader group, not 
as individuals.  Observers still often speak about “journalism” as an entity entirely shaped 
by urban, professional-class whites.  To capture the power dynamics that shaped access 
to elite discursive spaces, what is included under the umbrella of “elite public discourse” 
depends on where it appears—intellectual engagement with the white working class in 
alternative media oriented to African American, radical-left, or other counterpublics is 
generally left out of “elite public discourse” as defined here, but the same authors and 
arguments are included when their work appears in dominant discursive spaces. 
Studying elite public discourse raises a fundamental tension from a critical media 
studies perspective.  Fundamentally, exclusion makes elite public discourse what it is; it 
52 
 
deeply shapes the conversations that take place there.  However, the process of excluding 
inherent in researching an exclusive space can very easily reinscribe a narrow view of the 
intellectual milieu of a period.  Put differently, a focus on elite discourse skews a project 
in a way that mirrors the exclusions in the discourse itself.  Presenting a history of 
discourse within dominant publics yields an incomplete picture and is much more likely 
to exclude texts by authors who are members of marginalized groups.  It is important to 
mark it for what it is—particular. 
 
4. Methods: Operationalizing “Elite Public Discourse” 
This project follows conventional methodological approaches in the study of 
communication & culture and cultural history—gathering and conducting close analysis 
of relevant texts and constructing a historical narrative based on primary and secondary 
source material.  “The great question of communications history, I think, revolves around 
how people make sense out of things,” John Nerone argues. “This entails reconstructing 
mentalities that no longer exist, assumptions that are no longer commonly held.” “It is the 
job of media historians to identify what the common sense was in past media 
environments, what the dominant sensibilities were, and which coexisting discourses 
challenged that common sense,” Susan Douglas writes.96  This objective—reconstructing 
the discursive environments of the past—guided the research for this project. For each 
                                                           
96 John Nerone, Violence Against the Press: Policing the Public Sphere in U.S. History (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1994), 13; Susan Douglas, “Does Textual Analysis Tell Us Anything About Past 
Audiences?” in Explorations in Communication and History, ed. Barbie Zelizer (London: Routledge, 
2008), 69.  On approaches to media history, see e.g. Michael Schudson, “Toward a Troubleshooting 
Manual for Journalism History,” Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly 74 (1997): 463-476; 
Zelizer, Explorations in Communication and History; Peter Simonson, Janice Peck, Robert Craig, and John 
P. Jackson, Jr., eds., The Handbook of Communication History (New York: Routledge, 2013). 
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period, the goal was to gain mastery of the patterns in elite public discourse—what 
different camps were identifiable, and what views or objectives distinguished them; 
where there was debate and where there was consensus; what language authors used in 
reference to working class whites and other groups.  To do so, I employed an inductive 
approach founded on “prolonged, unstructured soaking”97 in the material. 
The central methodological challenge centers on the selection of texts—how to 
define “elite public discourse” for the purposes of research.  The texts examined 
primarily fall into the following categories—news stories, nonfiction books for a 
nonacademic audience, academic work, pollsters’ reports, and public speeches given by 
politicians.  This is an admittedly narrow understanding of political discourse, one that 
excludes popular culture or entertainment media. This project will not investigate 
representations of the white working class in film, television, or literature to keep the 
scope of the project manageable and because nonfiction material’s claim to present 
factual representations makes it more important for the purposes of the arguments here.  
The emphasis is on print media for reasons of access and because print news media were 
a primary prestige news source throughout the period. 
The first stage in the research was to identify a set of publications and conduct 
intensive reading within them.  The research foregrounded the following daily 
newspapers, journals of opinion, and business magazines: New York Times, Washington 
Post, Los Angeles Times, Wall Street Journal, Time, Newsweek, the Nation, the New 
Republic, Chicago Tribune (Chapters 1 and 2), the Saturday Evening Post (Chapters 1 
and 2), Survey Graphic (Chapter 1), Fortune (Chapter 2), Business Week (Chapter 2), 
                                                           
97 Richard Fenno, Home Style: House Members in Their Districts (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978), 250. 
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National Review (Chapters 3 and 4), and Commentary (Chapters 3 and 4).  After this 
initial set of publications was selected, articles were obtained through keyword searches 
(an effective tool for tracking contestation around specific language) and/or by reading 
through each issue published over a particular time period. 
These media were selected to ensure representation of multiple elite political 
perspectives in each period.  Much of the dissertation overlaps with what Daniel Hallin 
calls the “high modern” period for American journalism, in which national media were 
heavily centralized and professional journalism was at its strongest.98  In this period 
(roughly between the end of World War II and 1980), it is relatively easy to identify the 
specific media that best fit “elite public discourse.”  Contemporary scholars pointed to a 
small subset of media called “quality media” or “the prestige press”; as described by 
political scientist V. O. Key in a 1961 study, such media “command the attention of a 
highly politicized and very influential audience…These people talk to each other through 
these papers; thus they provide, in a sense, an arena for the continuing discussion of 
politics among those principally concerned.”  In the US context, media cited as typical 
“prestige papers” included the New York Times, Washington Post, and Wall Street 
Journal—“eastern metropolitan newspapers of higher quality and better coverage”—
alongside newsmagazines Time and Newsweek.99 Publications like the National Review, 
                                                           
98 Daniel Hallin, “The Passing of the ‘High Modernism’ of American Journalism,” Journal of 
Communication 42, no. 3 (1992): 14-25. 
99 V.O. Key, Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), 405; “eastern 
metropolitan…” in Bernard Cohen, The Press and Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
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New Republic, and Nation shed a great deal of light on conservative and liberal elite 
opinion. 
The centralized, professionalized media environment of the mid-twentieth century 
is historically atypical, and it is important to avoid naturalizing it.100  The most recent 
period (1990s/2000s-present) obviously presents a much more siloed, fragmented, and 
dispersed elite discursive space.  Because the project’s major narrative ends in the early 
1990s, the changes in elite public discourse since that time have not been 
foregrounded.101 A more complex elite discursive landscape is also present in the earliest 
period the project covers (1930s to mid-1940s).  The newspaper industry was less 
concentrated, and elite political media were more siloed by ideology—most of the top 
daily newspapers had a conservative bias and were viewed with distrust by liberals, who 
turned to their own media seeking reliable information.  This issue is addressed in more 
depth in the introduction to Chapter 1. 
To identify relevant books and other primary source material, the overall research 
strategy sought to take advantage of a snowball effect—adding books to the sample if 
they were reviewed in magazines and newspapers; reconstructing conversations among 
writers and scholars by following citations and quotes in books or news stories.  If one 
book seemed to be in conversation with another, I consulted the other book.  If secondary 
literature pointed to the importance of a particular primary source, I consulted the source 
directly.  I also mined databases (e.g. JSTOR and Google Scholar) for relevant books, as 
                                                           
100 A useful concept here is the “media regime,” a “historically specific, relatively stable set of institutions, 
norms, processes, and actors that shape the expectations and practices of media producers and consumers.”  
Bruce Williams and Michael Delli Carpini, After Broadcast News: Media Regimes, Democracy, and the 
New Information Environment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 16. 
101 Anecdotally, despite a considerable increase in the visibility of non-elite voices in elite discursive 
spaces, the dominant view of the white working class has not meaningfully changed. 
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well as the footnotes of primary and secondary sources.  Archival research focused on 
notable and representative journalists, political commentators, and union officials also 
made up an important part of the research process. A full list of archival collections 
consulted is available in the bibliography.  This research expanded the project’s core 
source base of books, news articles, press releases, public speeches, and other publicly 
available texts.  Personal papers, particularly correspondence, also give a sense of aspects 
of intellectual work (personal relationships, unguarded or “backstage” speech) that 
cannot be easily ascertained by looking at public discourse. 
 
III. Road Map 
This project’s main narrative is developed over the course of four chapters.  The 
timeframe—the 1930s to the 1990s—was chosen to encompass three critical transition 
points in the history of white working class representation over the last century. First, in 
the 1930s, ascendant liberal forces employed the (white) worker as a central symbol of 
the need for reform and the mass constituency that would bring it about.  In the 1950s, 
the middle-income white worker (against the backdrop of the Cold War) became 
predominantly symbolic of the broadly distributed prosperity produced by the American 
system.  Amid resistance to the civil rights movement and challenges to traditional 
cultural norms in the mid- to late 1960s, the white working class became the predominant 
symbol of cultural traditionalism and anti-black backlash.  The four chapters look 
specifically at these periods of transition and their significance. 
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The first chapter, “The Rise of the Progressive Worker,” covers the 1930s through 
the mid-1940s and examines how the strong link between (white) workers and 
progressive politics developed in that period.  The predominant question in elite public 
discourse, especially during the Depression years, asked how a just and proper economic 
system could be built in a modern, industrial society.  Very broadly, liberals and leftists 
who emphasized the need for an expanded role for the state confronted conservatives 
who saw an expansion of state power as a threat to liberty and justice.  Representations of 
(white) workers were closely implicated in that conflict. Industrial workers, for liberals 
and leftists, stood in for the future—a future in which the majority of Americans lived in 
urban areas, worked for wages, and had little agency over their own lives.  To place 
industrial workers at the symbolic center of society was to call for Americans to abandon 
the individualistic principles long central to national identity and recognize the 
importance of cooperation and collectivism.  Liberals also pointed to images of poor and 
suffering whites—especially native-born rural whites, who made for effective victims—
to suggest the failures of the existing system.  Meanwhile, conservatives sought to cast 
deserving, self-sufficient workers as harmed by an expanding welfare state and cast 
liberal constituencies as selfish or unfit.  The dominant elite understanding, in a period 
marked by the Depression, the rise of the New Deal Democratic Party, and the onward 
march of the industrial union movement, defined (white) workers and other nondominant 
groups against economic elites. 
Chapter 2, “The Rise of the Affluent Worker,” covers the late 1940s through 
1950s, when the dominant elite view figured (white) workers as part of a new and vastly 
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expanded middle class.  The broadly shared prosperity of the post-World War II economy 
was a central theme in elite public discourse, and the tone was usually triumphalist—
Americans had solved the industrial problems they had fought over for decades, 
enfranchising workers and expanding the role of the state while preserving the free 
enterprise system.  The secure, satisfied (white, male) worker was central to this 
narrative—underprivileged during the 1930s, he and his family now enjoyed leisure, 
homeownership, and a good standard of living.  The dominance of this view of the 
(white) worker was due above all to the imprint of the Cold War on domestic politics.  
The Second Red Scare exerted an enormous chilling effect on left-of-center opinion; 
anything that could be interpreted as a critique of American capitalism was dangerous, 
and the suggestion that (white) workers remained disadvantaged fell out of mainstream 
liberal discourse.  In this climate, the affluent worker was a critical symbol for business 
elites emphasizing their social responsibility and labor-liberals stressing their support for 
the American system. 
The emphasis on (white) workers’ integration into a prosperous mass middle class 
fundamentally altered the dimensions of political contestation around the white working 
class.  In multiple ways, Chapter 2 stresses, the affluent worker was a key waypoint in the 
migration of the (white) worker—as a political symbol—from left to right.  Even as these 
workers’ upward mobility served as evidence of labor’s success, their newly middle class 
status placed labor and liberals’ claims to represent them in question.  When they had 
something to protect, (white) workers could no longer be an unproblematic symbol of 
progressive change—they could instead suggest the benefits of the status quo, or even 
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hardheaded resistance to change.  In this period, influential pollsters and liberal observers 
identified white workers as complacent or conservative, and an image of the (white) 
working class as rigid, authoritarian, and prone to high levels of prejudice and violence 
took shape among social scientists, laying the groundwork for the emergence of the white 
worker as the central symbol of backlash in the 1960s. 
Chapter 3, “Rethinking Middle America,” examines the rise of the white worker 
as the central symbol of white backlash.  It does so through a case study of the 
construction of “Middle America” in the late 1960s and early 1970s.  Middle America is 
generally understood as a political identity created by conservatives (especially Richard 
Nixon) to appeal to discontented white voters.  Chapter 3 focuses instead on 
(predominantly white and professional-class) liberals and journalists who sought to 
understand and respond to the backlash.  Informed by preexisting understandings of 
working class culture as rigid and traditionalist and by arguments rooting racism in low 
education & economic deprivation, contemporary liberals assumed that the backlash 
would be concentrated among working class whites and conducted their research and 
analysis accordingly.  Some, following on the conventional wisdom of the post-World 
War II period, argued that blue-collar whites were secure economically, and their reaction 
stemmed from a desire to protect their gains.  Others countered that white workers faced 
significant economic disadvantage and legitimately felt forgotten by liberals who showed 
them condescension.  Elites of all stripes, for different reasons, coalesced around the view 
that white workers were uniquely driven by cultural and racial anxiety and might form an 
explosive right-wing constituency.  Fundamentally, Chapter 3 argues, in order to 
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understand the rise of the persistent frame pitting a conservative white majority against a 
liberal white elite, it is necessary to understand why that conventional wisdom made 
sense to left-of-center actors. 
Central to my understanding of white working class representation after the 1960s 
is the concept of an “elite consensus.”  One of the primary reasons why white workers 
have become so strongly symbolic of anti-black and culturally conservative views, this 
concept suggests, is because it made intellectual and/or strategic sense for opposing elites 
to position them that way. (To be clear, this is not to dispute the prominence of those 
views among white workers; the goal is to show why views pervasive among 
professionals, workers, elites of all sorts, and within society generally were so often 
debated through the figure of the white worker). While Chapter 3 asks why this 
positioning made sense to liberals, Chapter 4, “The New Liberalism and the Victimized 
White Worker,” focuses on its utility for critics of liberalism.  It looks at the role of the 
white working class as a symbol of opposition to liberal politics after the mid-1960s 
(what the chapter calls, for the sake of clarity, the “new liberalism”).  In the 1970s, 
1980s, and 1990s, conservatives and alienated Democrats often argued that changes 
within liberalism had produced a new liberal politics dominated by white elites and 
African Americans and unconcerned with the physical safety, economic wellbeing, or 
cultural values of middle-income whites.  Speaking on behalf of the white worker helped 
to invest arguments against liberal policy on welfare, integration, gender politics, or 
crime with a sense of disempowerment rather than privilege.  Ultimately, Chapters 3 and 
4 imply, the consensus elite-level understanding of the white working class was a clear 
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boon for conservatives and other critics of liberalism, who now held a strong claim to 
speak in elite public discourse for white workers. 
The dissertation concludes with a summary of the project’s major interventions 
and a brief discussion contextualizing white working class representation in the age of 
Trump within the narrative developed here.  The rise of Trump has brought the white 
working class back to the center of elite public discourse—where white workers have 
been for most of the past eighty years.  A historical lens is crucial for a comprehensive 
understanding of how the symbolic construction of the white working class functions in 
present-day American politics. 
 
 
 
 
 
62 
 
Chapter 1: The Rise of the Progressive Worker 
 
“American labor is being reorganized on a scale and with a speed which is 
unprecedented in American social history,” economist Robert R. R. Brooks wrote in 
1938.  For “half a century,” Brooks explained, mass production and finance capitalism, in 
the hands of the “great leaders of industry,” had been “the major sources of social 
power…Millions of workers, traders and professionals have found their fundamental 
loyalties directed toward management and finance.”  Recent developments, however, had 
“sapped the foundations of the old loyalties” and prompted “the reorientation of workers’ 
attitudes and beliefs.” Put simply, “the leadership of industrialists and financiers is being 
discarded…for the leadership of union officers and organizers.”102 
The period Brooks chronicled has long provided the most indelible imagery of a 
progressive white working class.  “I remember 1937 and ’38 so well, how much hope I 
had,” recalled a socialist organizer in the early 1960s.  “The auto strike seemed to make 
people see the light; when I went into a community I didn’t have to explain there was a 
class struggle. No doctrine. The struggle was in the men.”103 A longstanding 
commonplace holds that the Democratic Party and the union movement earned the 
overwhelming loyalty of white workers.  One recent article describes the New Deal 
Democrats as “the undisputed party of the white working class. Their dominance among 
these voters was, in turn, the key to their political success.”104  The Depression and New 
Deal era also tend to be remembered as a period in which white workers were seen as an 
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invaluable resource for left/liberal politics. “In the 1930s and 1940s progressives 
romanticized the working class, largely to the exclusion of women and racial minorities,” 
one liberal argues.105  1930s politics, a recent commentator argues, was marked by 
“idealized portrayals of noble blue-collar workers.”106  Liberals were once in harmony 
with the (white) working class, many have assumed—for good (liberals commanded a 
powerful majority) or otherwise (a focus on white working class men contributed to 
racial and gender inequality). 
This chapter examines the strong link between white workers and left/liberal 
politics as it developed in elite public discourse in the 1930s and 1940s.  The emergence 
of that link is among the most critical developments in a history of white working class 
representation in the twentieth- and twenty-first-century US: it is not an exaggeration to 
say that nearly all elite engagement with the white working class since has taken place, 
implicitly or explicitly, against that backdrop.  Most of all, the robust link between white 
workers and progressive politics in the period owes to the rise of powerful political forces 
that spoke for workers in a new way: the New Deal Democratic Party and the industrial 
union movement.  More broadly, the chapter argues, the importance of the (white) worker 
as a progressive political symbol must be understood in the context of elite debate on 
how to respond to the changes brought by the industrial age—incredible wealth and 
power for industrial elites and insecurity and Depression for the bulk of the population.  
For left/liberal elites of the 1930s and 1940s, this was the singular challenge of the day.  
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Liberals and leftists raised to dominant status the view that modernity required—and the 
electoral majority demanded—an activist state and the protection of unions.  The 
individualistic ethic long central to American identity, in this framework, could not 
secure justice in the modern world.  (White) workers, especially urban industrial workers, 
were representative of both the needs of a modern workforce and the aroused public that 
would bring about reform. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows: Part One details how (white) workers 
were incorporated into understandings of the political majority in the years just prior to 
the Depression and New Deal.  In the 1920s and early 1930s, dominant understandings of 
the American worker were advantageous to a libertarian or classical liberal politics.  
Common arguments held that most valued prosperity and the ability to consume almost 
above all else; deserving workers’ political views would not differ significantly from 
those of their employers; and the majority of Americans were middle class in lifestyle 
and mindset.  Parts Two and Three detail how liberals and leftists figured (white) 
workers, especially urban industrial working men, as beneficiaries of and forces for 
progressive reform.  Urban workers epitomized the liberal argument about the changing 
circumstances of American life, in which the majority now worked for wages, lacked 
economic security, and faced the arbitrary power of industrial elites.  These workers were 
important in elite understandings of the liberal electoral majority and central to the 
imagery of working class agency emerging from the industrial union movement. Gains 
for labor and liberals in the 1930s and 1940s brought about major changes in the 
dominant view of the majority, with the new dominant understanding advantageous to a 
65 
 
liberal politics.  From this perspective, the average American was a citizen of an 
industrial society without significant wealth or power; the interests of most Americans 
were opposed to the interests of a small group of industrial elites; and inequality could 
best be redressed via the collective power of the state. 
It is important to be clear, though, that the central significance of (white) workers 
for 1930s and 1940s left/liberal politics should not be equated with a “romanticized” 
view.  The extent to which liberals romanticized the (white, male) working class is 
overstated in academic literature and popular memory.  Deep concerns about the 
unsophisticated political views of (white) workers, their susceptibility to right-wing 
politics, and their reliability as a progressive constituency hide in plain sight in 1930s and 
1940s left/liberal discourse.  A coda section following Chapter 1 develops this argument.  
Fundamentally, that section suggests, what held together the commitment to the (white) 
worker’s cause among liberals and leftists was not the belief that workers were virtuous 
or intelligent, but the belief that they were disadvantaged, that their objective interests 
(even if sometimes unrealized) were progressive, and that they had legitimate claims to 
make on employers and the state. 
Terminology and source selection 
“Worker” was the term most commonly used in contemporary discourse to refer 
to white male wage workers, especially industrial workers.  “Wage earner” was 
interchangeable.  Unless modified (“the Negro worker”), “worker” usually referred to a 
white man.  “Working people” referred to white men and women.  White working class 
women were often incorporated into the discourse through their relationship to men (“the 
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worker and his wife”).  It is important to counteract the still-prominent tendency to use 
“worker” and “working class” to refer only to whites, particularly white men.  However, 
an argument framed around the “white worker” as a progressive symbol can easily be 
problematic—the progressive part comes from “worker,” not “white.”  Whiteness is also 
not what was most significant about white workers for contemporary elites—their status 
as workers was (and nationality second; see the following paragraph).  To mediate 
between these concerns, I primarily use “worker” and “(white) worker” interchangeably 
to capture the arguments contemporaries made.  Parentheses are used to capture 
distinctions that are important for present-day academic analysis but did not appear in 
contemporary discourse.  I also incorporate the phrasing “laboring whites” and “poor 
whites” to include farmers and other disadvantaged groups who did not work for wages.  
All of these categories are used to capture contemporary elite discourse.  In the cases 
where I am referring specifically to rank and file workers (for instance, strikers) as 
historical agents, I use “worker-actors.” 
At the outset of this period, workers of European descent were not necessarily 
viewed as racially or culturally similar enough to constitute a single bloc.  According to a 
powerful racialist discourse that reached its apex in the 1910s and 1920s, southern and 
eastern Europeans (for instance, Poles, Slavs, Italians, Greeks, often called “new 
immigrants” because they came to the United States in large numbers later) were inferior 
to northern Europeans (e.g. Anglo-Saxons, “Nordics”).  Even within those categories, 
individual racial/nationality groups were understood as having unique and distinct 
characteristics that (for instance) suited them for different types of work. In this 
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discourse, there were multiple European races, and an individual could be white and 
simultaneously inferior to other whites.  This brand of race theory was on the decline by 
the 1930s and was almost universally rejected by elites by the 1940s.  The idea that 
European-descended industrial workers could be understood as a single group—and 
could act politically as a group—became more or less axiomatic.  A comprehensive 
understanding of white working class representation in this period must take these 
distinctions into account, however.107  To do so, I use “new immigrants” and “southern 
and eastern European” synonymously.  “Old stock” or “native-born” referred to whites of 
northern European (especially Anglo-Saxon) descent whose ancestors had been in the 
United States for generations. 
Contemporaries also spoke frequently about the “middle class” in relation to 
“workers.”  As in the rest of the dissertation, I do not use “middle class” to describe an 
actually existing social group.  When contemporaries argued that most Americans were 
“middle class,” that generally meant that they enjoyed middle-income status, did not 
identify as part of a fixed working class, and held to a moderate political ideology 
supportive of the capitalist system.  Workers could be “middle class,” and for many 
observers they were.  To refer to people at a middling income level, I use “middle-
income”; to describe middle to upper-income educated elites, I use “professionals” or 
“professional class.” 
In this chapter (as compared with the later chapters), it is more difficult to identify 
a small group of media that meet the definition of “elite public discourse.”  There is less 
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of a sense in this period of ostensibly objective elite media as a consensus meeting point 
for alternative perspectives.  Most of the top daily newspapers had a conservative bias, 
which ranged from restrained (the New York Times) to strident (Chicago Tribune, Los 
Angeles Times).  To compensate, the analysis in this chapter draws more on liberal 
alternative media (particularly the Nation and the New Republic) than the analysis in the 
other chapters.  While their readerships were much smaller than the top dailies’ 
readerships, these media serve aptly as indexes of left-of-center elite opinion.  The 
greater focus on periodicals and books on the socialist left in this chapter reflects the 
atypically large mainstream influence of the left during the period. 
 
I: The (white, male) worker as a symbol of the strength of the existing system 
The dominant view in the years just prior to the New Deal understood American 
society as business-centered and individualistic.  Most Americans, in this view, identified 
as middle class, and consumer capitalism had created a broadly distributed prosperity that 
respectable American workers valued and wanted to share.  The predominant perspective 
from organized labor echoed this view, as did disappointed liberal intellectuals skeptical 
of the prospects for an independent working class movement.  Egalitarian consumer 
capitalism was one of the prominent resolutions proposed for what might be called the 
problem of industrial modernity—how to deal with the changes industrial elites, large 
corporations, wage work, and urbanization had brought to a society in which liberty and 
equality were historically linked to independent proprietorship. The problem of industrial 
modernity was one of the predominant themes in elite public discourse over the first half 
69 
 
of the twentieth century, and the importance of the (white) worker as a progressive 
symbol must be understood in that context. 
American exceptionalism and the middle class 
Perhaps the most durable argument about class in the US context is that it does 
not exist. According to a longstanding set of arguments for “American exceptionalism,” 
the United States had no hereditary or fixed class distinctions; it valorized formal 
equality, opportunity for the individual, and self-made elites.108  A key corollary has held 
that nearly all Americans were and understood themselves to be middle class.  In the 
years before the New Deal, elites often argued that the very rich and the disadvantaged 
represented small minorities vastly outnumbered and dominated in political and cultural 
terms by a middle-income majority.  “The outstanding characteristic of American 
civilization is the large size of the middle class,” Princeton historian T. J. Wertenbaker 
put it in 1930.  “This group, in many countries but a small fraction of the population, in 
the United States tends to swallow up all the others.”109  
In economic terms, the emphasis on the middle-class character of the United 
States meant that most Americans enjoyed a good standard of living and that wage 
earners were not held down in a semi-permanent “working class” (as they were, for 
instance, in the UK).  In cultural and political terms, it meant that most Americans held to 
values like individualism, thrift, hard work, and entrepreneurship and did not identify 
themselves as members of a subordinate, fixed class. “In the United States the average 
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man has always played a prominent part in popular thinking, and a substantial portion of 
the masses of the people have come to think of themselves as average persons,” 
particularly as compared with European countries where Marxism had gained a 
substantial toehold, political scientist A. N. Holcombe argued in 1933.  In “thinking of 
themselves as average persons they have made the middle class more comprehensive and 
more important than it would have been otherwise.”110  Membership in the middle class, 
in this framework, was partly a matter of self-identification, but economic circumstances 
made possible and encouraged that middle class self-identification. 
The historical reasoning that supported the view of the US as middle class 
suggested that the lack of a feudal history, the agricultural basis of the early American 
economy, and the availability of new land on the Western frontier had created a nation of 
self-sufficient small producers.111  By the 1930s, these arguments had been offered 
consistently for more than a century.  For much of the history of the United States, liberty 
itself had been firmly linked to independent landownership. In this framework, an 
independent farmer would gain a range of practical skills that equipped him for 
democratic decision-making, and with property came a stake in the welfare of the 
community key to the responsible exercise of democratic rights. Wage work was most 
acceptable on a temporary basis as a means of gaining the capital needed to become an 
                                                           
110 A. N. Holcombe, The New Party Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 1933), 102. 
111 Aziz Rana, The Two Faces of American Freedom (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010); Rogers 
Smith, Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in US History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1999); David Wrobel, The End of American Exceptionalism: Frontier Anxiety from the Old West to the 
New Deal (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993); a classic primary text is Frederick Jackson 
Turner, The Significance of the Frontier in American History (London: Penguin, 2008), originally 
published 1893. 
71 
 
independent entrepreneur.112  This rural ideal retained immense power as popular history 
in the 1930s, with adherents across the political spectrum.  Though it depended on the 
subjugation of African Americans and Native Americans and the appropriation of land, 
its early-twentieth-century champions imagined the settler society of the past as largely 
devoid of inequality, want, or illegitimate power. “The existence of a vast unconquered 
frontier made effective democracy relatively easy, offered limitless opportunity and a 
large measure of economic security to every able-bodied citizen,” one put it.113  In 
frontier mythology, land and hard work were all that were needed for a secure and 
egalitarian society. 
By the 1930s, however, understandings of American identity based around 
independent landownership were firmly tied to the past.  As a guiding force for modern 
life, they had been under deep threat since at least the late nineteenth century.  The 
frontier was thought to prevent class conflict by offering opportunity for men facing a 
lack of prospects in the city.  It was also thought to cultivate American norms among 
immigrants, to serve as a “transmuting force,” political economist Henry George put it, 
“turn[ing] the thriftless, unambitious European peasant into the self-reliant Western 
farmer.”114  The “closing” of the Western frontier (in the 1890s, in many accounts) raised 
concern that the equality it had enabled would erode.  The rise of industrial capitalism 
brought with it an as-yet-unseen concentration of economic power, violent labor conflict, 
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and an expanding urban workforce increasingly composed of immigrants from southern 
and eastern Europe. “The development of capitalistic industry, and of the class of 
industrial wage-earners who could not hope to become their own masters,” political 
scientist A. N. Holcombe wrote, “tended to bring to the front a new kind of labor problem 
such as had not been known in the earlier years of the Republic.”115 While immigrants 
made up the bulk of the unskilled labor force, no demographic, including old-stock 
whites, could expect to view wage work as a temporary condition.  No group of elites 
could escape the need to grapple with what might be called the problem of industrial 
modernity.  Four of the predominant elite-level prescriptions centered on cutting off 
immigration; expanding the role of government to check industrial power; ensuring that 
upward mobility remained possible; and emphasizing mass consumption and upward 
mobility for workers. 
Elite responses to the problem of industrial modernity 
One elite-level response centered on the dangerous character of the new 
immigration.  Elite political and intellectual discourse over the first three decades of the 
twentieth century was saturated with claims about the danger southern and eastern 
Europeans posed to an Anglo-Saxon civilization.  A 1909 book by the influential 
education theorist Ellwood Cubberley captures the broad argument: “These southern and 
eastern Europeans are a very different type from the north European who preceded them” 
in immigrating to the United States.  “Illiterate, docile, lacking in self-reliance and 
initiative and not possessing Anglo-Teutonic conceptions of law, order, and government, 
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their coming has served to dilute tremendously our national stock, and to corrupt our 
civic life.”116 Because these “other races and peoples” were “accustomed to despotism 
and even savagery, and wholly unused to self-government,” economist John Commons 
worried, their ability to exercise independent citizenship was in question.117  Social 
workers, industrialists, and reformers sought to improve new immigrants’ circumstances 
and instill in them middle-class “American” norms; eugenicists and others who viewed 
them as inassimilable or invariably dangerous campaigned for restrictions on 
immigration.  These efforts culminated in the adoption of the Johnson-Reed Immigration 
Act of 1924, in which Congress imposed severe quotas that largely cut off immigration 
from southern and eastern Europe and Asia until the 1960s. 
Another set of responses—by no means incompatible with the previous one—
prescribed a revised understanding of American individualism and an increased role for 
government as a counterweight to corporate power.  “The utterly changed conditions of 
our national life necessitate changes in certain of our laws, of our governmental 
methods,” Theodore Roosevelt argued, such that “the people through their governmental 
agents” could exercise sovereignty and escape the grip of “a few ruthless and 
                                                           
116 Ellwood Cubberley, Changing Conceptions of Education (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1909), 15; in 
David Roediger, Working Toward Whiteness: How America's Immigrants Became White (New York: Basic 
Books, 2006), 19.  On responses to the new immigration see also e.g. Mae Ngai, Impossible Subjects: 
Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 
2004); Nell Irvin Painter, The History of White People (New York: W. W. Norton, 2010); Matthew Frye 
Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1998); Gwendolyn Mink, The Wages of Motherhood (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1995); Graham Richards, ‘Race’, Racism and Psychology (London and New York: Routledge 2012); 
Hiroshi Motomura, Americans in Waiting: The Lost Story of Immigration and Citizenship in the United 
States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Cybelle Fox, Three Worlds of Relief: Race, Immigration, 
and the American Welfare State from the Progressive Era to the New Deal (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2012). 
117 John Commons, Races and Immigrants in America (New York: Macmillan, 1920), 5. 
74 
 
domineering men.”118 In this view, the conditions that had once made it possible for 
individuals acting alone to enjoy equality—the availability of land on the frontier, 
personal relationships between workers and the employers who labored alongside them in 
a small shop—had changed for good.  “A simple and poor society can exist as a 
democracy on a basis of sheer individualism,” Roosevelt put it elsewhere, “but a rich and 
complex industrial society cannot so exist; for some individuals, and especially those 
artificial individuals called corporations, become so very big that the ordinary 
individual…cannot deal with them on terms of equality.” It was thus necessary for “these 
ordinary individuals to combine in their turn,” to act collectively through the government 
and through voluntary associations.119 Roosevelt’s argument here understands the state as 
the tool of the public (“the people through their government agents”) for combatting the 
industrial elite (“ruthless and domineering men”).  Most New Dealers, including Franklin 
Roosevelt, came out of this broad tradition. 
Other elites countered that the coming of industrial modernity had not eliminated 
the equal opportunity that distinguished the United States.  Because no fixed class system 
existed, American citizens enjoyed absolute political equality and could rise as far as 
their talent and hard work allowed.120  It was unreasonable, in a democratic capitalist 
                                                           
118  Address of President Roosevelt on the Occasion of the Laying of the Corner Stone at the Pilgrim 
Memorial Monument, Provincetown, MA, August 20, 1907, available at 
https://www.archive.org/stream/addressofpreside00roo/addressofpreside00roo_djvu.txt.  On Progressivism, 
Sheldon Stromquist, Re-inventing “The People” (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2006); Daniel 
Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1998); Michael McGerr, A Fierce Discontent: The Rise and Fall of the Progressive Movement in America, 
1870-1920 (New York: Free Press, 2003). 
119 Theodore Roosevelt, An Autobiography (New York: Macmillan, 1913), 512. 
120 Scottish-born industrialist Andrew Carnegie dedicated his 1887 book Triumphant Democracy “to the 
country which has removed the stigma of inferiority which his native land saw proper to impress upon him 
at birth, and has made him in the estimation of its great laws…the peer of any human being who draws the 
75 
 
society, to expect “all the runners to end the race equally,” as Herbert Hoover put it in a 
1930 radio address, simply by virtue of the unequal distribution of talent and drive.  
Rather, it was necessary to “give them an equal start” and ensure that no ossified system 
of privilege restricted talented men from joining the ranks of the elite.  Classical 
liberalism’s victory over royalist privilege remained the critical world-historical event, in 
this view, opening careers to talent, enabling fair rewards for individual initiative, and 
“constantly refreshing the leadership of the Nation by men of lowly beginnings.”121  
Upward mobility was an index of character and the key to maintaining a just society. 
American exceptionalism’s claim to the good society had never rested solely on 
formal equal opportunity, however, but on broadly distributed material wellbeing.  The 
industrialized United States saw an immense emphasis on the mass bounty made possible 
by American consumer capitalism and the share that wage earners could gain from it.  
Middle class Americanism increasingly came to mean the ability to consume, a meaning 
compatible with wage work. “To be a middle class American,” the Chicago Tribune 
editorialized in 1926, “is to work eight hours a day, bring home a comfortable pay 
envelop every week, and ride in one’s car on Sunday.”122  High wages and workers’ 
access to mass-produced consumer goods served as primary evidence that the “American 
system” had not empowered a few at the expense of the majority but had harnessed talent 
and ingenuity for broad benefit. 
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Employers placed a particular emphasis on conveying to the public and to their 
employees the benefits workers could expect from American capitalism.  In a practice 
known as “welfare capitalism,” employers and managers in the late 1910s and 1920s 
sought to stave off unionization and win worker-actor goodwill by offering employees 
perks and concessions such as membership in company unions, higher wages, medical 
benefits, and firm-sponsored recreational activities.123  By adopting a paternalistic posture 
towards workers, employers also sought to communicate to other elites that they could 
behave responsibly and could solve industrial problems without interference. Welfare 
capitalism acknowledged that concerns about the dangers and harms of industrialism 
were entirely legitimate.  Employers would need to behave in a responsible and 
community-oriented manner and take on new responsibility for workers’ welfare, in this 
framework, but wholesale changes in the system were not necessary.  As distinguished 
from industrial unionism, for instance, welfare capitalism appealed to workers through an 
individualistic framework.  “Modern technology has tended to create class cleavage, by 
making the wage earner believe that…he has slight prospect of getting ahead as an 
individual, and that his welfare depends upon the welfare of his class”—the precise belief 
that made unionization appealing to workers, economist Sumner Slichter explained.  
“Modern personnel methods,” Slichter emphasized, aimed “to counteract the effect of 
modern technique upon the mind of the worker,” in large part by allowing better 
opportunities for individual advancement: an abundant package of consumer goods, 
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advancement up the company ranks for talented workers, stock ownership.124  
Importantly, the connection between American identity and entrepreneurship could be 
maintained even in a modern society, with the industrial worker imagined as an incipient 
capitalist.  The “wage earner,” one contemporary insisted, was “not satisfied any longer 
to be a wage earner; he wants to be a partner.”125 
The dominant 1920s view: “American” workers supported the existing system 
One of the most basic claims running through discourses on the benefits of 
consumerism, welfare capitalism, and the dangers of the new immigration held that 
respectable American workers’ political views would not differ substantially from those 
of their employers. They understood the benefits they gained from the “American 
system” and would not be drawn to the siren song of foreign radicalism.  Class cleavages 
in a “European” sense would not predict their political views, and they would reject 
demagogic appeals or the promise of direct aid from the government. Conservative 
columnist Frank Kent, touring the country in 1925, noted “the completeness with which 
all liberal thought has vanished, the astounding degree to which the country has become 
conservatized, and the strong hold” of Calvin Coolidge’s business-centered appeal “on all 
classes of society, whether rich or poor.”126 Those workers who did not subscribe to a 
middle class politics could not be seen as fully “American” under this framework.  Elites 
reflexively linked foreignness and radicalism, with immigrants, especially eastern 
European Jews, falling under the greatest suspicion.  “One pair of ears is enough to prove 
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the great majority of the agitators completely foreign born,” labor relations investigator 
Whiting Williams reported from Detroit, “and one pair of eyes and ears soon learn that 
most of their hearers are Europeans who have come here too recently to get a satisfactory 
toehold.”127  These newcomers were susceptible to demagoguery, in this view, in part 
because of their poverty and racial status, but also because they did not yet understand the 
opportunity the American economic system (in contrast to the economic system of the 
old country) provided them. 
The benefit of these arguments for a business-dominated, anti-statist political 
culture is straightforward.  They offered a persuasive claim to represent the majority and 
figured opponents as alien to the polity.  Great wealth did not disqualify an employer 
from speaking for workers in elite public discourse, particularly if he could claim humble 
beginnings and an interest in workers’ welfare.  Self-made industrialists, most notably 
Henry Ford, were among the period’s most acknowledged elite-level voices for workers. 
“Mr. [Henry] Ford represents better than any living person the American industrial 
worker,” one progressive commented in 1926.128  In the dominant framework, there was 
no necessary conflict between the interests of workers and the interests of business; 
rather, the two were deeply intertwined. 
Importantly, while the framework was most beneficial to their claims, employers 
and their allies were far from alone in assuming that political views did not differ 
significantly along class lines.  Left-of-center intellectuals often saw farmers and workers 
as almost entirely taken in by the dominant ideology. “We have no labor movement and 
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no agrarian movement,” the New Republic declared in 1929.  “Neither farmers nor 
industrial workers, as such, possess sufficient self-awareness or status to make qualitative 
contributions to our culture.  Their standards and aspirations are swallowed in the 
gigantic maw of middle-class ascendancy.”129  Workers did not perceive their separate 
interests, liberals argued, for two primary and related reasons.  First, “in this day of 
movies and automobile,” they had been seduced by consumer capitalism and were 
primarily concerned with making as much money as possible.130 Second, they were in 
thrall to the pioneer individualism of the past: political culture remained, as John Dewey 
put it, “saturated with traditions of liberty and self-help.”131 “Cultural lag,” one of the 
most central concepts in progressive discourse, offered an explanation for why these 
seemingly outdated values remained so powerful: ideology changed far more slowly than 
objective conditions.  In Dewey’s words, the “development of physical instrumentalities 
has far outrun the present development of corresponding mental and moral 
adjustment…We are carrying old political and old mental habits into a condition for 
which they are not adapted, and all kinds of friction result.”132  In other words, for these 
progressives, individualism became a guiding creed for Americans in a period where a 
self-sufficient rural life was the norm.  Even though that was no longer the case, the 
complex of beliefs held by the majority of the public had not yet caught up. 
It is important to draw out the connection in contemporary discourse between 
rural imagery and consumer capitalism.  At first glance, the link appears incongruous, 
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with the rural associated with the past and capitalism with the future.  The chief 
connection lies in the importance both placed on individualism and self-sufficiency.  For 
conservatives, the achievements of individual ingenuity in the industrial age 
demonstrated continuity with the self-sufficient rural past.133  For liberals, the new 
industrial powers had exploited the much-revered memory of the pioneer days for 
ideological purposes.  Basing the doctrine of “least possible interference by 
government…on the plea that certain persons or interests should have the chance to 
become quickly rich and powerful” would have been politically ineffective, popular 
historian James Truslow Adams emphasized.  Instead, “the doctrine of laissez-faire had 
to be linked with the preservation of the self-reliant virtues of the farmer and the 
frontiersman, the ‘typical’ American virtues which otherwise, it was claimed, might be 
ruined by paternalism.”134  For many liberals, this strategy had been very effective, with 
individualism remaining in its place of valor as a guiding principle of American political 
and economic life. 
Liberals’ sometimes-despairing assessments of the prospects for a majoritarian 
reform coalition reflected the dire conditions for their side at the macropolitical level.  
Without discounting the appeal of conservative and consumerist politics to white worker-
actors, it is important to stress that the elite discursive environment of the decade prior to 
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the New Deal was such that their resistance to the dominant ideology was hidden from 
view.  The two major parties did not differ substantially in ideological terms.  Wall Street 
and Southern planter class interests shaped the Democratic Party, a divided minority 
coalition of Northern urban political machines and the Solid South.135  Within organized 
labor, the dominant American Federation of Labor (AFL) articulated its claim to speak 
for workers in a manner congenial to dominant discourses. The labor movement had been 
crushed in the aftermath of World War I, and radicals like the International Workers of 
the World (IWW) and the Socialists were much less prominent than they had been early 
in the twentieth century. The AFL’s base comprised craft unions representing the most 
skilled workers, largely Protestant white men of Northern European heritage.  AFL 
unions sought to win concrete gains in wages and working conditions for members by 
bargaining directly with employers and avoided association with militancy or stigmatized 
groups of workers.136 The objective, AFL president Samuel Gompers explained, was to 
“make labor a contented and prosperous partner of business in this American system of 
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acquisition and enjoyment.”137 “In America there is no such thing as a working class as 
distinguished from a capitalist class,” one AFL union insisted, pledging “to show its 
members and workers generally how they can become capitalists as well as workers.”138  
The figure of the industrial worker as incipient capitalist and contented middle-income 
consumer was not beneficial only to business interests; it carved out limited space for the 
most privileged workers to make claims on employers about getting their fair share. 
Redefining the American worker – the New Deal, the CIO, and the Popular Front 
Prevailing understandings of “workers” were permanently altered by the politics 
of the 1930s.  In the understanding dominant by the end of the decade, the chief cleavage 
in American politics pitted workers, the “people” or the majority against economic elites; 
the political interests and views of the majority differed sharply from those of the most 
advantaged.  To be clear, the language pitting workers or the “people” against an elite 
was not in any way new in the 1930s; republicanism, agrarian Populism, the Marxist 
tradition, industrial unionism, the farmer-labor movement, and Progressivism (to name a 
few) had drawn on that language.  In the 1930s, this oppositional view of the worker 
became dominant to an unprecedented degree in mainstream elite political discourse, 
through the intersecting efforts of three primary political forces: the New Deal 
Democratic Party, the CIO, and the Popular Front. 
Under the leadership of Franklin D. Roosevelt (president from 1933 until his 
death in 1945), the Democratic Party became clearly defined as the liberal party in a two-
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party system. The New Deal Democratic Party’s pioneering social legislation included 
the National Labor Relations Act, or Wagner Act (1935), which guaranteed the right to 
organize; the Social Security Act (1935), the foundation of the American welfare state; 
the Works Progress Administration (1935), a large-scale government jobs program; and 
the Fair Labor Standards Act (1938), which set wages and hours requirements for 
employment.  The party remained a problematic vehicle for reform, as liberals within it 
well understood, and scholars stress the tension between radicalism and conservatism in 
the New Deal order.139  In particular, conservative Southern Democrats in Congress 
retained a substantial limiting influence over policymaking, forcing the exclusion of most 
African Americans from Social Security and other key programs and, by the late 1930s, 
forming an alliance with Northern Republicans to restrict and roll back liberal gains.  The 
policy limitations of the New Deal did not significantly limit Roosevelt and his allies’ 
success in defining the Democratic Party as the party of the “people” and the Republican 
Party, conversely, as the party of wealth and privilege. 
The CIO (originally the Committee for Industrial Organization, later the Congress 
of Industrial Organizations) was formed in 1935 by a group of union leaders, led by 
United Mine Workers president John L. Lewis and Amalgamated Clothing Workers 
president Sidney Hillman, who broke with the AFL leadership over its unwillingness to 
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aggressively pursue the organization of industrial workers. A surge of organization 
followed the passage of the Wagner Act in 1935; by 1938, CIO affiliates had largely 
organized the key industries of autos and steel.  The CIO disrupted the industrial status 
quo in multiple well-documented ways, but it is essential for the purposes of this 
narrative to stress its immense importance in altering public discourse around American 
workers.  “There is no other instrumentality set up or created through which Labor can 
speak its mind or express itself except through the American Federation of Labor,” AFL 
president William Green had insisted in 1933.140  Four years later, CIO national director 
John Brophy claimed that “the CIO…has brought to American political life the voice of 
the great mass of American workers—a voice for the first time organized and 
forceful.”141  If both organizations claimed the near-exclusive right to speak for workers, 
the CIO spoke for a different group of workers and represented workers in a different 
way.  Its leaders endorsed an antidiscrimination agenda and claimed to represent the 
“great mass of American workers” as a whole, not the most privileged segments of the 
working class. They adopted an often-combative public posture that defined workers 
against employers.  In contrast to the AFL’s policy of voluntarism (which warned against 
close ties with any political party and favored bargaining with employers without state 
                                                           
140 Robert Zieger, The CIO, 1935-1955 (Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 
1997), 30.  Discussion of the CIO in this chapter draws especially on Zieger, The CIO; Nelson Lichtenstein, 
State of the Union: A Century of American Labor (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002); Steve 
Fraser, Labor Will Rule: Sidney Hillman and the Rise of American Labor (New York: Free Press, 1991); 
Zieger, American Workers, American Unions (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); Philip 
Dray, There is Power in a Union (New York: Doubleday, 2010). 
141 Bruce Nelson, “Autoworkers, Electoral Politics, and the Convergence of Class and Race: Detroit 1937-
1945,” in Organized Labor and American Politics, 1894-1994: The Labor Liberal Alliance, ed. Kevin 
Boyle (Albany: SUNY Press, 1998), 121. 
85 
 
interference), the CIO formed an alliance with the Democratic Party and linked workers’ 
interests to an activist state. 
Political forces to the left of New Deal and CIO leadership also greatly shaped 
elite-level understandings of working class identity in this period, through the upsurge of 
rank-and-file militancy and the cultural and intellectual production of the Popular Front, a 
broad, social democratic movement comprising a wide ideological range of liberals, 
socialists, communists, and other leftists and based on the premise that all left-of-center 
forces should work together in an alliance against fascism and reaction.142  The Popular 
Front was strongly committed to both industrial unionism and antiracism, key parts of an 
antifascist project.  Though most leftists saw themselves as allied with the New Deal and 
the CIO during this period, they generally saw New Deal liberalism and CIO unionism as 
first steps toward a significantly more ambitious agenda. 
All of these political efforts, of course, took place against the backdrop of the 
Great Depression.  The mass poverty and unemployment of the Depression ran directly 
counter to the claims made in support of the existing system. For a significant segment of 
elite opinion, the Depression was an inexorable demonstration of the failures of the 
“individualist creed of everybody for himself and the devil take the hindmost.”143 The 
assumption that capitalist democracy would continue for the foreseeable future was 
deeply shaken, and radical views gained an atypical level of purchase in elite liberal 
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circles.  It is important to stress, though, that a significant group of elites did not see the 
Depression as disqualifying for the existing system and saw an increase in state power in 
response to the Depression as a much greater threat. Familiar arguments about the broad 
benefit of capitalism—in which the “many,” not the “few,” were its beneficiaries—
remained remarkably prominent in elite public discourse even at the height of the 
Depression.  “The American system…has provided bountifully for all but an unfortunate 
ten percent,” protested a representative 1936 Chicago Tribune editorial.144 
Contemporaries pointed to workers’ high wages; their ability to buy new products and to 
own stock; the middle-income lifestyle ostensibly enjoyed by the majority of Americans; 
the common interests of labor and capital; the fact that capitalists rose from the ranks of 
workers; the dangers of statism.  AFL president William Green warned against welfare 
(“the dole”) on the grounds that it would make the worker “a ward of the state.”145 
Ultimately, then, while the Depression was central to changing elite constructions of the 
“worker,” its influence on elite public discourse was not predetermined.  The 
interpretation of the Depression was subject to political conflict. 
The most basic claim in left/liberal discourse in the 1930s held that the economic 
system as presently constructed served the interests of elites but did not meet the needs of 
the majority of Americans.  Leftists and liberals advocated a wide range of alternatives, 
ranging from basic reforms of the existing system to socialism.  Many of those farther to 
the left wanted a greater degree of coordinated and centralized economic planning; in this 
view, individualistic, decentralized decision-making by corporate interests would never 
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allow for the nation’s productive capacity to be used in the best interest of its citizens.  
Others championed measures that would increase the purchasing power of workers and 
give citizens protection against the vicissitudes of industrial society.  No matter the scope 
of the change advocated, a consistent and fundamental claim throughout the discourse 
held that a more activist role for the state would be needed to secure justice in the modern 
world.146 
Also broadly shared in left-of-center politics was a frame opposing a small group 
of industrial elites to the majority of citizens.  These were the “robber barons” and 
“malefactors of great wealth” targeted by earlier generations—businessmen who had 
taken advantage of the affordances of industrial capitalism to amass immense power 
unknown in the early years of the republic.  Contemporaries put forward class politics at 
different levels of explicitness, with those most euphemistic in their framing closest to the 
center of elite public discourse.  New Deal Democrats did not identify a “capitalist class,” 
but they did argue explicitly that a small group of industrial elites had interests that 
diverged from the interests of the majority.  In 1936, FDR boasted that his administration 
had “earned the hatred of entrenched greed” and decried the “domination of government 
by financial and industrial groups, numerically small but politically dominant.”  “Never 
before in all our history have these forces been so united against one candidate as they 
stand today,” he exclaimed later the same year. “They are unanimous in their hate for 
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me—and I welcome their hatred.”147 His acceptance speech at the 1936 Democratic 
National Convention introduced the New Deal’s best-known term for its adversaries: 
“economic royalists.” Similar language appeared consistently across the full range of left-
of-center opinion.  Liberals and leftists denounced the “predatory power of the 
oligarchs,” “Wall Street and its minions…here full panoplied for battle,” “the small class 
whose one aim is profits,” a “financial and economic dictatorship,” “industrial 
autocracy.”148 
Most often, liberals opposed these oligarchs and autocrats to “the people,” “the 
majority,” the “plain people,” the “many,” the “common people,” the “average 
American”—constituencies defined by little other than their ordinariness and their 
numbers. These categories were broad and vague, expansive enough to suit a wide range 
of ideologies and accommodate the disparate groups in the New Deal coalition. African 
Americans and new immigrants could be explicitly included or left unmentioned. The 
many-versus-few frame could support explicitly antiracist politics, but opposing the 
people to the interests had also been commonplace in a Southern politics characterized by 
the amalgamation of progressivism and white supremacy.  In broadest terms, categories 
like “the majority,” “the common man,” and the “people” included all groups without 
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power or wealth: “the worker,” “the farmer,” “the housewife,” “the small business man,” 
“the immigrant,” “the Negro.”  For some speakers, they referred to non-elite whites.149 
To be clear, then, liberals did not speak only on behalf of a contemporary 
equivalent to “the white working class.”  To an important degree, though, white, male 
workers stood at the forefront of the imagery around the liberal public.  This chapter 
frames the importance of white working class representation in this period around two 
basic but central questions in elite public discourse.  First, was reform of the existing 
system—understood by elites on both sides as individualistic, anti-statist capitalism—
needed and legitimate? Second, how were the politics of workers (and non-elite 
Americans generally) changing, and what would they demand from their government and 
their employers? Parts Two and Three look at these questions, respectively.  
Plan of the chapter 
Part Two seeks to underscore the importance of the (white) worker as a symbol of 
the legitimacy of liberal reform.  Representations of (white) workers were closely 
implicated in debate around fundamental questions in elite public discourse—the proper 
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role of government in the economy, the appropriate responses to the changes brought by 
industrialism.  Rural whites primarily appeared in liberal discourse as evidence of the 
wrenching poverty the vaunted “American system” had failed to alleviate.  Urban 
industrial workers epitomized the liberal argument about the changing circumstances of 
American life, in which the majority now worked for wages and needed state intervention 
to assure security. 
Part Three seeks to capture how contemporaries understood and narrated the 
emergence of (white) workers, particularly industrial workers, as a crucial progressive 
political force.   Longstanding imagery of the progressive worker emerged from the 
electoral successes of the New Deal and the dramatic victories of the burgeoning 
industrial union movement, the source of the period’s most indelible images of working 
class agency.  In the early days of the CIO, sympathetic observers saw the labor 
movement’s gains as the beginning of a sustained forward drive towards a vastly changed 
and more just society.  Even as the political agenda associated with union workers 
became significantly less ambitious (basic reform as pursued by the Democratic Party), 
the frame depicting (white) workers as a vital force for progress remained in an altered 
form.  This imagery of “labor on the march” provides the centerpiece for Part Three.  Part 
Three concludes by noting elite resistance to the dominant progressive worker frame—
from observers who contended that deserving workers opposed liberalism or that any 
kind of class politics would not take hold in the US context. Part Three covers the same 
period as Part Two from a somewhat different angle; the two could be read in either 
order. 
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II. The (white) worker as a symbol of the need for reform 
“It is generally agreed by competent analysts of current affairs that the great issue 
of these times is how far the state should go in organizing and directing the nation’s 
economic activity—or conversely, how much of this organizing and directing should be 
left to individuals and groups of individuals (business) competing for public favor in a 
free market,” a mid-1940s National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) pamphlet 
argued.150  The majority of elites, even those strongly opposed to the staunch business 
conservatives of NAM, held to the same basic understanding of “the great issue of these 
times.”  The central questions in elite public discourse in the 1930s and 1940s centered 
on the proper role of government and private business in a modern economy.  Liberals 
and leftists who advocated a more activist role for the state confronted a deeply rooted 
antistatist tradition holding that “individuals and groups of individuals (business) 
competing for public favor in a free market” should determine the direction of the 
economy. Representations of laboring whites were directly tied up in that debate.  
As Part One detailed, employers and other conservatives had placed a great deal 
of emphasis on the prosperity workers enjoyed as a result of American capitalism.  The 
system was just, they argued, because it allowed for individual talent and drive to be 
harnessed for broad benefit.  Liberals and leftists sought to demonstrate that state 
intervention was both needed and legitimate, in keeping with the traditions of the 
American founding.  They too drew consistently on representations of workers, but they 
figured them much differently—as disempowered and deprived for the benefit of a few.  
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Liberals sought to underscore the depth of poverty in America, and their spotlight often 
focused on poverty suffered by the rural native-born white agricultural laborers central to 
the national imaginary.  Liberals also argued that urbanization and industrialization had 
created a fundamentally altered society where justice could not be secured via long-
revered individualistic principles; here urban industrial workers were symbolic of the 
chronic insecurity and lack of agency that had made an activist state necessary.  
Importantly, though, the (white, male) industrial worker had clear limits as a symbol of 
the needs of a modern workforce—contributing to a separation of “labor” issues from 
issues of race and gender. 
Rural laboring whites as symbolic of the depth of American poverty 
During times of crisis, journalists have often become particularly disillusioned 
with journalism reflecting the activities of dominant institutions. 151  During the 
Depression, liberals and leftists saw an elite-centered approach as an abdication of 
responsibility, a way to conceal an urgent reality.  “If we” professional-class Americans 
“had to walk through street after street of dingy tenements, looking at thousands of 
undernourished children,” one radical journalist wrote, “if these things were brought 
squarely under our noses, we might be moved…But the trouble is that we don’t see.  Our 
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lives are so arranged that we don’t have to see.”152  The 1930s saw a flowering of 
journalism written by liberals and leftists with the aim of documenting the poverty and 
disadvantage hidden from elite view, making elites “see.” 
Of all disadvantaged groups, this body of work spotlighted rural, native-born 
whites most of all.  In the mid-1930s, a series of texts dramatized for a middle-class 
audience the predicament of white Southern agricultural laborers—sharecroppers and 
tenant farmers.153  Journalists, novelists, and photographers depicted the human costs of 
the Dust Bowl and the plight of migrants to Southern California.154  (The most famous 
photograph of the era, Dorothea Lange’s “Migrant Mother,” comes out of this tradition). 
In this discourse, rural whites were one thing above all—they were poor, incredibly poor: 
In parts of the South human existence has reached its lowest depths.  Children are 
seen deformed by nature and malnutrition, women in rags beg for pennies, and 
men are so hungry that many of them eat snakes, cow dung, and clay. 
 
The children, dressed in scraps of dirty rags, stood around the table dipping their 
hands into bowls of a watery liquid with grease congealing on the surface and bits 
of broken crackers floating on it.  There was no milk on the table, no vegetables, 
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no fruit, no meat.155 
 
In a country now capable of producing enough that no one would go hungry, for liberal 
and leftist observers, it was an utter disgrace that people lived this way. 
The prominence of native-born white poverty in left/liberal discourse reflects the 
contemporary racial hierarchy.  Anglo-Saxon whites were closer to the symbolic center 
of the polity than African Americans or immigrants.  Their suffering was more 
destabilizing for antistatist ideologies and more difficult to ignore or explain away.  
Liberals and leftists (even those who rejected the view that Anglo-Saxons were the 
realest Americans) were abundantly aware of this and made strategic decisions on its 
basis.  Writer Sherwood Anderson, seeking to rebut the claim that “this [is] the land of 
opportunity” and “there is a good deal of nonsense about all of this poverty,” consistently 
stressed the pervasiveness of poverty among “whole generations of white men, their 
wives, daughters, sons,” people who were “American to the bone”: “These are not the 
foreigners of whom we Americans can say so glibly—‘If they do not like it here, let them 
go back where they came from.’  These men are from the oldest American stock we 
have.”156 One New Deal official urged a magazine editor running a story he had written 
on tenant farming to “see to it that most of the pictures cover white subjects, for as my 
article will show nearly two thirds of the cotton tenants are white and it is very important 
that the nation as a whole should realize that cotton tenancy is not a Negro problem.” 
Another official suggested to photographer Dorothea Lange that she “take [pictures of] 
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both black and white, but place the emphasis on white tenants, since we know that these 
will receive much wider attention.”157 
The calculation is clear—if policymakers did not dispel the assumption that 
tenancy was “a Negro problem,” it would be difficult or impossible to generate the 
necessary concern among elites to address its evils; if elites assumed that only African 
Americans and immigrants were poor, they would not view the problem as endemic.  
This dynamic is suggestive of an enduring tension: White disadvantage drew more elite 
attention because it tapped a sense that suffering was not “supposed” to happen to these 
people.  Making it visible was also necessary to force elites to recognize poverty as 
something more than marginal. 
Urban industrial workers as symbolic of the needs of a modern America 
In recent years, white industrial workers have been firmly tied to the past—as 
symbols of bigotry, or in the deeply nostalgic imagery around midcentury manufacturing 
jobs.  In the 1930s and 1940s, they were just as strongly associated with the future.  The 
census first found a majority of Americans living in urban areas in 1920.  This, one 
contemporary noted, was a “striking revelation”; the United States, “from the 
beginning…had been a land in which most of the people lived in the rural districts.”158  
For contemporaries, the transition from a rural to an urban society was ongoing, 
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immediate, and disruptive.  It generated both optimism and concern (much of it nativist in 
nature), but few doubted it would bring change. 
Liberal claims about the need for reform focused heavily on the changes brought 
by the urban industrial age.  In a very prominent narrative, equality, liberty, and 
security—ideals that the United States claimed as central to national identity and that had 
once been widely enjoyed—had been placed in jeopardy for the bulk of the population by 
increasing economic concentration, irresponsible corporate power, and precarious wage 
work.  The rise of industrial capitalism had brought about a level of interconnectedness—
in the modern corporation, in mass production and distribution—that could not be dealt 
with according to the individualistic principles of the past.  Because individuals were now 
at the mercy of vast, complex forces that they could not influence, in this framework, 
justice required an increased role for collectives large and powerful enough to 
counterbalance corporate power, namely unions and the state. 
This narrative of the transition to industrialism can be found in roughly the same 
form across the entire range of left-of-center opinion.  The narrative is significant for a 
history of white working class representation for two primary reasons: first, it helps to 
explain the long-term symbolic importance of the (white, male) urban industrial worker; 
second, it helps to explain the enduring discursive separation between “working class” 
issues and issues of race and gender.  The narrative undergirded some of the most far-
reaching left/liberal interventions of the period—that governments have responsibility for 
their citizens’ welfare, that political liberty means little without economic security, that 
those able to work should have the right to a job.  It is also suggestive of the limits of the 
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understanding of class and power that supported liberals’ claims on behalf of the working 
population.  The fundamental tension lies in the treatment of the preindustrial United 
States as simultaneously a good society and a chapter that needed to be closed to achieve 
justice in the modern world. 
In liberal argumentation, preindustrial America frequently served as an idealized 
backdrop to a more troubled present.  Contemporaries implied that equality and 
democracy had existed naturally in the pioneer days; slavery and settler colonialism were 
absent or downplayed. Put differently, liberals seldom argued that the ideal of a 
smallholding independent middle-income rural society was unjust, exclusive, or an 
inaccurate depiction of the American past.  Most often, they argued that it was obsolete. 
“No matter how deeply we may yearn to return to the splendid simplicity of our log-cabin 
and town-meeting era, here in America, there can be no turning back,” Roosevelt aide 
Rexford Tugwell put it.159  Tugwell was typical in understanding the rural past as simple 
and the present as infinitely more complex.  During the frontier era, Roosevelt himself 
argued, individualism had its day as “the great watchword of American life,” and “the 
happiest of economic conditions made that day long and splendid.”  On “the Western 
frontier, land was substantially free…Starvation and dislocation were practically 
impossible.”  But these conditions had irrevocably changed, FDR stressed: “Our last 
frontier has long since been reached, and there is practically no more free land.  More 
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than half of our people do not live on the farms or on lands and cannot derive a living by 
cultivating their own property.”160  
The widespread security and “equality of opportunity” of the past, in this 
narrative, was directly attributable to the availability of land (for white settlers) on the 
frontier.  Anyone who could access land had agency and could earn a living.  The same 
condition did not apply to a landless wage worker.  For W. Jett Lauck, an economist and 
close advisor of John L. Lewis, the need for reform “had its origin and development in 
the marvelous changes in industry and industrial life since the American Revolution,” 
especially the rise of “large scale production” directed by “artificial legal personages, 
known as industrial corporations.” Where an individual worker in a small shop could 
exercise agency through a personal relationship with the employer, a worker employed 
by a large corporation could only exercise agency as part of a collective, by “meeting 
organization with organization…The individual wage-earner was helpless.”161  An 
increased role for government or for unions, in this framework, did not violate 
longstanding American norms because conditions the Founders could not possibly have 
foreseen had rendered it necessary.  “The rush of modern civilization…has raised for us 
new difficulties, new problems which must be solved if we are to preserve to the United 
States the political and economic freedom for which Washington and Jefferson planned 
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and fought,” Roosevelt argued.162  Because economic inequality was so vast, formal 
political equality had become “meaningless.” 
The importance of the industrial wage worker in this discourse is straightforward: 
first and foremost, this worker epitomized the changing conditions faced by non-elite 
Americans.  For leftists, industrial workers felt the pressures of capitalism most acutely; 
they faced the oppression in the present that white-collar workers and others would face 
in the near future.  For liberals and labor leaders closer to the political center, framing 
politics and policy around the needs of the modern public required recognizing the 
United States as urban and wage-earning, not rural.  “We have long ceased to be an 
agricultural people,” John L. Lewis argued, noting that the workforce now comprised 
three times as many wage workers as agricultural workers.  It “is obvious that the future 
of our country is indissolubly bound up with the economic and social advancement of its 
industrial workers,” Lewis stressed.163  The time had come, New Dealer Harold Ickes 
claimed, to “modify or even to discard certain social, economic and political concepts 
appropriate to a pioneer people.”164 Libertarian concepts that might have been appropriate 
when most Americans were self-employed landowners were now, in this perspective, 
badly out of date. 
One clear example of this reasoning can be found in the case made by John 
Winant, the first chair of the Social Security Board, for why it was foolish and unjust to 
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stigmatize Social Security as an invitation to idleness. “There was no need for social 
insurance in [the] early days of the Republic,” Winant argued.  “Security depended on the 
individual’s own efforts…Poverty was a very relative term and was generally born of 
shiftlessness.”  However, Winant stressed, “that period in our history is over,” displaced 
by an “economic revolution which has altered fundamentally the status of the average 
American. Most of our population are wage earners, living in urban areas, working for 
corporations whose owners are strangers to them…The worker is no longer a free agent, 
who can provide for his own security by his own initiative.”165  The liberal understanding 
of industrial modernity, as Winant’s argument typifies, justified an expanded role for the 
state by stressing the limits of agency.  Security was not a guarantee no matter how 
industrious a worker might be.  But Winant also presumed that security had existed for all 
who did not succumb to “shiftlessness”—it was only industrialism that had taken it away. 
This discourse helps to explain the constrained understanding of “class” and 
“economic issues” that has long shaped elite political discourse.  In the predominant 
liberal narrative, the social injustice workers faced could be attributed to industrial elites 
and the workings of industrial society.  The narrative did not highlight other sources of 
power, including those that might benefit its typical worker, or other kinds of labor (e.g. 
agricultural, domestic, or reproductive).  The exclusion of slavery from the dominant 
understanding of the development of US capitalism encouraged a conceptual separation 
between the “Negro problem” and the problem of industrial modernity.  Some liberals 
and leftists in the period were very attentive to these.  But the dominant frame linked the 
changes brought by industrialism to work largely performed by white men.  Many of 
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them were of southern and eastern European descent, and they became recognized as 
“American” by becoming recognized as typical American workers.   A few decades later, 
when this group’s position had obviously improved, the continued subordination of 
women and African Americans did not prevent elites from claiming that the problems 
brought by industrialism had been largely solved (see Chapter 2). 
It is important to stress that (white, male) industrial workers were useful as a 
symbol of liberal reform because they suggested continuity as well as needed change.  To 
be clear, these workers appeared to many contemporaries as an “other”: Though nativist 
language directed at southern and eastern Europeans was declining, it remained very 
prominent in opposition to the ascendant liberalism.  But European men—unlike others 
confronted with the implication that they were not quite American—could lay claim to 
one of the most important elements of the normative understanding of Americanness: 
breadwinning white masculinity.166 
Breadwinning white men were understood as the average American, the basic 
democratic subject.  One of the most infamous examples of Depression-era propaganda is 
a National Association of Manufacturers billboard showing a white family—father, 
mother, and two children—happily riding in a car.  The text reads, “World’s Highest 
Standard of Living”…“There’s no way like the American Way.” An iconic photo 
featured in Life magazine captures a group of African American workers standing in a 
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breadline, against the backdrop of this billboard.167  For NAM and its cohort, the 
patriarchal family ideal and the “American Way” were deeply tied together; Americans’ 
high standard of living made possible a contented, normative family life.  As a political 
symbol, the patriarchal family ideal was not the property of the right, however; liberals 
and labor laid claim to it as well. 
What workers in an industrial age needed above all, liberals argued, was 
security—stability in employment, enough food and shelter to live a decent life, a fair 
wage, and income in old age or in the case of disability.  Security was an ideal that could 
directly challenge the existing economic system.  “The ideals of the labor movement 
must be security for every man and woman in the country,” Sidney Hillman argued. “If 
capitalism can’t give us security, then let another system do it.”168  Security was also an 
ideal firmly tied in with normative understandings of the family.  “What do the people of 
America want more than anything else?” Roosevelt asked in a 1932 speech.  Work, he 
answered, and “security for themselves and for their wives and children.”169 Where FDR 
figured of breadwinning men as equivalent to “the people of America,” the labor 
movement and its supporters framed the “worker” as a male with a wife and children. 
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Liberals and organized labor argued that justice in an industrial society depended on the 
family wage—a wage high enough that a single wage earner could support a family on 
one income. “The American standard of living is based upon the earnings of the main 
breadwinner,” argued a 1945 United Steelworkers release.  “It rejects the concept that 
other members of the family have to work in order to provide the family with the 
necessary living essentials.”170  The Steelworkers here invoked an ideal held as normative 
for Americans of all classes (“the American standard of living”) to argue that workers 
deserved the same. 
Stressing security for the individual family also helped unions to push back on 
right-wing claims of dangerous radicalism.  When labor officials wanted to convey that 
organized workers were not a threatening other, they consistently emphasized that 
workers sought above all to support their families. In a 1941 radio address clearly 
intended for a skeptical professional-class public, CIO legislative director John T. Jones 
described union workers as “good, upright patriotic American citizens, just like you and 
your neighbors…Like you, they are also deeply concerned with protecting the welfare 
and security of their families.”171 One unionist urged CIO publicity officials to emphasize 
“that a C. I. O. man is likely to be the Sam or Bill around the family table; no more alien 
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to the American scene than the most average and desirable type of American.  If this idea 
were driven home to the great majority of Americans do you think any politician would 
dare to get up in Congress and talk against him?”172  Here, racial signifiers 
(“alien”…“desirable type of American”) were rearticulated around (and rendered 
unnecessary by) an image of averageness tied to breadwinning masculinity (“Sam or Bill 
around the family table”). 
Ironically, this focus on security for the individual male-headed family can be 
read as an updated version of the rural ideal of individualism and self-sufficiency. When 
1930s and 1940s observers remembered the preindustrial United States, they envisioned 
independent families as its typical citizens: “The closely knit family group—its 
prosperity determined by what could be wrested from the soil—was the unit of the new 
society”…“The sovereign authority rested with a great middle class, whom we like to 
term the typical Americans. They were the people whose ideal of life was to own a home, 
and rear and educate a family in the fear of the Lord and in obedience to law.”173 In one 
interpretation, liberalism promised the opportunity to achieve the same ideal through 
modern means.  An industrial worker could aspire to own his own shop or even farm or, 
at the very least, his own home, and many worker-actors understood the New Deal’s 
promise to its constituents as a “white entitlement to a home in a racially homogenous 
neighborhood.”174  Even “the trade-unionist of urban America” was drawn to “the old 
Jeffersonian tradition of the farmer as a free man on his own homestead,” liberal Harold 
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Laski observed.175 Here the limits of the (white, male) industrial worker as a progressive 
political symbol came into sharp relief.  While a deprived worker who prized security 
could be a symbol of radical change, the picture was much cloudier once that worker had 
made some gains.  As the next two chapters will detail, a (white male) worker dedicated 
to securing what he had gained would become a chief symbol of conservatism and anti-
black backlash. 
 
III: The (white) worker as an agent of change 
The most indelible imagery of a progressive (white) working class comes out of 
the politics of the 1930s and 1940s and its legacy—union organizers socked by Henry 
Ford’s goons at the Battle of the Overpass in Dearborn, Michigan…little houses in rural 
West Virginia or South Boston where one of the only pictures on the wall was of 
FDR…“My father always said, stick with the Democrats, they’re the party of the working 
man.”176  The legacy of this imagery is only palely reflective of the major imprint it made 
on elite public discourse in the 1930s and 1940s.  The strong association between liberal 
politics and the (white) worker owes most to two parallel developments, both taking 
place against the backdrop of the Depression—the rapid gains made by the industrial 
union movement in the mid- to late 1930s and the rise of the New Deal Democrats to 
majority status in the same period. 
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The dominant elite view in the 1930s and early 1940s identified a leftward 
trajectory within the electorate, a broad ideological shift away from individualism and 
towards liberalism and the state.  The Democratic Party, which had appeared marginal as 
recently as 1928, became the clear majority force in American politics.  Amid a rush of 
unionization and sometimes-violent labor conflict, workers’ trajectory became an 
inescapable concern for all politically active groups.  Collectively, these developments 
raised to the level of conventional wisdom an understanding of American politics in 
which the majority supported an expanded role for the state and saw its interests as 
opposed to those of an economic elite.  From the standpoint of contemporary elite 
discourse, this was a significant shift from the view of workers (and voters generally) as 
sympathetic to business-led governance.  The first section below, “The Old Gods Are 
Tumbling,” sketches out that transition. 
A significant number of liberals and leftists believed that they were witnessing the 
birth of a sustained working class radicalism, and much of the enduring imagery of the 
progressive (white) worker comes out of their work.  The second section below, “Labor 
on the March,” focuses in particular on labor reporting in liberal and left periodicals, 
where left/liberal labor journalists pictured workers as on the march against injustice, 
anonymous but incredibly brave, facing down violence from employers to win their 
rights.  Imagery of a militant working class declined after the late 1930s as industrial 
unions became an accepted part of the economic landscape, but it left an imprint on elite-
level politics.  Liberals and organized labor continued to figure workers as a key force for 
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social progress, but indicated that they would realize their gains within the bounds of the 
formal political system and without violence. 
Even at the height of the progressive worker’s power in elite discourse, some 
elites remained skeptical.  The view that workers as a group embraced liberalism never 
went uncontested.  Many observers saw workers as moderate or “middle class” in their 
political views.  Some argued that responsible workers resented labor, liberalism, and 
undeserving workers and were basically conservative in their views.  The third section 
below, “Resistance to the Progressive Worker,” gives a brief sketch of this discourse, 
with an eye toward foreshadowing arguments that follow in the ensuing chapters. 
“The Old Gods Are Tumbling”: The Liberal Electoral Majority 
In the dominant elite view, workers and the public broadly shifted to the left over 
the course of the 1930s, amid the victories of the New Deal and the burgeoning industrial 
union movement.  The Democrats, clearly defined as the liberal party, replaced the 
Republicans (defined as the business party) as the majority party.  The dominant lines of 
division going forward, in this view, would center on income, with the “have-nots” 
opposing the “haves.”  
*** 
Political analysis in the 1920s and early 1930s understood the United States as 
“normally Republican.”  Syndicated columnist Paul Mallon explained the conventional 
wisdom: “that this is a Republican country; that the Republicans alone can bring 
prosperity; that the voters merely chastise them occasionally, but always restore them to 
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favor after a brief, unsatisfactory experience with the Democrats.”177 Belief in a natural 
Republican majority followed on Republican victories in all but two presidential 
elections since 1896.  It was also tied up with assumptions about the composition of the 
electorate—that most voters valued business-led prosperity; that political views did not 
differ significantly based on income; that the Republicans’ middle-income Protestant 
base was the dominant political force; and that the Democrats’ major constituencies, the 
Solid South and immigrants in Northern cities, were marginal.  Two Roosevelt victories 
turned that conventional wisdom on its head.  The Democratic Party’s “triumph now 
reaches even greater heights, with the prospect that it will be the dominant factor in 
American life for at least another decade,” a Washington Post correspondent commented 
after 1936. “Talk abounds that the Republican Party is finished.”178 
The new conventional wisdom rooted Democratic strength in an income-based 
division pitting the disadvantaged majority against the better off minority. “Today we 
have a new main cleavage of political opinion which, whether for good or ill, will be with 
us as far as we can see into the future,” wrote Wall Street Journal editor Thomas 
Woodlock in 1936.  That cleavage “is deeper than any heretofore experienced since the 
Civil War,” based “upon lines largely of economic class divisions.”179  “Any full 
understanding of politics today must take account of the fact that there has been a 
significant and far-reaching change in the political line-up of the country since the New 
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Deal came to power,” pollster George Gallup noted in 1938.  “This change has taken the 
form of a cleavage of political opinion along economic lines, a split between the high and 
low income brackets, a struggle for political power between the ‘haves’ and ‘have-
nots.’”180  This was the root of one of the most enduring truisms in American political 
history—Democrats are the party of working people, Republicans the party of the rich. 
It’s important to note that “class” in this context means the argument that the 
interests of economic elites were opposed to the interests of the bulk of the population.  
This was the argument that (for both supporters and opponents) New Dealers 
mainstreamed.  Allegations about Roosevelt’s legitimation of “class warfare” began as 
early as his 1932 campaign and intensified by the mid-1930s.  “Efforts to stir up class-
antagonism” had been made in the past, conservative columnist Frank Kent noted, but 
they had always come from “those on the outside trying to get in…It is the first time in 
history that a President of the United States has…initiated, encouraged, and promoted a 
fight along those lines.”181 Initially, a significant segment of elites in both parties 
believed that this kind of combative talk would turn off most voters.  Some interpreted 
FDR’s victory in 1932 as a one-time reaction to the Depression.  By the time he won the 
1936 election in a landslide (61% of the popular vote and all but two states, with a clear 
income gap identifiable in the voting), few disputed that a dramatic shift had taken place. 
Broadly, the dominant view in elite public discourse held that public esteem for 
liberals and activist government was rising sharply, while esteem for business had 
declined precipitously.  The frame in which liberals deliver more government and 
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conservatives less has been pervasive since the New Deal and was especially central in 
the 1930s and 1940s.   More recently, it has often been argued that this frame is 
inaccurate and advantageous to the right: it fails to capture the fact that government is 
always involved, including when policy is written for the benefit of corporate interests.  
During the Depression, when business leadership was at its most embattled and the 
federal welfare state undeveloped, liberals saw the government vs. laissez-faire frame as 
politically effective.  Whether they approved or not, elites of all political perspectives 
understood the electorate as demanding more government. 
An argument prominent among conservatives held that business was currently on 
the losing end of an ideological contest with advocates of liberal government.  “The 
recently enfranchised masses and the leaders of thought who supply their ideas are almost 
completely under the spell of [the] dogma” that “government with its instruments of 
coercion must, by commanding the people how they shall live, direct the course of 
civilization and fix the shape of things to come,” lamented Walter Lippmann, best known 
to 1930s elites as a leading conservative syndicated columnist.182  Liberals identified the 
same trajectory but saw it as encouraging.  Voters had been skeptical of government 
intervention in the past, in this view, but were starting to recognize the necessity of a 
different approach.  Liberal Stuart Chase interpreted the 1936 election as evidence of 
“wavering public support for the religion of business”: “The old gods are tumbling…The 
people have turned to a new god—the government, led by Mr. Roosevelt. The new god 
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works.”183 Notably, while Lippmann only uses religious language (“dogma”) to describe 
the views he opposes, Chase uses it in reference to his own side as well.  The “people,” in 
this framework, did not draw on critical thinking so much as faith.  Their political role 
was to place their trust in the right group of elites, and the chief indication of their 
changing views was the worshipful attitude many adopted towards Roosevelt. 
Chase’s phrasing is suggestive: the progressive majority built by the New Deal, as 
many liberals imagined it, exercised agency through elites.  It was a dispersed public184: 
millions of people in little towns and big cities listening to the president on the radio or 
talking with their neighbors about the need for change.  That dispersed public made it 
possible for reform to take place because voters demanded it at the ballot box.  The 
imagery of agency that came out of the industrial union movement was much different.  
Here workers exercised agency directly and as an embodied group, putting their 
livelihoods or lives on the line to secure their rights. 
The rush of labor organization was among the most central stories in American 
media and politics in the period, and that story proceeded at incredible speed.  As New 
York Times labor reporter Louis Stark recalled, the period saw a “Niagara of news” about 
labor enter the top headlines “over night.”185 Labor news appeared prominently in mass 
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publications and elite-oriented periodicals, and actors on both sides were deeply invested 
in shaping public opinion about the new unions. The key strikes of the period—including 
autoworkers in Toledo, truck drivers in Minneapolis, and longshoremen in San Francisco 
in 1934, autoworkers in Flint and steelworkers in Pennsylvania and Ohio in 1936 and 
1937—were reported extensively in a range of media, as were CIO involvement in 
electoral politics and conflicts between the nascent CIO and the AFL. The tenor of labor 
reporting varied across and within publications.  Unfavorable press often claimed to 
“expose” communist influence in unions or painted strikers as a small minority of 
workers egged on by “outside agitators” against the wishes of the majority.186 Some 
coverage was dry and straight-ahead, with a focus on political machinations within 
unions and the political strategy of industrial relations.  Some coverage, even in 
mainstream publications, treated the CIO story favorably, as a compelling drama.  
The new unions worked aggressively to shape their publicity.  Nearly all CIO 
affiliates had on staff a former newspaper journalist who knew how to write slick copy 
and attract press attention, and unions made strategic use of radio at both the national and 
local level. The CIO’s chief public voice in the mid- to late 1930s was its president, John 
L. Lewis, who was quoted frequently in the daily press and delivered a series of national 
radio speeches in which he claimed to speak for “labor” as a whole.  As Lewis and other 
elites argued, the power of the CIO’s claim to represent workers grew from the work of 
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non-elite actors as well as elite actors.  Rank-and-file worker-actor struggle supported the 
claims of the CIO’s leaders and publicity operation, which in turn shaped the meaning of 
that struggle at the elite level.  The predominant frame put forward by the CIO mirrored 
and reinforced the anti-elite rhetoric coming out of the New Deal (and from figures 
farther to the left).  “The organization and constant onward sweep of [the CIO] 
exemplifies the resentment of the many toward the selfishness, greed and the neglect of 
the few,” John L. Lewis insisted in a 1937 speech.187 
In understanding contemporary discourse on organized labor, it is important to 
stress that contemporaries responded not only to labor’s immediate, concrete 
achievements, but also to what it might achieve in the future.  The CIO, journalist C. L. 
Sulzberger wrote in 1938, “was the militant voice of the workers, the guide to the 
unorganized, a movement whose implied threat of power was beyond immediate 
measure.”188  As much as anything, it was its “implied threat of power” that made the 
CIO so important in contemporary discourse. Nearly all journalistic and intellectual work 
on organized labor dealt in some form with the question of how far the workers might go, 
what the unrest stirring across the country might portend.  As the next section details, 
some saw an entirely transformed society as more than possible. 
“Labor on the March”: Union Militancy and (White) Working Class Representation 
 
Leftists often saw the industrial union struggles of the 1930s as the beginnings of 
a sustained working class radicalism.  The New Deal and the CIO, in this view, were key 
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initial stages in the left’s struggle to gain working class support.189  Leftists differed on 
the kind of transformation they wanted, but many believed that workers would ultimately 
go beyond the modest, reformist goals unions initially sought (the right to collective 
bargaining, higher wages). The gains made by workers and unions would continue, in this 
view, and workers’ political consciousness would grow.  As inaugural CIO publicity 
director Len De Caux (a journalist pushed out for radical affiliations during the late 1940s 
Red Scare) recalled, the “working class became a concept to conjure with when newly 
organizing millions seemed to promise a movement capable of transforming society.”190  
Sympathetic observers used a persistent phrase to describe the trajectory of those 
“millions”: “labor on the march.” 
This section examines imagery of an onward-marching, militant working class as 
it emerged from liberal and radical labor journalism. It is important to stress that the lines 
between liberal and left in this period were blurry and were not strictly policed.  The 
drive to create a liberalism purged of any association with the radical left did not begin in 
earnest until the late 1940s.  In the 1930s in particular, radical reporting and radical 
opinions appeared consistently in most left-of-center publications, including the liberal 
Nation and New Republic.  While this work does not fit as neatly under the umbrella of 
“elite public discourse” as the reporting in the New York Times, left/liberal journalism 
was known to observers outside of radical left circles. 
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For liberal and leftist journalists, the archetypical imagery of an onward-marching 
1930s working class emerged from strikes and labor conflict. Strikes took center stage in 
liberal publications like the Nation and New Republic, in radical outlets like New Masses 
and Partisan Review, and in the book-length accounts of sympathetic labor journalists, 
including Charles Rumford Walker’s American City (1937), Mary Heaton Vorse’s 
Labor’s New Millions (1938), Edward Levinson’s Labor on the March (1938), and 
Benjamin Stolberg’s The Story of the CIO (1938). Strikes offered obvious manifestations 
of class conflict—violent combat between workers and police or employers’ hired 
thugs—and solidarity, as workers marched together, ate together, and fought together.  
Left/liberal labor reporting spotlighted both, treating them as (in one chronicler’s words) 
“expressive of the class awakening, of a mass soul in birth.”191 
The chief theme in left/liberal labor reporting is the collective unity and power 
exerted by scores of workers standing up for their rights.  “Jesus, we got some power, us 
workers, when we make up our mind to use it,” as one worker-actor quoted by a 
journalist put it.192  That power was evident in the huge numbers unions mobilized, in 
their coordination, bravery, and unity.  This account of a Detroit march led by the United 
Auto Workers (UAW) is typical: 
The workers arrived in tens of thousands.  They packed Cadillac Square, and 
overflowed down the side streets.  It was estimated that there were 150,000. But 
they maintained perfect order.  Bursts of song came from them.  Now the Boss Is 
Shivering in His Shoes, Parlez-Vous, and again, The Star Spangled Banner, 
followed by Solidarity…The crowd was always in gentle motion, adding new 
groups of workers with their banners flowing through the crowd like a river in a 
sea.  Huge slogans moved perpetually through the people: G.M.—Chrysler—Ford 
                                                           
191 Henry Kraus, The Many and the Few (Los Angeles: The Plantin Press, 1947), 292. 
192 John Mullen, “Mushrooms in the Foundry,” in Proletarian Literature in the United States, ed. Granville 
Hicks et al. (New York: International Publishers, 1935), 233. 
116 
 
Next. Police Clubs Are No Way To Negotiate With Workers.  You Can Beat Us 
But You Can’t Defeat Us.  Down With Police Brutality.  You Sat On Us Long 
Enough, Now We’re Sitting On You.193 
 
In this passage, “the crowd” and “the workers” seem to have an agency all their own; 
individual actors are absorbed into the collective (“new groups…flowing through the 
crowd like a river in a sea”).  The collective is simultaneously calm (“perfect 
order…gentle motion”) and threatening, at least for the boss “shivering in his shoes.”  
Workers were not looking for a fight, in this framework, but they were not afraid of 
anything they might face. 
Reporters explicitly depicted—and at times, celebrated—violence between 
strikers and employers’ forces.  With makeshift weapons, workers displayed incredible 
bravery in the face of police brutality, in these accounts.  “Thousands of workers, many 
women among them, came with squared jaws to take their places” on the picket line, the 
New York Post’s Edward Levinson reported from Flint.  “Men and women carried clubs 
and stout sticks; several had crowbars, stove pokers, and lengths of pipe.  A few had 
knocked the base off clothes-trees, and carried the poles, with metal hangers, on their 
shoulders.” Levinson positioned the strikers as heirs of the American revolution; like “the 
Minute Men of ’76…[and] as fully determined that their cause was righteous, they had 
seized whatever weapon lay at hand and rushed off to do battle.”194 Journalists made 
explicit the consequences of workers’ bravery and the brutality of their adversaries. 
“They flowed directly into that buckshot fire, inevitably, without hesitation…And the 
cops let them have it as they picked up their wounded,” Meridel Le Sueur reported from 
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Minneapolis.  “Lines of living, solid men, fell, broke, wavering, flinging up, breaking 
over with the curious and awful abandon of despairing gestures, a man stepping on his 
own intestines…another holding his severed arm in his other hand.”195  “The class line 
was drawn in blood on the streets of the city,” the Nation’s James Rorty wrote.196  These 
stark depictions of violence against strikers were intended to draw sympathy for workers 
and condemnation towards the employers and authorities responsible.  As one unionist 
explained, “Often there is nothing that throws as bright a spotlight on the sufferings and 
unrest of the workingman as a flareup of violence.  The worker is not news when he 
quietly starves.”197 
Radical labor reporting’s focus on battle also reflected a broader understanding of 
working class militancy in a masculinist idiom: the same strength that allowed 
workingmen to perform hard physical work prepared them to stand against their 
adversaries.  Some in Pennsylvania steel country cited a mythical, Paul Bunyan-esque 
steelworker named Joe Magarac, “made of steel all the way through” and seen as “the 
symbol of the men who have long been masters of metal and fire and machinery, and 
who only recently began to be masters of their own lives.”198 But reporters also 
emphasized the strength of working class communities broadly, the organization and 
collaboration required to keep the strikers fed and the bosses under pressure. “Between 
four and five thousand persons ate at strike headquarters and slept in or near it for the 
strike’s duration,” Charles Rumford Walker reported from Minneapolis.  “Fourteen or 
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fifteen hours of the day they were on the picket line, while at night they listened to the 
news of the strike, the status of negotiations, the bosses’ latest move.”199 While women 
were at times featured in supporting roles, they also consistently appeared as direct 
participants in the battle—wielding potato mashers against gun-wielding deputies, 
braving tear gas to get food to sit-down strikers, walking picket lines and coordinating 
picketing. 
 The work of Mary Heaton Vorse offers a model example of the kind of journalism 
practiced by leftwing correspondents.  Vorse was a fearless reporter who witnessed much 
of the iconic labor history of the 1930s firsthand as a freelance correspondent for the New 
Republic and Federated Press (a labor-left wire service created as an alternative to the 
Associated Press). Her reporting in this period—most notably her 1938 book Labor’s 
New Millions—told the story of the rise of the CIO as an upsurge of rank-and-file 
heroism, with individual “struggles” treated “not as isolated conflicts but as part of a 
great forward thrust.”  “The C.I.O., with its form of industrial unionism, its dynamic 
leadership, was an answer to the unspoken wish which had existed in the hearts of 
literally millions of workers,” Vorse wrote in a passage that might be read as a thesis. 
“Labor’s new millions” believed that “it is the function of good government to promote 
the welfare of people, rather than that of the small class whose one aim is profits,” and 
they were quickly gaining the power to make that vision of government a reality.200 
Vorse, like other like-minded journalists, consistently depicted violence in very 
stark terms.  “Piled on top of each other in [a] patrol wagon were sixteen dying and 
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seriously wounded,” she reported from Youngstown, Ohio. “They lay every which way, 
on top of each other. They couldn’t stand, they couldn’t sit.  The blood dripped upon the 
floor of the wagon.”  A striker tried to help a dying man, who “made a gesture that he 
wanted to smoke.  She searched in his pockets to try to find his cigarettes, but they were 
soaked in blood.”201  One critic surmised that Vorse had an “eighth sense” for where and 
when strikes and violent confrontations would take place.202  More likely, though, she 
relied on correspondence with organizers and local union officials, with all involved 
keenly aware of the strategic value of depicting brutal violence against workers.  One 
Pittsburgh unionist, for instance, gave Vorse names to contact for an unspecified “blood 
curdling” story and proposed a “Black Legion story which can be made sensational.  New 
strategy of attacking it, forcing big shot provocations into the open is in the 
making…Story in it sure.”203  In a separate skirmish, Vorse herself was wounded when a 
bullet grazed the side of her head, and a newspaper picture of her with “blood streaming 
down [her] face,” Vorse’s agent wrote her, had “all New York…buzzing.”204  
Undeterred, Vorse described the injury to her daughter as “the merest scratch.”205 
Though Vorse’s agent at times stressed her “completely objective” view in 
pitching stories—making a living writing for leftist and liberal publications on a freelance 
basis was a constant struggle—Vorse in much of her reporting was unapologetic about 
her own sympathies.  When apprehended by authorities, she dared them to “Kill me, if 
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you are not too yellow, I would rather die a martyr fighting for Democracy under the flag 
of the Socialist party and the C. I. O. than to ever turn traitor.”206  Her bravery and 
sympathy for labor’s cause won Vorse’s work a very warm reception from union leaders 
and left/liberal publications.  “A vast movement such as that which is embodied in the 
Committee for Industrial Organization has epic connotations whose spirit you have 
caught admirably,” John L. Lewis wrote to her in a letter of thanks.207  Another unionist 
praised Labor’s New Millions as “one of the most outstanding contributions to the labor 
movement on the North American Continent.”208  Others more suspicious of the CIO, 
though, found Vorse’s focus on its heroism off-putting.  As one blunt reviewer put it, 
“The whole thing is pictured as a mighty uprising of labor’s millions.  It is a folk 
movement, a crusade. The leaders are idealized.  The followers multiply as they come 
one million treading on another’s heels.  The writer is like a child watching a circus 
parade.”209 
This review, however uncharitable, called out a very real feature of radical labor 
reporting: while it drew labor leaders as dynamic personalities210, it treated rank-and-file 
workers as anonymous.  The protagonists were “the workers,” not individual workers. 
“This book has no hero or heroes; it is a story of the rank and file,” UAW-affiliated 
reporter Henry Kraus began his account of the Flint strike.211  Radical labor reporters 
typically gave rank-and-file workers’ names only if they were killed in the struggle (not, 
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for instance, if they were quoted).  Further, while some treated the rank and file as 
intellectually gifted and perceptive, for many chroniclers, workers’ heroism drew on a 
strong and single-minded devotion to basic truths: as Kraus put it, “an immense collective 
unity and power based on simple loyalty to group interest.”212  In this framework, 
workers did not need a deep understanding of politics; they needed to understand that 
they were workers and that their interests were with the union. 
To be sure, some argued that workers did desire a deep understanding of politics.  
Vorse, for instance, saw an almost superhuman intellectual curiosity motivating a “steady 
drive from beneath, by the rank and file…for more workers’ education”: “What the 
workers want to know about most is the economic side of the world they live in…They 
want courses in economics, the history of the labor movement, industrial situations, 
government, economic history, legislation, community problems…parliamentary 
law…[and] social philosophy.”213 More often, though, radical labor reporting featured 
workers advancing leftist slogans in dialect or broken English. “It’s a state of war—
capital agin labor,” a Toledo worker exhorted his cohorts.214  Meridel Le Sueur, reporting 
from Minneapolis, reproduced a letter from a striker to his girlfriend (“dere emily”) that 
exemplifies the untutored radicalism of this idealized worker: 
Here i am at strike head 1/4 an its plenty hot. Hell emily i bin thinkin the last few 
days. theze here bosses we got in town keep yellin in the papers and over there 
radios that communism and payin 54 1/2 [cents] an hour is one an the same thing. 
well if thats what communism is, why i gess I’m a Communist an I expec most 
evry one in the world excep a small bunch of potbellyd and titefisted bosses must 
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be to.215 
Not only has the striker begun to consider communism, in a common trope, the 
experience of the strike has brought him around to that position (“i bin thinkin the last 
few days”).  Here the boundaries between authenticity, normativity, and inferiority 
become very porous. 
The connection between the working class and the body, so evident in radical 
depictions of workers marching and fighting, reflected an often-stigmatizing 
understanding of working class life which leftists did not escape.  Both radicals and 
conservatives might define working class culture as visceral and physical, in opposition 
to the intellectual and rational culture of the professional class.  For Le Sueur, a novelist 
and journalist recognized as one of the leading “proletarian writers” of the period, the 
working class world was a welcome contrast to her own origins.  “I do not care for the 
bourgeois ‘individual’ that I am,” Le Sueur explained: while she had been born into the 
bourgeoisie, she sought to be “born whole out of it.”  Despite her radical views, she 
experienced a jarring transition “stepping into a dark chaotic passional world of another 
class, the proletariat…stirring, strange, and outside the calculated, expedient world of the 
bourgeoisie.” Le Sueur called on middle class readers, for whom “words are likely to 
mean more than an event,” to recognize that if “you are to understand anything [from the 
proletarian perspective] you must understand it in the muscular event, an action we have 
not been trained for.”216 This is an archetypical example of what historian Grace Hale 
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calls the “romance of the outsider”217—a common set of tropes in which professional-
class people imagine underprivileged people to have a more immediate, gratifying, 
sensual life.  In many such cases, an obvious investment in the wellbeing of the 
“outsider” tends to be accompanied by an ascription of inferiority.  Le Sueur does not 
prize workers for their ability to think or verbalize. 
The “romance of the outsider” is not so evident in the discourse of CIO leaders, 
who tended to be from working class families and did not view outsider status as their 
ultimate goal.  But the frame preferred by those to their left—the labor movement as a 
great forward march of ordinary people standing up to power and asserting their right to 
justice and control over their lives—was also advanced by CIO elites.  “No strength will 
suffice to curb the onward march of American labor,” John L. Lewis insisted in a 1937 
speech.  “The workers of America are aroused.  They are conscious of their rights and 
their privileges and they intend to secure them.”218  In the 1930s, CIO officials sometimes 
framed violent combat as part of labor’s struggle.  They largely shied away from doing so 
thereafter, however.  Aside from a few holdouts, business elites largely accepted by the 
late 1930s that hardline opposition to unionization (attempting to break strikes by 
bringing in law enforcement, hiring replacement labor, and beating up strikers) was no 
longer a workable option.  As a result, worker-actors did not need to face down violence 
just to force employers to recognize the union, as they had in the most famous strikes of 
the period.  Celebrating picket line militancy also gave off a whiff of radicalism that 
became extremely dangerous for unions over the course of the 1940s. 
                                                           
217 Grace Elizabeth Hale, A Nation of Outsiders (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
218 John L. Lewis, “Labor and the Supreme Court,” address delivered on CBS Radio, May 14, 1937, reel 
one, Lewis Papers. 
124 
 
Ultimately, though, in order for the “labor on the march” frame to apply, the 
workers did not need to be moving toward the radical left.  The CIO built a close alliance 
with the Democratic Party in the late 1930s and early 1940s, which helped to create a 
strong link in elite public discourse between workers’ political goals and the agenda of 
the Democrats.219  By the late 1940s, most of the radical-leaning officials in CIO unions 
had been pushed out, but traces of left’s militant worker remained.  Shortly after his 
election as United Auto Workers (UAW) president in 1947, Walter Reuther roused 
listeners in passionate terms: “We are the vanguard in America in that great crusade to 
build a better world. We are the architects of the future, and we are going to fashion the 
weapons with which we will work and fight and build.”220  Reuther, who had campaigned 
promising to take a hard line on communists in the union, drew on powerful imagery 
associated with the tradition he sought to expel. 
Union leadership and the Democrats put forward what might be read as a reined-
in version of the left’s onward-marching, militant worker.  In this framework, workers’ 
gains would be beneficial to all but a selfish few.  They would “lead…a national 
movement devoted to the general welfare just as much as to the particular interests of 
labor groups,” as CIO president Philip Murray put it in 1944.221  Most importantly, in this 
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framework, they would accomplish their goals within the contours of the formal political 
system and through their union representatives.  1940s CIO materials suggested one 
primary way for a worker to be a force for progress: becoming a reliable Democratic 
voter.  A suggestive CIO poster of the early 1940s depicts a muscular white arm placing a 
ballot into a ballot box.  The text reads, “The ballot is a power in your hands.  Use it—
and you help to secure good government.  Fail to use it—and you score for the other side.  
Your vote is the key to your freedom.”222 
The view of the progressive worker as a Democratic voter was most clearly 
embodied in the CIO Political Action Committee, founded in 1943.  CIO-PAC was 
tasked with registering worker-actors to vote and educating the rank and file about 
politics.  The CIO’s opponents seized on CIO-PAC as evidence that labor wanted to take 
over American democracy by delivering a bloc of voters marching in lockstep, “an 
attempt…by high-powered pressure groups to seize the people’s government from the 
majority of the people.”223 While CIO officials rejected this view and insisted that they 
did not control a “bloc” vote, they did at times frame the labor vote as a homogenous 
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progressive force.  CIO president Philip Murray touted PAC as “a mighty force devoted 
to keeping the great majority of Americans vigilant and alert in guarding their proper 
political interests”; CIO-PAC leader Jack Kroll promised that in order to “defeat its 
enemies,” labor would “get out 60,000,000 votes.”224  The use of war analogies in 
reference to electoral politics suggests the mainstreaming of the militant worker ideal. 
By the end of the 1940s (see Chapter 2), only a handful of radicals believed there 
was any chance that workers would support a politics to the left of the Roosevelt-Truman 
Democratic Party.  Nonetheless, the view of union workers as a reliable liberal vote 
survived until the mid-1960s, when white worker-actor support for backlash politicians 
made it no longer credible (see Chapter 3).  Ironically, though, portrayals of the white 
working class as the vanguard of white backlash bear a distinct resemblance to the 
imagery of “labor on the march.”  In each case, (white) workers act as a homogenous 
group, marching the nation towards a changed politics. 
Resistance to the Progressive Worker 
It’s useful to conclude this chapter by spotlighting discourse that does not fit the 
dominant trajectory of the period—the growing association between white workers and 
progressive politics.  While the view that the majority of (white) workers opposed 
liberalism was a minority view in this period, it was not an insignificant one.  Many 
observers argued that optimistic liberals and leftists read too much into the events of the 
decade; workers might support modest reforms that would raise their standard of living, 
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but they were not motivated by ideology.  Prominent arguments among conservatives 
held that “honest” workers understood that labor leaders were not their friends and that 
liberalism harmed the interests of deserving workers in favor of the undeserving.  The 
purpose of this section is not to undercut or contradict the larger argument of the chapter, 
but to nuance its triumphalist tone and provide a brief sketch of alternative views in New 
Deal-era elite discourse. 
The most prominent elite-level rebuttal to the assumption that (white) workers 
would be consistently progressive in their politics followed on the longstanding 
commonplace of American exceptionalism: the vast majority of Americans remained 
individualistic and moderate in their politics.  Particularly in the years most marked by 
labor struggle, centrist and right-leaning periodicals often reassured readers that the 
nation was still overwhelmingly “middle class.” While “class consciousness…has been 
read into” developments like the rise of the CIO, one 1937 New York Times article 
explained, what “one finds…as one goes about the country is evidence that we are still 
overwhelmingly a middle-class nation…There are no signs whatever [whatsoever] that 
the huge middle class layer is being crushed between the plutocracy and the 
proletariat.”225  Industrial workers, contemporaries argued, were overwhelmingly “middle 
class” as well.  Workers wanted to be treated fairly as individuals; they did not want a 
fundamentally different system.  New York Times labor reporter Louis Stark reported 
from the Flint sit-down auto strikes that the workers “would be well satisfied with a 
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workable plan of collective bargaining…The American worker is middle class in his 
viewpoint and outlook, not revolutionary.”226 Sociologist Alfred Winslow Jones led a 
1941 interview-based study seeking to uncover “to what extent the American people have 
preserved the sameness of economic viewpoint that we may assume existed in the early 
days”—in other words, whether Americans’ “middle class” outlook was only a product 
of the relative equality found in small rural communities.  Jones concluded that the same 
perspective survived in industrial society: “The workers do not want to be set off as a 
class apart, and if the agencies of public opinion were to attempt to set them off, the 
result would be nothing but resentment.”227  In this view, liberals and leftists who 
expected anything more than basic reform (e.g. the right to bargain collectively, social 
insurance for old age or disability) had projected their own hopes onto workers. 
Some conservatives drew on the notion that workers wanted a middle-class life 
above all to suggest that a significant portion of the working and non-elite population was 
out of sympathy with liberalism.  To be clear, these elite voices were not representative 
of conservative discourse as a whole.  As labor and liberalism gained momentum, many 
conservatives expressed deep pessimism about the purchase liberal ideas had gained.  In 
fatalistic terms, they figured themselves as part of a thinking minority overcome by a tide 
of mass emotion and demagoguery and predicted that liberals could maintain power 
indefinitely simply by giving voters goodies from the public purse.  Taken as a group, 
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though, conservative elites did not abandon the notion that they possessed (or could gain) 
majority support. 
One common argument held that liberals had not achieved majority support at 
all—rather, they had gained power by catering to the self-interest and greed of minorities 
at the expense of the majority.  A range of conservatives, from business circles to rural 
Christian circles, gravitated to a frame opposing idle and selfish minority constituencies 
to a modest self-sufficient middle-income majority.  Publisher Frank Gannett hoped to 
assemble “a great middle-class bloc…[of] thrifty, frugal, hard-working, self-respecting 
and God-fearing men and women who built America” to oppose the liberals’ 
constituencies, “the slackers, the shirkers, the incompetent, and the unfortunate.”228 “The 
great body of normal, uncomplaining, hard-working, thrifty, self-sustaining, and 
somewhat self-satisfied Americans,” “the great economic middle class…[that has] 
worked and saved to secure the homes, farms, insurance policies and savings which build 
and sustain the productivity of this country,” “the great middle class…given little 
political attention save as the source of taxes, the supplier of funds, the producer of 
votes”: these were the true victims of New Dealism, in this framework.229  In most 
accounts, this “great middle class” included skilled workers alongside professionals, 
small businessmen, and farmers.  Though it comprised the vast majority, the middle-
income constituency was not vocal, in this view, and a left catering to the less deserving 
had ignored its interests. 
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Particularly symbolic of this line of argumentation were efforts to reclaim the 
symbol of the “forgotten man” from liberals.  Figuring white workers as “forgotten” is 
one of the most notable recurring devices in the long history of white working class 
representation.  Gilded Age social theorist William Graham Sumner coined the term to 
valorize the quiet, deserving, productive member of society, defined against the idle 
poor.230  When Roosevelt adopted it in 1932, promising economic policy built around the 
needs of the “forgotten man at the bottom of the economic pyramid,” it came to mean any 
underprivileged American.  In response, conservatives who knew the original context 
cried foul and attempted to return the term to its earlier meaning.  Yale professor A. G. 
Keller, a former student of Sumner’s, argued that the New Dealers had “pervert[ed]” the 
term, applying it to the “willing or eager, and always whining, parasite on society who 
possesses no social virtues such as thrift, industry, fairness, self-respect, and honor,” the 
“whiner, who is never forgotten because he is so constantly dinned into the ear.” The true 
forgotten man, Keller suggested, was not a “pauper” or “a member of the proletariat.”  
Rather, he was the self-sufficient “tax-paying consumer” who “asks no favors. He makes 
no trouble.  He emits no squeals. He marches no marches on Washington nor maintains a 
lobby there.” He simply wanted “to be let alone.”231 
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This is the same basic claim that would underlie appeals to Middle America 
several decades later: A deserving middle-income cultural mainstream (or “silent 
majority,” as Richard Nixon would call it) had seen its political influence eclipsed by 
vocal minorities.  There is also an ironic resonance in this discourse with the enduring 
argument that liberals direct specific appeals to individual minority groups rather than 
appealing to a universal national interest.  This argument is not a product of the age of 
“identity politics” as conventionally understood—the period after the 1960s and 1970s.  
It is evident in response to New Deal efforts to make the government more responsive to 
nondominant groups (including white workers, who are now usually identified as those 
left out when liberals pursue “identity politics”).232  
The chief difference lies in the groups held to constitute the mainstream and the 
margins.  Here (unlike in the 1960s) a substantial proportion of the white working 
population was relegated to the margins.  One of the major minorities held to be seeking 
control over national politics was organized labor, and conservatives who spoke for a 
silenced mainstream were often reaffirming older understandings of that mainstream 
centered on a self-sufficient Protestant middle class. “Clean,” “sober,” “thrifty,” 
“industrious”: the adjectives applied to liberalism’s victims were longstanding signifiers 
of white Protestant masculinity.  Excluded were “peasants and parasites” or (more 
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explicitly) “the poor Pole…the illiterate Italian.”233 To be sure, it would be inaccurate to 
frame the argument as pure nativism—Al Smith, the 1928 Democratic presidential 
nominee and the first Catholic nominee of a major party, objected to the New Deal on 
similar terms234, and explicitly nativist criticism declined over the course of the 1930s. 
At bottom, in this framework, the key economic division pitted responsible 
against irresponsible rather than rich against nonrich.  “The dividing line runs not 
between Capital and Labor, but between the kind of Labor that works and saves, and the 
kind that doesn’t,” one conservative put it.235  Thrift, prosperity, and upward mobility 
were indicators of virtue, in this view, while poverty was not.  It was bad politics and bad 
policy to condemn someone for having more.  A thrifty and responsible skilled worker 
would see his interests as aligned with the interests of his employer more readily than 
with the interests of his irresponsible fellow-worker.  In this framework, a conservative 
did not need to be wealthy, but merely needed to have more to lose than gain from 
irresponsible change.  “Very often the smaller the amount of property the voter owns the 
more intense is his conservatism,” columnist Frank Kent emphasized in a compelling 
piece titled “America Is Conservative.”  Kent contended that “the common characteristic 
of all conservatives is that they have something—at least a little money or property, 
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acquired through inheritance, or thrift, or plain hard work.”236  In this view, liberals erred 
in assuming that all non-elite constituencies had common interests, or would see 
themselves as having common interests.  Distinctions that appeared unimportant from 
afar—that one worker had a little money saved, while another did not—were vitally 
important. 
A related line of argumentation held that most workers recognized that unions and 
union leaders did not have their best interests at heart.  Especially by the 1940s, those 
who sought to stem the growth of organized labor’s power often claimed to be defending 
the rights of the individual worker against mandatory union membership (the “closed 
shop”) and malfeasance in the union hierarchy.  It was deeply unjust, in this view, for 
workers to be forced to give up a portion of their wages to the union, and for the union to 
take up political activity its members did not endorse.  In this context, antimonopoly 
language typically directed at employers could be repurposed as a rebuke of labor 
leaders.  “The American working man has been deprived of his dignity as an individual.  
He has been cajoled, coerced, intimidated and on many occasions beaten up…His whole 
economic life has been subject to the complete domination and control of unregulated 
monopolists,” read a 1940s Republican House committee report.237  Unionism in itself 
was reasonable and necessary, in this line of argumentation, but thugs and opportunists 
posing as friends of the worker could easily seize power. 
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One of the most zealous conservative defenders of the worker victimized by 
unions was syndicated columnist Westbrook Pegler, whose exposés of union corruption 
and organized crime involvement in the late 1930s and early 1940s drew considerable 
attention.  Pegler believed that “the honest American workingman needs a labor union to 
protect him from the greed of his employer,” but he maintained that unions could 
victimize “honest” workers just as much. “It is bad when the honest workman is spied 
upon and denied his human rights by agents of a soulless corporation,” Pegler argued. 
“But it is at least that bad, if not worse, when he is spied upon, robbed of his earnings and 
coerced into strikes by men who cleverly appear to be acting in the interest of the 
oppressed.”  Union leaders—“parasite incompetents who live by their unionism”238—
enriched themselves at the expense of the workers they viewed as unthinking “robots.”  
Most workers were not “orators or parliamentarians,” Pegler emphasized; they did not 
have the publicity skills of the “smart professionals” who staffed the union hierarchy.  
Even though many to most workers inwardly dissented from labor-liberalism, for Pegler, 
their views went unheard in public discourse because they had been rendered “voiceless” 
by unions.239 
Pegler’s description of rank-and-file workers as “voiceless” has an odd resonance 
with the claims of the most famous voice of organized labor in the period, John L. Lewis.  
“The workers are still inarticulate,” Lewis told a journalist in 1938. “They are incapable 
of influencing Congress, industry or anyone else.”  The mission of Lewis and the CIO 
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was to exert influence on their behalf: “I speak for millions of the inarticulate workers of 
the United States”…“My voice tonight will be the voice of millions of men and women 
employed in America’s industries, heretofore unorganized, economically exploited and 
inarticulate.”240 For Pegler, Lewis and his cohort rendered workers voiceless; for Lewis, 
they were voiceless without organization.  Both spotlighted the mechanisms by which 
labor and liberals claimed to represent a mass constituency.  This chapter has sought to 
do the same—and in doing so, to provide an alternative angle on some of the best-
remembered events in the history of the US white working class. 
 
Conclusion 
In the 1920s, the dominant elite-level views of the majority and the American 
worker were unfavorable to liberal politics, this chapter has argued; they stressed the 
middle-income lifestyle most Americans, including workers, enjoyed and valued.  In the 
1930s and 1940s, liberals and leftists championed a new understanding of the majority 
with urban industrial workers at its center.  (White) workers, especially industrial 
workers, were symbolic of the need for American politics to move beyond the antistatist 
traditions it had inherited.  The insecurity industrial workers faced, their inability to 
secure decent lives through their own agency, underscored the need for dramatic changes 
in government to meet the changes brought by industrial capitalism, for liberals.  
Industrial workers—from the striker charging into battle with makeshift weapons to the 
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worker voting a straight Democratic ticket—were also symbolic of the immense political 
force that disenfranchised Americans could assert when they recognized their power. In 
the newly dominant elite view, workers and the public at large had turned away from 
business leadership in favor of liberals, organized labor, and the activist state. 
From the perspective of a study of white working class representation, it is 
important to stress that the association between the white working class and progressive 
politics had a great deal to do with the progressive elites and institutions speaking on 
behalf of workers in elite public discourse. There is no question that the changes in elite 
public discourse owed in part to worker-actors putting their bodies on the line.  However, 
few of those worker-actors had any influence over the way elites interpreted their actions. 
Progressive views among white worker-actors were mostly obscured at the elite level in 
the 1920s because there was no institution powerful enough to highlight them there.  In 
the 1930s, the rise of powerful elite-level political forces speaking for workers from a 
progressive perspective produced the appearance of a rapid shift to the left.  Changes at 
the level of elite public discourse are often rapid and sharp; micro-level changes are 
rarely so fast or neat. 
How elites saw workers as a political constituency—what they believed, which 
elite-level voices could be taken as their representatives—changed in this period, and 
changed for the long term.  Industrialists who had once pressed strong claims to represent 
workers were now defined as their antagonists.  Until the 1960s, liberal politicians and 
labor leaders exerted the strongest claim to speak for (white) workers at the elite level. By 
the same logic, nonliberal views among white worker-actors were obscured (to a degree) 
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as a result.  In particular, it is difficult to overstate how deeply unions shaped dominant 
views of (white) working class political consciousness at the height of their power: 
contemporaries often spoke about the views and interests of “workers” as interchangeable 
with the interests of unions.  At their midcentury peak, unions represented roughly a third 
of the national workforce. 
The same discourse that altered elite understandings of the American worker 
limited the scope of the liberal intervention.  Industrialists and industrialism were so 
central to left/liberal understandings of the political challenges before the nation that 
other sources of power received comparatively little emphasis.  The image of the average 
working American remained centered on the male worker and the patriarchal family.  
When it expanded to include eastern and southern Europeans, African Americans were 
excluded.  It is important to stress, though, that liberals’ claims appear significantly more 
limited from the standpoint of twenty-first century elite discourse than they generally did 
from the standpoint of 1930s and 1940s elite discourse. For a number of supporters and 
opponents, what was at stake was nothing less than a transformation of American 
political life.  The association between (white) workers and progressive politics 
developed in a period where the dominant debates within elite public discourse centered 
on economics narrowly understood—the role of unions, capital, and the state in an 
industrial society. When the problem of inequality was defined narrowly around those 
issues, the (white male industrial) worker in need of security was clearly a symbol of 
change, even stark change.  When the discourse changed, that was no longer the case. 
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In the late 1940s and 1950s, that worker remained a symbol of change, but it was 
a different kind of change—a transformation of American capitalism, led by both 
business and labor, into a tool for equality and broadly distributed prosperity.  As Chapter 
2 will stress, liberal successes challenged and altered the commonplace that America is a 
middle class country, but that commonplace remained powerful.  It was entirely 
compatible with a labor/liberal politics that enabled individuals to better their economic 
position and allowed a greater percentage of the population to reach middle-income 
status.  Between the late 1940s and mid-1950s, depictions of poverty and economic 
disadvantage among working whites almost entirely disappeared from elite public 
discourse.  The newly dominant view held that labor-liberal gains and prodigious post-
World War II economic growth had raised nearly all white workers into the middle class.  
These developments fundamentally changed the politics of white working class 
representation, and that is where Chapter 2 turns. 
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Coda: The (White) Worker as a Latent Progressive Force 
 
A longstanding commonplace about 1930s and 1940s culture and politics holds 
that liberals and leftists romanticized white workers, treating them as virtuous and 
politically perceptive.  That claim was made at the time241 and has appeared consistently 
in historical work since. Notable works on the 1930s describe “the laboring of American 
culture”; “a fascination with the folk and its culture, past and present”; a tendency “to 
romanticize the intuitive knowledge of the ‘people,’ to decide that the common man was 
really wiser and closer to ‘reality’ than those with formal education.”242 “Few public 
figures questioned…whether average Americans were too apathetic or confused about the 
sources of their collective problems to take up the burden of solving them,” Michael 
Kazin writes.243  In a common declension narrative, liberals’ idealized view of white 
workers in the 1930s gave way to a disdainful and condemnatory view in the 1950s, 
1960s, and after. 
This commonplace captures an identifiable strain of left culture and opinion, but it 
is misleading if left to stand on its own.  Most of all, it misses the extent to which 1930s 
and 1940s liberals and leftists expressed sharp concern about the current political 
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capabilities of (white) workers.  That a liberal program benefited the vast majority of 
Americans was, for all liberals, obvious.  To what extent they recognized this—and what 
role they might take in bringing about or implementing a new order—occasioned a much 
greater range of opinion.  Left/liberal assessments of disadvantaged whites might be 
usefully understood as falling along a spectrum.  On one end was a belief that they could 
act almost instinctively to bring about a better world (evident, for instance, in some of the 
radical strike reporting profiled in Chapter 1).  At the other end was an understanding of 
poor whites as passive, beaten-down populations in need of an outside intervention to 
drag them towards responsibility or political consciousness.  Most interpreters fell 
somewhere in the middle: if the majority of Americans were or would be basically 
progressive in their views, that majority was embryonic and could be easily led astray. 
This coda section sketches out contemporary left/liberals’ concerns about current 
working class politics as well as their reasons for optimism about (white) workers’ future 
political trajectory.  For many observers, (white) workers held tightly to dominant 
individualistic norms, were unable to see through misinformation in the media, and were 
apathetic and disengaged from political life.  Some raised the possibility that white 
workers would be drawn to fascism.  These concerns were tempered, though, by the ways 
in which contemporaries contextualized the views they saw as problematic.  For many, 
the political impoverishment of underprivileged people could be ultimately attributed to 
the power of the dominant class.  Many contended that (white) workers would develop a 
more progressive politics over time, particularly if reform gave them the opportunity to 
truly develop as human beings.  What was broadly shared in left/liberal discourse, this 
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section suggests, was the view that white workers’ objective interests were progressive 
and that they were crucial to any political strategy. 
 
Teleology and (white) working class representation 
A deeply held majoritarianism could be reconciled with concern about the current 
intellectual and political capacity of laboring whites for one primary reason: those who 
put their faith in white workers as a revolutionary force or a progressive force did not 
need to believe that these workers had broken through the walls of the dominant ideology 
or had developed a fully-formed politics—only that they would or could do so in the 
future.  The starting point for understanding this is the teleological framework central to 
left discourse in the period. 
Belief in the “improvement” of underprivileged people was deeply rooted among 
left/liberal elites.  As schools of thought based in Enlightenment traditions, Marxism and 
liberalism held to a firm faith in human progress and even perfectibility.244  Teleological 
language suffused leftist characterizations of working class politics—“primitive” or 
“elementary” forms of class action, “backward” or “advanced” workers, workers 
awakening (as from sleep) and learning. An emphasis on “improvement” also emerged as 
a direct response to the eugenicist view that individuals and groups possessed of bad 
genetics were inherently limited in their development. (The non-normative behavior of 
those belonging to ostensibly superior races—particularly poor rural Anglo-Saxon 
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whites—could be understood using this framework, on the grounds that “feeble-
mindedness,” slothfulness, promiscuity, and other negative traits were genetically 
heritable.245) The chief response to this school of thought emphasized that culture, 
circumstances, and environment shaped behavior and life outcomes far more than genetic 
endowment. As a result, if two individuals or groups had not been given the same 
opportunities, one could not be deemed inferior to the other: Very different environments 
would produce very different human beings. By the late 1930s, this culturalist 
explanation of group differences had become hegemonic among academics and 
intellectuals. 
It was also a commonplace among early twentieth-century progressives and New 
Deal-era professional-class reformers that a life of hardship and lack of opportunity 
produced undesirable behavior.  “Their ideas and resources are cramped,” Jane Addams 
wrote of new immigrant industrial workers in 1930. “The desire for higher social pleasure 
is extinct. They have no share in the traditions and social energy which make for 
progress. Too often their only place of meeting is a saloon, their only host a bartender; a 
local demagogue forms their public opinion.”246 The way to address these cultural and 
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moral shortcomings was not to take punitive measures against underprivileged people, in 
this view, but to change the societal conditions that had shaped them in the first place.  A 
major part of the rationale for social and economic reform was thus to create a system in 
which people who would otherwise be turned to pathology by their circumstances could 
live fulfilling and productive lives. As Bertrand Russell put it, “If it were indeed the case 
that bad nourishment, little education, lack of air and sunshine, unhealthy housing 
conditions, and overwork produce better people than are produced by good nourishment, 
open air, adequate education and housing, and a reasonable amount of leisure, the whole 
case for economic reconstruction would collapse.”247  The clear moral distinction made 
here (“better people”) was very common in this period.  In recent decades, elite 
discussions of poverty have often pivoted on the question of whether structural inequality 
or the culture of disadvantaged people is ultimately responsible.  Those who judge culture 
most important tend to argue against state-led structural interventions.  This opposition 
between culture and structure is a post-1960s phenomenon.248  In earlier decades, 
reformers calling for a structural intervention often pointed to cultural deficiencies among 
underprivileged people. Their pathological behavior served for reformers as evidence of 
their dire situation, not of any inherent inferiority or wrongdoing. 
As a result, lurid depictions of poor whites were repeatedly deployed in projects 
that attempted to aid them.  The most obvious example of this during the New Deal 
period centered on the plight of Southern sharecroppers, which became a major concern 
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in mid-1930s elite public discourse.  In the dominant elite view, poor Southern whites 
were interested in fighting, fornicating, drinking, and not much else.  In this view, as 
epitomized by journalist W. J. Cash, the “cracker” was “a remarkable romantic and 
hedonist…steadily tumbling down the slope into degeneracy, waxing ever more 
shiftless,” marked by “an intense individualism.”  Deeply invested in white supremacy, 
he would never strike at his true adversaries because “to succeed in revolt he must join 
forces with the Negro. And rather than do that, he prefers to starve and to rot.”249  
Sharecroppers’ professional-class advocates did not dispute this portrayal. They 
contended that the behavior stemmed from an agricultural system that enriched large 
landowners and subjected the vast majority to extreme poverty with no chance of escape. 
“We hear on all sides that the share-cropper is shiftless and worthless, but how could he 
be otherwise?” one asked. “By the conditions under which he lives his character is daily 
attacked and destroyed.”250  If the region achieved agricultural reform, another wrote, 
“many of the rural South’s disinherited people may be rehabilitated into useful and 
intelligent citizens”; a change in the objective conditions, in this framework, would 
necessarily precede any growth in “intelligen[ce].”251 
The South had long appeared in national-level discourse as an exceptional and 
pathological space; non-Southern laboring whites rarely appeared so distant from the 
norm.  For leftists, poor Southern whites displayed in heightened and undiluted form all 
the traits that militated against a more enlightened public opinion: individualism, racism, 
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suspicion of outsiders, inability to recognize their real interests and rise up against their 
oppressors.  But the same patterns are evident in representations of other working whites.  
Louis Adamic, for instance, is best remembered as an advocate for the inclusion of new 
immigrants in American culture, but Adamic’s work is also marked by a very sharp 
pessimism about the political potential of the working class.  “If Marx saw this 
‘proletariat’ in America today he would see precious few who might encourage him in his 
idea…that the impetus for the great change toward a new collectivist social order would 
come directly from this class,” Adamic wrote.  Most workers, he suggested, were 
“mainly done for as positive human material,” ground down by the Depression and 
unable to see a way out of their predicament.  They were “preponderantly 
individualistic…not very conscious of the world in which they live…licked by the chaos 
of America, by the machine, by industrialism; by regimentation on the one hand and by 
their futile, frustrated individualist psychology on the other.”252  For Adamic and many 
others, the dominant individualistic views continued to exert an immense amount of 
power, and many of those most devoted to them were workers whose interests were ill 
served by individualism.  
The power of the dominant ideology—and how to break it 
In recent years, liberals have often lamented working class whites’ seemingly 
inexplicable penchant for voting against their interests (as liberals perceive them).  This is 
by no means a new concern.  It is consistently present in left-of-center discourse in nearly 
any period. “It is the merit of Marxian theory that…it stresses the psychological factors 
resulting from the way in which the world lives and works,” Communist Party head Earl 
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Browder argued in 1937.  “Marxists know, and it is their duty to explain whenever 
possible, the factors which make people act contrary to their better interests and the 
practical consequences which flow therefrom.”253  “What…baffled” many of his 
contemporaries, economist George Soule wrote the same year, “is why men are reluctant 
to act in a rational manner.  Why, when social change is necessary, when external 
institutions are outworn, are men so often hesitant to see the truth and act upon it?”254  
The most prominent answer in contemporary discourse held that industrial society 
and the interests of capital worked to keep most workers, through no fault of their own, at 
a low level of intellectual development.  First, poverty and long hours of mind-numbing 
labor were not conducive to critical thinking; second, the dominant class maintained 
control over ideological channels—schools, churches, popular culture, and the press. 
Nation editor Max Lerner framed the problem as follows: “Between those who stand for 
corporate capitalism and those who stand for democratic collectivism there is a mortal 
struggle going on today, a struggle for the minds and souls of the common people.”  
Progressive views, Lerner continued, “must enter the consciousness of the vast majority 
before that majority can become an effective force to displace minority rule.  And the 
ironic fact is that, for the present at least, it is the minority that is in control of the 
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methods of influencing the majority’s mind.”255 The effects of media here were 
understood as direct, predictable, and very difficult to overcome. 
Press bias was perhaps the preeminent answer to the enduring question of why 
workers continued to act against their interests.  It is difficult to overstate the prominence 
of the press in the demonology of the 1930s and 1940s left.  New Dealers, faced with 
near-constant criticism from leading daily newspapers and syndicated columnists, 
recognized the daily press as among their most powerful adversaries and critiqued it 
accordingly.256  The rising CIO saw the press as among its primary threats as well, and 
many unionists argued passionately for a labor-funded daily paper. Conservative 
publishers William Randolph Hearst and Colonel Robert McCormick served as 
archetypical villainous economic royalists. In basic terms, the left/liberal critique held the 
press was owned and controlled by a small group of economic elites (“part of the 
financial oligarchy that is trying to rule America,” one critic put it257) who operated it in 
the interests of their class rather than in the public interest.  The commercial press 
featured editorial opinion, news commentary, and ostensibly objective news stories 
significantly weighted toward conservative views.  It also, for many, occupied readers 
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with lurid and trivial stories and features—crime, celebrities, sports, comics—that 
distracted them from more important issues.258 
Left/liberal press criticism consistently displayed a tension between majoritarian 
language and bluntly pessimistic assessments of the majority’s capacity.  For most 
left/liberal press critics, the mass audience for radio or the daily press was passive and 
suggestible. George Seldes, one of the foremost press critics of the 1930s and 1940s, 
staunchly advocated a majoritarian labor-left politics on behalf of “the great mass-
majority of the American public” while holding to a view of that public as largely 
incapable of resisting the machinations of the capitalist press.  “Public opinion is made by 
the newspapers,” Seldes claimed.259  Press lords were “little known to the people of the 
country whose minds they rule.” “The reader,” he noted, “is generally fooled, and likes 
being fooled.”260 He pitted the “intelligent minority” of workers who had begun to see 
through press propaganda against the “ignorant and betrayed workingmen who…blindly 
follow Huey Longs and Father Coughlins rather than those who teach them their own 
self-interests.”261 Nation editor Max Lerner, who called intellectuals to put aside their 
fear of the “mass mind” and become an “organic part of the life, the thinking, the striving 
of the common people,” also expressed a deeply ambivalent view of mass literacy: 
“Literacy for the common people is a fine thing.  But it is also a dangerous thing unless 
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the common people can have some control over what is given them to read in the press 
and to hear over the radio.  Literacy may only make the cattle ripe for slaughter.”262 
That striking claim suggests one primary reason for the commercial press’s 
prevalence in left/liberal discourse: bluntly put, the corrupt press worked to reconcile a 
faith in the majority with exasperation at majority decision-making.  In this period, to be 
on the left was to be on the side of the workers, the majority, the common people.  But 
the majority often made mistakes.  As Joli Jensen has argued, placing blame on the media 
allows critics to “avoid a direct attack on ‘the people’” and maintain a “faith in [their] 
natural goodness.”263  Contemporary left/liberal media criticism often follows Jensen’s 
pattern—workers were capable of making sound decisions, liberals argued, but were 
prevented from doing so by misinformation.264  Seldes and Lerner, for instance, 
preserved their “faith” in the “people” by implicating the inaccurate information 
disseminated through the media.  But they also assumed that in order to bring about a just 
economic system, the public would need to attain a level of political consciousness that 
was very difficult to attain under the current system.  That raised the question of how, if 
at all, the cycle could be broken.  For Seldes, the answer was clear—alternative media 
would be needed to circumvent and counteract the “poison” of the conservative press. 
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Contemporary leftists offered several other explanations for how workers might 
progress to a greater level of consciousness. One line of argumentation suggested that 
workers would become aware of their real interests as their social position gave them 
what one journalist called a “practical education…in the principles of Capitalism.”265  A 
worker did not need book learning to grasp the need for change, in this view, only a lived 
experience of capitalist social relations. Leading American Marxian theorist Lewis 
Corey, for instance, cited the “unemployment, mass starvation, and capitalist repression” 
of the Depression as forces that could rapidly push the mass of workers to the left: “The 
situation is so acute that revolution is on the order of the day; the conservative worker of 
to-day may become the revolutionary worker of to-morrow…As the objective conditions 
are favorable for the development of an American revolutionary labor movement and 
communism, the ideological backwardness of the workers must disappear.”266  The 
dominant ideology simply could not maintain public support indefinitely, in this view, 
when real social conditions proved it so demonstrably false. 
Others emphasized the critical role of organization and education. “We have a 
long and arduous task of education ahead of us, before we can lead a majority of the 
American people to the establishment of Socialism,” Communist Party leader Earl 
Browder explained.267 In a prominent left perspective, workers who began simply by 
voting for New Dealers and seeking collective bargaining would, through their reformist 
struggles, come to recognize the inadequacy of what they could achieve working within 
the system (in other words, the concessions they could win from capital).  Radicals 
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needed to be involved in basic, unglamorous trade union work in part for that reason, in 
this view—as workers desired more radical change, they would look to the organizers 
who had worked alongside them and earned their trust.268 
Actors outside the radical left, including CIO operatives who hoped to convince 
the rank and file to register and vote for Democrats, also stressed education.  “Arousing 
our people from their political apathy and their economic ignorance” was the key initial 
step, one official bluntly put it.269  In general, CIO leaders were consistently frustrated by 
the political disengagement of the rank and file.  However, they believed that apathetic 
workers would be progressive if they became politically aware; the basic problem was 
one of understanding and motivation.  As CIO president Philip Murray argued in 1944, 
“We, of the CIO, and of labor generally, believe in the democratic system.  We believe 
that the people, once they understand the issues, will decide them wisely.”270  This is a 
very suggestive and even startling phrasing.  It obviously begs the question of how (and 
by whom) sufficient understanding of the issues would be determined.  More broadly, 
though, it suggests that the “people” in whom Murray placed his faith were not the people 
as existing at that moment; his faith was based in an as-yet-unrealized future. 
The white worker and the threat of fascism 
Most of the analysis reviewed in this section so far has held in one way or another 
to a teleological framework in which laboring whites’ political consciousness would 
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improve over time.  Not all analysis held to this assessment.  If, as many leftists argued, 
political change was ultimately contingent on human agency, workers’ suggestibility and 
lack of sophistication could easily cripple the left, even if structural conditions were 
favorable.  “Socialism is not inevitable,” Marxian intellectual Sidney Hook put it.  “It is 
something to be accomplished when objective conditions are ripe…by men and not by 
economic forces.” Conceding for the sake of argument “Marx’s claim that the working 
class is, and has been, in a position to lead a successful socialist movement,” Hook 
continued, “unfortunately, being in a position and being able to move from that position 
are two different things.  The test of events has shown that the working class has been 
petrified in its position of potential movement.”271 At its more innocuous, this meant that 
workers would only support reformist measures and that socialism would not take hold in 
the American context; at worst, it meant that workers might be attracted by the far right. 
For some, workers’ inability to understand the true causes of their discontent 
might lead them to support a radical right-wing politics.  It is important to understand this 
analysis in the context of very real and deeply felt concern about the potential for fascism 
in the United States. Fascism for 1930s and 1940s leftists did not only or primarily refer 
to the Nazi regime; it meant a ruling class-led program of rabid nationalism, xenophobia, 
and violence intended to reestablish social control and stave off progressive change.272 If 
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the dominant class’s control over the existing system of nominal bourgeois democracy 
had begun to slip, in this view, it would be forced to reveal the iron fist under the velvet 
glove.  In the American context, a campaign of scapegoating and violence against Jews, 
blacks, immigrants, and radicals would be the likely outcome.  The group thought to be 
most susceptible to fascism was the lower middle class (petite/petty bourgeoisie), defined 
by structural position in the economy (e.g. small-scale employers, shopkeepers) rather 
than income level.  White workers would not be the leading participants in a fascist drive, 
in this view, but they might very likely be caught up in it. 
The radical right would take advantage of workers’ anger, in this view—anger 
created by the ruling class—by misdirecting it towards the most vulnerable.  Joseph 
Schmetz, a Woonsocket, RI textile unionist and the leading protagonist of Gary Gerstle’s 
Working-Class Americanism, rejected the notion that feelings of oppression would 
necessarily push workers to the left.  “The working class is ordinarily conservative,” 
Schmetz explained, and the “bitterness which eats away at the heart of a man who feels 
himself the victim of circumstances renders him easy prey to Fascism and Nazism.”273  In 
a key recurring argument, economic hardship pushed people to vent their frustration on a 
scapegoat.  “Our people are bewildered by economic problems which most of them do 
not understand and cannot solve,” radical journalist John Spivak explained.  Unable to 
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comprehend their circumstances, “they seethe with an ever-growing bitterness.”  Thus, 
“when they cannot reason themselves out of a situation they turn their resentment, like a 
child who stubs his toe on a stone and kicks it, against the immediate thing which hurt 
them.”  The targets of that resentment could be the villains identified by the left or the 
scapegoats identified by the right: “If he is told a banker or millionaire is responsible for 
his ills he can understand it and vent his hate on them.  If that hate can be deflected from 
‘millionaires,’ ‘bankers,’ and ‘politicians’ into another channel, the financiers and 
industrialists would get a breathing-spell.”274 The angry, alienated, benighted (white) 
worker as a potentially explosive right-wing force appears repeatedly in twentieth-
century American political analysis, particularly after the 1960s. Its prevalence in the 
1930s has gone mostly unnoted.  
*** 
The discourse detailed in this coda section is unexpected and counterintuitive, and 
it is important to ask what it says about the broader context of the period.  I want to 
suggest that the most important takeaway is the idea of a latent or embryonic progressive 
working class majority.  The declension narrative in which liberals sour on a white 
working class they once romanticized is overstated.  Concerns about (white) workers’ 
susceptibility to bigoted, right-wing political appeals were present well before the 1950s 
or 1960s.  But many contemporaries expected white workers’ politics to change, and 
perhaps change a great deal, under a different political economic system, a different 
media system, or after a period of organization and workers’ education. It was this belief 
that white working class politics and culture would significantly change for the better that 
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declined by the 1950s.  What appeared in a teleological framework to be initial, groping 
steps toward greater understanding appeared to be enduring limitations without that 
framework.  Chapters 2 and 3 show how the abandonment of that teleological framework 
changed liberal elites’ understandings of the political potentialities of white workers.  
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Chapter 2: The Rise of the Affluent Worker 
 
 “What is often described as ‘The March of the Masses’ is usually thought of as a 
radical, even insurrectionary development,” journalist Samuel Lubell remarked in his 
1951 book The Future of American Politics, one of the acclaimed political texts of the 
1950s.  It was not, Lubell insisted.  Ten years earlier, Lubell had argued that the New 
Deal “has drawn a class line across the face of American politics.  That line seems to be 
there to stay.”  Now he saw the enfranchisement of white workers as “an almost complete 
refutation of the Marxian thesis.  Our class struggle, if it can be called that, arises not 
from the impoverishment of the masses but from their progress.  It is evidence not of the 
failure of the American dream but of its successes.”  The chief demand pressed by “the 
masses,” after all, was “acceptance into our predominantly middle-class society.”  The 
changes brought by the New Deal could thus be said to have “strengthened rather than 
weakened the traditional middle-class basis of American politics.”275 
The claim that (white) workers had become part of a broad, prosperous middle 
class appeared again and again in 1950s political discourse, as observers of all stripes 
testified to Karl Marx’s irrelevance.  Dwight Eisenhower, addressing an AFL-CIO 
audience in 1955, labeled the “Class Struggle Doctrine of Marx…the invention of a 
lonely refugee scribbling in a dark recess of the British Museum.  He abhorred and 
detested the middle class. He did not foresee that, in America, labor, respected and 
prosperous, would constitute—with the farmer and businessman—his hated middle 
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class.”276  In 1950s media and elite political discourse, the “worker” was nearly always a 
white man who worked steadily in a unionized industrial sector, owned a home, and 
amply supported a wife and children, as in a 1955 Newsweek profile of “The Union 
Man”: “He owns a new and well-equipped home, a new car, and he and his wife and 6-
year-old son live well, indeed…[The] “portrait of the worker that Marx and Engels 
painted” all those years ago “bears as little resemblance to Harold Giebel as a surrealist’s 
nightmare.”277 “If Marx were able to visit the United States today,” economist Sumner 
Slichter quipped, “he would undoubtedly be amazed at the trouble enterprises have in 
providing adequate parking space for the ‘proletariat.’”278 
This chapter examines the emergence of the middle-income worker figure and its 
significance in late 1940s and 1950s political contestation and political analysis.  It is not 
a new argument that the postwar economic boom preoccupied and did key ideological 
work for a range of elites, or that it was exaggerated as a result of changes in elite-level 
politics and political discourse.  In a discursive environment shaped by the Cold War and 
the entrenchment of basic liberal reforms, liberals, moderate conservatives, organized 
labor, organized business, and the foreign policy establishment had a significant stake in 
touting the material benefits American workers enjoyed.  The scope of this project allows 
for an argument that goes somewhat further (and continues beyond this chapter): The 
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belief in (white) working class affluence was a crucial factor driving the migration of the 
white worker, as a political symbol, from left to right. 
Once a view of the majority as secure rather than needy became hegemonic, the 
contours of political representation fundamentally changed.  In the 1930s and early 
1940s, images of laboring whites had primarily served as evidence of injustice in 
American society and as symbols of the resistance to that injustice.  By the 1950s, white 
workers had become almost universally symbolic “not of the failure of the American 
dream but of its successes,” in Samuel Lubell’s words.  It became more difficult to justify 
fundamental political economic reform—and, just as important, difficult to envision a 
majority constituency that would support such reform.  As white workers approached 
“have” rather than “have not” status—moving to the suburbs and living a lifestyle nearly 
identical to that of professionals—they would have much less interest in liberalism, many 
interpreters assumed.  As the incomes of unionized white workers and white 
professionals converged, contemporaries also began to place more emphasis on cultural 
differences between blue-collar and educated whites in a manner that generally privileged 
the educated and tied working class whites to intolerant politics.  In sum, a secure (white) 
majority could be much more easily figured as disadvantaged by or hostile to further 
change—or victimized by those seeking to alter what had worked in the past. 
This chapter is divided into two parts.  Part One details the emergence of the 
affluent worker figure as part of a broad elite consensus—among liberals, conservatives, 
labor, and business—around the existence of widely distributed prosperity.  Part Two 
outlines the predominant elite-level assessments of what this mass affluence would mean 
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for white workers’ engagement in national politics; some observers predicted that (white) 
workers would remain solid liberal voters, while others predicted a turn to the right 
among upwardly mobile blue-collar whites, centered on a desire to protect economic 
gains or on cultural antagonism towards liberals.  As a whole, the chapter seeks to both 
underscore the importance of the middle-income worker for postwar politics and lay the 
groundwork necessary to convey the importance of the affluent worker figure in a longer 
story of white working class representation. 
Terminology and the collective memory of the midcentury blue-collar middle class 
 As in the period detailed in Chapter 1, “worker” was the term most often used to 
refer to white, usually male workers.  “Wage earner” was interchangeable.  White 
working class women were more often integrated into the discourse as “the worker’s 
wife” than as workers themselves.  Perhaps the most difficult terminological question for 
this chapter is how to refer to blue-collar whites who had reached middle-income status.  
Contemporaries were not always sure what to call this group; several analysts, finding no 
satisfactory term for the group’s present position, resorted to “ex-masses.”  The most 
common approach, however, was to call them “middle class.”  In midcentury elite public 
discourse, it was common for (white, male) workers and their families to be described as 
both “workers” and “middle class”; “worker” referred to occupation and “middle class” 
to income and lifestyle.  A worker who was “middle class” held a stable job, earned a 
moderate income, owned a car, and owned a home filled with modern appliances, most 
likely in the suburbs. I use “middle-income (white) workers,” “upwardly mobile 
workers,” “middle-income blue-collar whites,” and similar formulations to refer to this 
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group.  Because “middle class” is such a fraught and flexible term, I use it to reflect and 
represent contemporary discourse, not to describe a real social position. To refer to 
middle- and upper-income professionals, I use “professionals” or “professional class.” 
Postwar constructions of the postwar middle class left a legacy that extends to the 
present day, and I would be remiss not to mention that here.  In 2017, the decline of the 
same “middle class” celebrated by Eisenhower, Slichter, and Lubell has become a 
powerful and multifaceted narrative in American politics.  Liberals often identify a 
racially unmarked middle class as the victim of corporate greed—inequality was modest 
then, in this view, unions were strong, and blue-collar workers earned incomes that could 
comfortably support a family. “Previous generations of Americans built the greatest 
economy and strongest middle class the world has ever known on the promise of a basic 
bargain: If you work hard and do your part, you should be able to get ahead,” Hillary 
Clinton claimed.  “And when you get ahead, America gets ahead. But over the past 
several decades, that bargain has eroded.”279 Meanwhile, Donald Trump and his 
populist/nationalist conservative supporters claim to speak for a more explicitly white 
working/middle class victimized by cosmopolitan political and corporate elites.280 The 
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same period has served, for authors like Robert Putnam, Charles Murray, and J.D. Vance, 
as a backdrop to claims about the decline in morality, family stability, and social capital 
among white working class people.281  The temptation to see the world of the 1950s 
middle class through a nostalgic lens is widespread, though for different reasons. 
The powerful and varied politics attached to the legacy of the middle-income 
(white) working class underscores the importance of looking at postwar constructions of 
white workers with sensitivity and nuance.  While this chapter focuses, like the rest of the 
dissertation, on issues of representation, it is important not to dismiss—or to overstate—
white workers’ economic, social, cultural, and political gains.282  This period remains 
simultaneously one of the most powerful illustrations of “whiteness as property” in 
American history and a glimpse at an alternative governing philosophy to the one that 
now holds sway.  From the 1930s to the 1970s, the state intervened on behalf of non-elite 
Americans to an extent exceptional in the history of the United States.  Yet the postwar 
middle class, nostalgically envisioned, connotes much more than relative economic 
equality, as a result of the racial and gender inequality built into its growth.  Many of the 
interventions that allowed citizens of modest means to attain protection in old age, attend 
college, purchase homes, and build wealth—Social Security, the GI Bill, FHA and VA 
                                                                                                                                                                             
America, with assimilated immigrants, and it was good for America.”  Adam Serwer, “Jeff Sessions’ 
Unqualified Praise for a 1924 Immigration Law,” The Atlantic, January 10, 2017. 
281 Robert Putnam, “Crumbling American Dreams,” New York Times, August 3, 2013; Putnam, Our Kids: 
The American Dream in Crisis (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2015); Charles Murray,  Coming Apart: 
The State of White America, 1960-2010 (New York: Crown Forum, 2012); J.D. Vance, Hillbilly Elegy 
(New York: HarperCollins, 2016). 
282 A useful range of discussions can be found in Nelson Lichtenstein, “From Corporatism to Collective 
Bargaining,” in The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order, ed. Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1989), 122-152; Jefferson Cowie, The Great Exception: The New Deal and the 
Limits of American Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 153ff; Jack Metzgar, Striking 
Steel: Solidarity Remembered (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2000); Penny Lewis, Hardhats, 
Hippies, and Hawks: The Vietnam Antiwar Movement as Myth and Memory (Ithaca and London: ILR 
Press, 2013), 142ff; Cohen, Consumer’s Republic, 156ff. 
162 
 
loans—substantially or almost entirely excluded citizens of color until the 1960s.  In a 
profoundly segregated labor market, white men in unionized industrial sectors gained the 
most as organized labor won extensive “firm-centered, job-dependent benefits” for 
workers that generated “islands of security, with high waters all around.”283 
 Yet while white worker-actors as a group clearly fared better in this period than 
they did in decades before and after, it appears as a golden age only by comparison.  
They encountered a diversity of experiences, too seldom noted at the time (or since).284 
The best-paid (male) workers and their families appear as typical in collective memory, 
but women (and men outside the unionized industrial heartland) were less likely to hold 
stable and decent-paying jobs.  Social programming was designed around the needs of 
employed males and their dependents, leaving others less secure.  Further, even by the 
standard of the independent male-headed household, material hardship clearly remained a 
significant part of the lives of many white working class people, and middle-class 
lifestyles were often more apparent than real. In 1951, the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ 
yearly budget for a “modest but adequate” standard of living was $3,750; the average 
family income was $3,700.285 According to historian Mark McColloch’s calculations, the 
average steelworker’s family moved above the poverty line in 1953 and did not reach a 
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“modest but adequate” standard of living until the late 1960s.286 Many workers took on 
significant consumer debt to afford the goods associated with middle class status.  
Meanwhile, the postwar tax structure became increasingly regressive, and inflation cut 
into rising incomes. For many, the gains were obviously and tangibly real.  At the very 
least, though, it is fair to say that the elite discursive environment exaggerated those gains 
and rendered other experiences essentially invisible.  The consequences are the focus of 
this chapter. 
 
I: The Affluent Worker’s Origins 
In August 1946, Time-Life’s glossy business magazine Fortune published one of 
its semi-regular profiles of “typical” American workers, this one focusing on Detroit 
autoworker Bill Nation.  The magazine found it necessary to explicitly stress that Nation 
was no radical: “[he] likes his job…and he does not want to destroy General Motors or 
the capitalist system.”  Nonetheless, Nation was “a loyal union man and an admirer of 
Walter Reuther” who believed that “there are plenty of things wrong with the world, and 
that working people can do a lot to make the world a better place.”  He was “not too sure” 
of his security and concerned about his ability to support his large family.287 By 1951, 
Fortune’s assessment of the typical worker’s position had changed significantly, with 
“the worker” figured as “a middle-class member of a middle-class society.”288 In 1953, 
the magazine heralded “the rise of a huge new moneyed middle-income class,” a “New 
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Bourgeoisie” comprised, “to a startling extent, of groups hitherto identified as 
proletarians.” The archetypical middle class American was no longer a small town 
landlord or small businessman, Fortune emphasized, but “a machinist in Detroit.”289  
“Cars, refrigerators, sailboats, travel, places in the country, tennis, swimming pools, and a 
host of other things started out as the perquisites of the well-to-do and now belong to the 
masses,” competitor Business Week claimed the same year. “The Detroit factory worker” 
now “flies to Europe for his vacation.”290  The stark gap between Bill Nation and the 
“Detroit factory worker” vacationing in Paris is suggestive of the rise of a new elite-level 
paradigm for thinking about (white) workers. 
The basic narrative advanced in the latter three articles became dominant by the 
early 1950s: American capitalism had delivered broad-based prosperity, raising nearly all 
Americans to middle class status.  An extremely common device in mid-century 
journalism compared the United States of 1950 or 1960 to the United States at the turn of 
the century or the outset of the 1930s.291  In its more modest articulations, the narrative 
held that the once-poor majority had now reached secure middle-income levels.  As 
former New Republic editor Bruce Bliven put it, “When the century began, there was…a 
well-defined class structure in this country. At the base of the pyramid were the working 
                                                           
289 The Changing American Market, by the Editors of Fortune (Garden City NY: Hanover House, 1953), 
52, 57, 60. 
290 “Leisured Masses,” Business Week, September 12, 1953. 
291 The most detailed secondary source on this narrative in journalism is Andrew Yarrow, “The Big 
Postwar Story: Abundance and the Rise of Economic Journalism,” Journalism History 32, no. 2 (2006): 58-
76; see also Yarrow, Measuring America: How Economic Growth Came to Define American Greatness in 
the Late Twentieth Century (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2010).  On the use of the past in 
journalism, Barbie Zelizer and Keren Tenenboim-Weinblatt, eds., Journalism and Memory (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); Carolyn Kitch, “Anniversary Journalism, Collective Memory, and the Cultural 
Authority to Tell the Story of the American Past,” Journal of Popular Culture 36, no. 1 (2002): 44-67; Jill 
Edy, “Journalistic Uses of Collective Memory,” Journal of Communication 49, no. 2 (1999): 71-85. 
165 
 
class and most of the farmers; together, they were practically identical with ‘the poor.’”  
By 1960, however, “most of us really are beginning to approach the classless society we 
were always supposed to be…The new American society is centered upon the middle-
income group.”292  In its most triumphalist iterations, the narrative suggested that poverty 
and the working class had been abolished.  “There are no workers left in America; we are 
almost all middle class as to income and expectations,” suggested Herbert Gold’s 
suggestively titled The Age of Happy Problems.293 “Poverty was all but eliminated, a 
large measure of security provided for all,” US News and World Report claimed in 
1957.294  One commonplace likened the progress of the first half of the twentieth century 
to a revolution: “the permanent revolution,” “half-century revolution,” “bloodless 
revolution,” “near revolution,” or “Second U. S. Revolution.”  The primary evidence for 
this claim, and the linchpin of the entire conceptual structure, was the movement of 
(white) workers into the middle class. 
“Middle class,” as argued in Chapter 1, was a fraught term with overlapping 
cultural, racial, political, and economic connotations.  Most simply, when contemporaries 
identified (white) workers as middle class, they were referring to the incomes and 
lifestyles these workers had gained.  The dominant narrative was one of homogenization: 
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“a narrowing of the difference between rich and poor”—and between workers and 
professionals—“in their ways of living.”295 In this discourse, the most important evidence 
for the gains the worker (understood as a white husband and father heading a nuclear 
family) had achieved was his ability to provide his wife and children with the standard 
package of modern conveniences, on a single income. “The wage earner’s way of life is 
well-nigh indistinguishable from that of his salaried co-citizens,” a 1959 Department of 
Labor report claimed. “Their homes, their cars…the style of the clothes their wives and 
children wear, the food they eat…their days off, the education of their children, their 
church—all of these are alike and are becoming more nearly identical.”296 
Contemporary elites also used the category “middle class” to describe the erosion 
of distinctions marking off whites of southern and eastern European descent from whites 
of northern European descent.297  Becoming “middle class” or “American” meant 
becoming incorporated into a homogenous whiteness.  The suburbs, which 
contemporaries accorded nearly unlimited power to homogenize, were critical in this 
regard.  (White) workers had been identifiable as workers in part because of where they 
lived—workers’ housing in company towns, urban neighborhoods marked as immigrant 
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spaces.  Suburbia functioned as a “second melting pot,” contemporaries suggested, 
turning urban working class Catholics and Jews into middle class Americans. “People 
may come out of the new suburbs middle class; a great many who enter, however, are 
not,” journalist William H. Whyte put it.298  “In the suburb the Catholic is regarded, at 
last, as a full-fledged American,” priest-sociologist Andrew Greeley explained.  “The 
ghetto walls are crumbling…Suburbia, with its conglomeration of nationalities and 
religions, seems the ultimate melting pot.”299 Pollster Louis Harris’s account of the same 
process captures the racial transition at work especially explicitly: “The third- and even 
fourth-generation offspring no longer had the telltale markings of the immigrant home.  
In speech, they were hard to tell from any son or daughter of the Revolution…This was 
civilization out in the suburbs, and Jimmy Ripple, the grandson of Lladislaw Repulski, 
could pass with the best of them.”300  Once Jimmy had Anglicized his name and moved 
to the suburbs, in this framework, he was no longer identifiably Polish, and he felt only 
pride in leaving the “immigrant home” behind. 
While contemporaries who stressed (white) workers’ middle class status were 
most concerned with life outside work, “middle class” status had a related connotation in 
the context of workplace and labor politics—workers had moved beyond an oppositional 
working-class consciousness.  Notably, business organs chronicling this transition 
applied traits long mapped to native-born Protestants—thrift, hard work, self-sacrifice, 
patriotism—to union workers. When Fortune introduced a dedicated labor section in its 
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October 1948 issue, it cited concerns that workers might “come to rely more on group 
security and group loyalty, the group being the work team and the union”—an obvious 
challenge to management’s “faith in the Protestant ethic emphasizing individual 
responsibility, risk, and competitiveness.”301  Three years later, the gap between workers’ 
views and management’s views seemed to Fortune much narrower: “American labor is 
not ‘working-class conscious’; it is not ‘proletarian’ and does not believe in class war.” 
Instead the union was the worker’s “tool for gaining and keeping as an individual the 
status and security of a full citizen in a capitalist society…There are no Wobblies today, 
no Jewish Bund, no Italian anarchists, no Debs, no Mother Jones”—largely symbols 
associated with a specifically foreign radicalism.302  A Fortune profile of the 
International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union (ILGWU)—a union with a predominantly 
Jewish and Italian immigrant membership founded on the New York garment industry—
compared the rise of the ILGWU and its president David Dubinsky to a Horatio Alger 
story.303 
The claim that workers had moved into the middle class obviously relied on a 
very limited understanding of the “worker.”  The white working class woman generally 
appeared in this framework as a beneficiary of the family income, able to perform her 
normative role more easily with the goods her husband could afford: “Housework is not 
drudgery for Mrs. Dupas with the aid of modern appliances…Her food budget allows her 
to feed [her] family an ample and varied diet.”304  Triumphalist elite-level chroniclers of 
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American affluence either ignored African Americans altogether or dismissed their 
situation as the great blemish on an overall healthy society.  Fortune did the latter, 
drawing on longstanding tropes of Southern exceptionalism:  “The South is problem 
country.  It grew up differently from the rest of the nation…It still has with it the problem 
of the Negro.”305  What elites called the “Negro problem” was understood separately 
from issues of industrialism and organized labor—or at least separately enough that the 
dominant story of broad equality remained untroubled by African American 
disadvantage. 
Yet the vision of the worker as white and male did not in itself make possible the 
widespread belief in working class affluence.  A similar understanding of the worker had 
been dominant in the 1930s, but it had still allowed for passionate claims about the 
injustice workers faced.  Above all, what allowed the narrative of the affluent worker to 
gain the prominence it did was the near-unanimity with which elites embraced it.  It 
emerged from the work of business groups engaged in public relations, liberals endorsing 
postwar capitalism, unions emphasizing their role in the rising standard of living, 
government officials stressing the superiority of the American system in a Cold War 
context, and journalists chronicling the dramatic changes they perceived. Together, a 
wide range of voices portrayed a secure United States that experienced little to no social 
conflict on political economic matters. 
For a number of years, scholars often understood the period between the late 
1940s and early 1960s as characterized by a “liberal consensus” in which a low level of 
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conflict and dissent, particularly on economics, characterized American politics.306  
Contemporaries who made this claim pointed to conservatives’ accommodation to the 
active role of the state and the majority of New Deal reforms, liberals’ disavowal of 
socialism, and the rise of professionalized, bureaucratized labor relations marked by 
negotiation rather than violence.  “The fundamental problems of the industrial revolution 
have been solved,” sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset declared in 1960.  “The workers 
have achieved industrial and political citizenship, the conservatives have accepted the 
welfare state, and the democratic left has recognized that an increase in state power 
carries with it more dangers to freedom than solutions for economic problems.” These 
developments heralded “the end of ideology,” as Daniel Bell put it.307   The liberal 
consensus interpretation also appeared in later historical work, though often lacking the 
triumphalist inflection of Bell and Lipset.  In the mid-1970s, for instance, Godfrey 
Hodgson popularized a pessimistic version of the argument, in which the “liberal 
consensus” represented a kind of straightjacket indicative of the defeat of the left, a 
“strange hybrid, liberal conservatism” that “blanketed the scene and muffled debate.”308 
In more recent decades, the consensus interpretation has been challenged and 
largely unseated by scholars pointing to the prevalence of aggressive anti-labor efforts by 
business interests, conservative activism against the New Deal order, and opposition to 
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liberal policy on race among white liberal constituencies.309 “Even at its zenith, liberalism 
was far less secure than it appeared to be,” Kim Phillips-Fein notes, if scholars “loo[k] 
beneath the surface.”310  Recent defenders of the consensus interpretation respond that the 
dissenters did not have the influence to command a substantial following or win 
substantial gains and that “the sharpest conflicts did not dominate the mainstream.”311  
Without question, the consensus interpretation does not capture the full range of the 
period’s politics.  It remains, however, very apt for understanding elite constructions of 
the white working class in the late 1940s and 1950s.  Again, simply put, the imagery of 
the affluent (white) worker attained the prominence it did because it appeared persuasive 
to and made strategic sense for a wide range of elites. 
The years immediately following World War II, as scholars have noted, seemed 
promising for a social democratic politics in the United States; in the aftermath of the 
wartime experience, planning, full employment, and other left-liberal priorities enjoyed 
considerable public support. The Popular Front was largely defeated by the late 1940s, 
however, amid a resurgence of anticommunism.  A few dates give a rough sense of the 
timeline: in 1947, the Truman administration adopted a policy requiring government 
employees to sign a loyalty oath, and the antilabor Taft-Hartley Act passed; in 1949, the 
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CIO banned communists from leadership positions in member unions; the next year, it 
dismissed eleven communist-led unions.312  The narrative of widespread prosperity 
became hegemonic in the wake of the Popular Front’s defeat and the shift to the right 
within the labor movement and within mainstream liberalism.  It is instructive, for 
instance, that the texts spearheading the narrative appeared in the early 1950s, including 
Peter Drucker’s The New Society (1950); Fortune’s series USA: The Permanent 
Revolution (1951) and The Changing American Market (1953); and Frederick Lewis 
Allen’s The Big Change (1952). The foremost driver of the narrative of mass prosperity 
was the influence of the Cold War and anticommunism on domestic politics and media. 
The Cold War had a paradoxical effect on American liberalism.  On one hand, it 
sliced off its left wing and discredited the more ambitious aspects of its agenda; on the 
other, it linked the legitimacy of the American state to the position of subordinate groups 
in American society.  The Soviet state’s legitimacy was staked on its claim to represent 
working class and marginalized people, and Soviet elites repeatedly invoked racial and 
economic inequality in the United States.313  In a period where the two powers competed 
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for the allegiance of European, African, and Asian nations, the American state needed to 
vehemently challenge those claims.  International propaganda consistently cited 
American workers’ high standard of living, often in comparison to Soviet workers. The 
United States Information Agency (USIA) drew on one typical frame in its traveling 
international exhibit on “People’s Capitalism,” a “dynamic new kind of capitalism which 
benefits all the people.”314  Richard Nixon’s “kitchen debate” with Soviet premier Nikita 
Khrushchev inside the American National Exhibition in Moscow in 1959 may be the 
most famous example of the ideological value of the affluent (white) worker and working 
class housewife for Cold Warriors.  The exhibit featured a model home identified as 
affordable for the average American family and packed with modern conveniences.  “Can 
only the rich in the United States afford such things?” Nixon asked, walking Khrushchev 
through the exhibit.  “If this were the case, we would have to include in our definition of 
rich the millions of America’s wage earners…Any steel worker could buy this house.”315  
In this climate, liberals who strayed outside acceptable contours risked serious 
danger; those who worked within those contours could see real gains.  For African 
American elites, this meant pressing for racial equality in a language of US nationalism, 
accepting an optimistic interpretation of the progress blacks were making in the United 
States, and being careful not to link American capitalism or imperialism to racial 
inequality within the nation’s borders.  For organized labor, it meant employing a 
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nationalistic frame of reference, excluding radicals from positions of influence, and 
adopting a language of cooperation with business when appropriate. The view that white 
workers as a group were disadvantaged—or that the “American system” did not work for 
a majority of its citizens—was increasingly excluded from the mainstream. 
Journalism: “A True and Honest Picture of Our Civilization” 
Journalism spotlighting poverty and inequality was generally at a low ebb in the 
postwar period.  A broad-based media reform movement, flourishing during the 1940s, 
had largely been defeated by the end of the decade.316  The view that journalism had a 
duty to reinforce American values, particularly during wartime, was widespread among 
journalists, publishers, and government officials. For some, this aligned with an anti-New 
Deal domestic agenda.  In 1945, Frank Gannett urged his fellow publishers to “tell our 
readers what we stand for”—“the American way of life…a system of competitive 
enterprise.”  “Our best promotion will be the re-selling of that American system,” 
Gannett insisted.  “In doing so, we will be selling ourselves.”317 The ties between the 
foreign policy apparatus and the media industry ran deeper than partisan politics, 
however.  Former newspaper journalists staffed government propaganda operations, and 
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journalists working in the private sector had wartime propaganda experience.  FBI 
director J. Edgar Hoover cultivated relationships with journalists, and about two dozen 
media outlets, including the New York Times, Time, and CBS, cooperated with the 
CIA.318 
Certainly most journalists touting the prodigious growth of the American 
economy firmly believed in their reporting.  “I believe we might all agree that a 
distinguishing factor of our own particular period in history is the rapidity of change,” 
American Society of Newspaper Editors (ASNE) president Kenneth MacDonald told an 
industry audience in 1956.  “A new revolution is altering rapidly the social, economic, 
and cultural life in this country…[Our economy] is tending to produce a classless 
society.”319  “Magazine liberalism and iconoclasm” had declined since World War II, one 
journalist claimed the same year, in part because “most of the immediate social gains 
have been gained.”320  Journalists understood, though, that they were not simply reporting 
on the American economy for an audience of everyday American readers.  It was 
commonplace for news accounts to contain direct refutations of Soviet allegations about 
American society, often with a non-American audience in mind. One American 
journalist, chagrined at the tendency of some Europeans to “depict the American system 
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as a horror to be rejected equally with the Soviet horror,” insisted that “we learn to draw 
for Europe a true and honest picture of our civilization.”321  “The European does not see 
the rapidly changing, socially conscious capitalism of 1950,” Fortune worried.  “He sees 
Wall Street, Mammon—and he trembles aloud over all the false dilemmas it would imply 
for Europe.”322 
If this sense of duty motivated positive portrayals of American life, the dangers 
associated with leftism also militated against comprehensive attention to inequality. 
Subscriptions to liberal magazines and newspapers such as the Nation, New Republic, 
PM, or In Fact raised suspicion in loyalty investigations.  Journalists understood that they 
could be fired at any time if evidence of unacceptable leftism came to light. Anyone 
within journalistic or media reform circles who had a radical past or continued to work 
from a Popular Front perspective was particularly at risk. Over a hundred journalists were 
brought before Congressional committees investigating communist influence, where 
rhetorical tropes seen as mainstream during the New Deal could be read as evidence of 
communist ties.323  One of those journalists was inaugural CIO publicity director Len De 
Caux, who had been asked to resign from his CIO post in 1947 amid concerns about his 
radical history.  Another was media critic George Seldes, who had been forced to suspend 
publication of his newsletter In Fact when resources dried up amid allegations of 
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communist involvement.324  At his hearing, Seldes encountered questioning from 
McCarthy lieutenant Roy Cohn on a story he had written about industrial tycoons: “Cohn 
read one paragraph, something about the DuPonts, Mellons and Rockefellers getting 
monopolies in industry while there was unemployment and poverty. ‘Do you think that is 
the right kind of reading matter to send to European countries we want as friends?’”325 
This view was by no means confined to the hard right wing of anticommunists.  A 
1948 exchange between Seldes and liberal journalist Ferdinand Lundberg is suggestive.  
Ten years earlier, Lundberg had worked in the same vein as Seldes: his 1937 bestseller 
America’s 60 Families tracked the control exerted by a handful of immensely wealthy 
and powerful families over American industry, government, and journalism.  Seldes 
continued to focus his attention almost exclusively on the American right, American 
capitalism, and the commercial press—entities, in the eyes of Lundberg and many 
liberals, considerably less dangerous than the Soviet Union. “No liberal that I know of 
objects in the slightest to [your] running critique of the newspaper press or the 
skullduggery of the higher-ups,” Lundberg explained in a letter to Seldes: 
What they object to, in short, is the clear implication in In Fact [Seldes’ 
magazine, which ran from 1940-1950] that the U.S. press and U.S. higher-ups, 
and [their] friends abroad…are about the worst things politically in the world.  
This isn’t so, isn’t a fact.  There is worse, much worse, and it centers in the 
Kremlin, about which you preserve a strange silence...By failing to put its critique 
of the American scene into the proper perspective against the world background 
In Fact merely does what it can to promote disaffection in the U.S. In so doing it 
becomes an instrument in the ideological warfare of the USSR against those 
countries not under its control. 
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Bringing the injustices in the United States into sharp relief would be harmful on multiple 
fronts, Lundberg implied: it would diminish the legitimacy of elites who could fight 
communism, it would aid the Soviets in their outreach to unaffiliated countries, and it 
would “creat[e] disaffection” on the home front.  In short, it would be “helpful only to the 
Kremlin.”326   
None of this meant that objectivity was abandoned or that no diversity of views 
could surface: part of what distinguished the American press from the Soviet press, in its 
anticommunist backers’ views, was its openness to the free exchange of ideas.327  
Alternative perspectives on communism or the Cold War were simply outside the sphere 
of legitimate controversy. In a particularly illustrative turn of phrase, Lawrence Spivak of 
NBC News explained the political perspective of his show Meet the Press: “Ideologically 
I never really took a position…and of course we carried on the most vigorous 
anticommunism campaign from the beginning.”328  “There is always room for divergence 
of opinion within the bounds of basic principles, but there is no room to compromise 
those principles,” one publisher insisted.329  Liberals had a very prominent place in the 
elite discursive environment of the period, but that discursive environment generally 
included only moderate and respectable elite perspectives. 
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Labor and Business: “The People…Are Using the Capitalists” 
Contestation within acceptable boundaries also serves as a good one-sentence 
characterization of the fate of labor, liberal, and left articulations of working class 
identity after the late 1940s.  On one hand, basic claims—that the Democrats held the 
allegiance of ordinary people, that workers saw their interests as opposed to those of big 
business—remained strong throughout the period.  At the same time, mainstream liberals, 
labor leaders, moderate conservatives, and business elites could increasingly agree that 
American capitalism had evolved from the tycoon days of the past and that the United 
States was a basically just society in which the majority of workers enjoyed security and 
a reasonable opportunity for happiness. 
The dominant narrative of business-labor relations in the period stressed the 
broadly shared benefits made possible by an evolved capitalism.  In this narrative, the 
events of the past twenty years had brought about a transfer of power from employers to 
workers and the public, allowing for a reasonable balance of interests.  Workers and non-
elite groups were getting more of the gains, contemporaries stressed, and corporations 
had embraced social responsibility.  As a result, an egalitarian society had been achieved 
without recourse to coercive statism.  Americans had developed “a system which not only 
helps the underdog, and brings about a dynamic redistribution of income in his favor, but 
also maintains the freedom of business enterprises and other private institutions,” 
Harper’s editor and popular historian Frederick Lewis Allen put it.330 This narrative had 
a great deal to offer both labor and business groups, and their claims overlapped 
substantially. It suggested that criticism of a selfish, antisocial capitalism was outdated 
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and that there was no need for further encroachment (by unions or the state) on 
management’s privileges.  It also recognized unions’ legitimacy, respectability, and role 
in the American system, in a period where the appearance of radicalism was deeply 
dangerous. 
Business groups’ public relations efforts were one chief impetus behind elite 
discourse’s emphasis on broadly shared prosperity.  Business elites concerned that liberal 
successes had turned public opinion against capitalism and toward an activist state 
invested significant time and resources in persuasive efforts aimed at workers, 
schoolchildren, and the broader public. In 1952, Fortune editor William H. Whyte 
estimated that corporate spending on public relations and educational materials 
promoting “free enterprise” stood at more than $100 million per year.331 These efforts 
often rested on a view of workers as credulous, easily misled by simplistic anti-business 
arguments, but persuadable: if workers truly understood how business worked (why 
corporations should not be condemned for making profits, for instance) and what they 
gained from it, they would view business positively.  “When you talk to the people in 
lower income levels you find a large majority who wonder if the American capitalistic 
system is really right,” one advertiser worried, advocating that business “educat[e] the 
general public on why our economic system has been able to do what it has for them…on 
how and why it works so that they would have sufficient knowledge of its basic 
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principles, to be able to judge future issues.”332  “The story of business economics and 
philosophy needs to be told simply, understandably, repetitiously and without dilution or 
distortion—to broad masses of the people,” another businessman insisted.333  The scope 
of business elites’ investment in communicating to workers is strong evidence of how 
seriously many took labor-liberal claims to represent workers.  Ironically, much like 
liberals, they assumed that views they saw as mistaken were the result of misinformation 
and could be dispelled through education. 
In their public argumentation, moderate business groups in this period moved 
away from the hardline approach adopted by much of the right wing during the 
Depression: attacking New Deal liberalism and industrial unionism as utterly contrary to 
American principles.  Instead, they accepted a role for unions and the modern state but 
warned against class conflict.  In a narrative advanced by groups like the Advertising 
Council334 and appearing consistently in news media, capitalism had once undeniably 
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generated unacceptable inequality and hardship for workers, but no longer.  American 
capitalism at the turn of the century “seemed to be what Marx predicted it would be and 
what all the muckrakers said it was,” a typical account in Fortune held, and the United 
States of the 1930s was “a society that could not solve, did not know how to solve, 
internal problems that threatened to destroy it.”  A resolution came, this narrative 
suggested, through a revised understanding of individualism that recognized “the right to 
organize and bargain collectively” and acknowledged “that ownership carries social 
obligations.” The magazine conceded that “the American capitalistic system still works 
injustices” but insisted that “to think about it in terms of exploitation is to think in terms 
of a past century...It is not the capitalists who are using the people, but the people who 
are using the capitalists.”335  In a period where capitalism had become cooperative rather 
than coercive, in this framework, the responsibility incumbent on workers was to 
recognize the need to “pull together.”336  The implicit bargain posed was that corporate 
leaders would deliver broadly shared prosperity for all if they could direct the economy 
without significant unrest or interference from labor or the state. 
A significant group of moderate Republicans—including the first Republican 
president since the New Deal, Dwight Eisenhower—made similar arguments.  
Eisenhower was associated with an ideology called “modern Republicanism,” a centrist 
                                                                                                                                                                             
report explained.  American capitalism had extended “to the population as a whole of the standard of living 
previously regarded as possible only for the few.”  “The American Round Table: People’s Capitalism, Part 
I,” November 16 and 17, 1956; “The American Round Table: People’s Capitalism, Part II,” May 22, 1957, 
both held at The Yale Club, New York. 
335 Davenport, USA: The Permanent Revolution, 79, 29, 88, 7.  
336 As one Advertising Council advertisement put it: “Sure, our American System has its faults.  We all 
know that.  We still have sharp ups and downs in prices and jobs.  We’ll have to change that—and we will!  
It will continue to take teamwork, but if we work together, there’s no limit on what we can all share 
together of even greater things.” “Sure, America’s going ahead…if we all  pull together!,” Advertising 
Council ad as it appeared in Life, November 8, 1948, 162.  
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approach that (for its supporters) transcended both libertarianism and New Deal 
liberalism and emphasized cooperation between labor and capital for shared prosperity.  
Eisenhower aide Arthur Larson identified the “New Republicanism” as “a set of ideas 
keyed explicitly to contemporary mid-century facts” in which “wellworn niche[s] like 
‘liberal’ or ‘New Deal’ or ‘prolabor’ or ‘probusiness’ or ‘left’ or ‘right’” were obsolete.  
“This Administration is against neither” labor nor business, Larson insisted, “but is for 
both.”337  Modern Republicanism accepted the basic liberal understanding of industrial 
modernity—that workers in an industrial society required the protection of unions and the 
state338—but argued that antagonistic attitudes toward business were as obsolete as the 
tycoon. 
To be clear, this approach was not representative of all conservative discourse—
right-wing critics saw modern Republicanism as a slightly watered-down version of 
liberalism, and the most vehement voices on the right continued to assail organized labor 
in stark terms.  NAM warned its members of the dangers posed by the “spread of 
Collectivist thinking in America,” particularly among “such large groups as 
labor…people in large cities…and the lower-income segment of our population,” and 
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deemed labor elites “professional propagandists for powerful, totalitarian-inspired 
organizations…bent upon destroying everything this nation has achieved in the last 150 
years.”339  As unions became an entrenched feature of the political economic landscape, 
allegations about labor leaders’ immense, illegitimate power only increased.  The much-
distributed 1957 book Labor Union Monopoly claimed that “the greatest concentrations 
of political and economic power in the United States of America are found” not among 
corporate interests but “in the underregulated, under-criticized, under-investigated, tax-
exempt, and specially privileged labor organizations—and in their belligerent, aggressive, 
and far-too-often lawless and corrupt managers.”340  From a presentist perspective, it’s 
instructive to note that conservative anti-union argumentation followed a logic that 
continues to be prominent on issues of race and immigration (see also Chapter 4)—
liberals pretend to be championing the underprivileged but are in fact seeking benefits for 
themselves. 
It’s important to be clear that the argument that management reached an “accord” 
with organized labor in this period, recognizing labor’s right to exist and the value of its 
role in the social order, only holds by comparison to what came before and after.  The 
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1940s and 1950s saw consistent efforts to undercut union power.341  For a powerful 
segment of the business community in the midcentury United States, however, it made 
strategic sense to adopt a labor policy that offered good pay and benefits and recognized 
unions as a natural facet of industrial society.  Large firms in capital-intensive industries 
(archetypically autos and steel) faced little international competition, which had been 
decimated by World War II.  For these firms, continued labor unrest and union demands 
for input on managerial decisions appeared far more destructive than generous and 
consistent wage and benefit increases. From this perspective, middle-income worker-
consumers with a stake in the existing system were desirable employees; they would 
work steadily and dependably and would be uninterested in radicalism.  “The first 
requirement of a functioning industrial order is to get rid of the proletarian,” management 
theorist Peter Drucker emphasized.  “Industrial society cannot afford him…[It] demands 
the active and real citizenship of the worker.  It demands acceptance of the principle of 
profitability from the worker.  It loses its social cohesion if the worker is a proletarian.” 
The affordances of a “modern industrial order,” for Drucker, made it possible to “get rid 
of the proletarian,” to “convert the socially destructive proletariat into the very basis of 
social strength and cohesion.”342   For radicals in later decades, the power structure in this 
period made concessions that “integrated [workers] into American capitalism”343 and 
snuffed out labor militancy in the process.  Drucker called for just such an approach and 
framed it as a great positive. 
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The narrative of middle-income workers and an evolved capitalism had a great 
deal to offer organized labor as well.  It placed unions firmly within the bounds of the 
American tradition as safeguards for workers within modern society, not proponents of 
“class war” or “socialistic” principles.344  It meshed with the most common argument 
labor officials made in tying gains for unions to the national interest: that increasing 
workers’ purchasing power would stimulate the economy as a whole.  “Year after year 
objective observers increasingly agree that trade unionism has been largely responsible 
for raising the nation’s standard of living,” an Amalgamated Clothing Workers pamphlet 
suggested.345  Perhaps most simply, labor could most persuasively claim success by 
pointing to the material gains it had won for members.  “The labor movement in America 
is developing a whole new middle class,” Walter Reuther argued.346   
The arguments made by labor officials overlapped substantially with the 
arguments made by moderate business groups and in the business press.  Certainly there 
were differences: where business gave productivity and innovation most of the credit for 
the increase in workers’ incomes, labor and liberals stressed collective bargaining and 
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New Deal reforms. What was shared was the implication that American workers were the 
beneficiaries of a revolutionary social transformation that obviated the need for class 
conflict.  In the preface to a 1956 reissue of Edward Levinson’s Labor on the March, a 
chronicle of the early CIO, Walter Reuther readily consigned 1930s militancy to the past 
in a tone that would have been familiar to readers of Harper’s, Fortune, and other 
newsmagazines.  The sit-down strikes described in the book, Reuther wrote, would seem 
to the mid-1950s reader “as far away as the Whiskey Rebellion, the Dred Scott Decision 
or…the Haymarket riots…[The] improved income of millions of wage earners has made 
the 1950’s as unlike the 1930’s as the 20th century is unlike the 19th century.”347 
This emphasis on prosperity and middle class status reflected the primary postwar 
course pursued by organized labor.  Though inflections differ, as do assessments of 
whether a course farther to the left would have been possible, the literature emphasizes 
the tradeoff inherent in this trajectory.  Unions gained mainstream status, respectability, 
and considerable security for members but did not realize the transformative agenda 
many had desired for them. Briefly, they generally adopted a strategy of bargaining with 
employers to secure firm-specific benefits for their workers (higher wages, health 
insurance, vacation time, etc.) rather than making claims for a broad public welfare state 
of the European variety, aggressively attempting to organize the most underprivileged 
                                                           
347 Walter Reuther, 1956 preface to Edward Levinson, Labor on the March (Ithaca: ILR Press, 1995), iv.  A 
similar example can be found in CIO-PAC’s Speaker’s Book of Facts for 1952, which features a passage 
that could easily have been drawn from the pages of Fortune: “There has been no murderous uprising, no 
desperate revolt of the masses against a wicked ruling class.  Our revolution has been handled through the 
ballot boxes, through the processes of democracy and under self-government…under the regime of 
Presidents who have led us to a better capitalism—not to socialism or to communism.”  CIO Political 
Action Committee, A Speaker’s Book of Facts, 1952 (Washington, D.C.: Congress of Industrial 
Organizations, 1952), 25. 
188 
 
workers, or seeking worker representation in firms’ decision-making.348 Organized 
labor’s embrace of the existing system was firmly in line with the broader trajectory of 
liberalism, as liberals based policy around the assumption that strong economic growth 
within a mixed economy would meet the needs of the vast majority.349  
It is important to note that some leftists and labor advocates disputed the 
dominant, sunny interpretation of working class life. Workers were not, in fact, secure 
and happy, these contemporaries stressed.  Instead, a surface affluence (often financed by 
steep debt) concealed tension and malaise.  Breadwinners with alienating and repetitive 
jobs sought a “progressive accumulation of things” because they had no other way to feel 
that they were moving forward, sociologist Ely Chinoy emphasized.350 The stay-at-home 
“wife of the…worker” lived a life of “quiet desperation,” not contentment, labor 
intellectual Patricia Cayo Sexton argued; her time was occupied by “Junior’s whooping 
cough, the week’s ironing, the plugged sink, the wet pants, the runny nose, the pay check 
that can’t cover expenses, the kids who won’t stop yelling and fighting—and the husband 
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who offers little affection or attention in payment for her drudgery.”351  Above all, in this 
framework, life in the working class family was marked by a basic sadness, exacerbated 
by families’ inability to comfortably afford “the things they want and need—or are 
pressured into believing they must have.”352  These critical voices were far from the 
center of elite public discourse, however, often confined to liberal and left periodicals 
like the Nation, Dissent, and Monthly Review.  The dominant voices in organized labor 
were far more optimistic. 
It’s important to note that the demands of the Cold War, the dismissal of radicals 
from mainstream institutions, and the extensive focus on (white) workers’ upward 
mobility did not mean that labor could no longer oppose workers to industrial elites.  In 
some contexts, pitting workers against employers could be dangerous, particularly if the 
speaker had a suspect past.  In other contexts—supporting Democrats over Republicans, 
articulating the union’s case during strikes, or calling out industry for going back on a 
bargain—it became a well-worn language that elites could offer almost ritualistically 
when it made strategic sense to do so. “The National Association of Manufacturers and 
Big Business are waging a class struggle in America as Karl Marx wrote it would be 
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waged,” Walter Reuther railed in 1959 against an anti-labor bill being considered in 
Congress.  “They are working overtime to prove Karl Marx was right.”353  
Though workers continued to be defined against economic elites, prevailing elite-
level understandings of working class identity had fundamentally changed since the days 
of “labor on the march.”  White working men putting their bodies at risk now played a 
much-diminished role in public representations of labor.  Language of bargaining 
displaced language of war and combat; when combat was necessary, it would not require 
physical violence. “There were no mass picket lines; no flying squadrons swept through 
the city; few meetings were held,” Mary Heaton Vorse reported from a 1950 Chrysler 
strike.  The “conflict was a bitter one, in which neither side pulled any punches. But the 
blows were struck through full-page advertisements, radio speeches, newspaper releases, 
and endless and often acrimonious negotiations.”354  A different kind of (white) working 
class masculinity, one less associated with bravery in combat or feats of strength than 
with breadwinning, homeownership, and consumerism, now took center stage. An early 
CIO poem had featured a striker telling the young child of a fallen comrade that 
“Daddy’s on another picket line tonight.”  In the predominant midcentury framework, the 
breadwinner’s battle would take place in the voting booth.  “CIO members owe it to 
themselves, their wives, and their children to accept the political challenge thrown at 
them,” union officials fighting Taft-Hartley urged workers in a 1947 appeal.355 
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This breadwinning (white) working class masculinity was simultaneously a 
powerful symbol of respectability for labor and legitimacy for business.  The narrative of 
capitalism’s evolution was linked far less to changes in the nature of industrial work itself 
than to the claim that workers now had the time and money to live a fulfilling private life.  
“Shorter hours [and] vacation time give the breadwinner plenty of time to enjoy his 
family and the comforts he has bought for them,” a Business Week profile of a “typical” 
worker read.356  From labor’s perspective, a worker seeking to provide for his family—
“Joe Smith needs more money to buy his kids food and get them adequate clothing and 
provide decent shelter”357—was less threatening than a worker whose unionism was 
motivated by political ideology. 
By the early 1950s, the worker, narrowly defined, had been incorporated into the 
symbolic center of American identity and was often interchangeable with the “average” 
American.  That meant a great deal.  But unions’ and liberals’ emphasis on (white) 
workers’ middle class status worked at cross-purposes even to their relatively modest 
aims.  Conceding that the injustices faced by white working class people had effectively 
been resolved, or were resolvable under the existing system, sapped the moral urgency of 
the labor-liberal cause.  “The political chemistry of the New Deal worked a double 
transformation: the ascendancy of labor and the eclipse of the ‘labor question,’” Steve 
Fraser has argued.358  The “labor question” could be eclipsed because white working 
class disadvantage all but vanished from elite discourse.  As argued in Chapter 1, the 
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dominant New Deal-era narrative of industrialism’s social consequences centered on 
white workers, especially male industrial workers.  It did not incorporate in any 
meaningful sense slavery or the experiences of workers of color and treated pre-industrial 
America as an egalitarian and largely just society of independent producers undone by 
the rise of industrial society and the greed of industrial tycoons.  The industrial order of 
the 1950s could easily be read as a resolution to that inherently limited story, in part 
because the workers it spotlighted the most had seen the most conspicuous gains. 
A more capacious understanding of the problem of industrial modernity would 
have required much more attention to (in modern terms) the intersection of class, race, 
and gender than mainstream left-of-center elites offered.  Most political figures who 
could offer it were under suspicion of radicalism and/or unable to access mainstream 
forums. One of the long-term consequences of the narrow understanding of the American 
working class has been that issues of class narrowly understood—unionization, the 
workplace, corporate power—often do not appear in elite discourse unless disadvantaged 
white men appear in elite discourse.  When the institutions chiefly responsible for 
bringing white working class grievances onto the front pages of newspapers rarely did so 
any longer, the urgency that had been attached to those issues declined.  Organized labor, 
at the height of its power, had an extremely strong claim to speak at the elite level for 
“labor” and the “worker” as homogenous categories.  The power of unions’ claims to 
represent workers now served to minimize the visibility of (white) working class 
disadvantage, as the heterogeneity of experiences even among white workers went 
unnoticed. 
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II: Affluence and (White) Working Class Politics 
While few mainstream elites disputed the existence of mass prosperity, more 
disagreement surrounded the political implications of (white) workers’ upward mobility. 
Contemporary analysis can be usefully condensed into three broad narratives, detailed 
below.  (To be clear, these were not mutually exclusive, and the differences were 
sometimes subtle; the analysis below aims to draw out differences and points of overlap.)  
First, a significant number of observers thought newly affluent (white) workers likely to 
retain their labor-liberal allegiance.  Even if their circumstances had changed, in this 
view, these voters still understood their interests as opposed to those of the wealthy, and 
they still had more to gain than lose from liberal programs. They remembered the 
Depression vividly and would not abandon unions and the Democratic Party, so central in 
their rise to prosperity. 
For others, however, the sharp income-based divisions that had marked national 
politics during the Roosevelt period would not last.  In the second narrative detailed 
below, as white workers eagerly seized the opportunity to assimilate to the broad (white) 
middle class through suburban homeownership and consumerism, they would adopt the 
conservative views typical of professional-class homeowners concerned about taxes and 
inflation.  The third narrative outlined below predicted a different kind of conservative 
turn: politics in a period of economic abundance would focus less on immediate material 
interests and more on issues like civil rights, civil liberties, and enlightened 
administration, where lower-income and less educated whites would likely be more 
conservative than their more educated counterparts.  While #2 and #3 both predicted a 
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turn to the right among white workers, they drew on different understandings of class and 
politics.  #2 remained situated within the dominant framework in which a middle class 
mentality was tied to conservatism and a working class mentality to liberalism.  #3 
pushed back on that conventional wisdom in a way that foreshadows discourse of the 
1960s and after. 
 
1. (White) workers would remain a central part of a solid liberal majority 
From the mid-1930s to mid-1940s, the understanding of the American electorate 
as “normally Democratic” pitted a nonaffluent majority against an affluent minority.  
“The strength of the Democratic Party is evidenced by the hold which it has upon the 
middle and lower economic levels,” George Gallup explained in early 1946. “The 
majority of voters look upon the Republican Party as the party of wealth and consider the 
Democratic Party as the party of the people.”359 While its influence fluctuated and it 
certainly did not go unchallenged, this basic mapping of the electorate retained strength 
throughout the 1940s and 1950s, with interpreters convinced that liberalism would 
remain a majority force for the foreseeable future.  Admittedly, (white) workers had more 
than before, but they would not cease to identify as workers, in this view; the few would 
always have more than the majority, and workers’ gains needed protection from elites 
continually eager for a larger share of the pie. 
Harry Truman’s victory in 1948 was interpreted as one of the most significant 
pieces of evidence for this claim.  To be clear, by the late 1940s, only a few would 
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contend that white workers desired or would come to desire an agenda significantly to the 
left of the New Deal.360  White workers could still be positioned as a force pushing for a 
more progressive future within the framework of postwar liberalism.  Truman, by no 
means a favorite of labor-liberals early in his presidency, had adopted an electoral 
strategy that called for him to emulate FDR’s indictments of “economic royalists” (“If 
you let the Republicans get control of the government, you will be making America an 
economic colony of Wall Street”…“The battle lines of 1948 are the same as they were in 
1932”).361  His victory—stunning to journalists and political insiders, who had been 
almost unanimously convinced that Republican Thomas Dewey would win—suggested 
that the Roosevelt coalition could hold without Roosevelt and perhaps indefinitely. 
Truman’s victory “confirms an old revolution,” Fortune commented—making clear, in 
other words, that the political cleavages of the New Deal still held.  The magazine 
dubbed Truman “Our Laboristic President” and predicted that Republicans would not 
regain power “until they have found a way to interest the workingman and the farmer in 
the Republican cause.”362  
The most common explanation for liberalism’s continued appeal to (white) 
workers pointed to material self-interest.  This could be framed negatively, as in the ever-
present conservative allegation that New Dealers won by doling out benefits to voters, or 
positively, as when Democrats ran on the narrative that they had led the country from 
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poverty to prosperity (“You never had it so good”…“Truman and Prosperity—or Dewey 
and Depression”).  In either case, the implication was that the labor-liberal program 
obviously offered the majority more material benefits than did the opposition.  1952 press 
reports noted a refrain among Detroit autoworkers: “Vote Democratic and live like a 
Republican.”363 A 1952 New York Times feature identified as key Northern Democratic 
constituencies “the masses of urban workers and wage earners” and “the national and 
racial minority groups.” These groups, the Times suggested, were “‘liberal’ in a largely 
material and selfish way,” with “more to gain than to lose through high wages, greater 
Government benefits of whatever sort, effective labor legislation and laws to improve the 
social and economic status of minorities.”364  The analysis reflected an assumption that 
would collapse within fifteen years: urban white and black workers were natural political 
allies, and both would gain from liberal programs whatever those were. 
While the dominant view linked majority support for liberal programming to 
simple self-interest, some saw Northern white workers as genuine adherents to a liberal 
creed who wanted justice and progress, not simply “more.”  In a telling mea culpa 
published shortly after the 1948 election, New York Times political reporter James Reston 
suggested that journalists had believed in a certain Dewey victory because they had not 
accorded enough weight to a few simple facts: Americans had enjoyed prosperity under 
Democrats, more voters had become “sensitive to the influences of organized labor,” and 
“a whole generation had grown up under the strong influences of the Roosevelt era.”  
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Because journalists had missed the overriding “political influence of the Roosevelt era on 
the thinking of the nation,” Reston concluded, “we were wrong, not only on the election, 
but, what’s worse, on the whole political direction of our time.”365  In a 1956 study of 
Detroit autoworkers, social scientist Arthur Kornhauser and his colleagues argued that 
these UAW members’ “predominant political outlook or ‘philosophy’ is clearly one that 
conceives of workers’ and unions’ goals as opposed at many points to those of business 
and wealthy groups.”  To be sure, many workers were relatively “passive and unaroused” 
politically, but “if they go conservative, it will not be because economic prosperity 
compels it but because liberal leadership…fails to reach them with convincing alternative 
social-political interpretations that fit their own fundamental needs.”366 America would 
not revert back to pre-New Deal politics because prosperity had come, in this view; the 
successes of liberals and organized labor had left a broad and lasting imprint on public 
opinion. 
For political observers who saw white workers as a reliable liberal constituency, 
that faith had deep roots; it did not fall apart in the face of unfavorable political 
outcomes.  This has a great deal to do with the way liberals thought about (white) 
working class politics.  As argued in the coda to Chapter 1, many liberals held to a 
teleological understanding of (white) working class political consciousness; they 
expected workers to become more aware and politically sophisticated over time. In this 
framework, problems in the near term would be less problematic in the long term: for 
                                                           
365 James Reston, “Why Forecasts Erred: Times Correspondent Discusses the Reversal of Political 
Appraisals,” New York Times, November 4, 1948. 
366 Arthur Kornhauser, Harold Sheppard, and Albert Mayer, When Labor Votes (New York: University 
Books, 1956), 145, 281. 
198 
 
instance, racism would lessen as whites came to understand that it was wrong and counter 
to their own self-interest.  In the short term, however, (white) workers could be readily 
misled by external forces working against their interests—advertising, the conservative 
press, deceitful politicians, business-funded campaign messaging.  CIO political officials 
generally held to this basic framework.  They saw the rank and file as generally liberal—
though apathetic and uninformed—and sought to educate workers about politics and 
motivate them to vote.  “Once they know the facts there is no doubt about how they will 
vote,” CIO Political Action Committee director Jack Kroll argued: 
Will any man knowingly vote to pay heavy taxes, just so others who make much 
more than he will be able to pay small taxes?  Will any man knowingly vote to 
pay higher prices for his food and clothes and shelter in order to pile up huge 
profits for big business?  Will any man knowingly vote to give away his 
property…so that a few people can make money out of it?  Knowingly, people do 
not do such things. Our major job is to see that they know.367 
 
Beyond the key assumptions of CIO political action—the CIO worker/voter is a 
breadwinning male concerned with the costs of domestic life; the chief political cleavage 
pits the wealthy against the majority—what is particularly suggestive about this quote is 
its repetition of “knowingly.” Attributing conservative votes among workers to a lack of 
knowledge (essentially, false consciousness), as Kroll did here, made it difficult for 
liberals to understand workers drawn to conservative politics as acting with full 
consciousness or exerting agency. 
This way of thinking about political agency comes through clearly in CIO 
political analysis from the late 1940s to mid-1950s, which typically credited favorable 
political outcomes to the self-assertion of a natural liberal majority and unfavorable 
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outcomes to factors like low turnout and misinformation.  The 1946 Congress had 
assembled “a record of benefit for the few and injustice for the many,” a 1947 pamphlet 
explained, because “56,000,000 Eligible Americans Failed to Vote…The majority of us 
did not elect this Congress.  WE DIDN’T VOTE AT ALL.”368 Two years later, the 
“Victory Edition” of PAC’s newsletter celebrated Truman’s victory in typical 
majoritarian terms: “The people took back control of the United States on November 
2.”369 National CIO-PAC’s 1950 midterms postmortem noted Democratic weakness on 
issues like inflation, taxes, anticommunism, and foreign affairs, but continued to 
emphasize voter apathy and confusion: “While Democrats have good, defensible 
positions…their arguments are mainly intellectual, while the charges of the Republican 
opposition are loaded with emotion,” and “assisted by almost unanimous support from 
the daily press.”370 Eisenhower’s victory in 1952, national CIO-PAC emphasized, “was a 
personal one in every sense of the word… It was victory for a popular hero, constantly 
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before the electorate in a heroic role since 1942, and cannot be construed as a repudiation 
of the principles of the New Deal and the Fair Deal.”371   
The weaknesses of this framework—in which liberals won when the natural 
majority voted its interests and lost when that majority stayed home or was misled—
came into sharp relief on issues of race.  One suggestive example can be found in 1940s 
Detroit, where UAW-backed candidates lost to race-baiting conservatives in three 
mayoral elections over six years.  In 1949, liberal George Edwards faced Albert Cobo, a 
conservative businessman running on opposition to so-called “Negro invasions” of white 
neighborhoods.372 The UAW-led labor campaign against Cobo played in the typical key 
of labor-liberal populism (“Who is the Big Business Candidate? ‘Cobo, the Republican 
Tax Collector’”…“Edwards has been in the peoples corner. Big business wants Cobo”).  
One flyer put the issue succinctly, in the words of a classic union song: “The question in 
this election is which side are you on? You know which side you are on—the same side 
with George Edwards and the Union.”373  The election result reflected the fact that the 
union was not the only “side” to which white workers belonged—Cobo won by 
approximately 100,000 votes, the largest margin in any Detroit mayoral election to that 
point. 
  Several groups of UAW officials met shortly after the election to discuss what 
had gone wrong.  They offered a wide range of explanations, collected in two compelling 
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documents.374  Some attributed the result to their side’s campaign missteps (“I think we 
would have won if we had a program…a concrete program”… “Ringing door bells on 
Monday when women were in the basement was bad.  I am convinced that sound cars 
should be at busy intersections rather than making noise in residential communities and 
waking babies up”…“[Canvassers] stop ringing door bells and have a few drinks and by 
the time noon arrives they are pretty tight”). One saw a manifestation of the power of the 
media (“I think we got the vote out but…the people were conditioned wrong. I don’t 
know who conditioned them, whether it was the newspapers or radio”).  Several officials 
identified more a deeply rooted problem for union political action—a political 
consciousness rooted in the intersection of race and homeownership. “I think…we are 
dealing with people who have a middle class mentality.  Even in our own UAW, the 
member is either buying a home, owns a home or is going to buy one,” one unionist 
noted.  “It boils down to this,” another remarked bitterly, “that the Union helps their 
economic condition until they can have a front porch and for that they become 
capitalists.”  This imposed obvious limits on the political influence of the union: “You 
can tell them anything you want to but as long as they think their property is going down, 
it is different”…“The fellow is not going to go along with you because you give him a 
leaflet or because Philip Murray says to do so.” 
 What these unionists were getting at, at bottom, was the viability of assuming that 
(white) workers were or would become liberal voters.  In a prominent liberal 
understanding of working class political consciousness, shared membership in the 
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“people,” shared economic interests, and shared opposition to big business and 
reactionary politics would ultimately outweigh divisions within the liberal coalition.  The 
organizer who stressed that he and his colleagues were “dealing with people who have a 
middle class mentality” expressed a different view.  Workers would support the union 
insofar as it helped them to increase their standard of living, in this view, but they would 
have no interest in a labor-liberal program that appeared to threaten their gains.  This 
reading of white workers’ relationship with liberalism would not become dominant until 
the 1960s.  Even in the midcentury period sometimes remembered as the height of liberal 
influence, however, prominent political analysts devoted considerable attention to factors 
motivating a turn to the right among (white) workers.  The next two sections turn to those 
arguments. 
 
2. White workers as part of a right-leaning middle class majority 
A second prominent argument about the political consequences of mass affluence 
predicted that white workers’ rapid absorption into a broad middle class would erode the 
income-based cleavages that had undergirded liberal success since the New Deal.  In this 
view, a liberal program drawing an opposition between the majority and the privileged 
few would appeal to voters only in a period of Depression and scarcity.  As their 
circumstances changed, their politics would change as well.  “The real roots of the 
Roosevelt coalition were established along economic lines,” pollster Louis Harris argued.  
“As we move into an increasingly middle-class society, these lines are disappearing.”375  
“The proportion of the population who can easily identify themselves with ‘the common 
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man’ is declining,” political scientist Angus Campbell put it in 1956.  “If the current high 
level of economic activity in this country is maintained for a sufficient period to bring 
about a significant upgrading in class identifications, the Republican Party is likely to 
collect a sizable dividend.”376 One Democratic official offered a succinct version of the 
thesis: “The trouble is, we ran out of poor people.”377 
For some observers who held to this view, the prosperity of the postwar period 
had already transformed millions of urban Democrats into Republicans.  This 
transformation was a matter of lifestyle, not simply income, with suburbanization the 
chief cause.  In the dominant interpretation, suburban life produced political and cultural 
homogeneity.  Newsweek offered a typical formulation in 1957: “When a city dweller 
packs up and moves his family to the suburbs, he usually acquires a mortgage, a power 
lawn mower, and a backyard grill…Often, although a lifelong Democrat, he also starts 
voting Republican.”378  The New Deal, liberal historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr. argued, 
“gave millions of people new economic and social status and enabled them to become 
‘respectable’…They moved out of the cities into the suburbs, abandoned tenements for 
bungalows, bought automobiles, and became Republicans.”379  In most accounts, new 
suburbanites (consciously or unconsciously) jettisoned their liberal views chiefly because 
                                                           
376 Angus Campbell, “The Case of the Missing Democrats,” New Republic, July 2, 1956. 
377 Arthur Schlesinger Jr., “Where Does the Liberal Go From Here?,” New York Times, August 4, 1957. 
378 “Suburbia-Exurbia-Urbia,” Newsweek, April 1, 1957.  For contemporary analysis of suburban politics 
see e.g. Fred Greenstein and Raymond Wolfinger, “The Suburbs and Shifting Party Loyalties,” Public 
Opinion Quarterly 22, no. 4 (1958): 473-482; David Riesman, “The Suburban Dislocation,” The Annals of 
the American Academy of Political and Social Science 314, no. 1 (1957): 123-146; Robert Wood, 
Suburbia: Its People and Their Politics (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1958); C. Wright Mills, White 
Collar: The American Middle Classes (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953); AFL-CIO Committee 
on Political Education, “New Frontier: Politics in the Suburbs” (1960); Whyte, The Organization Man; 
John Millet and David Pittman, “The New Suburban Voter: A Case Study in Electoral Behavior,” 
Southwestern Social Science Quarterly 39, no. 1 (1958): 33-42. 
379 Steven Gillon, Politics and Vision: The ADA and American Liberalism, 1947-1985 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1987), 124-125. 
204 
 
they wanted to fit in with their neighbors.  By changing political affiliations, they could 
leave their immigrant past behind and blend into an affluent, homogenous existence. 
When liberals made this argument, it typically came with a note of bitterness—
they suffered politically because of the gains they had made possible.  Conservatives 
gave the argument a different inflection: workers who became part of a middle-income 
suburban mainstream would easily see through liberal promises and demagoguery. “The 
fairly well-paid industrial worker today…has his home, his automobile, his insurance, 
and his children are getting a good education,” New Dealer turned conservative 
columnist Raymond Moley explained.  “He has too much money and too much sense to 
believe the guff of John L. Lewis or William Green or Philip Murray about wage slavery. 
He knows that no one is grinding his face at the work bench.  In fact, he is beginning to 
resent this talk that puts him in a class apart from his neighbor the white-collar worker or 
the small independent businessman.”380 These workers had moved into what Moley 
called the “middle interests” of society, the symbolic center he identified “with such 
concepts as self-help, personal liberty, individual enterprise, and opportunity.”381  As a 
result, in this view, they could be expected to vote like small businessmen or 
professionals, regardless of union leaders’ efforts to persuade them otherwise. 
In contemporary elite public discourse, one the most notable analysts of the 
consequences of white workers’ ascension to the middle class was journalist and pollster 
Samuel Lubell. Lubell made his name with his work on the New Deal coalition, 
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especially as developed in his 1951 book The Future of American Politics, and with an 
idiosyncratic methodology viewed with skepticism by traditional pollsters but compelling 
to a popular audience: He parsed election returns to identify areas that would be 
representative of demographics of interest, visited those districts on foot, interviewed as 
many voters as he could, and then generalized from his interactions.382  Looking in depth 
at Lubell’s work is useful, most simply, because he was an influential figure in his own 
right.  Though not as well known in the present day as comparable figures (Kevin 
Phillips, for instance), Lubell was hailed in the 1950s as “one of the top political analysts 
in the nation today,” “one of the accomplished political writers of this generation,” and 
“the nation’s leading political analyst...something of a major prophet.”383  More broadly, 
looking at Lubell’s work helps to shed light on the reasoning of contemporaries who were 
convinced that the era of liberal dominance was a thing of the past. 
Lubell saw the changes and tensions within the New Deal coalition as the 
fundamental story in 1950s politics.  His central research question, as he explained to an 
editor, centered on the “varied elements making up [the] new Democratic majority, what 
brought them together, the struggle now raging among these diverse groups to shape and 
control the destiny of this new majority, [and] whether it will hold together or split, 
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giving the Republicans a chance to ‘come back.’”384 Perhaps most of all, Lubell sought to 
push back on the view that the Democratic coalition would “remain [a] ‘leftist’ force”; 
rather, he implied, it contained “the seeds of its own conservatism.”385  For Lubell, the 
class polarization characteristic of the New Deal was a product of a particular place and 
time.  “When Roosevelt first took office, no segment of the population was more ready 
for ‘a new deal’ than the submerged, inarticulate urban masses,” he wrote.  As the 
Democratic Party successfully brought urban new immigrant workers into the political 
mainstream, “awaken[ing]” them “to a consciousness of the power in their numbers,” 
they became “the chief carriers of the Roosevelt Revolution.” Anticipating the “culture of 
unity” argument later made by social and labor historians, Lubell argued that the New 
Deal had “drawn the same class-conscious line of economic interest across the entire 
country” and “subordinated the old nativistic prejudices of race and religion, which had 
divided the lower half of American society for so long,” bringing working Americans “a 
greater degree of social unity than they had ever shared before.” These two 
developments—working class unity and the emergence of the urban vote—brought about 
“the transformation of the United States from a nation with a traditional Republican 
majority to one with a normal Democratic majority.”386  
For Lubell, it was a serious mistake to assume that these changes in the electorate 
would mean Democratic dominance for the foreseeable future.  By the beginning of the 
1950s, the Democrats were no longer “an aggregation of economic ‘have-nots.’” Key 
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Democratic groups, especially labor and urban immigrant-descended workers, had been 
lifted to “a ‘have’ status” and desired “not to get more but to preserve the gains of the last 
twenty years.”  As a result, Lubell suggested, the “inner dynamics of the Roosevelt 
coalition” had “shifted from those of getting to those of keeping.”  This introduced an 
inescapable instability into the Democratic coalition.  When voters had nothing to lose, 
they experienced liberal programs, taxation, and spending as largely cost-free.  When 
they had something to lose, they became sensitive to the costs: “Once the bite of taxes 
was felt, the Welfare State took on a new aspect.” Yet while the new middle class—the 
old Northern urban working class, in other words—had become “conservative in the 
manner of all middle classes,” for Lubell, its conservatism did not manifest in the 
traditional way, as reflexive antistatism.  For voters whose “memories of discrimination, 
poverty and the Great Depression” were vivid, the Democrats, not the Republicans, 
would be the “conservative” choice—at least for a time. 387 “Because we have slipped 
into the habit of considering the Republicans as the nation’s conservative party and the 
Democrats as the liberal party,” this “conservative turn within the Democratic coalition” 
had been obscured.388 
As they moved forward, Lubell emphasized, none of the key Democratic 
constituencies could advance further without imperiling the gains of the others.  The core 
of the Democratic appeal had been based on the principle of government helping “have-
not” Americans to rise.  When Democrats offered new gains to the most disadvantaged 
members of their coalition, they risked “taking it away from somebody else through 
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inflation.”389  Further, while the emphasis Lubell placed on anti-black views as a factor in 
Northern politics is modest by 1960s standards, it was substantial by 1950s standards.  
Lubell saw potential peril for the liberal coalition in the fact that whites perceived blacks’ 
struggle for upward mobility and better housing as a threat to their efforts to assimilate 
and achieve middle class status.  “The emotions stirred by the civil rights issue assume 
their most violent form,” he suggested, among whites struggling to reach middle class 
respectability, living in areas “along the line where expanding Negro settlement pushes in 
on those unable to rise higher on the social ladder…Wherever the Negro appears on the 
urban ladder, he puts to test the relative strengths of the economic ties binding the 
Roosevelt elements and the racial prejudices tugging them apart.”390  This model of white 
workers as torn between their racial prejudice and their close ties to the Democratic Party 
would be central to elite understandings of the political landscape from the 1960s through 
the 1990s.  Lubell essentially arrived at this conventional wisdom ten years earlier. 
Lubell and the other analysts featured in this section positioned their arguments 
chiefly in response to liberals who assumed the political cleavages of the New Deal 
would continue indefinitely.  Importantly, though, the argument that financially better-off 
workers would turn to the right was consistent with the labor-liberal assumption that 
economic interest was the driving force in politics.  “Keeping,” in Lubell’s terms, had 
simply become more important than “getting.”  In this framework, economic interest 
trumped ideology, and the latter could quickly change to fit the former—as in the 
archetypical new suburbanite’s switch to the Republican Party.  Further, importantly, 
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narratives #1 and #2 both drew on an association between conservatism and middle class 
norms and between liberalism and working class norms.  Here a worker who turned 
conservative had become less like “workers” as a group.  The erosion of these dual 
associations—middle class/conservative and working class/liberal—is one of the critical 
events in a study of white working class representation.  It began earlier than the 
traditional backlash narrative lets on, as the next section shows. 
 
3. (White) workers as more conservative than (white) professionals 
The third broad narrative of postwar white working class politics raised the 
possibility that (white) workers might become more conservative than a (white) 
professional class increasingly understood as liberal.  Presenting this as a single narrative 
requires more synthesis and indulgence than the previous two.  Doing so, though, helps to 
show how the opposition between liberal white elites and a conservative white working 
class—the dominant view since the 1960s—built on intellectual work conducted in the 
1940s and 1950s.  In 1940s and 1950s discourse on anticommunism, racial prejudice, 
cultural differences between social classes, mass culture, intellectual identity, and more, 
it is possible to discern emergent images of (white) workers as rigid and traditionalist and 
of (white) professionals as elitist liberals. 
Before the 1960s, a clearly established narrative suggested that the liberal 
governing class was different from the “average American.”  A common interpretation of 
the New Deal in contemporary elite discourse held that liberal intellectuals had dislodged 
businessmen as the predominant governing elite.  Critics of this trend argued that 
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intellectuals had no practical skills, whereas those who had been successful in business 
had proven their ability as leaders and administrators.  Conservatives consistently argued 
that the New Deal empowered a dangerous and unqualified clique of intellectuals bent on 
intruding into Americans’ private lives.  Conservative columnist Frank Kent derided 
them as “third rate college professors and unsuccessful welfare workers”; H. L. Mencken 
as “obscure and impotent fellows” raised to “the secular rank of princes of the blood.”391  
This line of argumentation flourished as the prominence and prestige of intellectual 
occupations grew: government money poured into research universities, the GI Bill 
swelled undergraduate enrollment, and intellectuals maintained high-level, prestigious 
positions in government.  The 1952 Dwight Eisenhower-Adlai Stevenson campaign 
brought to prominence the term “egghead,” a derogatory label for a liberal intellectual.392  
Eisenhower’s victory, charged one conservative, “demonstrated...the extreme remoteness 
of the ‘egghead’ from the thought and feeling of the whole of the people.”  The majority, 
in this view, disdained those who “treated mankind as if it were a large lump of dough to 
be molded into shape by the confused and pushing fingers of those who, however lacking 
in experience, were persuaded beyond all argument that they knew best.”393 
For their critics, liberal intellectuals were also distinguished by their tendency to 
push the boundaries of conventional morality on issues of gender and sexuality.  “The 
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average American just does not want some expert running around prying into his life and 
his personal affairs and deciding for him how he should live,” Ohio congressman 
Clarence Brown commented in a 1946 hearing on the creation of a national social 
scientific foundation; it would be a nonstarter, Brown stressed, if liberals hoped to 
“establish some sort of organization in which there would be a lot of short-haired women 
and long-haired men messing into everybody’s personal affairs and lives.”394  
“Nonconformity in politics is often the handmaiden of the same proclivities in sex,” two 
Hearst journalists alleged in a 1951 tract deeming the nation’s capital a “femmocracy” 
populated by call girls, “crackpots from the campuses, Communists, ballet-dancers and 
economic planners.” In the culture of the liberal governing class, they charged, “the 
women wore flat-heeled shoes and batik blouses, and went in for New Thought.  The 
men, if you could call some of them that, wore their hair longer than we do, read 
advanced literature, and talked about the joys of collectivism.”395  One of the surest ways 
to identify a radical, in this discourse, was to look for signs of unconventional personal 
behavior—grooming or dress associated with homosexuality, marriages in which wives 
held high-level professional jobs. 
This understanding of “nonconformist” liberal culture was particularly prominent 
in anticommunist discourse, which typically identified wealthy Eastern liberals as most 
prone to communist involvement.  “It has not been the less fortunate, or the members of 
minority groups, who have been traitorous to this nation,” Joseph McCarthy alleged, “but 
rather those who have had all the benefits that the wealthiest nation on earth has had to 
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offer…the bright young men who were born with silver spoons in their mouths.”396  A 
prominent stereotype of communist sympathizers in government centered on an effete, 
homoerotic clique of State Department officials from old New England WASP families: a 
“conspiracy of the gentlemen”…“the pompous diplomat in striped pants with phony 
British accent”…“striped-pants snob”…“dilettante diplomats…with kid gloves in 
perfumed drawing rooms”…“boys in striped pants.” Anticommunism and the persecution 
of gay men proceeded in parallel, with allegations of homosexuality and disloyalty in the 
State Department prominent in the same period.397 
The common claim that communist ties were concentrated at the top of the social 
hierarchy typically came with the corollary that American workers had no interest in the 
false promises of the radical left.  Communists might claim to speak on behalf of 
workers, in this view, but workers were loyal to the United States.  John Birch Society 
founder Robert Welch dismissed communism’s claim to be a “movement of the 
proletariat” as “one of the biggest lies in all history.  For Communism has always been 
imposed from the top down by the very rich, the highly educated, and the politically 
powerful on the suffering masses.”  In the contemporary United States, Welch charged, “I 
can find you a lot more Harvard accents in Communist circles…than you can find me 
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overalls.”398  American Legion magazine, commenting on suspected Soviet collaborators 
brought before the House Un-American Activities Committee, stressed that the group 
included “no farmer or workman or so-called ‘common man.’  Without exception they 
were college graduates, Ph.D.’s, summa cum laudes and Phi Beta Kappas from Harvard, 
Yale, Princeton and other great colleges.”399  Ex-communist Whittaker Chambers, whose 
explosive allegations of communist involvement against former State Department official 
Alger Hiss prompted a high-profile 1949 trial, saw the Hiss case as significant for the 
“jagged fissure, which it did not so much open as reveal, between the plain men and 
women of the nation, and those who affected to act, think and speak for them”—the 
elites, and only the elites defended Hiss, Chambers suggested, while ordinary Americans 
saw through his disloyalty.400 
One of the most consistent patterns in liberal discourse in the New Deal era is the 
use of the language of averageness (“common people,” “plain people”) to mark off 
liberals’ majority constituency from the wealthy and well connected.  The more 
identifiable liberals became as an elite, the more that same language (“common man,” 
“plain men and women,” as in the previous paragraph) could undercut their claim to 
speak for the majority.  In this context, to be “average” meant to lack significant power or 
wealth—which prominent liberals now had—and to remain within a cultural and political 
mainstream where radicalism and non-normative sexual practices had no place.  It is 
important to stress, though, that the work of defining liberals against the “plain people” 
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was not performed by conservatives alone: in a pattern that would become increasingly 
prevalent in the 1960s, liberals who themselves felt a sense of alienation from the (white) 
majority adopted frames that mirrored the conservative claims against them. 
Liberal intellectuals, like their political adversaries, advanced a frame in which 
liberal leadership meant leadership by intellectuals instead of businessmen.  
(“Intellectuals” is effectively synonymous with “liberals” in contemporary discourse).  
For contemporary liberals, there was no workable alternative to intellectuals in 
government—their expertise was needed to direct the complex programs of the modern 
state.  Liberals did, however, identify intellectuals as a distinctive elite class with an 
unconventional outlook.  “New Dealism” was not only a set of policies, historian Eric 
Goldman argued, but a way of looking at the world.  It was “the assumption that the new 
was better than the old; that intellectuals ought to be leaders; that morals and religion as 
well as economics and politics were constantly to be re-examined…that the cocked eye 
was man’s most proper expression.”401  Liberals also expressed concern that the growing 
power and prestige of intellectuals would set off dangerous anti-intellectualism within the 
broader public.  “The practical, non-intellectual man feels uneasy” under liberal 
leadership, intellectual David Riesman hypothesized.  “He resents the fact that his own 
importance, as well as his own understanding of the world, are threatened by the 
intellectual and the intellectual’s ability to change ideas.”  Riesman predicted that 
American politics would increasingly be marked by “a new status warfare” between “the 
better educated upper middle class people” and “the groups which, by reason of rural or 
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small-town location, ethnicity, or other parochialism, feel threatened by ideas.”402  It is 
not difficult to see here the familiar frame in which liberalism and sophistication 
accompany upper middle class status. 
For Riesman and his contemporaries, this kind of anti-intellectual politics 
manifested most clearly in the anticommunist conservatism exemplified by Joe 
McCarthy.  The dominant liberal reading understood McCarthyism as a populist revolt 
against elite liberals.403  In a compelling 1955 essay, Riesman and Nathan Glazer framed 
the rise of McCarthyism as a bookend to liberals’ claim to speak for the majority.  
“During the New Deal days a group of intellectuals led and played lawyer for…a mass of 
underprivileged people,” they suggested.  Now, however, “many who were once among 
the inarticulate masses are no longer silent” and had “reject[ed] the liberal intellectuals as 
guides” in favor of “right-wing demi-intellectuals.” Riesman and Glazer posited that the 
relationship between the liberals and the “masses” was only a temporary alliance—it 
relied on white workers’ submerged status, their lack of anything to protect, and their 
inability to speak for themselves.  “The earlier leadership by the intellectuals of the 
underprivileged came about through a program of economic changes,” they stressed.  
Now raised to security, these groups remained “discontented,” but for reasons more 
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difficult to alleviate—the fear of losing what they had gained, the desire to be recognized 
as fully American.  In a prosperous but somehow still unsatisfactory existence, Riesman 
and Glazer wrote, these “ex-masses” “must continually seek for reasons explaining their 
unrest—and the reasons developed by intellectuals for the benefit of previous proletariats 
are of course quite irrelevant.” 
The literature on McCarthyism formed part of a broader reappraisal of working-
class politics among liberals. Concerns about workers’ susceptibility to dangerous, 
emotion-laden politics were nothing new, as emphasized in the coda to Chapter 1.  
However, these concerns became more central after Nazism, as it became 
(understandably) far more difficult for liberals to view mass politics through a rosy lens.  
Fascism was in part a “popular mass movement,” sociologist Talcott Parsons argued in 
1942, in which “large masses of the ‘common people’ have become imbued with a highly 
emotional, indeed often fanatical, zeal for a cause.”404 Nazis’ use of radio and film 
intensified concerns about the uncritical mass media audience and its susceptibility to 
elite manipulation (see coda to Chapter 1), a concern that came through particularly 
clearly in postwar criticism of industrialized popular culture.405  Broadly speaking,, 
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contemporaries emphasized the power of hatred to motivate political mobilization. Led 
by historian Richard Hofstadter, liberal scholars in the 1950s popularized a reappraisal of 
the populist history of the United States, in which Populism was an antimodern 
movement driven by psychological strains and anti-Semitism.406  A vast social scientific 
literature on prejudice407 identified a link between class status and tolerance and implied 
that lower-income American whites posed the greatest impediment to racial equality. 
One key common thread in this analysis—and a key difference between 
understanding white workers as becoming conservative like professionals (section #2) 
and becoming more conservative than professionals (#3)—was an emphasis on 
psychology-based frameworks for understanding politics. These frameworks, in 
comparison to political economic frames, tended to yield a more pessimistic assessment 
of white workers’ potential as a progressive force.  If political behavior ultimately 
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depended on emotional and often irrational drives, whether a constituency’s objective 
interests were progressive was less important.  What mattered most was how that 
constituency perceived and acted on its political interests in present-day politics.408 
As the coda to Chapter 1 showed, concerns about how white workers perceived 
and acted upon their interests had been prevalent in left-liberal discourse throughout the 
Depression era.  But liberal discourse in previous decades had often attributed socially 
undesirable behavior to material deprivation: If most workers were currently at a low 
level of political or cultural sophistication, that would change as their socioeconomic 
circumstances improved.  By the 1950s, a far greater percentage of leftists and liberals 
had abandoned these kinds of teleological assumptions about (white) workers.  The 
foremost reason for this was, again, the widespread belief that the formerly 
underprivileged had achieved economic security.  As one liberal explained, “It has not 
been many years since [liberals] could concentrate on removing the economic and social 
disabilities suffered by the people, while telling themselves that when this was 
accomplished the proletariat would raise itself from its intellectual and cultural 
degradation.”  Now he and his cohort were like “climbers who discover, on attaining 
what they had taken to be the summit, that they have only reached a plateau…We are 
separated from the good society by terrain far more forbidding than any we had 
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foreseen.”409  While “today’s material conditions of life are fantastically better than we 
ever thought possible,” another contemporary wrote, there “would be much less cause for 
concern if levels of taste, thought and morals had come as far from what they were in 
1933 as the average income has moved from what it was at the same time.”410  For these 
elites, once white workers’ obvious material deprivation seemed to have been eliminated, 
it was more difficult to overlook concerns about “taste, thought, and morals” and 
continue to view white workers sympathetically. 
Taking multiple literatures broadly, mid-1940s through 1950s social science and 
political commentary offered at least four explanations for (white) workers’ higher 
susceptibility to racism and right-wing politics.  One line of reasoning centered on 
education.  In the dominant postwar framework—often called “racial liberalism” and 
exemplified by Swedish social scientist Gunnar Myrdal’s 1944 book An American 
Dilemma—racism was understood as an irrational set of beliefs in the head of the 
individual, reducible through education and persuasion.411  The idea that existing racial 
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inequality did not stem from biological inferiority was difficult to grasp for the 
uneducated “masses of white Americans,” Myrdal wrote.  Environmental explanations 
for social inequality, he suggested, “tax knowledge and imagination heavily…To 
conceive that apparent differences in capacities and attitudes could be cultural in 
origin…requires difficult and complicated thinking about a multitude of mutually 
dependent variables, thinking which does not easily break into the lazy formalism of 
unintellectual people.” More broadly, in this view, effective democratic citizenship 
required critical thinking and respect for free expression and the rights of others—skills 
that required cultural capital.  “A liberal outlook is much more likely to emerge among 
people in a somewhat secure social and economic situation and with a background of 
education,” Myrdal argued. “The problem for political liberalism…appears to be first to 
lift the masses to security and education and then work to make them liberal.”412 
In a second common line of argumentation, poor whites vented or displaced 
frustration with their economic status through racism, and they held most tightly to 
racism simply because they possessed little aside from whiteness.  The economically 
insecure white man was “afraid to lose his own feeling of superiority,” the Journal of 
Social Issues explained. “If he did he might have to face the fact that he wasn’t 
succeeding as well as he wished—that he was unable to realize the American dream.” If a 
man invested in white supremacy felt “downhearted and uncertain of his job, [or] if he is 
living in poverty and squalor—at least he can feel that he has something in his make-up 
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that is superior to others.”413  It is important to note that leftists also generally attributed 
white working class racism to economic deprivation and competition for scarce 
resources.414  A key difference lies in the implication that educated and economically 
secure whites would make better allies precisely because they did not compete with 
blacks and thus felt less threatened by them.  As Myrdal put it, “the Negro’s friend—or 
the one who is least unfriendly—is still rather the upper class of white people, the people 
with economic and social security who are truly a ‘noncompetitive group.’”415 
Third, contemporaries suggested, those who had recently attained middle-class or 
middle-income status would be most opposed to anything that seemed to threaten it.  
Political scientist Robert Lane’s work on “why the American common man believes as he 
does” found that these (white) working class men—as distinct from the “lower classes”—
did not “want equality.”  These “stable breadwinners, churchgoers, voters, family men” 
had achieved stability “through hard work and sometimes bitter sacrifices,” Lane 
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stressed; the idea of seeing the “lower orders raised and one’s own hard-earned status 
given…as a right and not a reward for effort, seems to them desperately wrong.”416  
Lane’s argument here pushed back on the liberal view of all nondominant groups as part 
of the same “people” or “majority”—distinctions that elites overlooked meant a great 
deal to those who had worked hard for modest gains. 
A fourth prominent line of argumentation held that working class cultural norms 
and ways of life—family life especially—drew workers to right-wing politics.  A 
growing academic literature in the 1940s and 1950s focused on understanding class 
differences in cultural terms.  One scholar writing in 1947 outlined the basic premise: 
“Social classes in America constitute somewhat separate sub-groups in American society, 
each with its own cultural attributes of behavior, ideas, and life-situations.”417  Studies 
examined differences across a range of areas, from childrearing to mental health to 
participation in political activity.418  Where the dominant view in elite public discourse 
tied rising incomes and consumerism to cultural homogenization, this social scientific 
literature stressed that workers with higher incomes did not cease to be distinctively 
working class.  While “today’s wage earners do have tremendous buying and consuming 
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power,” one researcher put it, “they are not just like everyone else”—meaning educated 
white professionals—“now that they have money to spend.”419  This finding was of 
particular interest to marketers hoping to appeal to white workers, the impetus behind 
much of the research on working class culture in this period. 
The most infamous argument about the political distinctiveness of the working 
class was developed in the late 1950s by sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset, under the 
title of “working class authoritarianism.”420  Briefly, Lipset contended that the “lower-
class way of life produces individuals with rigid and intolerant approaches to politics.” 
Workers’ “unsophisticated perspective…greater suggestibility, absence of a sense of past 
and future…inability to take a complex view, greater difficulty in abstracting from 
concrete experience, and lack of imagination” excluded them from meaningful 
participation in political debate, in this view. Because of the rigidity of working class 
parenting practices, the “lower-class individual” was “likely to have been exposed to 
punishment, lack of love, and a general atmosphere of tension and aggression since early 
childhood”; all experiences likely to “produce deep-rooted hostilities” that emerged later 
in life as “ethnic prejudice” and “political authoritarianism.” Individuals with a “relative 
lack of economic and psychological security” also tended to relieve tension via “the 
                                                           
419 Burleigh Gardner, introduction to Lee Rainwater, Richard Coleman, and Gerald Handel, Workingman’s 
Wife: Her Personality, World and Life Style (New York: Oceana Publications, 1959), xi. On this point, see 
especially Bennett Berger, Working-Class Suburb: A Study of Auto Workers in Suburbia (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1960), which challenged the notion that white workers’ move to 
suburbia would cause a distinct working class culture to disappear; for Berger, if “a whole stratum has 
collectively raised its standard of living…by buying new homes in the suburbs,” the “nature of the stratum 
itself…remains largely unchanged,” and it would be “a great mistake to equate an income which permits 
most of the basic amenities of what the middle class calls ‘decency’ [with] becoming middle class.”  
Berger, Working-Class Suburb, 23. 
420 First published as “Democracy and Working-Class Authoritarianism,” American Sociological Review 
24, no. 4 (1959): 482-501 and later included in Lipset’s book Political Man (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 
1960). Quotes and page numbers in the next note are from the version in Political Man. 
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venting of hostility against a scapegoat,” Lipset argued.  In sum, the working class tended 
towards a view of “politics and personal relationships in black-and-white terms, a desire 
for immediate action, [and] an impatience with talk and discussion.”421 
Lipset’s view of the working class was more alarmist than the literature as a 
whole but generally consistent with it.  The imagery that emerged from social scientific 
and marketing literature portrayed (white) workers as rigid, traditionalist, family-
centered, and distrustful of the outside world.  Because they were the primary target of 
advertising, white working class women drew more attention than white working class 
men.  Marketers understood the white working class woman as a housewife who lived an 
exceedingly narrow life focused on her home and family and had little knowledge of or 
inclination towards the outside world.  Journalist Vance Packard, summarizing the 
consensus in 1957, identified her as “Mrs. Middle Majority”: 
Mrs. Middle Majority has a fine moral sense of responsibility and builds her 
whole life around her home.  On the other hand she lives in a narrow, limited 
world and is quite timid about the outside world….She works harder than other 
women, her life has very narrow routines, she likes to deal only with familiar 
things and tends to view anything outside her narrow world as dangerous and 
threatening…She finds it difficult to manipulate ideas in an original way and is 
not very adventurous.422 
 
                                                           
421 Lipset, Political Man, 88-89, 108, 112, 114, 104-6, 115. Lipset uses the terms “working class” and 
“lower class” interchangeably, the convention in the social scientific literature at the time.  For 
contemporary critiques of his thesis, see S. M. Miller and Frank Riessman, “‘Working-Class 
Authoritarianism’: A Critique of Lipset,” British Journal of Sociology 12, no. 3 (1961): 263-276; Lewis 
Lipsitz, “Working-class Authoritarianism: A Re-Evaluation,” American Sociological Review 30, no. 1 
(1965): 103-109. 
422 Vance Packard, The Hidden Persuaders (New York: David McKay, 1957), 117.  See also e.g. Herbert 
Gans, The Urban Villagers: Group and Class in the Life of Italian-Americans (New York: The Free Press, 
1962); Berger, Working-Class Suburb; Mirra Komarovsky, Blue-Collar Marriage (New York: Random 
House, 1962); Rainwater et al., Workingman’s Wife; Arthur Shostak and William Gomberg, eds., Blue-
Collar World: Studies of the American Worker (Englewood, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1964); Pierre Martineau, 
“Social Classes and Spending Behavior," Journal of Marketing 23, no. 2 (1958): 121-130. 
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“Mrs. Middle Majority” had no identity beyond her role as wife and mother—to 
researchers, she was, in the words of the title of one of the most notable 1950s studies of 
working class culture, Workingman’s Wife.  White working class men, as they appeared 
in the social scientific literature, tended to be figured as “traditional, ‘old-fashioned,’ 
somewhat religious, and patriarchal.”423  Above all, in this discourse, working class life 
was simple, routinized, and repetitive. Here white workers had some admirable 
qualities—though rigid and not particularly intelligent, they were devoted to those within 
their circle.  But there was little in this emerging vision of (white) workers that supported 
an understanding of the white working class as an essential part of an informed or 
progressive citizenry. 
Liberal scholars in the postwar period worked to understand very difficult and 
important questions—why people could follow an ideology like Nazism, what caused 
racial prejudice, why bullies with no regard for the truth could gain such incredible 
power.  Their concerns about mass politics should not be written off as simple elitism.  
But a significant takeaway from this work, particularly as it bled into social commentary 
and journalism, was that educated and sophisticated thinkers about politics could not 
have faith in what one contemporary called “the basic assumption of democracy—that 
ordinary men and women possess good sense.”424 
 
 
                                                           
423 S. M. Miller and Frank Riessman, “The Working Class Subculture: A New View,” Social Problems 9, 
no. 1 (1961): 88. 
424 Peter Bachrach, “Fear of the People,” The Nation, September 19, 1959. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that the postwar middle class—as a symbol and (in part) 
as an actually existing social formation—gained such power because a wide range of 
political actors had a stake in incorporating white industrial workers into the symbolic 
center of the American polity.  Secure, happy workers occupied a crucial position in the 
vision of America that elites hoped to convey to prospective international allies.  Their 
advancement proved capitalism’s evolution from tycoon days and the social 
responsibility exercised by modern business.  It also served as vital evidence of unions’ 
successes and mainstream status. Even in a period of substantial consensus, though, 
contemporaries could read the ascent of (white) industrial workers to middle-income 
status quite differently: as proof of the long-term dominance of American culture by a 
middle class mentality, for instance, or, conversely, the consolidation of the changes 
brought by the new liberal governing philosophy. 
As Chapter 1 argued, one of the achievements of the labor-liberal alliance was to 
fundamentally alter how elites understood the American electoral majority.  It is useful to 
conclude this chapter by asking to what extent the widespread emphasis on mass 
affluence undermined, reversed, or solidified those changes.  The view that modernity 
required and the majority demanded the protection of unions and the state maintained 
hegemony throughout the period.  The widespread emphasis on working class affluence 
heightened the symbolic importance of (white) workers, as their prosperity and 
contentment served for so many as chief evidence of the goodness of American society.  
No mainstream elites accorded them—publicly at least—anything less than full 
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citizenship.  As has long been noted, the first Republican presidential administration 
since the New Deal accepted the basic New Deal understanding of the modern electorate. 
Even conservatives who opposed New Deal reforms in general could not display 
indifference to industrial workers’ welfare; they argued instead that those who claimed to 
represent workers undermined workers’ wellbeing. 
The view that the majority might support a far-reaching left/liberal politics did not 
fare so well, even while the continued power of the labor-liberal understanding of 
working class identity helped to consign libertarianism to the margins.  Interpreters 
identified clear limits on the kinds of politics that would be realistic in a post-scarcity 
age.  To be sure, there were significant differences of opinion about the future course of 
(white) workers’ politics.  Some predicted that the basic cleavages of the New Deal era 
would continue, in somewhat muted form, for the foreseeable future; for others, domestic 
politics would be centered on a broad, comfortable suburban middle class primarily 
focused on protecting its gains; alternatively, the material divisions of the New Deal 
period would be supplanted by cultural antagonisms that placed white workers ever more 
on the right side of the ledger, opposed to liberalism.  But only strong partisans could 
imagine majority support for a politics to the left of New Deal liberalism or to the right of 
moderate Republicanism. Left/liberal faith in white workers as a key progressive force 
was a faith founded on those workers’ objective economic interests.  When their 
economic interests appeared well served by the existing system, that faith could not be 
easily sustained. 
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“New Dealism, having labored mightily to lift low-income Americans, found that 
it had created a nation of the middle class,” historian Eric Goldman wrote in 1956.425  
The dominant view prior to the New Deal had understood the United States as a “nation 
of the middle class,” but the middle class Goldman referenced was different.  Labor-
liberalism had a great deal of success in shifting dominant understandings of American 
identity such that proud unionism, support for “big government,” or non-Nordic ancestry 
did not disqualify an American from membership in the normative middle class and the 
values mapped to it—individualism, self-reliance, the work ethic.  A white steelworker 
who prized his seniority and distrusted his employer did not violate the work ethic.  A 
white autoworker who bought a suburban home on a VA loan and a union wage was no 
collectivist.  These workers, whatever the role collective economic rights had played in 
their enfranchisement, could be seen as advancing as individuals in a way that was less 
true for working class people of color.  The chief symbol of their advancement was the 
single-family home, and the policies that supported them remained relatively invisible. 
The new middle class was more urban and suburban, less rural; it included Poles, Czechs, 
Italians, and Jews.  It did not, as Samuel Lubell emphasized, share the old-stock middle 
class’s reflexive distaste for statism.  But it was still a middle class; it valued moderation, 
stability, and self-sufficiency.  The normativity of the great middle class, individualism, 
and the work ethic proved durable, as did their link to whiteness and the patriarchal 
family. 
                                                           
425 John Kenneth White, Still Seeing Red: How the Cold War Shapes the New American Politics (Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press, 1997), 76. 
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In the short term, a limited labor-liberal agenda could benefit from that 
normativity.  As the triumphalist narrative of American prosperity was replaced in the 
1960s by a focus on racial and cultural inequality and division, this was no longer the 
case.  When longstanding understandings of middle class Americanism appeared to be 
under deep threat in the 1960s, belief in the political and cultural dominance of a broad, 
secure white majority served few left-of-center aims.  As Chapter 3 details, the prevailing 
elite imagery of middle-income white workers changed significantly by the late 1960s—
picturing them as deeply angry and alienated from society, not incorporated smoothly 
within it.  Yet 1950s intellectual work on working class affluence deeply informed the 
analysis of backlash politics that displaced it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
230 
 
Chapter 3: Rethinking Middle America 
 
Since the late 1960s, “Middle America” has been one of the more durable tropes 
in American politics, used to refer to a traditional Americanism and a politics of 
resentment most often associated with the white working class, rural America, and the 
Midwest.  Donald Trump is only the latest in a long line of populist conservatives to be 
deemed “Middle America’s messenger.”426  Yet while Middle American culture is 
sometimes imagined as fixed in time, the concept of “Middle America” has a history, and 
a significant one.  It dates to the late 1960s, when the anger and alienation spurred by the 
civil rights movement, the anti-Vietnam War movement, and an increasingly high-profile 
radical left rose to the forefront of elite public discourse.  “In recent years we have 
become aware of the emergence of Middle Americans,” sociologist Murray Friedman 
wrote in 1971.  “Newspaper and magazine articles have been written about them, social 
scientists are starting to study this group, and politicians have developed elaborate 
strategies in an effort to use them to gain or keep power.”427 
The conventional story of the construction of Middle America focuses on the 
conservative politicians who saw opportunity in the turmoil of the period.  In the 
conventional account, conservative electoral strategy in the late 1960s centered on 
appealing to the cultural values and racial fears of white working class and lower middle 
class voters who felt threatened by the rise of the civil rights movement and the dissent 
and cultural change of the period.  “Middle America” was both a name for this 
constituency and a rhetorical trope that contemporaries, most notably Richard Nixon, 
                                                           
426 Patrick J. Buchanan, “Trump: Middle America’s Messenger,” The American Conservative, February 23, 
2016. 
427 Murray Friedman, Overcoming Middle Class Rage (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1971), 15. 
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used to appeal to it.  Reworking liberal and left populism by substituting journalists, 
academics, and liberal politicians for the economic elites targeted by the left, they 
developed a political identity that defined white workers against (white) liberal/cultural 
elites and African Americans.  Emphasizing “their solidarity with the concerns of an 
imprecisely defined ‘silent majority’ of…taxpayers, white ethnics, housewives, [and] 
‘Middle Americans’ who felt scorned by the New Left and besieged by powerful 
liberals” allowed Republicans to “capture” formerly Democratic constituencies like 
“ethnic Catholics…blue-collar workers, union members…Out of this maelstrom of 
defection there emerged a new social formation, Middle America,” the backbone of a new 
conservative electoral majority.428 
Nixon remains the political figure most associated with Middle America in both 
academic literature and popular memory. He is sometimes positioned as possessed of a 
unique insight into the psyche of alienated white workers.  “Nixon knew in his very soul 
that working people would rally against a new kind of elite,” Jefferson Cowie writes.429  
In both scholarly and popular accounts, he is credited with almost singlehandedly 
originating the “two Americas” frame that has opposed Middle America to intellectual 
elites, Red States to Blue States, and so on. For Rick Perlstein, “What Nixon left behind 
                                                           
428 “their solidarity…” in Michael Kazin, The Populist Persuasion (Ithaca and London: Cornell University 
Press, 1998), 246; “ethnic Catholics…” in Jonathan Rieder, “The Rise of the Silent Majority,” in The Rise 
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(New York: The New Press, 2010), 125-166; Matthew Lassiter, The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in 
the Sunbelt South (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006). 
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was the very terms of our national self-image: the notion that there are two kinds of 
Americans.  On the one side: Nixon’s ‘Silent Majority,’ the ‘non-shouters’: the Middle 
Class, Middle America…On the other side are the ‘liberals,’ the ‘cosmopolitans,’ the 
‘intellectuals.’”430 “With one rhetorical stroke,” Matthew Lassiter argues, referencing 
Nixon’s 1969 speech introducing the term “Silent Majority,” “Nixon identified a new 
populist category that redefined how political groups strive for influence.”431 
The conventional account of the construction of Middle America, this chapter 
suggests, only captures part of the story.  Middle America was as significant for liberals 
and journalists—the elites defined against Middle America in conservative criticism—as 
it was for conservatives, and the claims Nixon and his supporters made about white 
workers were not unique in the broader elite public discourse of the period.  This chapter 
develops an alternative origin story for Middle America, spotlighting the work of 
journalists and liberal commentators who sought to understand and respond to what they 
saw as a sharp turn to the political right among white workers.  Placing the focus on these 
actors suggests that Middle America—as an identity category in elite political 
discourse—was not the product of conservative strategy alone.  Rather, it was the product 
of the mutually reinforcing discourses of disparate and often competing elites.  Many 
liberals, like conservatives, argued that a vast cultural divide separated well-off and 
professional whites from an increasingly conservative white majority; like their 
                                                           
430 Rick Perlstein, introduction to Richard Nixon: Speeches, Writings, Documents (Princeton: Princeton 
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contemporaries, they characterized this majority’s politics as marked by anxiety about 
change, support for traditional Americanism, and hostility to black Americans. 
The centerpiece of my understanding of white working class representation since 
the 1960s is the notion of “elite consensus.”  This is meant in the most straightforward 
descriptive sense: elites of divergent aims and perspectives coalesced around the same 
basic understanding of the politics and culture of white workers. To be sure, some elites 
(often conservatives) championed and romanticized white workers, while others (often 
liberals) were disdainful of them.  However, whether white workers were viewed as 
reactionaries or defenders of rightful tradition, the fundamental assumptions about the 
group’s politics and culture were largely the same.  Conservative efforts to define, claim, 
and appeal to a majority constituency consistently dovetailed with liberal and journalistic 
efforts to understand the voters many saw as the most important force in American 
politics.  The elite consensus frame foregrounds this basic alignment.  It sheds light on 
one of the most fundamental questions for a history of white working class representation 
since the 1960s: why and how the white working class became the predominant symbol 
of cultural traditionalism and anti-black backlash. 
The short answer to this question, the next two chapters suggest, is that it made 
intellectual and/or strategic sense for elites leading the reaction against 1960s dissent, and 
for those seeking to quell that reaction, to place the white working class at the forefront 
of their claims.  Liberal analysis of the backlash understood resistance as concentrated 
within the white working class, Chapter 3 suggests, in part because that reading was 
consistent with prevailing understandings of racism and working class culture and 
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because it fit a vision of society favorable to white, professional-class liberals.  By 
placing white workers at the center of their appeals, Chapter 4 suggests, conservatives 
and other critics of liberalism could invest their claims with a sense of underdog status.  
Framing the analysis in this way should not obscure the fact that resistance to the civil 
rights movement and to social change was widespread within the white working class, as 
it was among higher-income whites and white America broadly.  One key goal of 
Chapters 3 and 4 collectively is to convey the causes and consequences of the assumption 
that anti-black and traditionalist views would be found almost exclusively within the 
white working class.  This frame allows for sounder analysis than (for instance) asking 
whether the stereotype of the bigoted white worker is “true” or not. 
Chapter 3 is divided into two parts.  Part One lays out the political context that 
prompted elites to speak to, for, and about Middle America—the growing elite awareness 
of Northern white resistance to the civil rights movement and resistance to the 
counterculture & anti-Vietnam War movement.  Against that backdrop, both liberals and 
conservatives sought to label and describe those Americans who were most opposed to 
dissent and most dedicated to the preservation of the older ways of life dissent seemed to 
threaten.  Part Two focuses on how contemporary liberals’ engagement with what might 
be called the problem of the white working class—how to explain white working class 
backlash and support for right-wing politicians, and what to do about it—helped to 
redefine the dominant elite-level view of the white worker. 
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Terminology 
In this chapter, I use “Middle America” to refer to a political identity, 
constituency, and social type defined by middle-income whiteness, cultural and social 
conservatism, cultural mainstream status, anti-black racism, and/or antipathy to white 
liberal elites. While the boundaries of Middle America were never rigidly delineated, 
Middle America clearly included certain “kinds” of people and excluded others.  White 
men doing blue-collar work—“hard hats”—stood at the forefront of the imagery around 
Middle America.  For some interpreters, Middle America also included lower-status 
segments of the white-collar working white population, such as clerks and salespeople.  
Occasionally, conservative businessmen or professionals might be included.  Excluded 
were African Americans, white liberal, urban, or cosmopolitan elites, feminists, political 
radicals, and others seen as antagonistic to traditional, mainstream Americanism.432  
“Traditional” is always a fraught concept, but it had a clear meaning in contemporary 
discourse.  Norms of hard work, self-sufficiency, the patriarchal family, heterosexuality, 
chastity, and a restrained self-presentation were collectively described as “traditional” 
values, “older” American values, or “middle class” values. 
Contemporaries used other language to refer to the “kind” of people who made up 
Middle America: the “working class,” the “white working class,” the “lower middle 
class,” the “middle class,” the “Forgotten Americans,” the “Silent Majority,” the “New 
                                                           
432 A comprehensive contemporary description of the key political cleavages indicated by the term Middle 
America can be found in political scientist Walter Dean Burnham’s Critical Elections and the Mainsprings 
of American Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 1970), 169: “Black against white, peripheral regions 
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American Majority,” the “majority,” the “people,” the “workingman,” the “worker,” and 
the “white ethnic.”  These terms were not entirely interchangeable.  “White ethnic,” for 
instance, referred to a white worker of southern or eastern European (or sometimes Irish) 
descent; the “Silent Majority” and “Middle America” were more inclusive of professional 
or managerial-class conservatives than was, say, “working class.”  Very often, though, 
these terms were not clearly differentiated in analysis.  Here “middle class” and “working 
class” are not two distinct political economic categories; they are two ways of naming a 
group of middle-income whites distinguished by a shared cultural orientation.  I have 
framed my argument around “Middle America” because it was both entirely new in this 
period and used consistently across the political spectrum.  When I am referring 
specifically to white working class people as historical agents, I use “worker-actors.” 
One of the central frameworks in the analysis of American politics after the 1960s 
opposes “social” and “economic” issues.  That framework has been particularly common 
in analysis of the politics of the white working class, which is not coincidental—it 
entered the discourse to explain the breakup of the New Deal coalition.433 Prior to about 
1970, “social issues” meant any issues of societal importance, particularly as related to 
social justice.  Earlier in the twentieth century, the “social question” had been 
synonymous with the “labor question”—how to deal with the changes brought about by 
industrial capitalism. The first influential use of “social issues” as opposed to economic 
                                                           
433 To be clear, the idea that political issues could be divided under two headings—one materialist-rational-
economic, the other cultural-identitarian—well predated the 1960s.  It appears in the Marxian base-
superstructure model, for instance, as well as in the work of 1950s observers who suggested that a different 
set of concerns had emerged to displace the liberalism that had characterized white workers’ politics in the 
1930s and 1940s. The material/cultural split became particularly prevalent in political analysis after the 
1960s, however.  For a cogent critique of the material/cultural dichotomy in US liberal politics, see Lisa 
Duggan, The Twilight of Equality: Neoliberalism, Cultural Politics, and the Attack on Democracy (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 2003). 
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issues came in the 1970 book The Real Majority, written by a pair of conservative 
Democrats who warned that any party losing touch with the “unyoung, unpoor, unblack” 
majority would be promptly removed from power.  Here the “Social Issue”—also called 
“law and order, backlash, antiyouth, malaise, change, alienation”—was understood as “a 
new…issue powerful enough that under certain circumstances it can compete in political 
potency with the older economic issues”434 that had ensured Democratic dominance. 
 It is important to note that the opposition between “social” and “economic” 
issues—as with any conceptual framework opposing economics and culture—has clear 
limitations.  The framework largely restricts the realm of the “economic” to the issues 
most associated with New Deal liberalism—organized labor, regulatory policy, 
government intervention in the economy as a basic principle.  From the 1970s to the 
1990s, analysts repeatedly designated as “social issues” issues with obvious political 
economic significance, including busing, welfare, efforts to improve the representation of 
women and people of color in the workplace, the Equal Rights Amendment, and the gay 
rights movement.435  In some cases, conservatism on “social issues” seems to be simply a 
euphemism for racism.436  There has been a clear tendency to understand “economic 
issues” as in effect what the imagined average voter (typically a middle-income white 
heterosexual man) might see as economic.  The effect was to detach issues associated 
                                                           
434 Richard Scammon and Ben Wattenberg, The Real Majority (New York: Coward-McCann, 1970), 40. 
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with people of color, women, and LGBTQ people from political economy. The 
framework also encourages a reading of liberal politics among white workers as 
motivated by straightforward material rewards alone rather than solidarity or the pursuit 
of dignity and fairness. 
 In short, my view is that the social vs. economic issues framework can be, if not 
handled in a careful way, very often counterproductive.  I often refer to “social” and 
“economic” issues in the next two chapters, though, because it is difficult to accurately 
represent the discourse without using these concepts as contemporaries used them.  It has 
often been argued that white workers began to be understood as conservative in the 
1960s, but this is not specific enough.  The emerging elite consensus framed white 
workers as conservative on social issues.  Very few elites saw white workers as economic 
conservatives devoted to a business or austerity agenda or the sanctity of free enterprise.  
For contemporaries, it was precisely this bifurcated political identity that made white 
workers a significant swing constituency—cultural issues pulled them to the right, while 
economic issues pulled them to the left.437 
 
I. The Roots of Middle America 
 What I call the “elite consensus” view of white working class identity—in which 
white workers were understood as the foremost opponents of racial and cultural 
liberalism—developed out of disparate elites’ overlapping responses to the political 
                                                           
437 Republican strategist Lee Atwater’s formulation gives a good sense of the conventional wisdom: 
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context of the mid- to late 1960s. Staunch opposition to the civil rights movement, the 
counterculture, the anti-Vietnam War movement, and the rapid pace of change, including 
and especially among Northern white workers, became one of the central themes in elite 
public discourse; as a result, older political assumptions—about Democrats’ advantage 
with white workers and Northern whites’ basic support for civil rights—eroded 
considerably.  By the late 1960s, multiple observers—most notably Richard Nixon and 
his supporters—saw blue-collar whites as the core of a patriotic, moral, and traditionalist 
anti-liberal majority held together by opposition to dissent.  New political categories 
(“Middle America,” the “Silent Majority”) emerged to describe this constituency, while 
older ones (“workers,” the “middle class”) took on new meaning. 
Resistance to the civil rights movement among Northern whites 
The immediate roots of Middle America’s rise to prominence lie first and 
foremost in the increasing salience for 1960s white elites of Northern white resistance to 
the civil rights movement.  For decades, Northern white worker-actors had been 
“defending” their neighborhoods against integration, often violently, and Northern 
politicians had been successfully drawing on racial appeals438, but a significant majority 
of white elites simply did not grasp the political implications of race outside the South, in 
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part as a result of the discursive environment they inhabited.439  Before the 1950s, 
coverage of racial issues or black communities in the Northern white press was minimal 
and typically stigmatizing.  This began to change dramatically when the civil rights 
movement in the South became a major national story in the mid-1950s. As a substantial 
literature has documented, Northern white media and Southern black activists developed 
a symbiotic relationship in which, as Gene Roberts and Hank Klibanoff put it, the media 
“held in common with the civil rights movement an interest in a simple, live, electrifying 
story in which good confronts evil.”440  Through the mid-1960s, the dominant 
understanding of race and politics among white Northern elites hewed heavily to a frame 
of Southern exceptionalism, in which the problem of race in America was a Southern 
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problem and most white Northerners were sympathetic (at worst, indifferent) to African 
Americans’ claims. 
It was against this backdrop that elite-level observers understood what came to be 
called the “backlash” as new and motivated by 1960s political developments—urban 
rioting, the visibility of black radicalism, and (first and foremost) the national Democratic 
Party’s increasing ties to the civil rights movement’s agenda. Elite public discourse noted 
clear rumblings of resistance, for instance, after John F. Kennedy took a newly strong 
stance in a nationally televised 1963 speech on civil rights.441 Politicians noted newly 
unfavorable reactions to the prospect of new civil rights legislation from their white 
constituents: “For the first time I’m getting mail from white people saying ‘wait a minute, 
we’ve got some rights too,’” a Democratic senator told the Washington Post in 1963.442  
Robert Kennedy revealed after his brother’s death that JFK had been concerned that civil 
rights legislation would harm the party’s prospects “even in the suburbs” and “the big 
cities in the North.”443 For the first time and even suggest the apparent novelty of this 
concern.  As Democrats expressed unease about the political implications of Northern 
resistance, some Republicans saw a new strategic opportunity.  “A year ago it was said 
that Kennedy was unbeatable,” commented one Republican strategist in 1963.  “But 
people are not thinking that way now.” “The hostility to the new Negro militancy has 
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seemingly spread like wildfire from the South to the entire country,” wrote an advisor to 
Arizona senator and 1964 GOP presidential nominee Barry Goldwater.444 
It is important to situate this discourse in the context of the “Southern strategy” 
advocated by some conservative Republicans in the period, including Goldwater.445  In 
this view, Republicans’ path to a national majority ran through the South, the nation’s 
most conservative region, which was locked into supporting the Democrats in national 
elections because of its entrenched one-party system. Liberals and moderates within the 
Republican Party recoiled from what they saw as an openly racist strategy and 
emphasized the need to reduce Democrats’ margins in the industrial cities among white 
ethnic and African American voters. In general, in the 1940s, 1950s, and early 1960s, 
white ethnic and Southern white constituencies were championed by two different groups 
of Republicans and linked to two different kinds of political appeals in a running debate 
one historian calls “The South versus the City.”446  Northern white workers were 
associated with the brand of politics conservatives derided as “me-tooism”—cultivating 
support among interest groups along the lines suggested by the New Deal. Conservative 
                                                           
444 Both quotes in Edward Miller, Nut Country: Right-Wing Dallas and the Birth of the Southern Strategy 
(Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2015), 125, 128. 
445 On Republicans and the South and calls for the South to leave the Democratic Party see Joseph 
Lowndes, From the New Deal to the New Right: Race and the Southern Origins of Modern Conservatism 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008); Edward Miller, Nut Country: Right-Wing Dallas and the Birth 
of the Southern Strategy (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2015); Earl Black and Merle 
Black, The Rise of Southern Republicans (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002); David Reinhard, 
The Republican Right since 1945 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1983); Joseph Aistrup, The 
Southern Strategy Revisited: Republican Top-Down Advancement in the South (Lexington: University 
Press of Kentucky, 1996); Nicole Hemmer, Messengers of the Right: Conservative Media and the 
Transformation of American Politics (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016), 132ff; Charles 
Wallace Collins, Whither Solid South? (New Orleans: Pelican Press, 1947); William Rusher, “Crossroads 
for the GOP,” National Review, February 12, 1963.  It’s worth noting here that the conservative plan to win 
the South was not framed primarily as an appeal to white working class Southerners—this was a more 
respectable appeal, its proponents argued, because it would target the urban white professional/managerial 
class, as opposed to the virulently racist rural poor whites who voted for race-baiting Southern Democrats. 
446 Reinhard, Republican Right, 168. 
243 
 
stalwart Robert Taft wrote to one correspondent that his moderate rivals “never had any 
interest in the South because it interferes with their idea that we should appease the 
minorities of the North”447—labor, African Americans, and white ethnics.  A decade 
later, liberal Republican Nelson Rockefeller attacked the Southern Strategy on the 
grounds that it would, by “writ[ing] off the Negro and other minority 
groups…deliberately write off the great industrial states of the North.”448 “Other minority 
groups” could refer equally to Italians, Jews, and Puerto Ricans, and the phrasing 
suggests an assumption that Northern white ethnic workers had more in common with 
Northern African American workers than they did with white Southerners.  This 
assumption—evident, to name only a few examples, in one journalist’s casual reference 
to the “Negro and labor vote” and a segregationist newspaper’s attacks on “labor, the 
minorities” and “the gimmecrats”449—is indicative of labor-liberal success in linking 
labor’s cause to the civil rights cause at the discursive level (if not as much in practice). 
The 1964 election cycle, in one prominent elite-level frame, was a test of the 
political potency of anti-black sentiment in the North.  It was during the 1964 campaign 
that the term “backlash”—which initially referred specifically to the threat posed by the 
“race issue” to Democratic prospects, especially in Northern, urban white 
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neighborhoods—began to appear regularly in the media.450  1964 was the first 
presidential run for segregationist Alabama governor George Wallace, perhaps the single 
individual most responsible for drawing elite attention to Northern white working class 
backlash. Wallace, whose level of Northern support shocked and disturbed many 
observers, “demonstrated…for the first time the fear that white working-class Americans 
have of Negroes,” journalist Theodore White wrote in his election postmortem.451 
Republican nominee Barry Goldwater adopted a strategy explicitly pitched at anti-black 
sentiments among white voters, emphasizing the need for “law and order” and states’ 
rights.452 In contemporary elite discourse, one of the key questions raised by the 
Goldwater campaign was whether conservatives could bring about a realignment in 
which the parties would be defined by opposing positions on race, and in which the 
Republicans would be the party of the white majority. “The race issue” was unique, 
columnist Stewart Alsop argued, in that “it permits Goldwater to reach across party lines 
for votes in areas normally heavily Democratic.”  Alsop noted a “growing belief that 
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white votes for Goldwater might at this time of racial crisis vastly outnumber black votes 
for Kennedy, in the North as well as in the South.”453    
Lyndon Johnson’s landslide victory in 1964, accompanied by substantial gains for 
the liberal wing in Congress, reduced the salience of liberal concerns for a short time.  
Johnson won 44 states and 61% of the popular vote, the largest margin for a Democratic 
presidential candidate since FDR.  Goldwater won only South Carolina, Georgia, 
Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana, along with his home state of Arizona.  Most 
observers framed the result as a repudiation of conservatism and as confirmation that 
anti-black racism was not a determinative issue in Northern politics.  “The vote in 1964 
must be taken as a decisive setback to the cause of segregation and what came to be 
named the ‘white backlash,’” pollster Louis Harris told an audience shortly after the 
election. “For other than in the deep South, people turned their backs on prejudice.”454  
“White Backlash Doesn’t Develop,” one New York Times headline put it.455 
The view that the problem of race was a Southern problem, and that “white 
backlash” would not infect Northern politics, collapsed rapidly in the mid-1960s.  Riots 
in African American neighborhoods in multiple cities outside the South (typically in 
response to incidents of police brutality, and beginning in August 1965 in Watts, Los 
Angeles) came as a shock to most white elites and shifted the focal point of elite attention 
from the rural South to the urban North. Northern whites who “for many a long 
year…could look down their noses at the South,” Newsweek editor Osborn Elliott wrote 
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in 1967, “came to realize that their own vision was similarly impaired.”456  One of the 
consequences of increased elite attention to issues like housing segregation, employment 
discrimination, and educational disparities in the North was greater elite awareness of 
white resistance there.  When Martin Luther King and other activists marched through 
white ethnic Chicago neighborhoods in 1966 as part of an open housing campaign, they 
were met with slurs, jeers, death threats, and thrown projectiles.  King, who was hit by a 
rock, told reporters that he had never seen such a display of hatred before: “The people of 
Mississippi ought to come to Chicago to learn how to hate.”457 
Electoral politics was also critical in drawing elite attention to the scope of the 
backlash. In the mid-1960s through early 1970s, prominent politicians in multiple cities 
(including Louise Day Hicks in Boston, Mario Procaccino in New York, Charles Stenvig 
in Minneapolis, Sam Yorty in Los Angeles, and Frank Rizzo in Philadelphia) built 
careers on appeals to white grievances.  At the national level, Democrats suffered steep 
losses in the 1966 midterm elections, including 47 seats in the House.  Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan described the result as “a bruising declaration that the electorate is fed up to 
the teeth with demonstrations and riots,” a message to elites that “the country has gone 
about as far as it wishes in providing social welfare and economic assistance to the Negro 
masses…The voters think Negroes have received enough for the time being.”458  For 
Moynihan, “the electorate, “the country,” and “the voters” were all interchangeable with 
white America; this reflects both an enduring inability to understand blacks as full 
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members of the public and a growing sense that any political program would only 
proceed at the sufferance of the white majority.  Moynihan’s assessment of the new 
political reality was shared by a significant number of Democratic elites. One aide, for 
instance, urged that 1968 nominee Hubert Humphrey “not talk about anti-poverty 
programs, racial integration, civil rights, welfare handouts, or social justice…stay out of 
the ghettos and away from minorities.”459 
 As Richard Nixon prepared for his 1968 presidential run, some within his circle of 
advisers continued to urge the liberal Republican line of leadership on civil rights, but 
others advocated an appeal to discontented white voters in the North and South. “Take it 
easy on the pro-negro speeches,” publisher William Loeb wrote to Nixon in early 1968.  
“Neither the popular vote nor justice is in that direction.  You have no idea how stirred up 
the people in the metropolitan cities are on this subject, especially those in the north.” 
“All this endless talk we have been getting about [Nixon] losing unless he gets the Negro 
and Jewish vote is a pile of crap,” Pat Buchanan put it in a July 1968 memo.  “We have 
let ourselves be sold a bill of goods.”  Instead, Buchanan emphasized, Nixon needed to 
win the “Wallace Protestants,” the traditionally Democratic white working class vote in 
the South, and the “Humphrey Catholics,” the traditionally Democratic white ethnic 
voters in the North.460  Buchanan’s pairing of these constituencies suggests that the 
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“South vs. the City” debate was becoming moot: the two constituencies might be brought 
together under one program and one political identity. 
Resistance to the new youth culture 
This chapter understands Middle America as first and foremost a symbol of racial 
grievance.  It is important to be clear, though, that the backlash central to contemporary 
political discourse was not only a reaction against African Americans’ advancement.  It 
was also understood as a reaction to the counterculture, anti-Vietnam War movement, 
and changing conventions on gender and sexuality, all of which were blurred together 
and understood as part of an emergent rebellious culture among young, educated whites. 
“The child of prosperity and the past decade,” Theodore White put it in a typical account, 
the “new culture” was defined “by its contempt and scorn of what the past has taught” 
and its opposition to “all laws, manners, mores, institutions which restrict such areas of 
individual expression as drugs, sex, [and] obscenities.”461  The highest-profile 
manifestations of this “new culture” and its divisiveness included the student protests that 
shut down Columbia University (1968), the beating of anti-Vietnam War protestors by 
the Chicago Police during the Democratic National Convention in Chicago (1968), and 
the “hardhat riots” (1970) in which a counter-protest group led by construction workers 
beat up antiwar protestors on Wall Street in New York City. 
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For contemporary elite observers, the counterculture, antiwar protests, the civil 
rights movement, and urban rioting were firmly tied together under the broad umbrella of 
“change,” “dissent,” “unrest,” or “disorder.”  All the elements of the “social turmoil that 
has gripped the country”—“racial disturbances and urban unrest, antiwar demonstrations 
and revolutionary talk by dissident intellectuals, the soaring use of drugs and an apparent 
collapse of conventional values”462—were seen as having arisen at roughly the same 
time, ran counter to engrained modes of behavior, and had been heavily covered in the 
media.  As a result, in a prominent view, voters experienced them as a collective and 
visceral threat. “Between 1964…and 1968, the average middle class American has gone 
through many wrenching experiences,” NBC News president Reuven Frank argued.  “He 
has seen the ghetto riots in his living room; he has watched with horror young people of 
good background expressing contempt for his dearest values in the way they dress and act 
and what they say…What he has seen…has shaken him physically and morally, made 
him fear for his safety, his savings, his children, his status.”463 Issues of race, sex, gender, 
and culture were also tied together because they cut across conventional lines of major-
party political contestation.  They gave Republicans a chance to make inroads among 
Democratic voters, and they collectively raised the possibility that a (white) majority 
angered by the direction of the country would dictate the future course of American 
politics. 
 
 
                                                           
462 “Winter of Crisis for Television News,” Broadcasting, December 9, 1968. 
463 Reuven Frank, “The Ugly Mirror,” Television Quarterly 8, no. 1 (Winter 1969): 82-83.   
250 
 
Conservatives and Middle America 
The conservative claims central to the conventional account of Middle America 
came out of this context.  Chapter 4 focuses more explicitly on conservatives’ 
championing of white workers; liberals and journalists are the focal point of this chapter.  
In order to situate liberal representations within a broader context, however, it is 
important to briefly outline how the most influential conservative voices of the period 
understood white workers and Middle America.464  Above all, conservatives claimed a 
majority constituency that had been wrongly drowned out in public discourse by vocal 
but marginal groups.  Nixon, who spoke on behalf of “forgotten,” “quiet,” and “silent” 
Americans, provides the archetypical example. In his acceptance speech at the 1968 
Republican National Convention, he defined his constituency as “the great majority of 
Americans, the forgotten Americans—the non-shouters, the non-demonstrators…They 
give steel to the backbone of America. They are good people, they are decent people; 
they work, and they save, and they pay their taxes, and they care.”465 In a November 1969 
speech on Vietnam policy, he famously appealed to the “great silent majority of my 
fellow Americans,” defined against the “vocal minority” who advocated immediate 
withdrawal from Vietnam “and who try to impose it on the nation by mounting 
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demonstration in the street.”466  It is difficult to overstate how rapid and substantial an 
imprint these categories made on conservative discourse and elite public discourse 
generally.  Almost immediately, conservative activists and rank-and-file citizen-actors 
engaging with elite discursive spaces—writing letters to the editor or petitioning 
politicians, for instance—began to identify themselves as part of the Silent Majority.467 
For conservatives, categories like Middle Americans, forgotten Americans, or the 
Silent Majority were not equivalent to the “worker”; they were broader. They allowed for 
a populist claim on behalf of workers against an elite but did not exclude the sympathetic 
professional-class and wealthy whites long central to the conservative coalition.  Above 
all, for conservatives, “Middle America” meant a dispersed national majority united by a 
traditionalist point of view.468  In a basic argument running through much conservative 
discourse, there had been a consensus way to be a good American, rightfully held up as 
normative for decades.  Recent years had seen a dangerous challenge to this older 
understanding of Americanism, in this view, a spreading sense “that our values are false, 
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that there is something wrong with being patriotic, honest, moral and hard working.”469 
Middle Americans, very simply, were those who continued to hold to the “‘old values’ of 
patriotism, hard work, morality, and respect for law and order,” “the traditional values of 
middle class America—hard work, individual enterprise, orderly behavior, love of 
country, moral piety, material progress.”470 In “its values, its virtues, its instinctive grasp 
of what the United States and the West have always stood for…Middle America is the 
last heir of Western civilization,” exclaimed National Review’s Frank Meyer.471  As a 
result, for Meyer, Middle America met with “utter contempt” from liberals who viewed 
these values as passé. 
 Conservatives claimed white workers (in the North and the South) as part of this 
national traditionalist majority.  Though formerly a liberal constituency, they argued, the 
white working class rejected the excesses of 1960s liberalism.  “The Catholic and ethnic 
and Southern conservative foot soldiers who gave FDR those great landslides are in 
fundamental disagreement with the isolated, intellectual aristocracy and liberal elite who 
now set the course of their party,” Pat Buchanan argued, on issues ranging from the war 
to “marijuana, school prayer, welfare, [and] campus disorders.”472  The sense that white 
workers were rebelling against liberal leadership—shared, as this chapter stresses, by 
liberals—was unambiguously encouraging for conservatives.  As “anti-proletarian feeling 
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on the intellectual Left” increased, one National Review contributor explained, 
conservatives “discovered” the “blue collar” and became “full of admiration for his 
instinctive patriotism, his mistrust of the reigning liberal abstractions and his neo-Puritan 
work ethic.”473  This ironic phrasing—tying predominantly Catholic industrial workers to 
a “Puritan” work ethic—is suggestive of a broader trend. 
Conservatives claiming to speak for white workers in this period sought to blur or 
deemphasize distinctions like North/South, Protestant/Catholic, and union/nonunion.  In a 
framework especially prevalent during the 1970s and 1980s, white workers in the South 
and white workers in the North were very similar politically: socially conservative and 
alienated by permissive liberalism. “There has come into being a vast middle American 
constituency, which increasingly transcends regional and ethnic differences,” argued one 
conservative in 1974.  “A…conservative Southerner whose grandfather might have been 
riding around in a white sheet now feels quite comfortable with [New York] Irish and 
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Italian Catholics.”474 Nixon, though opponents assailed his “Southern Strategy,” rarely if 
ever made arguments directed to a specifically Southern identity. By the late 1960s, no 
mainstream national politician who appealed to white Southerners argued in favor of 
segregation or against legal equality. Instead, a common argument stressed that the South 
was reflective of the national mainstream view. “This is the heart of America, out here in 
Middle America,” Nixon began a 1974 speech at the Grand Ole Opry in Nashville.475  
(White) Southerners were “in the mainstream of American political thought,” George 
Wallace stressed.  “The people of Arkansas and Alabama speak the language the great 
majority wanted to hear politicians speak for so long.”476  In collapsing the South into 
Middle America and stressing the nationwide scope of their message, conservatives 
sought to rebut the claim that their intent was to make a racist appeal to white voters. 
It’s important to be clear that observers who understood social conservatism as 
central to the politics of white workers, both North and South, rarely saw these workers 
as conservative on economic issues.  In the predominant view, cultural and economic 
issues fell into two distinct categories, with the latter favorable to liberals and the former 
favorable to conservatives.  Most conservatives in the late 1960s and early 1970s saw 
cultural issues as much more salient than economic issues.  These contemporaries 
assumed that mass prosperity had raised blue-collar (white) workers to a secure economic 
position and that the liberal and radical challenge to basic American norms was such a 
far-reaching and immediate threat that other concerns paled in comparison. “The real 
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issues…are the ones like patriotism, morality, religion—not the material issues. If the 
issues were prices and taxes, they’d vote for [the Democrats],” Nixon commented in 
explaining his working class support.477 Conservatives’ claims to speak for white workers 
in this period did a great deal to shift dominant elite understandings of white working 
class identity, but the basic association between white workers and distrust of the rich 
remained. 
*** 
Stressing white workers’ strong commitment to “middle class” values was not 
new in the 1960s, as the material in Chapter 2 indicates.  However, when 1950s observers 
stressed (white) workers’ movement into the middle class, they implied that these 
workers had become just like other Americans (implicitly, white professionals).  For late-
1960s observers who saw white workers as strongly committed to “traditional” or 
“middle class” values, the point was that they were not just like all other Americans.  
They were positioned against other groups thought to depart from these norms, as those 
who did not shout or protest, as those who did not take welfare or drugs, as Democrats 
who were not drawn in by their party’s foolishness. 
Put differently, the strong association between white workers and “middle class” 
or “traditional” American norms crystallized at a moment when these norms could not be 
understood as something that nearly all Americans aspired to or shared.  From one angle, 
uncritical patriotism was to blame for the disgrace of Vietnam; rigid and patriarchal 
                                                           
477 Mason, Richard Nixon and the Quest for a New Majority, 98, 238. While he rejected calls from aides 
and outside advisors to pursue new social welfare programs aimed at white workers, Nixon accepted the 
basic popularity and legitimacy of the post-New Deal economic consensus and did not believe that a 
candidate could win national office running afoul of that consensus.  He sought explicitly to convey that his 
administration was not opposed to labor in the way that stereotypical Republicans had been.  Cowie, 
Stayin’ Alive, 133-134; Mason, Richard Nixon and the Quest for a New Majority, 73-74. 
256 
 
family norms yielded unhappiness and injustice toward women; the work ethic was a 
screen for a racist society.  From another, America remained the greatest country in the 
world; the traditional family made for happy homes and good citizens; the work ethic 
ensured a well-functioning economy and a moral society. Traditional norms were 
understood as divisive, opposed by vocal and powerful groups.  They were no longer 
normative in a taken-for-granted way, and it was clear that those who supported them 
would have to explicitly defend them.  In this political moment, drawing a connection 
between white workers and cultural conservatism proved appealing to political actors on 
opposing sides. Even as business, government, the press, and the white-collar world 
generally remained marked by segregation and professional and managerial-class whites 
railed against the student left, what was by any fair assessment “a cross-class backlash 
against dissent” was “represented synecdochically by the [white] working class.”478 
For conservatives, the strategic benefits of that connection are easier to see.  
Political actors who spoke on behalf of white workers could make a powerful elite-level 
claim to represent the majority against an elite. Conservatives’ “classic populist 
interpellation,” as one scholar terms it, rested on “the construction of a (implicitly 
majoritarian) popular opinion whose views are embodied in the agenda of the…Right 
itself against the socially and politically isolated elite liberals.” The elite consensus frame 
calls attention to the role the “isolated…liberals” played in that process of 
construction.479 The mid- to late 1960s saw a reshaping of the dominant elite-level 
mapping of the American electorate in a way that placed white workers and liberals on 
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opposing sides.  That reshaping cannot be attributed only to conservative electoral 
strategy or the substantial mass appeal of backlash politics.  It is also necessary to look 
critically at liberal political analysis.  As the next section suggests, understanding the 
backlash as concentrated within the white working class fit with understandings of class 
and racism central to contemporary liberal discourse.  It made it easier for liberal 
professional-class whites to distance themselves from culpability for racism and 
inequality. The scope and the importance of the backlash, including among white 
workers, should not be in question.  However, the broadly shared assumption that 
political reaction would predominantly be found among low- and middle-income whites 
pushed elite discussions around fundamental issues—race, gender, sexuality, equality, 
morality, good citizenship—in a specific direction, foreclosing other possibilities. 
 
II. Liberals, Journalists, and Middle America 
As the scope of the backlash and its political implications came into focus 
beginning in the mid- to late 1960s, journalists and liberal activists & intellectuals 
produced a substantial body of work seeking to document white discontent and make 
sense of its causes and consequences. This work emerged in the same period as the 
conservative claims central to the conventional understanding of Middle America. 
Liberal syndicated columnist Joseph Kraft coined the term “Middle America” itself in 
June 1968.  The highest-profile news media treatments of the subject appeared beginning 
in fall 1969: Newsweek’s forty-page “The Troubled American: A Special Report on the 
White Majority,” published in October 1969, and Time’s January 1970 issue naming 
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“The Middle Americans” Man and Woman of the Year.  In the same period, the Ford 
Foundation, Rockefeller Foundation, and Carnegie Corporation began to fund research on 
working class whites.  Multiple notable books on white workers from a liberal 
perspective appeared in the early 1970s, including Peter Binzen’s Whitetown, U. S. A. 
(1970), Louise Kapp Howe’s The White Majority (1970), Patricia and Brendan Sexton’s 
Blue Collars and Hard Hats (1971), Sar Levitan’s Blue Collar Workers: A Symposium on 
Middle America (1971), Michael Novak’s The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics (1971), 
Robert Coles’ The Middle Americans (1971), and Murray Friedman’s Overcoming 
Middle Class Rage (1971). 
Above all, this work was motivated by the urgency of the moment.  Simply put, it 
was clear to contemporaries that white discontent imperiled the full range of left-of-
center political goals, from continued progress for left movements to continued 
incumbency for Democrats.  Journalistic work on white working class discontent was 
motivated by the clear electoral implications of the backlash and the broad sense that 
white workers had become a major social problem in need of attention.  Trends within the 
media industry also played a role.  Major elite media institutions were significantly more 
sensitized to covering issues of race by the late 1960s, when the media industry saw a 
“wave of vigorous endeavor…to penetrate the urban and racial crisis.”480 Reporting on 
white resistance was part of this effort. As they increasingly spotlighted inequality and 
division, however, news organizations confronted a spiraling backlash from conservative 
politicians, viewers, and readers who saw their reporting on radicalism and dissent as 
excessive.  Journalism faced pressure to self-correct, to devote more attention to (in the 
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words of trade publication Editor & Publisher) “the views of what is called ‘the silent 
majority’ who feel that television has devoted too much time to the role of the militant 
and the agitator and has given too little coverage to the quiet hard-working Americans of 
all races.”481 
It’s important to emphasize that while conservatives were careful to include 
higher-income conservative constituencies within their “Silent Majority,” liberal and 
journalistic analysis of the backlash generally focused narrowly on white workers, for 
several reasons.  Professional-class whites conducted most of the research.  Conservative 
views among white workers appeared more anomalous—and thus more in need of 
analysis and explanation—than conservative views among well-off whites who drew 
more obvious material benefit from a conservative agenda.  Most of all, as the last section 
of Chapter 2 argued, notable intellectual work in the postwar period had helped to 
mainstream a view of white workers as more conservative than white professionals.  
Prevailing understandings of what racism was and what caused it encouraged white 
professionals to interpret racism as concentrated in the white working class, and 
preexisting understandings of working class culture associated the white working class 
with rigidity, traditionalism, and anti-intellectualism. 
Two longstanding and widely accepted arguments linked working class whites to 
higher levels of racial prejudice.  First, the framework dominant since World War II 
understood racism as a set of individual-level irrational attitudes reducible through 
education; in this view, less educated whites lacked the intellectual training that would 
help them to grasp the true causes of racial inequality and adopt a sympathetic view of 
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marginalized racial groups.482 A second longstanding argument understood racism as 
rooted in job competition and economic hardship; in this view, lower-income whites felt 
more threatened by blacks because they would compete more closely with them. Both 
explanations remained prominent in the 1960s.  “It’s the man who thinks that his 
neighborhood will be damaged or his job placed in jeopardy by the disenslavement of the 
Negro who is the center of the ‘white backlash,’” one liberal argued.483  “In many 
Northern college-educated and ‘sophisticated’ circles, at least a kind of superficial 
antiracism is the norm,” another contemporary noted.  For those who inhabited “worlds 
in which a strong civil-rights position is not an accepted social convention, it takes either 
an extraordinary compassion, or else a certain ability to deal with abstractions, to grasp 
it.”484  Fundamentally, most contemporary liberals assumed, antiracist norms had not 
penetrated working class culture.  
An established line of social research understood working class culture as narrow 
and rigid, centered on the patriarchal family and tending toward authoritarianism in 
politics.  Typical 1960s accounts of the “working-class subculture” understood (white) 
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workers’ world as “distinguished by the dominant role of the family circle” as “the 
outside world…is faced with detachment and…hostility”…“reminiscent of the 
past…insulated from contemporary currents of thought…narrowly circumscribed by the 
family, the relatives, a few friends, the union, the boss, the church”…marked by “a desire 
for stability and security and an unwillingness to take social and economic risks…an anti-
intellectualism which aspires for the understood result.”485  The most notorious concept 
in the literature on working class culture, Seymour Martin Lipset’s “working class 
authoritarianism,” had a clear imprint on late 1960s analysis. “Working-class 
authoritarianism goes far to explain the rigid and intolerant approach many blue-collarites 
take to American political affairs,” one social scientist wrote in 1969. “Unable to 
understand how politics works, and contemptuous of conciliation and compromise, 
working-class authoritarians seek to impose on society some sort of ‘fundamental truth’ 
that will liberate America from its soft-headed illusions.”486  Traditional values, in this 
view, were appealing to white workers because they offered a black-and-white sense of 
right and wrong; challenges to those traditional norms unsettled white workers because 
they undermined that moral clarity. 
In sum, the intellectual environment encouraged elite-level liberal interpreters to 
presume that anti-black and socially conservative views would be most widely held 
among blue-collar whites and seek answers accordingly.  “I started this study with the 
assumption that America is a racist society and that the most overt expression of that 
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racism is to be found among working-class and lower-middle-class people,” sociologist 
Lillian Rubin flatly declared. “It was not my intention to spend more than two years to 
document the obvious.” That assumption, on the part of professional-class whites, 
encouraged a sense of cultural division, of entering an unfamiliar space to understand 
something far from the researcher’s lived experience.  “For an upper-middle-class 
professional like me to view the world from the perspective of what the media call 
Middle America is, to say the least, difficult,” Rubin admitted. “The requisite empathy is 
elusive because too many experiences, beliefs, and values divide us.”487 In the 
predominant framework, the world of the white working class—marked by its explicit 
and unabashed racism, its emphasis on rigid patriotism and moral rectitude—was utterly 
distinct from white professionals’ day-to-day world. 
This assumption comes through clearly in most journalism focused on white 
workers. Reporters (even for middlebrow publications that no doubt counted Middle 
Americans among their readers) wrote as outsiders interpreting unfamiliar experience for 
a politically attentive public that was assumed to be non-Middle American. “In this book 
we hope to bring before the reader something about the lives of millions of American 
citizens,” two contemporaries began 1971’s The Middle Americans.488  Some writers 
plumbed the quotidian details of working class life: “Once a week his wife leaves him at 
home when she goes to play bingo. There is usually a Christmas party for the men on the 
job.”489  Most often, late 1960s reporting on the white working class afforded starring 
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roles to men who sprayed their speech with racial epithets and showed no interest in 
norms of civility: “None of them politicians gives a good goddamn.  All they worry about 
is the niggers.  Everything is for the niggers.  The niggers get the schools.  The niggers go 
to summer camp.  The niggers get the new playgrounds…And they get it all without 
workin’.” …“Bastards don’t want jobs.  If you offered them jobs now, 90 per cent of 
them would run like hell.  They ought to take machine guns and shoot the bastards.”490  
Above all, in this discourse, what distinguished white workers was their anger and their 
willingness to vent it freely and widely—towards “integration and welfare, taxes and sex 
education…the rich and the poor, the foundations and students,” but above all towards 
African Americans.491 
Looking closely at the research process of one prominent study of Middle 
America, Peter Binzen’s Whitetown, U. S. A., provides insight into the cultural dynamics 
at work in research on the white working class.  Whitetown is a 1970 study focused on 
urban white working class neighborhoods (“Whitetowns”) and their schools; Binzen was 
an education reporter and later an urban affairs reporter at the Philadelphia Bulletin.  
Though he made trips to “Whitetowns” in several other major cities, Binzen conducted 
the majority of his research in the Northeast Philadelphia neighborhood of Kensington.492  
He taught in several schools, interviewed dozens of teachers, staff, parents, and children, 
played bingo at area Catholic churches, and spent time in bars listening to neighborhood 
men sound off about politics. Binzen, a Yale graduate whose father was an executive at 
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JC Penney493, grappled with a strong sense of cultural difference from his subjects 
throughout the reporting.  He worried that he would be seen as a “do-gooder, ivy liberal 
from Yale with a Carnegie grant.”494  As he attempted to secure interviews, he found the 
cultural mores of Kensington’s inhabitants irksome: “When you enter one of these houses 
at midday you can be sure a TV soap drama will be filling the room…And the lady of the 
house, even while sitting for an interview, will not turn off the TV or even turn it down.  
She’ll keep watching between questions.”495  Most of all, Binzen’s observations of 
Kensington were shaped by his own identification as a white liberal professional-class 
suburban dweller with progressive views on race.  Though he readily admitted that his 
own neighborhood was as segregated as Kensington, Binzen began his research under the 
impression that white professional-class suburbanites were liberal on race issues, while 
urban white ethnic workers as a group were not.  “As an outsider, a WAP (white Alsatian 
Protestant) and a middle-class suburbanite, I went into Kensington with preconceived 
prejudices,” he acknowledged.496 
Binzen, like many of his contemporaries, had a sincere desire to draw sympathetic 
elite attention to white workers.  He saw Kensington as a neighborhood with serious 
needs that had been wrongly overlooked by the press and city government.  Throughout 
his reporting, he also understood “Whitetown” as a distinctive, isolated space 
distinguished by its residents’ resistance to any kind of change: their “alienation from the 
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American ‘mainstream,” their “contempt for white rich and black poor,” and their 
“bristling defensiveness and yearning for the recent past when life was simpler and 
loyalties less complex, when children were reared by the Bible and the beltstrap, when 
the schools stuck to the three R’s, and when patriotism meant ‘My country right or 
wrong.’”497  Binzen made the decision not to foreground ideological diversity within 
Kensington, even when he encountered differences of opinion during his interviews.  The 
significant unit of analysis was Kensington itself, “home to a hundred thousand proud, 
irascible, tough, narrow-minded, down-to-earth, old-fashioned, hostile, flag-waving, 
family-oriented ethnic Americans.”498  As he later put it in a turn of phrase that 
characterizes elite writing on Middle America as a whole, “I was trying to look at a 
whole mass of people.”499 
*** 
One of the most common arguments made about liberal politics in this period held 
that (white professional) liberals viewed white workers with condescension and disdain.  
Conservatives and fellow liberals charged liberals with “class snobbery,” a tendency to 
“savage” white workers “as rednecks, ethnic clods, Archie Bunkers, and the like.”  Many 
of the arguments white professional-class liberals made about white workers in this 
period are self-evidently classist.  However, simply labeling them as classist or elitist 
misses a broader story—the intellectual context that supported the prevailing view of 
white workers; the element of self-criticism in liberal discourse on Middle America; the 
importance of symbolic constructions of the white worker for the political claims liberals 
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made; and the extent to which liberal representations of white workers dovetailed with 
conservative claims to represent them. 
The remainder of this chapter seeks to shed light on that broader story.  It is 
organized around the two primary arguments liberals and journalists made in diagnosing 
the political grievances of the white working class.  Though both arguments can be 
understood as under the umbrella of a broad elite consensus, the differences were 
significant.  The dominant argument (#1) suggested that white workers were a middle-
income group, economically secure and culturally & racially conservative, and their 
primary political concern centered on protecting what they had gained.  While in earlier 
decades they had been animated by economic concerns, they now voted based on anxiety 
about integration and cultural change.  The first section below (#1) outlines this view.  
Joseph Kraft, the liberal syndicated columnist who coined the term “Middle America,” 
serves as the primary case study. 
The major challenge to this construction of the white working class came from a 
group of liberals who diagnosed the situation in a different way, arguing that white 
workers were far closer to poverty than affluence.  Their anger, in this view (#2), was 
motivated by economic deprivation and the rightful sense that they had been forgotten by 
liberal elites.  To combat it, liberals needed to address the real economic and social needs 
of white workers and work to bring them together in a coalition with working class 
people of color that would pursue an agenda to benefit all.  For these liberals, white 
workers’ ongoing conservative turn could be reversed.  The second section draws out 
these arguments through the example of what contemporaries called the “white ethnic 
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movement”—understood here as a small group of liberal activists and intellectuals who 
advocated for increased elite attention to disadvantaged ethnic whites. 
 
1. White backlash stems from economic security and racial/cultural antagonism 
The dominant view in journalism and liberal discourse understood blue-collar 
whites as defined less by any underdog class status and more by a shared cultural anxiety.  
In this view, white workers had little need for progressive reform themselves, little 
interest in government measures designed to aid those below them on the social ladder, 
and considerable concern about further change. The archetypical white worker, as 
pictured in this discourse, was a homeowning and breadwinning male who had achieved 
a (perhaps tentative) middle class lifestyle and seethed with anger at those he saw as 
threatening his gains: 
The forgotten man of Roosevelt’s day has made spectacular progress.  He not 
only has a job a generation later, but he has property.  He has benefited from the 
welfare state and the planned economy and has now moved out of the slums of 
the cities into the suburbs…The vast army of the unemployed of Roosevelt’s 
day…have bought houses and now resent taxes, and are now indifferent and many 
of them even hostile, to the militant poor whites and blacks who are left behind.500 
 
He is almost out of his mind with frustration — call it hate. He sees his 
Government, with programs for blacks and for the indigent and programs for 
everyone except him, and he figures, “God dammit, I’m paying for this out of my 
pocket.” He’s got some bungalow in a development and a whole bookful of 
installment payments and he is mad as hell.501 
 
Frustration, anger, and fear are his natural reactions to blacks, the government and 
middle-class liberals. He holds strongly conservative views in politics, religion, 
and education.  The rebellious blacks and dissident students fill him with rage.  
They threaten everything for which he worked and fought.  Patriotic, proud, 
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family-loving, authoritarian, generous, anti-intellectual, he is being left behind in 
the turmoil of our society.502 
 
This figure might be understood as the dark underside of the “typical” worker as pictured 
in triumphalist 1950s discourse.  Then, his position as the king of his own castle served as 
evidence, for business and labor alike, of the basic fairness of American society.  In this 
period, for many liberals, the picture was much less optimistic. 
It is essential to understand 1960s liberal views of the white worker in the context 
of the still-dominant affluent society discourses discussed in Chapter 2.  For most elite-
level observers, including liberals, 1960s America offered the majority a secure and even 
prosperous life.  This view remained remarkably durable despite the period’s critical and 
contentious political discourse.  The narrative of mass affluence survived the civil rights 
movement’s intervention into elite public discourse, in part because it had never treated 
African Americans as full members of the polity.  Contemporary elites could understand 
poverty and racial inequality within an affluent society as a disgraceful injustice while 
remaining convinced that the political economic status quo basically worked.503  Some 
continued to hold to the triumphalist view that a wealthy United States could eliminate 
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social problems in relatively short order. “Hell,” Lyndon Johnson told aides in 1964, 
“we’ve barely begun to solve our problems.  And we can do it all. We’ve got the 
wherewithal…There’s nothing we can’t do, if the masses are behind us.”504  The 
assumption of mass affluence also undergirded much of the highest-profile social 
criticism of the period, including Betty Friedan’s The Feminine Mystique (1963) and 
Students for a Democratic Society’s Port Huron Statement (1962).505 In an increasingly 
influential frame, America was an affluent but unhealthy society that overvalued material 
gain and tolerated inequality and injustice that it had the resources to resolve. 
Pessimistic views of affluent America were tied to pessimistic views of the most 
obvious beneficiaries of postwar affluence, middle-income white workers.  The sharpest 
examples can be found in New Left discourse, where the dominant view understood blue-
collar whites as economically secure, dulled by prosperity and consumer culture, and 
adamantly opposed to further change. “The working class today shares in large measure 
the needs and aspirations of the dominant classes,” Frankfurt School theorist and New 
Left intellectual leader Herbert Marcuse argued, and was most concerned with “the need 
to buy a new car every two years, the need to buy a new television set, the need to watch 
television five or six hours a day.”506 Charles Reich’s 1970 radical manifesto The 
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Greening of America depicted an American public “in their sullen boredom, their 
unchanging routines, their minds closed to new ideas and feelings, their bodies slumped 
in front of television to watch the ball game Sunday.”507  Radical students, one activist 
complained, “frequently claim that all workers live in the suburbs, own two cars and a 
color television set, and that the main problem of the working class is 
overconsumption.”508 Above all, in New Left discourse, the white worker epitomized a 
society that had met the basic needs of most of its members but had left them 
intellectually and spiritually impoverished. 
What changed most in liberal elite opinion over the course of the 1960s was not 
belief in an economically secure majority, but how that secure majority was situated 
within a broader context.  The mounting evidence of pervasive resistance to liberalism 
pushed elite observers to emphasize the negative social and political consequences of the 
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security white workers had attained, to understand the secure white majority as an 
immense and potentially immovable obstacle to further progress.  Liberalism had been so 
successful in raising white workers’ incomes, many suggested, that it had created a 
conservative majority. 
This dynamic comes through particularly clearly in the work of Joseph Kraft, the 
political analyst who coined the term “Middle America” in 1968.  Kraft was a former 
journalist and John F. Kennedy speechwriter who had become a well-known columnist 
and news commentator by the mid-1960s.  Looking in depth at Kraft’s understanding of 
Middle America is useful for several reasons. Most simply, he was an influential figure 
whose work gives a good sense of the dominant view among liberals in his cohort.509  
Kraft was based in Washington, D.C., and his papers make clear that he possessed a 
substantial network of politicians, government officials, and journalists who read his 
column regularly and whom he saw socially510; in the period detailed in this chapter, his 
column appeared in over 200 newspapers.  More broadly, Kraft’s work on Middle 
America helps to illustrate the sense of urgency tied up in liberal writing about white 
workers, the sense that white working class anger would halt progress and that liberal 
elites themselves bore some responsibility.  Kraft’s work also serves as a particularly 
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clear illustration of how liberal and conservative claims intersected to create “Middle 
America” as a political category.  Kraft was a prominent liberal and a member of the 
“Georgetown cocktail party” circle assailed by conservatives. When Nixon’s “enemies 
list” was uncovered during the Watergate investigation, Kraft’s name was included. It is 
significant and instructive that Nixon, and generations of populist conservatives after 
him, could profitably use a term invented by Kraft.  
Kraft first began to argue that white discontent was central to the future of 
American politics in 1967 and wrote about the theme consistently for the next several 
years. He understood Middle America as the vast majority, the “ordinary” American of 
the 1960s—and, like many contemporaries, equated ordinariness with whiteness and 
middle-income status.  As their incomes rose, Kraft argued, “American workers have 
come to personify the national majority”511, and for Kraft the archetypical Middle 
American was an industrial worker.  Middle Americans had achieved “security,” in 
Kraft’s view, but nonetheless felt their economic position to be precarious.  They desired 
“ease of life”512 but found it difficult to find.  There were always new expenses, constant 
pressure to “keep up with the Joneses for better cars and homes and other appurtenances 
of the good life.”513 Middle Americans also confronted, Kraft suggested, “a sense of 
having worked steadily and hard for naught…of having been conned somehow”514—that 
perhaps working hard to buy more did not bring happiness after all. 
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Kraft’s analysis of Middle America’s politics followed the left-to-right trajectory 
characteristic of the emerging dominant narrative—what would be known to later 
journalists and scholars as the backlash narrative.  “As the backers of Roosevelt and 
Truman, and the supporters of the unions and their broad social welfare programs, [white 
workers] stood for decades on the forward frontier of politics,” he emphasized.515  
However, as economic prosperity “dissolved the harsh lines of opposition between 
economic groups, and diminished the appeal of bread-and-butter issues,”516 their chief 
political goal became preserving what they had gained and opposing anything that 
appeared to threaten their newfound security, particularly African Americans’ 
advancement.  “The ordinary white worker,” Kraft argued, “feels that the value of his 
home is seriously threatened by the enormous migration of Negroes to the cities.  He may 
feel the same about his job, and his social standing, and the safety and education of his 
children.”  Asked to “pay more for social services which serve him only slightly,” the 
white worker’s response was to “dig in against higher taxes for more welfare 
spending.”517  White workers’ relative economic security also increased the salience of 
noneconomic issues in their politics, Kraft emphasized, particularly “fear of the new 
culture with its drugs and sloppy clothes, rhetorical violence, and love of minorities.”518  
In sum, Kraft argued in a representative articulation of the dominant view, “the basic tie 
of economic interest that bound working-class America to the Democratic Party of the 
New Deal has progressively come unstuck.   Now this group—the group which I have 
                                                           
515 Kraft, “Scrambled Politics,” filed October 5, 1967, box 19, Kraft Papers. 
516 Kraft, “Happening Politics,” filed July 9, 1967, box 19, Kraft Papers. 
517 Kraft, “Scrambled Politics,” filed October 5, 1967, box 19, Kraft Papers. 
518 Kraft, “Republican Tide,” filed November 1, 1970, box 21, Kraft Papers. 
274 
 
called Middle America—is up for grabs and the stakes are tremendous.  Who wins the 
support of Middle America dominates American politics.”519 
 Though contemptuous of a class struggle frame that opposed workers to 
employers (which he dismissed as “Depression politics—not to say Populist stuff out of 
the 1890s”520), Kraft gravitated towards a class struggle frame that opposed Middle 
Americans to wealthy liberals.  He posited a deep divide between Middle Americans and 
the progressive upper-income whites he labeled “Upper Americans”: where the latter 
were “sure of themselves and brimming with ideas for doing things differently,” the 
former were “traditional in their values and on the defense against innovators.”521 “Upper 
America, in countless ways, is always sticking its finger in the eye of Middle America,” 
he wrote in 1970.522  Upper-income whites placed themselves at odds with Middle 
Americans in multiple ways, in Kraft’s framework: their desire to “improve the status of 
the Negro, at the expense of Middle America, to raise taxes, also at the expense of 
Middle America; and to circumscribe the power used in wars fought chiefly by the sons 
of Middle America,” their “assault on the Army and police” and “mockery of the kept 
hair, tidy clothes, and harmonious music which Middle Americans identify with 
decency.”523 
It’s important to note that this framework allows for the populist positioning 
conservatives undertook in pursuit of the Middle American vote: the righteous middle 
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victimized by arrogant and misguided liberal elites.  Kraft, however, believed that the 
liberal elites were right, while Middle American political views were unsophisticated and 
wrong.  “The upper-income whites have got, I believe, a good grip on the problems of the 
Nation,” he wrote in a 1968 column.  Since “notions of restraint and balance that are 
intrinsically hard to grasp, have not been fully absorbed” by Middle America, however, 
“there is no majority in the country for sophisticated ideas about race relations, economic 
policy, and defense.”524  Kraft had deep concerns about populism, influenced by the work 
of Richard Hofstadter, Seymour Martin Lipset, and like-minded scholars.  Drawing on 
Lipset’s term, he characterized George Wallace’s campaign as indicative of the “awful 
threat of working-class authoritarianism.”525 The United States had a dark populist 
history, he stressed, and the political environment of the late 1960s threatened another 
outbreak of mass intolerance against blacks and Jews.  Kraft also offered unselfconscious 
support for elite leadership in politics, which he considered a necessity in the twentieth 
century given that “the stuff of public life eludes the grasp of the ordinary man.”526 
In sum, Kraft’s work on Middle America is not about Middle America in a 
vacuum; it is very directly about the relationship between Middle America and his own 
cohort of educated, liberal whites.  “The central problem” in American politics “is not the 
visible problem of disaffected Negroes and young people,” he wrote in 1968. “The 
central problem is that the lower middle class whites who comprise the great body of the 
electorate have lost confidence in the upper-middle-class whites who have been running 
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the country for the past decade.”527  This is a striking statement, reflecting a view of 
politics as a game played by elites who ultimately served at the sufferance of the mass 
public.  For Kraft, many of the dire consequences of “a new wave of folk 
malevolence”528 would be realized through electoral politics.  Because Middle America 
was the majority, it had the power to expel the incumbent, enlightened governing class 
and replace it with a dangerous one: “Backed by the great mass of middle Americans, the 
conservatives could come to power” and “could plunge the country in cataclysm.”529 
Kraft presented Middle Americans as victimized by Upper Americans despite his 
belief in Middle America’s backwardness because he felt that liberal elites bore a 
substantial responsibility for the emerging backlash.  For Kraft, elites had a responsibility 
to promote a fair, stable, and orderly politics and to be cognizant of the needs and views 
of other groups—above all, to recognize their own privilege and particularity.  He argued 
that most of his cohort had failed in this regard, instead adopting “an overconfident 
attitude of snobbish contempt,”530 because they had failed to take into account how civil 
rights, Vietnam, and cultural change impacted the lives and psyches of non-elite whites.  
Journalists, Kraft argued, had displayed a “systematic bias towards young people [and] 
minority groups” and needed “to make a special effort to understand Middle America,” 
“the great mass of ordinary Americans.”531 White elites generally, in his view, had failed 
to recognize the “terrible tensions” faced by working class whites “being called upon to 
share their neighborhoods with the blacks, to accept Negro children in the schools with 
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their own kids, and to yield up hard-won job privileges to Negro workers.”532  Kraft 
reserved his sharpest criticism for young, affluent student protestors, whom he saw as 
classist and needlessly provocative, inclined to “rub the country’s nose in a ‘superior’ 
lifestyle at odds with traditional notions of morality and patriotism.”533 
Kraft’s work illustrates the contradictory nature of much liberal discourse on the 
white working class.  He saw Middle American views as destructive and unsophisticated, 
but nonetheless called on liberal elites to be more attentive to them.  He argued that 
Middle Americans’ anger threatened racial retrenchment but conceded that they faced 
“strains” better-off and better-educated whites did not.  He both criticized and effectively 
mirrored fellow liberals’ “snobbish” view towards working class whites.  Kraft’s work on 
Middle America reveals, simultaneously, concerns about the dangers posed by the white 
majority; concern about the political and social consequences of straying too far from the 
white majority’s views; and an understanding of professional, liberal identity as defined 
against Middle America. 
Understanding the majority as white, economically secure, and invested in the 
status quo left Kraft, and liberals generally, with only one plausible solution to the 
problem of the white working class: put forward a more restrained politics that would not 
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antagonize white workers.  Kraft argued explicitly that liberals had no chance to win if 
they allowed themselves to be defined by support for African Americans’ and students’ 
claims; rather, it was only through a moderate approach that they could keep Middle 
American discontent at a manageable level.  If they continued to press policies that could 
not gain majority support, they would only worsen the backlash.  He was more optimistic 
about liberals’ long-term prospects (in an argument with ironic presentist resonance in 
2017) because of demographic change: the college-educated population was growing, 
while “blue-collar workers and white ethnic groups…are now shrinking relative to the 
rest of the population.”534  Kraft therefore urged that “enlightened convictions” be “put 
forward”535 for a period of time until the composition of the electorate was more 
favorable.  In the meantime, “unless all of us are careful about pushing our claims, the 
country is going to go agog with demagogic appeals to the lower middle class.”536 
The great irony in the history of “Middle America” is that a term so closely 
associated with populist conservatism was coined by a liberal who described himself as 
an “antipopulist.”537  Kraft had none of the political goals usually associated with the 
rhetoric of “Middle America.”  Rather than hoping to break apart the New Deal coalition 
or polarize the country by race, he sought to avert this outcome.  It is clear from Kraft’s 
columns that “Middle America,” when it emerged on the national stage, did not have the 
positive connotation that it would attain for Nixon and his supporters.538  Yet generations 
of conservatives and other sympathetic observers have valorized Middle America and 
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claimed it as their constituency, taking the term in a direction Kraft never intended. It’s 
important to consider what made this possible. 
Certainly “Middle America” has a pleasingly egalitarian ring, and middleness has 
long been valorized in American politics.539  Most importantly, though, Kraft defined 
Middle American identity—and social divisions in America broadly—in a way that 
overlapped with and largely bolstered the claims of conservatives, pitting white workers 
against white liberal elites and African Americans and identifying them as defenders of 
traditional American values.  It is not surprising, for instance, that Pat Buchanan admired 
Kraft’s writing on the “forgotten” white working class (sending a series of Kraft’s pieces 
to Nixon in fall 1967 with the comment that “these columns…make some damned 
interesting points about what is needed at this point in time in the way of political 
leadership”540).  As the two continued their very separate work, Buchanan’s arguments on 
the cultural divide between liberal elites and conservative masses became nearly 
indistinguishable from Kraft’s.  “The most explosive social tension in the country now 
lies along the fault line that separates Middle America from Upper America,” Kraft wrote 
in 1970. Three years later, Buchanan claimed that the “most serious political rupture in 
the nation” was the “ideological fault” running “between the lower and middle class 
Democratic center and right, and its upper-middle-class elite and left.”541   
Populist conservatives had a deep stake in the claim that they represented a 
popular revolt against a liberal elite.  Kraft (and many other liberals in his cohort) put 
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forward the same reading.  Some saw white workers’ patriotism as dangerously 
uncritical, while others saw it as praiseworthy, but few disputed the link between white 
workers and staunch patriotism.  Pat Buchanan celebrated “traditional America, ‘Middle 
America,’” where Kraft saw those “traditional in their values and on the defense against 
innovators” as a regressive force in society, but both drew the link between Middle 
America and traditionalism.  To be clear, this is not a simple story of appropriation, in 
which the concept of “Middle America” was detached from its original context and put to 
work by conservative elites.  Rather, the arguments made by disparate political actors in 
the same period overlapped to produce a consensus elite-level view of the white 
worker—a view most favorable to conservatives. 
 
2. The needy white worker as a symbol of the urgent need for further change 
It’s important to stress that some prominent liberals directly contested the 
dominant view—or at least a significant piece of it.  For this second camp of liberals, 
white workers’ reaction stemmed not from economic security but from economic 
insecurity. White workers were not at all affluent, in this framework, and they were not 
inevitably conservative.  Rather, the movement of white working class voters to the right 
could be reversed if elites took the appropriate lesson from it: that they needed to pay 
attention to the very real problems of disadvantaged whites and work to address them.  
Though this argument is distinct from the dominant view of the period, it can still be 
understood under the umbrella of a broader elite consensus.  Liberals who worked to stop 
white workers from turning to right-wing demagogues made arguments that overlapped 
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substantially with the conservative claim that white liberal elites had overlooked 
traditionalist whites in favor of vocal and marginal minority groups. 
*** 
One result of the increasing visibility of white discontent in this period was 
increased elite attention to economic precarity among white working class people—a 
trend also visible in elite public discourse in the post-Trump era.  In the 1960s, as in 
recent years and months, this attention grew out of elite-level efforts to answer the why 
question—why white workers were so discontented and (for liberals) why they were 
moving to the right.  White workers were thought to be the chief beneficiaries of thirty 
years’ worth of change, and their unhappiness called out to elites for an explanation in a 
way that other groups’ pain did not.  “We know the United States is an affluent society, 
and it goes against our preconceptions to think that the American worker is in a bind,” 
one contemporary put it.542  Much of the research liberals conducted on the white 
working class in this period, including projects funded by the Ford Foundation and 
Rockefeller Foundation, set the explicit goal of understanding and finding solutions to 
white workers’ resentment.  “Great numbers of working-class Americans have not been 
at the center of recent social concerns...It is important to know more precisely the 
economic and social roots of their anxiety and to explore ways of mitigating their 
discontent,” Ford Foundation president McGeorge Bundy explained.543 “We will have to 
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understand far more about them before we can expect to stop their move to the right,” for 
sociologist Louise Kapp Howe.544 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, a notable cohort of liberals with ties to the civil 
rights movement, the labor movement, and the white ethnic movement coalesced around 
a clear understanding of the problem of the white working class: White workers were 
lashing out because of basic economic deprivation and unhappiness. An increasingly 
visible narrative stressed that blue-collar whites’ gains from postwar prosperity had been 
heavily overstated.  Family expenses strained the paycheck; men worked multiple jobs 
and felt emasculated by the need to “send the wife to work”; consumer goods conveyed a 
surface affluence, but they had often been financed through steep debt. As one 
contemporary stressed, “the home, the car, the paid vacation,” and the other “outward 
signs of affluence…that celebrants of American society have publicized are deceptive 
indices of security.  Purchased to give security, as often as not they have only increased 
anxiety.”545 Contemporaries argued, drawing on deeply rooted social democratic analysis 
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of race and class, that racism grew out of this insecurity.  In a 1966 speech, for instance, 
civil rights and labor activist Bayard Rustin urged listeners not “merely to [condemn]” 
the group of white Chicagoans who had thrown rocks at Martin Luther King during an 
open housing march.  These whites’ “racial prejudice…was permitted to come to the 
surface by objective economic and social conditions,” Rustin stressed: these were “people 
who were buying homes that were only one-third paid for, who were saving money to 
send their children to college, who were sending their wives to work…It was this 
economic fear that made it possible for their latent prejudice to come to the surface and 
be politically organized.”546 
This understanding of what caused the white backlash pointed to a clear solution: 
strike at the source by working within a multiracial coalition towards economic security 
for all. African Americans, Rustin argued, “can either spend the rest of this century 
denouncing these people as racist and being denounced by them in turn.  Or we can 
attack the root causes of their fear…We can eradicate white fear and black rage by 
satisfying the real needs of all our people.”547 Rustin and like-minded progressives had a 
clear view of what the needed agenda would be, rooted in the longstanding priorities of 
the black-labor-left alliance: an ambitious government-led structural intervention that 
                                                                                                                                                                             
followed on high-profile strikes, including New York City postal workers and Appalachian coal miners in 
1970 and autoworkers in Lordstown, Ohio in 1972.  See e.g. Judson Gooding, “Blue-Collar Blues on the 
Assembly Line,” Fortune, July 1970; William Serrin, “The Assembly Line,” The Atlantic, October 1971; 
Irving Bluestone, “Boredom on the Assembly Line,” Harper’s, August 1972; “The Spreading Lordstown 
Syndrome,” Business Week, March 4, 1972. 
546 Daniel Levine, Bayard Rustin and the Civil Rights Movement (New Brunswick: Rutgers University 
Press, 2001), 190.  For Rustin’s view of the importance of an alliance with white workers and organized 
labor see e.g. Rustin, “From Protest to Politics: The Future of the Civil Rights Movement,” Commentary, 
February 1965; Rustin, “The Lessons of the Long Hot Summer,” Commentary, October 1967; Rustin, “The 
Blacks and the Unions,” Harper’s, May 1971. 
547 Levine, Bayard Rustin and the Civil Rights Movement, 217.   
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would ensure jobs and a livable income for all citizens.  Voices within the civil rights 
movement and the left wing of organized labor pushed back on the dominant elite-level 
view that the private sector would create the necessary jobs, while government’s role was 
to assist the minority of poor Americans to increase their skills and become integrated 
into the affluent society.  The 1963 March on Washington was a March for Jobs and 
Freedom; the messages on marchers’ placards included “We March for Jobs For All 
Now.” The Freedom Budget, put forward in 1966 by a coalition of civil rights, labor, and 
other progressive groups, was an ambitious set of policy proposals centered on full 
employment, fair wages, the right to medical care, and the right to decent housing; it 
called for the government to allocate $185 billion towards these priorities over ten 
years.548 
For contemporaries who sought this kind of fundamental economic reform, the 
white working class was a crucial constituency, numerous enough to force major action 
in national politics.  The disadvantage white workers faced and the common interests 
they shared with African Americans provided strong ground for an alliance, in this 
framework, but the racialized political consciousness many working class whites adopted 
stood in the way.  The challenge, as contemporaries saw it, was to turn disadvantaged 
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whites away from the psychic salve of conservative rhetoric and toward a liberal agenda 
that could actually meet their needs.  Key to the solution, in the predominant view, was 
the reform agenda itself—providing jobs for all would neutralize the resistance that 
stemmed from whites’ fears of losing their jobs to blacks. “We must develop a federal 
program of public works, retraining, and jobs for all—so that none, white or black, will 
have cause to feel threatened,” Martin Luther King Jr. argued.549 
White workers also played a key symbolic role for liberals seeking fundamental 
economic reform.  As Chapter 1 and its coda section argued, liberals in the 1930s and 
1940s consistently drew on imagery of needy and troubled whites to stress the need for 
reform.  As Chapter 2 showed, the widespread belief in (white) working class affluence 
convinced many elites that further change was not needed.  In the late 1960s and early 
1970s, liberals once again pointed to white working class disadvantage as evidence of the 
failure of the existing system. The anger raging among blue-collar whites was 
indisputable proof that the affluent society was a myth, many argued.  For Gus Tyler of 
the ILGWU, the backlash was the price elites should have expected to pay when “the 
basic and burning need to redistribute the wealth of America [was] forgotten…It is 
precisely this continuing maldistribution of income and wealth” that had “turn[ed]…poor 
against near poor; white against black.”550  White working class anger also testified to the 
need for immediate action: if progressives could not reach disadvantaged whites quickly, 
some argued, the backlash would halt or reverse the progress that had been made. If 
                                                           
549 King interview with Alex Haley, Playboy, January 1965, available at 
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policymakers did not respond to the “real needs of these people,” one contemporary 
warned, the result would be “a sharp move to the right—even beyond Wallace.”551 
There was, importantly, a clear tension running through efforts to employ the 
white worker as a progressive political symbol.  White working class discontent served as 
evidence of the continuing unfairness of American society, but it also suggested that the 
liberals who had been in power for most of the preceding thirty years had failed to meet 
white workers’ needs.  The tension lies in how contemporaries explained why liberalism 
had failed working class whites.  In one line of argumentation, white workers’ needs had 
been rendered invisible in elite public discourse because of the widespread belief in 
working class affluence.  “The myth that all Americans are affluent has made us 
unobservant of middle America,” Patricia and Brendan Sexton of the UAW argued.552  In 
another—adopted often by white progressives, rarely by black progressives—they had 
been overlooked because of a narrow elite-level focus on black disadvantage.  The white 
worker “was ignored—consciously, carefully, and, many believed, necessarily,” argued 
sociologist Louise Kapp Howe.  With “pressures from civil rights groups mounting,” 
Democrats chose “to move…on behalf of those most in need, the black and the poor, 
without waiting any longer to assuage the fears and prejudices of those one notch higher 
on the economic ladder.”553  These two arguments often appeared together, but they were 
very different in their implications.  One placed the blame on postwar liberal elites who 
adopted a triumphalist take on the American economy.  The other rebuked 1960s liberals 
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for not giving sufficient attention to the needs of white workers during the civil rights 
revolution. 
To be clear, those in this camp who argued that 1960s liberals had overlooked 
disadvantaged whites did not want to slow the progress of the civil rights movement.  
They wanted to prevent white backlash—which they saw as rooted in unrecognized 
economic deprivation—from wrecking that progress.  The advantage of the elite 
consensus frame is that it recognizes that actors with different aims could coalesce 
around a set of arguments more beneficial to some political projects than others.  One of 
the ironies of white working class representation in this period is that liberals who 
explicitly sought to prevent white workers from being captured by the right adopted 
many of the discursive tropes employed by their adversaries—defining white workers 
against blacks and professional-class white liberals. 
Useful examples of this dynamic can be found by looking at the work of major 
figures in the white ethnic movement.  While its political moment has mostly passed, 
whites’ ethnic identity was a prevalent theme in elite public discourse in the 1960s, 
1970s, and 1980s. The reassertion of ethnic identity among whites emerged as a response 
to and an attempt to mirror the efforts of African Americans, Latinos/as, Native 
Americans, and others who pressed claims as marginalized minority groups and rejected 
assimilationist ideologies in favor of pride in their group identity.  It also drew from a 
conviction that white ethnics had been denied the promises of the postwar affluent 
society and should not be treated as part of a homogenous, dominant whiteness.  Ethnics 
had been promised the good life in return for assimilating, in this view, but had ended up 
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culturally and economically deprived.  White ethnic organizations sought to make ethnic-
identity-based political claims, disaffiliating from a generic white middle class identity 
and demanding recognition as Poles, Italians, or ethnics generally.554 
Existing literature has often linked the white ethnic movement to conservative 
politics.  In this view, the reassertion of white ethnicity was primarily about racial 
grievance: Italians, for instance, demanded recognition in an effort to undercut claims 
made by blacks or Chicanos/as.  This is too narrow an interpretation.555  White ethnic 
advocates did not want to displace other social movements. They wanted disadvantaged 
ethnic whites to be more explicitly included in liberal programming and in elite public 
discourse.  It is not necessary to draw a straightforward connection between white ethnic 
grievances and conservatism to recognize that liberals sympathetic to white ethnics talked 
about white working class disadvantage in a way that undermined their own goal of 
defining white workers as a potential progressive force. 
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Speaking about a “movement” as a whole is obviously harder and riskier than 
representing the arguments made by Joseph Kraft or any single individual.  It is possible 
to speak somewhat broadly about the white ethnic movement, though, because this 
movement can be understood as a loose coalition of elite-level actors who spoke for 
white ethnic workers from a liberal perspective.  “A small coterie of about twenty people 
gave birth to what was called the ‘ethnic movement,’” recalled Richard Krickus, a 
sociologist active in that cohort.556  Elite-level actors prominent in the white ethnic 
movement included the American Jewish Committee (AJC), a liberal Jewish advocacy 
organization, and two of its staff members, Irving Levine and Murray Friedman; Geno 
Baroni, a Catholic priest and activist who led the National Center for Urban Ethnic 
Affairs and later served in the Carter administration; Andrew Greeley, a priest and 
sociologist; Barbara Mikulski, a Baltimore activist and politician; and Michael Novak, a 
writer and intellectual.  For clarity, I refer to these actors as “white ethnic advocates.” 
The major figures in the white ethnic movement were motivated by two primary 
concerns: first, that white ethnic workers were moving to the racist right; second, that the 
dominant view of these workers among professional-class white liberals was inaccurate, 
unjust, and politically destructive.  To address the threat of the populist right, they 
argued, liberal organizers needed to channel the anger and anxiety white workers felt 
towards material solutions—which white ethnic organizations sought to do at the local 
level in cities like Baltimore, Chicago, and Philadelphia.  “If we don’t get these people 
                                                           
556 Richard Krickus, Pursuing the American Dream: White Ethnics and the New Populism (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1976), xii. 
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first, Wallace will,” one advocate put it.557  White ethnic advocates also stressed the 
urgent need for an alliance between white ethnics and people of color.558  “The interests 
of the lower-middle-class white and the poor non-white are identical,” Michael Novak 
argued. “Both together, they need a larger slice of the American pie.  United, they can 
prevail; divided, they doom each other.”559 A 1970 statement by advocate Geno Baroni 
gives a good two-sentence summary of the chief intervention the movement sought to 
make: “We must stop exploiting the fear of the ethnic Middle American and consider his 
legitimate needs. We must bring together a new coalition to press for new goals and new 
priorities for all the poor and the near poor.”560 
Standing in the way of this objective, for white ethnic advocates, was the all-too-
frequent liberal assumption that white workers did not have legitimate grievances.  
Organizations active in the ethnic movement sought to combat that perception, producing 
reports on white workers’ problems (including a “Middle America Pamphlet Series”), 
sponsoring conferences, and facilitating connections between like-minded liberals. As 
Richard Krickus recalled, they conducted a coordinated effort to “sensitize middle-class 
urban experts, journalists, government bureaucrats, and progressive politicians to the 
unmet needs of residents of white working-class communities,” drawing on connections 
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in government and the press to “inundate[e] government agencies, the media, and 
politicians with pertinent information.”561  They had a significant influence on funders 
like the Ford Foundation and Rockefeller Foundation, who underwrote multiple projects 
proposed by white ethnic organizations beginning in the late 1960s as part of an effort to 
put resources behind political leaders who could tamp down white resistance. 
White ethnic advocates also directly, and often combatively, argued that the 
snobbery and blind spots of upper-income white liberals were partly responsible for the 
backlash.  First and foremost, white ethnic advocates charged, white professional-class 
liberals had wrongly scapegoated white ethnics for racism. Second, they suggested, these 
same elites had only paid attention to black disadvantage and had ignored the 
disadvantage white ethnics faced (Chapter 4 deals with this theme in more depth). “The 
ethnic American is sick of being stereotyped as a racist and dullard by phony white 
liberals, pseudo black militants and patronizing bureaucrats,” Barbara Mikulski insisted 
in a widely publicized piece.  “He pays the bill for every major government program and 
gets nothing or little in the way of return.”562 Often, legitimate critiques of the often-
insistent focus on white working class racism—“They’re not the people in the executive 
suites who would not hire a single Jew or Negro for so long,” one advocate noted—slid 
into a complete elision of any privilege or culpability for white ethnics: “Nobody has 
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done anything for ethnics since Social Security.”563  Some ethnic advocates reinforced 
the broader cultural mappings marking white workers as socially conservative and white 
elites as liberal, arguing that liberals had wrongly derided the traditional values dear to 
ethnics.  “The white ethnic’s commitment to his family, home and neighborhood is 
profound in a way few who are part of the more cosmopolitan elite understand,” Andrew 
Greeley insisted.564 
White ethnic advocates did not champion white workers in pursuit of populist 
conservative political goals.  They mounted a direct challenge to the prevailing notion 
that an affluent America had met the needs of the majority of its citizens, and they sought 
to build a multiracial liberal coalition in support of a universalistic policy agenda.  Yet in 
seeking to convince other liberals of the need for a different political strategy, they 
echoed some of the key arguments made by conservative critics of liberalism—a 
coalition of white elites and African Americans dominated liberalism, leaving the white 
working class out; blacks received government largesse but hardworking whites did not; 
cosmopolitan liberal elites were chiefly responsible for the wrongs suffered by white 
workers.  Writing in 1972, for instance, George Meany expressed his hope “the new 
focus on ethnicity” would mean a “renewed and serious concern for the lives and 
problems of ordinary Americans—following a period of undue attention to the antics of 
the rich, the marginal, and the bizarre.”565 
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Taken as a whole, elite discourse on Middle America returns again and again to a 
single frame—ordinary whites who comprise the majority have been forgotten in elite 
public discourse, displaced by marginal minority groups.  This frame proved both 
seductive and flexible.  It was useful for those who wanted to remove liberals from power 
(Nixon and his supporters) and those who wanted liberals to be more responsive to white 
workers (Joseph Kraft).  It was compatible with an emphasis on the economic 
disadvantage white workers faced and the need for fundamental economic reform.  But 
the frame also suggested that advocacy on issues of race and gender would necessarily 
alienate white workers.  It encouraged zero-sum, either-or frames in which liberals could 
either be vocal champions of the new social movements or representatives of the white 
working class, not both.  The dominant elite-level view defining white workers as anti-
black and anti-liberal placed clear limits around what the white working class could mean 
in elite public discourse—limits that persist to the present day. 
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has sought to challenge the close association between the concept of 
Middle America and the populist conservative politics identified with Richard Nixon.  It 
presents a narrative rooting Middle American identity in the overlapping responses of a 
range of elites to white reaction against the civil rights movement and the dissent and 
cultural change of the mid-to-late 1960s.  Liberals and journalists largely framed working 
class whites as those who were most enraged by dissent and most anxious about or 
hostile towards integration and political gains for African Americans, and their 
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characterizations of white working class identity mirrored those of conservatives.  The 
notion that white workers comprised a homogenous group increasingly opposed to social 
change became widespread throughout media and intellectual discourse and was adopted 
by figures from across the political spectrum. 
 Placing liberals and journalists alongside conservatives, via an elite consensus 
frame, reorients the traditional narrative of the rise of Middle America in a few ways.  
First, it stresses that the longstanding culture-wars discourse that opposes “Middle 
America” to “liberals, cosmopolitans, and intellectuals” cannot be attributed to 
conservatives alone.  In order to understand its longevity as a feature of American 
political discourse, it is necessary to understand its appeal to liberals and the role they 
have played in perpetuating it.  The history of Middle America was deeply bound up with 
white-liberal anxieties around straying too far from the white majority on issues of race, 
but it also placed the blame for regressive policy and racial inequality at the feet of the 
mass of less enlightened whites and allowed “Upper Americans” to enjoy the privileges 
of whiteness without being marked as racists.  Liberals defined themselves against 
Middle America in the same moment that conservatives sought to define Middle America 
against liberals, and the two trends reinforced each other. 
 Second, the elite consensus frame suggests the value of viewing the late 1960s as 
a period in which what the white working class meant in elite political discourse changed 
rather than a period in which white workers as a group changed their political affiliations.  
As scholars such as Thomas Sugrue, Becky Nicolaides, and Kenneth Durr have 
emphasized, none of the “backlash” behavior so central to late 1960s reporting on the rise 
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of Middle America—whether resistance to integration, opposition to government 
programs perceived as aiding African Americans at the expense of whites, or attachment 
to religious or ethnic values—was new.566  In the period examined in this chapter, it 
became more visible on a national stage.  The civil rights movement forced Northern 
whites to think more rigorously about racism and racial inequality outside the South.  
Backlash was more directly at issue in national-level contestation between the 
Democratic and Republican parties, as the Democrats became the party of new social 
movements and the Republicans the party of the opposition.  The news media began to 
cover race, dissent, and cultural turmoil more consistently.  Elite understandings of the 
preeminent social divisions in American politics were relatively new in the 1960s; the 
real-life referents were not. 
By the late 1960s, ethnicity, religion, patriotism, traditional values, racism, and 
other signifiers of cultural affinity were seen as more central to working class identity 
than the bread and butter political economic concerns emphasized by labor, not because 
they were not central to the political views of white working class people in previous 
decades, but because national-level understandings of what class meant in US politics 
were still heavily informed by the New Deal era’s opposition between workers and 
economic elites.  Republicans, once viewed as partisans of business and the middle class, 
could now stake persuasive claims to speak for white workers. The emergent 
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understanding of white working class identity cut across traditional regionally- and 
religiously-based divisions and allowed Southern and Midwestern Protestants and 
Northern ethnic Catholics to be claimed under the same political identity.  The 
realignment of the prevailing elite-level mapping of the electorate was as abrupt and 
long-lasting as any that emerged from the 1960s, and it was made possible by elite 
consensus. 
Crucially, the emergence of the white worker as the chief symbol of cultural 
traditionalism and white backlash did not sever the association between white workers 
and New Deal-style economic populism.  Labor and liberal understandings of working 
class political identity were founded on an opposition between workers and economic 
elites, and this was in no way incompatible with a focus on racism or cultural 
antagonism.  While the notion that white workers as a group could be progressive on race 
or on cultural issues did not survive the 1960s, the notion that they could be progressive 
on economic issues certainly did.  This is particularly clear in the decades of calls from 
the left for staunch economic populism as the antidote to backlash politics.  In the 
prevailing understanding of white working class identity after the 1960s, material interest 
and cultural grievance were opposing forces, each with the ability to override the other.  
White workers were defined against economic royalists, white liberal elites, and African 
Americans simultaneously—as an anxious and elusive swing constituency ill at ease with 
either major party but critical to the hopes of both.  
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Chapter 4: The New Liberalism and the Victimized White Worker 
 
At a 1989 conference sponsored by the Democratic Leadership Council (DLC), a 
centrist group working to move the Democratic Party away from its liberal image, 
political scientist William Galston delivered a speech critical of the state of the party.  
Afterward, he recalled, “all hell broke loose,” as party elites in attendance broke into 
heated disagreement in full view of the media.  The speech that had generated such heat 
was a sharply worded call for Democrats to increase their appeal to middle-income 
whites.  “The inescapable fact is that the national Democratic Party is losing touch with 
the middle class, without whose solid support it cannot hope to rebuild a presidential 
majority,” Galston and coauthor Elaine Kamarck wrote in a corresponding memo.  With 
the party “increasingly dominated by minority groups and white elites…the public has 
come to associate liberalism with tax and spending policies that contradict the interests of 
average families; with welfare policies that foster dependence rather than self-reliance; 
with softness toward the perpetrators of crime and indifference toward its victims…and 
with an adversarial stance toward mainstream moral and cultural values.”567 
The arguments in Galston and Kamarck’s paper were intensely controversial—
centering a “middle class” synonymous with the “public” and defined against “minority 
groups and white elites”—but they were not new.  The paper drew on a recognizable 
critique that had developed over the course of several decades.  In the 1970s, 1980s, and 
1990s, criticism of liberalism’s treatment of those Americans contemporaries most often 
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called the “middle class,” the “lower middle class,” or the “working class” was never far 
from the center of elite public discourse. Elites of multiple stripes objected to the 
trajectory of liberalism since the late 1960s, and they often cast blue-collar whites who 
had worked hard to achieve a tenuous middle-income lifestyle as those most harmed by 
the new liberal politics.  Critics charged that leniency on crime and misguided integration 
policies had placed white working class people and their children, especially in cities, in 
danger. An antagonistic attitude towards traditional cultural norms—the patriarchal 
family, chastity, heterosexuality, hard work, personal responsibility—had undermined 
what working class whites valued most, others argued.  Government had spent freely on 
misconceived social policy targeted to African Americans, many charged, placing the tax 
burden on middle-income whites who gained nothing from the programs they were asked 
to support. 
This chapter provides a detailed treatment of the argument that liberalism after the 
1960s neglected the interests and needs of its blue-collar white constituents, with an eye 
toward illuminating why working class whites have served as such a consistent and 
useful foil for elites critical of liberalism.  Where Chapter 3 explored the elite consensus 
on Middle America from the perspective of liberals and journalists, Chapter 4 focuses on 
the work of critics of liberalism.  For those who sought to defend traditional values as 
they understood them, oppose the cultural left, or oppose liberal policy on race, it made 
sense to place Northern working class whites, especially white ethnics, at the forefront of 
their appeals.  Blue-collar whites’ grievances could not be (as) easily dismissed by 
liberals as an attempt by the privileged to harm the underprivileged. Advocates could 
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point to working class whites’ immigrant histories and modest lifestyles as evidence that 
their claims came from a position of disempowerment, not a position of power.  A 
populist frame opposing (white) workers to a liberal elite was more palatable than a direct 
attack on African Americans or other marginalized constituencies.  Positioning white 
workers in this way was not necessarily baldly strategic (though it often was)—it was 
simply easier (at least or especially for white elites) to see their grievances as 
sympathetic. 
This chapter, unlike the previous one, does not focus on a specific, tightly 
bounded time period.  It attempts to capture a set of recurring arguments put forward 
consistently from the late 1960s through the 1990s.  These arguments did not change 
markedly over that time period, and the chapter is structured in a way that brings together 
material from the late 1960s through the 1990s.  The first section provides a brief 
background on the national-level political actors who were particularly influential in 
taking liberalism to task for a bias against working class whites, including conservatives 
who sought to make white workers a permanent conservative constituency and centrist 
Democrats who sought to moderate the party’s position on issues of race and culture.  
The second section clarifies what these actors meant when they talked about “liberals”—
affluent, college-educated professionals who did intellectual or “verbal” work, held 
political priorities centered on “post-materialist” issues, and cultivated an elitist attitude 
toward non-elite citizens, especially white workers.  The remainder of the chapter focuses 
on three primary arguments contemporaries made against liberalism: 1) Liberal urban 
policy unfairly placed the burden of integration onto white workers, exempting suburban 
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white elites; 2) Cultural liberalism, especially the feminist movement, chipped away at 
the traditional family norms prized by white workers; 3) Liberal programs gave unearned 
benefits to African Americans and nothing to working class whites, who were taxed to 
pay for them anyway. 
A note on terminology and white working class exceptionalism 
Contemporaries used different language to refer to the same basic “type” of 
people.  As in the previous chapter, it is that “type” that is most important to the 
argument here.  Galston and Kamarck, for instance, argued that liberals had lost touch 
with “the middle class,” “mainstream values,” “lower middle-class voters,” “lower 
middle-class white voters,” “working-class voters,” “middle-income voters,” and “the 
demographic and political center”—seemingly distinct terms used interchangeably in this 
context.  As employed by contemporaries, “middle class,” “Middle America,” and 
“mainstream” were slightly broader in income terms than “working class,” but the 
differences are modest.  The “middle class,” “Middle America,” the “mainstream,” the 
“working class”: these are flexible, empty terms that were defined more by what they 
were not—e.g. black, poor, rich, liberal, queer—than by what they were.  They referred 
to lower-middle to middle-income whites, typically homeowners, non-college educated 
and working blue-collar or low-level white-collar jobs.  The use of “middle class” reflects 
blue-collar whites’ more central symbolic position within the polity in the 1980s and 
1990s (as compared with the 2010s), as well as the continued elite assumption that most 
blue-collar whites were economically secure.  I use “blue-collar whites,” “middle-income 
whites,” “white workers,” “working class whites,” “white working class,” and “white 
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working class voters” interchangeably to refer to this group as talked about by elites.  As 
in previous chapters, if I am making reference to white workers as political actors with 
agency, I use the suffix “actors” (white worker-actors). I use “professional” or 
“professional class” to refer to upper-middle-income educated elites. 
In any period, the multiple meanings of “liberal” make it easy to lose the thread of 
an argument, and that problem is especially pressing in this period, when what it meant to 
be a “liberal” was explicitly contested and in flux.  From the late 1940s to early 1960s, 
the dominant “liberalism” had been welfare state-oriented, pro-union, pro-civil rights, 
nationalistic, anticommunist, and hawkish if necessary in its anticommunism.  As 
understood in contemporary discourse, the emergent “liberalism” was opposed to the 
Vietnam War, anti-nationalistic, much less union-oriented, in favor of affirmative action 
rather than strict legal equality, and much more oriented to challenging traditional norms 
around gender and sexuality. Many elites who had identified with the former did not 
identify with the latter.  During the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, “liberal” came to refer to a 
distinct social type—elitist, professional, college-educated, upper- or upper-middle-
income whites—as much as an ideology. This poses a challenge for clarity in writing.  
While the dissertation as a whole uses “liberal” as a descriptive term, the negative 
construction of “liberalism” as defined by its alienation from white workers is so 
pervasive in this period that it becomes difficult to capture the discourse without using it 
as contemporaries used it.  To clearly differentiate references to “liberalism” in this 
chapter from the analysis in the previous chapters, I use “new liberal” and “new 
liberalism” to refer to the emergent liberal ideology and the social type associated with it.  
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I use “progressive” as a descriptive term to refer to any person with left-of-center views.  
The analysis of the “new liberalism” in this chapter should be read as an effort to 
historicize a caricature, not to make descriptive claims about changes in liberalism or 
progressive politics. 
For a significant portion of elite opinion, it has long been axiomatic that working 
class whites are more prejudiced and more socially conservative than the white 
population as a whole.  As Thomas and Mary Edsall’s 1991 bestseller Chain Reaction 
puts it: “It has been among the white working and lower-middle-classes that many of the 
social changes stemming from the introduction of new rights—civil rights for minorities, 
reproductive and workplace rights for women…and the surfacing of highly visible 
homosexual communities—have been most deeply resisted.”568 From this perspective, it 
is easy to understand why critics of the new liberalism invoked disadvantaged whites so 
frequently: these whites were most angered by the new liberalism and were the most 
receptive audience for critics’ claims. 
The Edsalls’ argument is not footnoted and is presented as self-evident.  This is 
not to say, of course, that no evidence could be cited in support of it.  Over many 
decades, one of the most consistent findings in public opinion research on whites’ racial 
attitudes is that whites with lower levels of education are more likely to express 
prejudiced views.569 The predominant explanation has held that education confers 
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training in egalitarian norms and a better grasp on the structural causes of inequality.  A 
dissident reading attributes the gap to cultural capital; in this view, educated people are 
more likely to know the “right” answer, and education equips members of the dominant 
group “to promote their interests more astutely.”570  It’s also important to note that 
interpretations of the same data can vary significantly depending on how much emphasis 
is placed on differentiating between white subgroups.  To take one very simple example: 
in General Social Survey data from 1977-1989, part of the period this chapter covers, 
67% of whites with a high school education and 51% with more than a high school 
education agreed with a statement attributing racial inequality to a “lack of motivation or 
willpower” among blacks.571  These figures support the argument that less educated 
whites were more likely to choose the prejudiced view.  They also support the argument 
that the prejudiced view was prominent among whites in all educational categories.  They 
do not support the argument that less educated whites as a group were prejudiced, while 
educated whites were not. 
Understanding resistance to new-liberal perspectives on issues of race, sex, 
gender, morality, and the work ethic as widespread throughout American society and 
white America in particular—and as frequently pressed by elites contesting other elites in 
elite public discourse—suggests that the arguments detailed in this chapter should not be 
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understood only or primarily as political appeals to non-elite whites.  This chapter draws 
on an alternative explanation for the prominence of white workers in anti-liberal 
discourse: The most seductive and politically effective way to respond to a claim of 
marginalization is with a counter-claim of marginalization. 
In existing literature, the theme of “white victimhood” captures the prevalence of 
imagery of wounded or disadvantaged whites in contesting threats to white normativity.  
As Sally Robinson argues, in a period where whiteness and white masculinity cannot be 
normative in the everyday, uncontested way they had been in the past, whites and white 
men have often responded politically by “claim[ing] a symbolic disenfranchisement.” 
Robinson understands the rise of Middle America in this context, as “Middle Americans, 
so angry at others’ use of the logic of victimization, position themselves as victims.”  
This positioning allows them to pursue a kind of “identity politics of the dominant” in 
which they “compete with various others for cultural authority bestowed upon the 
authentically disempowered, the visibly wounded.”572   
This is a very useful framework, but it also raises questions in the context of a 
longer study of white working class representation.  It is important to stress that 
victimization claims on behalf of white workers have a long and varied history.  That 
history includes a wide range of claims, from the consistent comparison of wage work to 
slavery (the upshot being that free whites should not be treated as “slaves”) to depictions 
of strikers beaten and shot at the behest of employers (see Chapter 1).  Further, if working 
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class people, including whites and men, are understood as “authentically disempowered,” 
there is nothing necessarily problematic in their claims to disempowerment.  What is 
most important is how white disadvantage is made visible, contextualized, and explained.  
Over the last fifty years, this has very often taken place in elite discourse in a manner 
favorable to the right.  This chapter aims to shed light on that dynamic. 
 
Advocates for the White Working Class Against the New Liberalism 
The argument that the new liberalism gave the white working class a raw deal was 
advanced by political figures associated with both major parties and with disparate 
ideological traditions.  It cannot be easily mapped to any one single political project.  
While the chapter as a whole emphasizes this broadly shared critique of the new 
liberalism and deemphasizes the specific goals of the actors who contributed to the 
critique, this section outlines the basic political context.  Significant criticism of the new 
liberalism’s treatment of working class whites came from conservative activists and 
politicians who sought to win blue-collar white voters to their cause.  It also came from 
left-of-center elites—intellectuals, Democratic politicians, and labor leaders—who 
sought to make the new liberalism more responsive to white working class views as they 
understood them.  Through the period, the dominant elite-level view understood the white 
working class as a discontented swing constituency, “an unpredictable force in American 
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political life, an uneasy ally for either the Left or the Right.”573  Criticism of the new 
liberalism had very clear electoral (as well as symbolic) stakes for all involved. 
Conservatives: Converting opposition to the new liberalism into a durable majority 
Richard Nixon and his aides had worked towards a goal they called the “New 
Majority”—a durable conservative electoral majority founded on substantial white 
working class support.  When Nixon resigned in 1974, the New Majority project was 
very much unfinished, but influential conservatives continued to work towards that goal.  
Writing in 1975, National Review publisher William Rusher saw in the mid-1970s 
electorate an “imposing (though not yet politically united) conservative majority.” 
Critical to that majority were the “hard-hats, blue collar workers and farmers” who had 
once been the backbone of the Democratic coalition. These workers were deeply 
alienated from the “verbalist elite” and the “semi-permanent welfare constituency”574 that 
dominated the new liberalism, Rusher and other contemporaries argued, and they made 
up a latent conservative constituency key to success. 
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Few conservatives believed that any national political force had fully capitalized 
on the rightward trend among white workers, however, or that doing so would be an easy 
or frictionless project.  Rusher and his counterparts cited several major obstacles to their 
pursuit of the blue-collar white vote: many voters angered by the new liberalism held a 
deep and emotional attachment to the Democratic Party, inherited from their parents and 
grandparents; the Republican Party remained associated with wealth and Eastern elitism; 
Democrats who recognized their vulnerability on social issues could simply moderate 
their positions; even deeply socially conservative voters were often skeptical of big 
business; Watergate had eroded the progress made under Nixon, as identification with the 
Republican Party dropped to extreme lows. The challenge for conservatives was to 
overcome white workers’ longstanding ties to the Democrats and build a conservative 
politics that appealed to alienated blue-collar whites.   
The conservatives who most consistently and passionately spoke for white 
workers in the 1970s and 1980s came out of the populist conservative social movement 
often called the New Right.  New Right organizations were most associated with activism 
on what were called the “social issues”—feminism, busing, abortion rights, school 
prayer, pornography, and gay rights. In the predominant contemporary framework, 
passionate social conservatives tended to be blue-collar whites; more affluent 
conservatives were willing to talk about abortion or busing at election time but cared far 
more about lowering the tax rate.  The New Right sought to build a conservative program 
in which “‘social issues’…[received] more than lip service” and in which social 
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conservatives and economic conservatives were “equal partners.”575  In their public 
criticism of liberalism, and in their calls for their fellow conservatives to recognize the 
moral and electoral importance of social issues, New Right activists frequently stressed 
the harm new liberals had done to blue-collar whites.  Among the most visible New 
Right-associated voices in the period were analyst/strategist Kevin Phillips, former White 
House aide Pat Buchanan, National Review publisher William Rusher, North Carolina 
senator Jesse Helms, televangelist Jerry Falwell, and activists/strategists Phyllis Schlafly, 
Richard Viguerie, and Paul Weyrich. 
The most influential conservative critic of the new liberalism was without 
question Ronald Reagan.  For both supporters and opponents, Reagan epitomized white 
working class voters’ turn against the new liberalism, as reflected in the demographic that 
bears his name (“Reagan Democrats”). In the dominant elite-level interpretation, his 
victories in 1980 and 1984 were glaring proof of the electorate’s rejection of new liberals: 
for decades, elites in both parties had assumed a candidate with his views would be too 
conservative to win the presidency.  Reagan was a former Democrat who had idolized 
FDR as a young man and served as president of his union (the Screen Actors’ Guild).  He 
continued to see value in the liberalism of the past, which he associated more with 
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common purpose and cultural traditionalism than with activist government or economic 
reform.  He also consistently criticized 1970s and 1980s liberalism from the perspective 
of a disappointed true believer and sought to convey to disillusioned former Democrats 
that the Republican Party was a hospitable place for them.  “When the left took over the 
Democratic Party, we took over the Republican Party,” he claimed in a 1988 speech.  
“We made the Republican Party into the party of working people, the family, the 
neighborhood, the defense of freedom, and, yes, the American flag and the Pledge of 
Allegiance to one nation under God.” “Working people,” in this framework, were defined 
by their attachment to family, neighborhood, and nation and their aversion to the “left.”576 
Democrats: Mounting opposition to the new liberalism 
When Reagan in 1988 decried the Democrats for their alienation from “working 
people,” Democrats unhappy with the new liberalism had been expressing the same 
concern for two decades.  Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Democrats worked to 
maintain and regain support among white working class voters.  Candidates followed two 
primary approaches—placing the emphasis on economic issues and moving to the 
center/right to lessen their vulnerability on race and cultural issues.  For the purposes of 
                                                           
576 Lou Cannon, “President Woos ‘Reagan Democrats’: GOP Touted as Haven For Mainstream Values,” 
Washington Post, October 13, 1988.  For contemporaries writing on Reagan’s appeal, especially to white 
workers, see e.g. Peggy Noonan, What I Saw at the Revolution: A Political Life in the Reagan Era (New 
York: Random House, 1990); Lou Cannon, Reagan (New York: Putnam, 1982); Lou Cannon, “The Man 
from Main Street, U.S.A.,” Washington Post, April 25, 1980; Norman Podhoretz, “The New American 
Majority,” Commentary, January 1981; James Q. Wilson, “Reagan and the Republican Revival,” 
Commentary, October 1980; Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, “Blue-Collar Revolt,” Washington Post, 
May 14, 1980; James Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party System (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 
1983); Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, The Reagan Revolution (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1981); Kevin 
Phillips, Post-Conservative America (New York: Random House, 1982); on Reagan’s class politics, Doug 
Rossinow, The Reagan Era: A History of the 1980s (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015); Joseph 
McCartin, Collision Course: Ronald Reagan, the Air Traffic Controllers, and the Strike That Changed 
America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Robert Dallek, Ronald Reagan: The Politics of 
Symbolism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984). 
 
310 
 
this chapter, it’s most important to spotlight those Democrats who argued that the key to 
winning working class whites was (in a common contemporary phrasing) a “mainstream” 
cultural positioning—in other words, an appeal more in line with majority views on 
issues of race, work, sex, and gender. 
It is useful to situate the arguments that follow in the context of the deep party 
divisions Democrats confronted beginning in the late 1960s.  The 1968 convention, 
where violent confrontations between protestors and police in the streets of Chicago 
received more attention than the convention speeches, brought these divisions into sharp 
relief.  Antiwar Democrats were outraged by the nomination of pro-Vietnam War 
candidate Hubert Humphrey, the sitting vice president who (having entered the race late 
after the incumbent, Lyndon Johnson, dropped out) had not entered any primaries, while 
the majority of primary votes had been cast for Eugene McCarthy and the late Robert 
Kennedy, both antiwar candidates.  In the wake of this crisis, the party yielded to calls for 
reform of the convention process.  The reforms developed by the McGovern-Fraser 
Commission beginning in 1969 changed the process of delegate allocation for the 
convention, requiring that states award delegates based on public participation and in 
proportion to the votes won by candidates.  States were now required to hold primaries or 
caucuses open to the public, and candidates could no longer win the nomination at the 
convention without running in primaries.  More controversially, the reform committee 
endorsed quotas to increase the representation of African Americans (and Latinas/os in 
some states), women, and young people in state delegations to the convention.577 
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For their supporters, the reforms made the party more responsive to its rank-and-
file constituents and opened up opportunities for previously excluded groups. To 
opponents, most vocally the AFL-CIO, they were an unjust and politically disastrous 
power grab at the expense of white workers. The reforms worked “to favor the affluent 
liberals within the party and to diminish the influence of its lower-middle and working-
class constituents,” one labor advocate argued.578 The reforms, the typical argument held, 
made the party less responsive to (white) working class views by failing to ensure 
proportionate representation for workers in state delegations and by reducing the 
influence of politicians and labor leaders responsive to them, who would no longer enjoy 
substantial power to influence candidate selection and other decisions by bargaining on 
the convention floor.579  Instead, critics argued, the new primary system was designed to 
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give excessive weight to the views of engaged activists and would produce candidates too 
far to the left to win. The most inexorable demonstration of this, for many, was the 1972 
election.  South Dakota senator George McGovern, the Democratic nominee, was 
associated with the political program of (in his own words) “the poor and the minorities 
and the young people and the anti-war movement.”580  Nixon, who dubbed McGovern the 
candidate of “acid, amnesty, and abortion,” won 49 states and 60% of the electoral vote. 
For decades afterward, Democrats pointed to the “McGovern coalition” as an indication 
of the drubbing they would receive if they alienated the moderate white vote. 
The early to mid-1970s saw a passionate effort by moderate Democrats to push 
the party back towards the center, toward the internationalist, anticommunist, pro-union, 
welfare state agenda identified with Democrats from Truman to Hubert Humphrey.  
Many of the critics of the new liberalism gathered around the AFL-CIO; this camp 
included AFL-CIO president George Meany; Al Barkan, head of the AFL-CIO’s 
Committee on Political Education (COPE); Washington senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson, 
a presidential candidate in 1972 and 1976; and analysts/strategists Ben Wattenberg and 
Penn Kemble. In the same period, a group of formerly liberal intellectuals often called 
“neoconservatives” (Irving Kristol, Nathan Glazer, Norman Podhoretz, Jeane 
Kirkpatrick, and Michael Novak, among others) gained considerable elite-level 
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prominence as cutting critics of the new liberalism, particularly the core liberal approach 
of using government programs for the benefit of underprivileged people.581  As one 
observer noted, these groups were united in their opposition to “what they see as the 
liberal excesses of the sixties…too much government intervention, too many demands by 
blacks…social and political changes by ‘the kids’ and their sympathizers of the late 
sixties.”582  They were also united in the belief that those “excesses” were absolutely 
anathema to white working class voters and would prevent the Democratic Party from 
ever regaining a national majority. 
It is important to be clear that moving towards the center/right was not the only 
option put forward by Democrats seeking to regain white working class support.  In the 
early to mid-1970s, advocates of a “new populism” argued that a focus on combatting 
corporate power could overcome whites’ racial fears and unite “a majority coalition of 
economic self-interest…across race, age, sex, and regional lines.”583 For notable voices 
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on the left wing of the labor movement, white workers were disillusioned and 
disengaged, but not conservative; they could be engaged by a revived social democratic 
politics.  When AFSCME president Jerry Wurf urged progressives to enter the 
“competition for the political loyalties and the support of middle America,” he disputed 
the assumption that this would require a move to the right: “I have not given up on the 
basic decency of the American people…I believe you can still rally a majority in this 
country around an ideal.”584  To overcome disengagement, in this view, the Democratic 
Party and progressives generally needed to make political participation meaningful.  For 
UAW president Douglas Fraser, “People stay home and don’t vote because they have lost 
faith that casting that vote will impact on the course of the nation…The proclaimed shift 
to the right has occurred not so much among the public as among those who have been 
elected to serve it.”585 
The view dominant in the Democratic Party by the 1990s held that an electoral 
majority did not exist for the kind of politics new liberals had embraced.  Centrists who 
argued that the party was too far left to win in national politics gained in influence over 
the course of the 1980s as Democrats continued to lose, and the party as a whole shifted 
to the right. These “New Democrats”586 defined themselves against what this chapter 
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calls the “new liberalism,” which they viewed as outdated and ineffective.  Collectively, 
New Democrats argued that the liberal Democratic tradition as they saw it—problem-
solving through government programs, attentiveness to minority constituencies like 
“blacks, feminists, gays, [and] organized labor”—was no longer workable as politics or 
policy.587  They championed a group they most often called the “middle class”—middle-
income whites skeptical of big-government solutions, particularly those they associated 
with aid to people of color.  These were the voters Democrats had alienated, New 
Democrats argued, and the voters they would need to regain to return to power. 
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The chief institutional engine of the New Democratic effort after 1985 was the 
Democratic Leadership Council (DLC), headed by Al From.  The most influential New 
Democratic voices on the needs of blue-collar whites (the “middle class,” in their terms) 
included pollster Stanley Greenberg and Bill Clinton, who served as the chair of the DLC 
in 1990 and 1991 and drew substantially on New Democratic ideas and rhetoric in his 
campaigns and his presidency.  Clinton ran as a “different kind of Democrat” (a 
Democrat not defined by the new liberalism, in other words), promised to “end welfare as 
we know it,” and pursued center-right policy on criminal justice and welfare reform.  
While their new-liberal critics accused them of capitulating to a right-wing agenda, 
Clinton and like-minded Democrats saw themselves as building a center-left politics that 
could work in an irrevocably changed political landscape.588 In their efforts to refashion 
the Democratic Party in that image, they consistently critiqued the new liberalism’s 
treatment of the white working class. 
Deindustrialization and the political economic context 
It is critical to stress that these elite debates took place against the backdrop of 
deindustrialization and the collapse of the Keynesian economic order organized labor had 
helped to build.  The postwar economic boom had brought about a great deal of 
confidence in Keynesian economic expertise. By the mid-1970s, elites perceived major 
signs of trouble. The United States ran a trade deficit in 1971 for the first time in the 
twentieth century.  Unemployment in 1975 sat at 8.5%, as compared with 3.5% in 1969.  
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Where conventional wisdom for decades had implied a tradeoff between inflation and 
unemployment (if one was high, the other would be low, and policymakers could keep 
the economy in balance by adjusting spending and interest rates accordingly), the 1973 
oil crisis and 1973-5 recession were marked by rising inflation as well as rising 
unemployment—“stagflation.”589 
Elites understood that something was wrong but, collectively speaking, were 
unsure how to articulate it or address it.  “The economics profession, in sharp contrast to 
its position 10 years ago, is divided and unsure as it contemplates these problems….It 
knows neither what ails the economy nor what should be done about it,” one observer 
noted in 1979.590 Multiple alternatives gained purchase in elite circles.  On the left, 
microeconomic planning measures prescribed a significantly more active role for 
government, which would intervene in specific industries to achieve goals around wages, 
prices, and employment.  Others advocated reworking trade policy to better protect 
domestic firms and workers in industries (archetypically autos and steel) now facing 
vastly increased international competition. “The present trade policy is slowly but surely 
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converting America into a service industry country,” George Meany stressed in 1978.  “It 
is possible that we will lose our position as a major manufacturing nation.”591 
On the right, supply-side economics, growing in influence in the pages of the 
Wall Street Journal and among policymakers like New York congressman Jack Kemp, 
understood unemployment as an outgrowth of insufficient capital rather than (as 
Keynesians had argued) insufficient demand from the rank-and-file consumer.  Growth 
came from the private sector, in this framework, and policymakers needed to incentivize 
private sector investment by getting rid of overly burdensome taxes, regulation, and 
deficit spending.  The period saw a wide-ranging political mobilization on the part of 
American business, including a growing investment in Washington, D.C. lobbying and 
campaign contributions and a more aggressive stance against organized labor.592  
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Employers by the 1980s sought steep concessions from workers during contract 
negotiations and saw strikes as an opportunity to break unions.  Broadly speaking, the 
1970s, 1980s, and 1990s saw a shift in the dominant economic reasoning toward 
deregulation, cuts to the social safety net, and tax cuts tilted to the highest income groups, 
while the economy as a whole shifted away from manufacturing and towards financial 
services. 
It’s important to note here that elite public discourse, particularly in periods where 
the economy seemed (according to the standard indicators) to be doing reasonably well, 
was not altogether pessimistic about economic change.  To be sure, it is possible to find 
interpretations very familiar to a present-day reader in the discourse.  “The system that 
seemed to be capable of providing a steadily growing standard of living during the 
turbulent 1960s [has] become totally incapable of providing people with a simple home 
mortgage, a stable job, or a secure pension,” two labor-left economists argued in a 1982 
book, with the decline of “productive investment in our basic national industries” giving 
way to “shuttered factories, displaced workers, and a newly emerging group of ghost 
towns.”593 Especially during the 1990s, however, a current of optimism and even 
triumphalism ran alongside a current of pessimism and concern. In a 1992 analysis, R. W. 
Apple of the New York Times stressed “the tremendous increase in the size of the middle 
class and the concomitant shrinking [of] the working class…The have-nots are still there, 
and still vocal, but there are far more haves now, and many are less and less prepared to 
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help the have-nots.”594 “There is every reason to believe that this new era will see a 
revolution in goods and services that will empower and enhance most people,” House 
Speaker (and futurist) Newt Gingrich told an interviewer later in the decade.595 
The impact of deindustrialization and the rise of neoliberalism on the history of 
white working class representation has been significant to a degree beyond the scope of 
this chapter.  For the purposes of the argument here, though, it is important to first stress 
that the dominant understanding of white working class identity continued to foreground 
cultural traditionalism and anti-black views.  The disadvantage white workers faced amid 
deindustrialization and economic transition came into the discourse against that 
backdrop.  Contemporaries suggested that economic stagnation was likely to make 
middle-income whites even more focused on protecting their own gains.  Blue-collar 
whites’ “social anger…turned downward as the economy stopped expanding,” 
Massachusetts senator Paul Tsongas argued, directed at “the have-nots,” now a 
“minority…whose desires seemed seriously to threaten the achievements of the newly 
arrived middle class.”596  Second, deindustrialization might be understood as an invisible 
actor within the discourse traced in this chapter.  Critics of the new liberalism referred 
consistently to the disadvantage suffered by white workers, but they paid little attention 
to the causes of inequality and of disinvestment in cities and industrial towns.  Rather, 
criticism of the new liberalism spotlighted the consequences (crime, urban blight, high 
unemployment, precarity), explaining them through the racialized frame of personal 
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behavior.  Critics made white workers’ pain visible not to address it materially but to 
portray white workers’ response to it as normative. 
This chapter has been organized around specific, distinguishable arguments 
central to a broader critique of the new liberalism’s treatment of the white working class.  
Individual sections of the chapter deal with three overlapping attacks, phrased here in 
language reminiscent of new liberals’ critics: (1) New liberalism was indifferent to the 
physical safety and wellbeing of its urban constituents; (2) New liberalism undermined 
the traditional values prized by the white working class; (3) New liberalism was 
indifferent to white disadvantage and forced working class whites to pay for new-liberal 
favoritism toward blacks. Before turning to these specific claims, however, it is necessary 
to clarify and contextualize what critics meant when they talked about liberals, liberalism, 
or liberal elites.  That is the goal of the next section. 
 
The “New Class”: The Historical Context of the New Liberal Elite 
In this period, criticism of liberalism as elitist was not nearly as well worn as it 
has been in more recent decades—there was a level of novelty to the argument.  
Contemporaries put forward a specific historical narrative explaining the new liberalism’s 
turn toward elitism, and most understood themselves to be describing a relatively recent 
development.  In the key narrative, the transition from an industrial society to a 
postindustrial society had empowered a new group of college-educated white liberal 
elites, sometimes called the “New Class.”  These elites, many of them influenced by new-
liberal campus culture and the New Left, were disdainful of mainstream America, in this 
322 
 
view, and especially disdainful of working class whites.  They held a different set of 
political views than liberals had held in New Deal days, critics argued, and were 
indifferent to material issues like physical and economic security.  Critics charged that 
the new liberals sought to use their influence in government, influence over intellectual 
institutions (particularly journalism and academia), and influence over the Democratic 
Party to move national politics to the left, through undemocratic means.  This section 
should be read as an attempt to historicize a critique of the new liberalism, not to evaluate 
the critique’s validity. 
*** 
The vision of the new liberalism that came under fire in this period was in many 
respects a straw man.  It is most easily grasped as a still-familiar set of images: urban 
liberal elites, “affluent, well-educated cosmopolitans who judge the factory worker and 
mill hand from their high-rise foundation offices, TV studios, and tweedy campus 
retreats,”597 journalistic snobs, denizens of the ivory tower.  While these images have 
outlasted their earlier context and now suggest an ahistorical elitism, 1970s and 1980s 
critics of liberalism had a very specific cohort in mind: affluent, college-educated white 
professionals, many young enough to have grown up in the prosperous 1950s and 1960s, 
empowered by the rising status of fields like government, journalism, academia, and 
social services.  Contemporaries often used a term to describe this cohort that has since 
dropped from the discourse: the “New Class.” 
Like the “economic royalists” of the 1930s, the new liberal elite was understood 
as having emerged as part of a large-scale socioeconomic transformation.  In this case, 
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that large-scale transformation was the transition to a postindustrial society, in which the 
service sector and the professions increased in importance as manufacturing declined. 
While industrial society had empowered conservative elites, New Class theorists held, the 
coming of postindustrial society empowered a new group of liberal elites distinguished 
by their ability to manipulate language and claim intellectual expertise.  As Kevin 
Phillips argued in a typical account, “America’s new mandarins are not the people who 
sell manufactured items but the people who shape and market ideas and information.”598  
The New Class construct was broadly inclusive of “college-educated people whose skills 
and vocations proliferate in a ‘post-industrial society,’” as Irving Kristol wrote in a 1975 
op-ed, but the archetypical new elites, in this framework, included liberal intellectuals, 
journalists, academics, government bureaucrats, and foundation officials.599 
Critics of the new liberal elite argued that its emergence was a recent 
phenomenon and a unique phenomenon: it was historically atypical for a privileged class 
to hold liberal views.  “Until the rise of a large, distinct knowledge sector, broadcast 
networks, major newspapers, and fashionable Ivy League colleges tended to reflect the 
conservative views of the industrial establishment,” Phillips emphasized.600  FDR, 
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delivering the commencement speech at Harvard in 1936, had been booed.  In explaining 
the rise of the new liberal elite, contemporaries cited liberalism’s successes since the New 
Deal; the growth of the state; the larger and more prestigious social role played by expert 
administrators, bureaucrats, and public intellectuals; the growth of higher education 
during the affluent postwar period; and the creation of a national media establishment 
concentrated in Washington and New York.  Critics tended to picture younger members 
of the elite as children of affluent America, shaped by liberal campus cultures in the 
1960s and 1970s and the intellectual currents of the New Left.  Older members of the 
new liberal elite tended to be pictured as 1930s and 1940s radicals who had become 
elitists as their status rose in the 1950s and 1960s.  “The ex-underdogs, the ex-outcasts, 
the ex-rebels are satisfied bourgeois today, who pay $150 a plate at Americans for 
Democratic Action dinners,” journalist Howard K. Smith claimed.601  Amid the 
incredible changes in the country and in their own lives, in this view, these elites had 
remained liberals, in part as a status symbol.  They wanted it known that they supported 
liberal causes and organizations like Americans for Democratic Action (and that they 
could afford to support them).  However, as liberalism became the ideology of an elite, in 
this view, the meaning of liberalism itself had changed. 
The ideology of the new liberal elite 
For critics, the new liberal elite held to an ideology distinct from the liberalism of 
the past.  It was less focused on bread-and-butter issues, more negative about American 
life, and much more contemptuous of working class whites.  First, in this view, elite 
liberal politics was distinguished by its post-materialist focus: its assumption that 
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economic security and a decent standard of living were no longer the most pressing 
political issues.  “There are now two Lefts—the materialist and the postmaterialist—
which are rooted in different classes,” Seymour Martin Lipset put it in a typical account.  
Traditional, working class-centered liberalism prioritized “satisfying material needs, i.e., 
with sustenance and safety” and pursued a “high standard of living, a stable 
economy…an enduring family life, crime fighting, and maintenance of order.” In 
contrast, the issues prioritized by educated liberals included “a clean environment, a 
better culture, equal status for women and minorities, the quality of education, peaceful 
international relations, greater democratization, and a more permissive morality.”602  
Lipset deemed these “non-economic or social issues,” a particularly clear demonstration 
of what the culture/economics binary falsely excluded from the realm of the 
“economic”—the environment, education, “equal status for women and minorities.”  In 
this framework, voters would only become concerned with these issues when they no 
longer had concerns about their economic stability and wellbeing.  That made it easy to 
dismiss concern with “social issues” as elitist. 
Second, critics argued that the New Class held a basically negative view of 
America itself—as racist, imperialist, and culturally bankrupt.  “A few fashionable 
intellectuals and academics,” Ronald Reagan charged in a 1976 address, would “have us 
believe ours is a sick society—a bad country.”603  Where the old liberalism had been 
proudly patriotic, in this view, the new liberalism saw the history of the United States as a 
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history marked by slavery, consumerism, and unjust war in Vietnam.  The term 
“adversary culture,” coined by literary critic Lionel Trilling, was widely adopted to 
describe this orientation.  For Trilling, writing that cultivated an adversary stance had the 
objective of “detaching the reader from the habits of thought and feeling that the larger 
culture imposes, of giving him a ground and a vantage point from which to judge and 
condemn…the culture that produced him.”604  Intellectual life, in this view, was 
fundamentally critical and oppositional; it required intellectuals to stand at a distance 
from the broader culture to identify and point out its flaws.  The value of the concept for 
critics of the new liberalism was clear—it identified a powerful cohort hypocritically 
distinguished by its opposition to majoritarian norms.  When conservatives like Irving 
Kristol, Kevin Phillips, and Pat Buchanan referred to “adversary culture,” they meant a 
culture “hostile to the prevailing middle-class values of work, patriotism, and traditional 
morality,” as Phillips put it.605  For many, that adversary stance extended to capitalism.  
At bottom, it meant that new liberal intellectuals treated negativity toward American 
society as a means of class distinction.606  
Third, for critics, the new liberal elite held a contemptuous view of lower and 
middle-income whites as narrow-minded, bigoted, and unconcerned.  Critics most often 
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tied these views to the influence of the 1960s New Left.607  Contemporary discourse 
understood the New Left as a movement of professional-class white students who “have 
all ‘had it made’ in economic terms,” as the AFL-CIO News alleged608, and for many, the 
New Left (and student radicalism generally) left an egregious class bias in its wake.  Penn 
Kemble, an intellectual and strategist close to the AFL-CIO, charged that the New Left 
had mainstreamed the idea “that the average American had been brainwashed by the 
Establishment and was tainted by racism” and therefore “could [not] be fully trusted to 
make the best decisions for himself or the nation.” Instead, “political decision-making 
had to be shifted into the hands of those who by virtue of superior education and the 
possession of ‘conscience’…could give some civilized shape to the malleable politics of 
the masses.”609 For Kemble and other critics, New Left-inspired intellectuals did not only 
see education as an index of competence and expertise; they saw it as an index of purity 
and intelligence.  They saw themselves as entitled to lead for both reasons.  Their 
emphasis on the intractable bigotry of the white working class, in this view, served their 
professional interests. 
A common corollary held that liberals took a patronizing and paternalistic attitude 
towards a range of marginalized minority groups, whom they blatantly favored over all 
others.  “Liberals are obsessed with the need to rectify, by federal intervention, the 
injustices historically perpetrated by whites against the black population of the country, 
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as well as other wrongs allegedly committed against a whole series of newly-discovered 
and acutely self-conscious ‘minorities,’” William Rusher charged, “ranging from 
homosexuals and American Indians to Spanish-speaking citizens, flower people, prison 
inmates, and women.”610  Any semi-organized minority could get something from liberal 
elites simply by proclaiming itself as such, critics complained.  While similar charges had 
been directed at 1930s and 1940s liberalism and organized labor (see Chapter 1), in this 
period, working class whites were not mapped to any minority group in elite public 
discourse—they were instead understood as those most excluded in any discussion 
focused on “minorities.”  
The new liberal elite’s sources of power 
The New Left had figured itself as an oppositional social movement working 
against the Establishment from the outside.  For critics of the new liberalism, New Left-
influenced professionals were part of the Establishment.  They sought to deny their class 
interests, in this view, even to themselves, but their power was very substantial.  Broadly, 
within discourse critical of the New Class, liberal elites exercised power in three primary 
ways: their influence in government; their influence in dominant intellectual institutions, 
particularly news media and universities; and their influence over the Democratic Party. 
First, fundamental to the conservative critique of the New Class was the view that 
the most significant, coercive power was now the state, not business. Conservatives 
charged that the increasing size and scope of the administrative state had empowered a 
powerful group of liberal bureaucrats insulated from the wishes of the electorate.  The 
courts were similarly unaccountable to the democratic process, in this view.  Because 
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they lacked faith in the majority, critics charged, new liberals pursued reform through 
these and other channels where they could circumvent the need to get majority support.  
They sought, Kristol argued, to have “a set of ideals and values that are not shared by the 
majority of the American people…imposed on them through legislation, regulation and 
judicial decree.”611  It is critical to stress the connection between the language of 
“impos[ition]” and issues of race and integration, the subtext of Kristol’s comments here: 
Elites who envisioned an integrated society of a certain kind used state power to force the 
less powerful (white) majority to comply with their vision, regardless of consent.  
Liberalism had begun as a defense of ordinary people against powerful and coercive 
elites, in this framework, but had evolved into an equally coercive power.  “In 1928, the 
average industrial worker in Cleveland was as helpless against his autocratic factory 
owner as his grandson is today against court-ordered busing,” populist conservative Bob 
Whitaker argued.612   
New liberals did not only use the state to impose their desires on others, in this 
framework; they also exploited it to support themselves financially.  Most versions of the 
thesis tied the New Class to the creation of a vast, powerful, self-serving state apparatus 
claiming to ameliorate social problems.  A system of glorified cronyism took place, as 
bureaucrats in control of government resources created “federal initiatives making 
hundreds of thousands of jobs and opportunities available to those whose hearts itch to do 
good and who long for a ‘meaningful’ use of their talents, skills, and years.”613  As a 
result, in this view, taxpayer money ostensibly intended for the poor primarily served to 
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enrich elites.  Americans working in the private sector picked up the tab.  This, 
businessman and former Treasury secretary William Simon claimed, was a “politics of 
stealing from productive Peter to pay nonproductive Paul, creating a new class of 
Americans which lives off our taxes and pretends that its institutionalized middle-class 
pork barrel is all for the sake of the ‘poor.’”614 Central to criticism of the liberal elite was 
the view that new liberals camouflaged and justified their desire for power by claiming to 
work on behalf of the marginalized.  They cloaked their naked ambition in a heavy dose 
of moralism, in this view, and imagined themselves as the forces of light and their 
opponents as the forces of darkness. 
Conservatives who sought to bring about an alliance between working class 
whites and business-focused economic conservatives cited New Class power in 
government as a key unifying issue.  In a 1976 book, Pat Buchanan called on the 
Republican Party to become “the party of the working class, not the welfare class,” to 
“champion the cause of producers and taxpayers, of the private sector threatened by the 
government sector, of the millions who carry most of the cost of government and share 
the least in its beneficence.”  His besieged constituency comprised “producers and 
laborers, blue collar and white collar,” asked to carry “upon their backs” an “expanding 
army of millions, utterly dependent upon government for education, medical care, food 
and shelter.”615  The slippage in this account between the interests of the (white) working 
class and the interests of business (“the private sector threatened by the government 
sector”) is clear and intentional. Buchanan and like-minded conservatives argued that the 
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key economic divide in American politics pitted “producers” and “taxpayers” against 
nonproducers.  Because (white) workers and their employers worked, produced things of 
value, and were overtaxed to pay for those who did neither, in this view, they had a 
common interest in opposing “intellectuals,” the “welfare class,” and the statist apparatus 
that supported them. 
Second, in this framework, the New Class exerted power through its influence 
over the intellectual establishment, especially the news media and universities.  Both, for 
contemporaries, were realms where liberal elites had displaced an old conservative elite.  
Universities had once defended the social order; students were now pushed to question 
the foundations of capitalism and American society.  Similarly, contemporary critics of 
liberal bias in the media did not dispute that the press had been conservative during New 
Deal days.  They argued that a new generation of journalists, more educated and more 
liberal, had attained positions of influence as news production became centralized in 
Washington and New York.  The result was a milieu in which elite journalists inhabited 
closed professional circles unwelcoming to alternative views. “Unlike his predecessor of 
a generation ago, the adversary journalist is less at home in the neighborhood tavern than 
the college seminar,” Pat Buchanan charged, and that “adversary journalist” had “ceased 
playing the neutral observer and reporter and [taken] up the more exciting and satisfying 
role of pleader, partisan, and advocate.”616 For Buchanan and other critics, new-liberal 
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journalists sought not to report the news but to convert the audience.  Television news, 
the greatest offender for most conservatives, portrayed America as a troubled society 
marked by constant conflict and an endless parade of social problems. 
Liberals’ growing influence in the Democratic Party comprised a third leg of New 
Class power.  When Reagan and centrist Democrats charged that “the left took over the 
Democratic Party” via the McGovern-Fraser reforms, the culprit was a Democratic Party 
faction then called the “New Politics.”  The New Politics was understood to comprise 
younger, college-educated activists, often connected to anti-Vietnam War, civil rights, 
feminist, and queer people’s movements—in the words of one critic, “educated, 
prosperous people, members of the professional and technical intelligentsia.”617 “New 
Politics” Democrats differed from New Left radicals in their belief that change could 
come through mainstream institutions.  For their critics, they were just as antagonistic to 
majoritarian American norms, to white working class people, and to organized labor.  
Opponents defined the New Politics against the “majority,” the “ordinary” American.  
When they called for increasing the influence of women, one critic charged, new liberals 
meant not “Catholic women or ordinary housewives” but “politically untypical 
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women”—liberal well-to-do white professional women.618  “I honestly believe that these 
new politics types get a psychological comfort out of losing,” remarked the AFL-CIO’s 
Al Barkan.  “They don’t want to be identified with the majority.”619 
For critics, the outsize influence of the new liberal elite in government, media, 
academia, and the Democratic Party had serious negative consequences.  Individuals and 
groups who had little sense of life as most Americans lived it occupied positions of 
power, they argued, and their decisions harmed those with less privilege.  The remainder 
of this chapter examines three separate charges: 1) New liberal urban policy placed white 
workers and other non-elite urbanites in danger; 2) The pressure new liberals placed on 
conventional moral norms harmed working class whites most; 3) New liberals 
overlooked white disadvantage and created a welfare system whereby the most deserving 
workers paid heavy taxes to support the least deserving.  The goal of this chapter is to 
stress the importance of the white worker as a symbol of resistance to the new liberalism.  
Contemporary elites consistently invoked white workers in debating many of the most 
contentious issues of the period—feminism, busing, integration, crime, welfare, and 
more.  A full treatment of the political history around these issues is beyond the scope of 
the chapter.  I have focused primarily on portraying contemporary arguments and 
analyzing them in the context of a history of white working class representation. 
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1: The new liberalism places the body at risk: Integration and crime 
A prominent line of attack on post-1960s liberalism held that new-liberal policies 
placed the bodies and lives of lower- and middle-income constituents in danger.  This 
critique focused heavily on Northern cities, understood as home to the white 
(predominantly ethnic) working class. Upper-income new-liberal whites, critics charged, 
lived in the suburbs, removed from the real-life consequences of their policies, 
particularly policies dealing with crime and integration.  New liberals, opponents argued, 
blamed social injustice for crime (rather than criminals themselves) and were unwilling to 
support the strong anti-crime measures necessary to protect law-abiding citizens.  They 
supported desegregation busing plans, despite the harms inflicted on the children 
affected, in this view, but kept their own children out of integrated lower-income schools.  
Law-abiding urbanites were the ultimate victims.  Simply put, in this discourse, the chief 
privilege afforded by class status is understood as the ability to avoid dangerous urban 
spaces—less obliquely, the ability to avoid mixing with blacks, or as mainstream critics 
of new liberals more often framed it, mixing with any dangerous “lower class” regardless 
of color. 
*** 
The starting point for understanding discourse on crime, integration, and the white 
working class is the common argument that white elites compelled the least well-off 
whites to take on a disproportionate amount of what observers often called “the burden of 
change,” “the costs of integration,” “the price for racial integration.” The “burden” of 
change, as understood in this framework, could be seen in heightened competition among 
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the less advantaged for jobs and resources—if the courts or the mayor’s office mandated 
that a certain percentage of jobs on a construction project go to blacks, a white 
construction worker would be put out of work, not a white city planner.  Most of all, it 
could be seen in a deteriorating and dangerous school experience for children and in the 
changing culture of neighborhoods.  “The vast mass of white citizens…see change as 
taking place at their expense,” neoconservative Aaron Wildavsky wrote in a typical 
account. “It is their jobs which are sought for blacks, their schools which are invaded by 
other people, and their children who are bused to strange locations.”620  As Wildavsky’s 
phrasing (“invaded,” “other people”) made particularly clear, the burden of change in this 
framework ultimately came down to sharing space with African Americans. 
Contemporaries, especially critics of new liberal urban policy, often argued that 
class, not race, was the issue—urbanites with stable family lives, regardless of race, 
reasonably did not want to live alongside others, regardless of race, who were dangerous 
and loud.  New York politician Mario Cuomo, for instance, framed controversy over the 
construction of public housing in Forest Hills, New York as “a clash between working 
and nonworking people, many of the unemployed being black…The objection is to crime 
and deterioration and not color.  The coincidence [sic] that most of the lower economic 
class are black is what produces confusion.”621 This argument was rooted in a common 
elite-level opposition between two very different cultures found among lower- to middle-
income urbanites.  One was orderly, family-centered, quiet, clean, traditional; the other 
was loud, violent, crime-ridden, lacking in stability, marked by sexual promiscuity and a 
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desire for immediate gratification.622 These clearly fit conventional imagery around white 
ethnics and blacks, respectively, but observers often framed the opposition in race-neutral 
language (e.g. “working class” versus “lower class” or “poor”).  
For critics, lax law enforcement, public housing and neighborhood integration, 
and busing had all chipped away at the barriers neighborhoods had built to insulate 
themselves, bringing pathology closer and closer into the sphere of once-stable 
neighborhoods.  Journalist Jim Sleeper described the problem from the perspective of 
Italian New Yorkers:  
The Italians knew—and these were, indeed, incontestable facts—that at eight each 
morning, when the men in their families had gone to work and their sidewalks and 
stoops were already hosed down and the wash was hanging out back, garbage 
covered the sidewalks in front of the “welfare” buildings, whose residents were 
sleeping off another night of noise and mayhem. The nightly screams and 
shatterings of glass, the inevitable police sirens and bubble gum lights ricocheting 
through the Italians’ blinds and around their parlors, had brought the block to the 
edge of war.  Puerto Rican and black boys urinated against the fronts of the 
block’s two abandoned buildings in broad daylight and strode down the street 
bearing boom boxes at full blast.623 
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In this framework, cleanliness attests to respectable domesticity (“sidewalks and 
stoops…hosed down” and “wash…hanging out back”); pathology is evident in the 
dirtiness of a living space (“garbage covered the sidewalk”; “boys urinated…in broad 
daylight”).  Sleeper and like-minded critics charged that new liberals did not confront the 
problems brought by pathological lower class culture with clear eyes, under the 
wrongheaded impression that doing so would be racist.  Because their daily lives were 
touched by the pathological culture, working class whites—and, in many accounts, law-
abiding, working class blacks and Latinos/as—paid the price.  Deindustrialization here 
was an invisible actor; the discourse depicted the consequences of racial inequality and 
the disinvestment in cities but foregrounded bad behavior. 
Crime 
First, in this framework, lower-income urbanites paid for the blindness of 
suburban new liberals when they were victimized by crime.  When New Democrats 
Galston and Kamarck charged Democrats with “softness toward the perpetrators of crime 
and indifference toward its victims,” they echoed the longstanding argument that new 
liberals were too quick to attribute crime to poverty and injustice rather than to the 
agency of the criminal and (as a result) unwilling to support strong law enforcement 
measures.  A 1972 article by George McGovern suggests the type of reasoning they had 
in mind.  “The purse-snatcher, the mugger and the car-stripper” committed crimes 
primarily because they had no other means of getting money, McGovern argued.  The 
“dismal fact is that the street criminal is almost always the product of poverty and 
alienation.  To deplore street crime and not deplore the conditions that provoke it is 
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senseless.”624  For critics, this kind of argument gave criminals more indulgence than 
their victims.  It was both unjust and politically damaging, and it was primarily a product 
of new liberals at a safe distance from the very real and legitimate worries of the urban 
street. 
One of the most influential treatments of crime, white workers, and new liberal 
politics can be found in sociologist Jonathan Rieder’s 1985 book Canarsie, an 
ethnographic study of a predominantly Jewish and Italian neighborhood in Brooklyn.  
The book asked why urban white ethnics—people whose parents and grandparents had 
provided the “élan” and “ballast” for the New Deal—had turned against their political 
heritage.  Rieder rooted urban white ethnics’ turn to the right in a “distinctive politics of 
space” forged by concerns about integration, mugging, and “crime in the streets.” 
Canarsie residents, he argued, “began to see liberalism as being out of key with the 
requirements of urban living and to equate it with a self-destructive idealism...[that] 
ignored the demands of bodily survival.”625  New liberals, for Rieder and other 
contemporaries, had unfairly dismissed these concerns as illegitimate.  Instead of 
incorporating the “need for law and order” into a broader progressive program, they had 
ceded the issue to the right.  As a result, Rieder argued, “left-liberalism hardened into an 
orthodoxy of the privileged classes.” Privilege, in this framework, is idealistic, soft, 
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unwilling to accept difficult truths, more interested in appearing righteous or pure than in 
acting practically. 
Centrist Democrats consistently stressed that calling for “law and order” was not 
equivalent to racist backlash politics.  In their view, crime was “a real problem” that 
constituents needed policymakers to address, and the law-abiding African American and 
Latino/a majority had the same concerns as the whites new liberals reflexively deemed 
racist.  As those most victimized by crime, in this view, urban voters naturally wanted 
strong policing.  Washington senator Scoop Jackson epitomizes the argument: “Well, 
first the absolute left said that law and order was a code word for racism.  Then they said 
it was a code word for repression…[But] who takes it on the chin? Not the fellow in the 
new high rise downtown” or “the fellow in the exclusive suburb…No, it is the vulnerable 
little guy again who is victimized.  There are elderly people, there are poor people, there 
are black and Chicano people in this country who are afraid to walk out in the street at 
night or during the day. Talk about repression!”626  In this view, liberals’ traditional 
mission had been to safeguard the welfare of the “little guy”; “law and order” was 
consistent with this heritage, and anything else was not. 
Never far from view, however, was a discourse in which urban working class 
whites were the primary white victims of crime, with blacks and Latinos understood as 
the primary perpetrators.  “In suburbia…a distant sympathy for the black condition can 
be aroused,” journalist Theodore White argued, as “the white middle class can insulate 
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itself—by zoning and money—from the stress and strain of experiment, from the fear of 
violence.”  Urban whites, however, understood crime as “a peculiar, savage condition 
brought about by Negroes.”  White conceded that “blacks who live in black ghettos are 
most in danger,” but stressed that “those who live close to black precincts are also in 
danger…and those who live close to the black precincts are by and large the white poor, 
the white working class, largely of recent immigrant stock themselves,” dismayed as “the 
streets on which their old ladies walk to midnight mass…[became] dangerous because of 
purse snatchers.”627 
The association of blackness with criminality is obviously among the most deeply 
rooted tropes in American politics, as is the need to protect the white body from black 
intrusion.  This discourse specifically turns on which white bodies are in danger and 
which are not.  White implies that “distant sympathy for the black condition” is only 
possible for those (affluent) whites who do not share space with African Americans on a 
daily basis.  In this framework, it is not simply that new liberals can insulate themselves 
from urban strain; liberals can only remain liberals because they are untouched by street 
violence.  Working class whites are in danger, in this logic, and therefore cannot possibly 
remain liberal.  A pair of jokes best captures this connection between ideology and street 
violence: “A conservative is a liberal who’s been mugged…A liberal is a conservative 
who hasn’t been mugged—yet!”628 
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Neighborhood and school integration 
Contemporaries cited busing, perhaps more than any other issue, as evidence that 
working class whites bore the burden of integration.629 Particularly after the 1974 
Milliken v. Bradley Supreme Court decision held that metropolitan desegregation plans 
could not touch the suburbs, the chief argument against busing from white parents and 
politicians held that it placed the burden on the least privileged urban families (whites 
and, for some, blacks too). These children endured long bus rides to unfamiliar or 
dangerous neighborhoods, in this view; at school, they faced inferior instruction and 
violence.  The most central charge in this case against busing was a charge of basic 
hypocrisy: The elites who designed and imposed the busing plans exempted their own 
children.  For one conservative, liberal stalwart Ted Kennedy’s support of busing was 
easily explicable and deeply unjust: “No Kennedy has ever had to experience the horrors 
of having himself or his children bused into the ghetto.  The Kennedys of 
America…created a system whereby the rich could buy their way out of racial trauma.”630 
It is difficult to overstate the pervasiveness, in antibusing discourse, of a “class 
struggle” frame stressing the unfairness of upper-income whites treating white working 
class families differently than their own.  “Busing is a strategy devised by the haute 
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bourgeoisie to force the working class to pay the price for racial integration while their 
kids bask in lily-white suburban or private schools—with, of course, a few upper-middle-
class blacks around to make it look good,” white ethnic advocate Andrew Greeley 
argued.631  Boston antibusing activist Louise Day Hicks focused her criticism on “rich 
people in the suburbs,” “the establishment,” “the outside power structure.”632  The same 
frame is foregrounded in journalist J. Anthony Lukas’s 1985 Pulitzer Prize-winning 
treatment of the Boston busing crisis, Common Ground: “class resentment did more than 
anything to feed the fires of white resistance in the inner-city neighborhoods,” Lukas 
argued.  Framing busing as a class-based conflict between the affluent and the working 
class was beneficial for antibusing activists.  It allowed them to claim underdog status 
and to soften any direct attack on African American children or activists who had worked 
to desegregate schools.  Racism was not the motivating factor, they implied; class 
unfairness was.  More broadly, in this framework, the only group with any power or 
agency within urban politics was the white elite, and this group imposed busing (or any 
policy intended to promote integration) from the top down.  The longstanding work local 
civil rights movements had done on education issues was elided.  This is characteristic of 
much of the discourse on liberalism’s unfairness to working class whites.  In a customary 
framework, African Americans do not have any political agency; the white elite 
champions them, at the expense of the white working class.   
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For contemporaries, the outsize burden borne by working class whites also 
manifested in the changing nature of urban white ethnic neighborhoods.  It’s important to 
note that sympathetic contemporaries framed these neighborhoods as warm, communal 
spaces home to an almost timeless culture.  “These are places…where the white worker 
gets back his face and his name, where he ‘has a say,’ where he experiences participation 
and community,” one scholar explained.633  A common corollary held that residents of 
these neighborhoods did not want other groups to move in because they wanted to 
preserve the ethnic homogeneity central to their identity.  “The pattern of Italian-
American life is continuous with that of their ancestors,” Italian-American advocate 
Richard Gambino argued; with “outsiders” understood as “threats to neighborhood 
stability which is necessary to the close-knit life and culture of the people.”634  In this 
view, opposition to integration was not about anti-blackness, but about preserving (in this 
case) Italianness.  This argument was prominent enough in the period to inspire one of 
the highest-profile controversies of the 1976 presidential campaign, in which Democratic 
candidate Jimmy Carter averred that “I see nothing wrong with ethnic purity being 
maintained” in a neighborhood.  Government should not, Carter suggested, “break down 
an ethnically oriented community by interjecting into it a member of another race,” “alien 
groups,” or a “diametrically opposite kind of family.”635  Carter’s inartful phrasing 
underscores the obvious subtext behind references to ethnicity and “family” norms in this 
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context—“another race,” “alien groups,” and a “diametrically opposite kind of family” 
are effectively synonymous. 
Urban elites, critics charged, were indifferent to white ethnics’ legitimate worries 
about change in their neighborhoods—loss of ethnic distinctiveness, fears about safety 
and disruptive neighbors—instead writing them off as racism.  These concerns were “not 
merely irrational, and over skin color,” white ethnic advocate Michael Novak argued 
(following a common contemporary framework in equating racism with irrational 
psychological attitudes).  Rather, “in the present system, the only thing one gets for 
integration is punishment: higher crime, worse schools, the diminishment of basic 
services, and the rest.”636  Furthermore, Novak and like-minded critics stressed, neither 
white ethnics nor their ancestors had created the American racial regime, and they had 
been victimized by it themselves.  “Racists? Our ancestors owned no slaves. Most of us 
ceased being serfs only in the last two hundred years,” Novak insisted.  This argument 
had a clear corollary: it was unjust for the white ethnic, “who is living on the margin 
himself,” to be “asked to pay the entire price for the injustices done to blacks”—to 
redress the sins perpetrated by white Anglo-Americans before his ancestors had even 
arrived in America—“while those who were enriched pay nothing.”637  The ultimate class 
privilege, in this view, was the ability to reap the benefits of racism while displacing the 
blame and the costs onto others. 
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Since the 1960s, white working class anger at the liberal elite has sometimes been 
attributed to an abstract sense of condescension or bias.  In mid-1960s-1980s discourse 
on integration and crime, the cause is often much more explicit: new liberals designed 
urban policy based on their own self-interest or their sense of moral righteousness, 
without regard to the practical, immediate, and bodily concerns of non-elites.  Working 
class whites were harmed as a result, as their neighborhoods and schools deteriorated—in 
large part because they were forced to share space with African Americans.  In this 
framework, white liberals are liberals predominantly because they lack direct experience 
with the consequences of their policies, a luxury not afforded to most—only a white 
person with class privilege can “afford” to be liberal. 
 
2. The erosion of traditional norms hurts the (white) working class most 
The victimized white worker was first and foremost a symbol of racial grievance.  
Because of the association between the white working class and traditional values, 
however, white workers could be defined against anything ostensibly threatening to those 
values—changes within the family structure, women in the workplace, “women’s 
liberation,” normalization of homosexuality, increasingly nontraditional norms in schools 
and in popular culture.  This pattern manifests particularly clearly in elite public 
discourse around the Christian conservative movement and the feminist movement.  
Contemporaries argued that the changing norms brought by feminism and the new 
liberalism harmed white working class people.  Working class whites found meaningful 
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lives through stable and close-knit family life, in this view, and the new liberalism took 
an adversarial approach to their major source of agency and happiness. 
Feminism and the white working class 
It was a commonplace in elite public discourse that second-wave feminism was 
primarily a movement of professional-class white women. Progressive white working 
class women and women of color argued as much; so did observers from other 
perspectives.  Those who framed feminism as out of touch with white working class 
women made two primary arguments: first, the movement’s economic agenda focused 
too heavily on equal access to professional jobs, a priority only for professional-class 
women; second, professional-class feminists’ leftwing social views ran counter to 
socially conservative working class norms. 
In one prominent line of argumentation, the women’s movement was too heavily 
focused on workplace equality with men, which it assumed to be necessarily liberating.  
“Women’s Lib periodicals assume that the majority of women are college-educated, 
endowed with superb talents they are churning to express to a reluctant world, eager to 
enjoy a fascinating career,” one white ethnic activist wrote.638  That assumption, in this 
critique, did not reflect the needs and experiences of women who did not have 
professional men in their families and were not in a position to choose whether or not to 
work out of the home.  “We’re not after the jobs that our men have because we know 
how our men feel,” Baltimore politician Barbara Mikulski explained.  “We know that 
when they come home from work every day they feel they’ve been treated like the 
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machines they operate.”639  When the only jobs a woman could conceivably hold were 
low-paying and boring with little chance for advancement, subsidized childcare, family 
leave, and job training were more pressing concerns than workplace equality, in this 
view. 
A second line of argumentation held that white working class people found the 
“role-changing” associated with feminism offensive.  Since at least the 1950s, social 
researchers had understood white working class women as heavily focused on stability 
and the family.  While new research conducted in the mid-1970s was significantly more 
nuanced, often stressing the agency and activism of white working class women in their 
families and in local politics, that emphasis on the close-knit family remained.  “The 
working-class and lower-middle-class subculture…is dominated by an inner-family 
orientation; members are expected to find both social and emotional gratifications within 
its bosom,” sociologist Lillian Rubin wrote in a 1976 study.  “No woman worthy of the 
title Mother would wish to do otherwise.”640 
In this framework, role changes posed a particular challenge for white working 
class people, both men and women, because they were less likely to find fulfillment or 
self-actualization in their jobs.  Now, in this view, cultural change imperiled their ability 
to find it in family and community too.  The movement had “unsetting” implications for 
                                                           
639 Janet Zollinger Giele, Women and the Future: Changing Sex Roles in Modern America (New York: The 
Free Press, 1979), 75.  For contemporary treatments of the gap between feminists and white working class 
women, see e.g. Edith Evans Asbury, “Feminists Cautioned on Attitude Toward Other Women’s Work,” 
New York Times, June 26, 1975; Carol Hymowitz and Michaele Weissman, A History of Women in 
America: From Founding Mothers to Feminists (New York: Bantam Books, 1978), 333ff, 361ff; Susan 
Jacoby, “What Do I Do For the Next 20 Years?,” New York Times, June 17, 1973; Martha Weinman Lear, 
“‘You’ll Probably Think I’m Stupid’: E.R.A.,” New York Times, April 11, 1976; Lisa Hammel, “Feminism: 
A Wider Meaning for the Word ‘Us’,” New York Times, January 15, 1974. 
640 Lillian Rubin, Worlds of Pain: Life in the Working Class Family (New York: Basic Books, 1976), 63. 
348 
 
both “the male breadwinner whose self-esteem derived mainly from that role, and to the 
woman whose life’s commitment was to husband, children, and home,” noted Nancy 
Seifer, a leading researcher on white ethnic working class women.641  “It [women’s 
liberation] doesn’t relate to us,” one New Yorker argued.  “You can’t agitate women 
without agitating men. It’s destructive to the family. Most of us were poverty families—
the men were put down as much as women. They need support too.”642  In this 
framework, those who could not easily attain social status outside of traditional roles 
were hurt the most as titles like “mother,” “father,” and “wife” no longer carried 
automatic regard.  Women who suffered class disadvantage also, in this view, reasonably 
did not see men or the family as oppressive.  Men dealt with the same pressures women 
faced, and the family was their refuge against the outside world. 
In looking at this discourse, it is important to stress that there has been a 
longstanding connection between economic security (particularly for workers) and 
traditional norms around gender and family.  For instance, some of the earliest labor laws 
limiting the power of employers had governed the hours and conditions under which 
women could legally work; while they were grounded in paternalism, they also provided 
real gains.  A significant number of feminists in the first half of the twentieth century 
opposed the Equal Rights Amendment (“Equality of rights under the law shall not be 
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex”) on the 
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grounds that it would take away these protections.643  In the 1970s, conservatives, most 
notably Phyllis Schlafly, led opposition to the ERA.  Schlafly was less insistent than 
many of her social conservative allies in linking her claims to the welfare of white 
workers.  Much of her public argumentation featured lurid and homophobic allegations 
directed at “radicals,” “man-haters,” and “lesbians.” But she and her supporters did tap 
the notion that seeking to be treated exactly like men would disadvantage women by 
removing protective measures designed for their benefit: “In the face of the double cost, 
industry just takes the benefits away from the women so men and women can be equal on 
a lower level.”644  Traditional roles, for Schlafly and like-minded conservatives, protected 
women and privileged them over men. 
More broadly, the notion of economic security and the “good life” has historically 
been deeply tied to the breadwinning father/homemaker mother model, which had been 
normative for workers and professionals alike for decades.  During the heyday of 
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organized labor’s power, officials argued strongly in favor of the family wage system, 
which they saw as central to economic security and justice.  Staunch support for the 
family wage within labor circles certainly did reflect norms proscribing wage work for 
women who had a choice in the matter, but it was not read as “conservative.”  The 
expectation that multiple members of the household would work for wages, in this 
framework, was most advantageous to employers (and harmful for working class men), 
because it allowed employers to defend paying the primary earner lower wages. 
When critics framed the new liberalism as classist, they tapped (implicitly or 
explicitly) the connection between (white) working class economic security and 
patriarchal family norms.  “The culture wars that have convulsed America since the 
sixties are best understood as a form of class warfare,” Christopher Lasch argued in a 
typical account, pitting an “enlightened elite (as it thinks of itself)” against “the 
majority.”  The “working and lower middle classes,” Lasch continued, “favor limits on 
abortion, cling to the two-parent family as a source of stability in a turbulent world, [and] 
resist experiments with ‘alternative lifestyles.’”645  Lasch here played on the longstanding 
connection between the white working class and stability.  (White) workers, in his view, 
had a healthy understanding of limits that elites lacked.  They regarded strict moral norms 
as protection from the vicissitudes of “a turbulent world,” not as oppressive. 
Christian conservatism and the white working class 
More broadly, the value of “class struggle” frames on issues of sexuality and 
gender, as with race, is straightforward: they undercut a frame in which the conservative 
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position is the position of dominant groups (Christians, heterosexuals, men) and identify 
it instead as the position of the (white) working class.  This dynamic can be seen in the 
public claims-making of the New Right, which championed working class and middle-
income whites more vocally than any contemporary conservative group.  The movement, 
leader Richard Viguerie claimed in 1983’s The Establishment vs. the People, “represents 
the class of Americans variously referred to as ‘the little people,’ ‘the forgotten men and 
women,’ ‘the working class,’ and ‘the silent majority.’”646 The “establishment,” the 
“cultural elite,” and the “intellectual elite” were customary adversaries for Christian 
conservatives.  “Over the last 15 years, Middle America’s fabric of beliefs, conventions, 
norms, customs and moral values has been torn apart,” charged one conservative, with a 
“new intellectual elite…carrying out the process of demolition.”647  
An understanding of the social conservative constituency as a previously “silent” 
majority was advantageous for the New Right.  While many of the leaders of the New 
Right had grown up in (white) working class America, they were also seasoned activists 
and operatives who saw an opportunity to win gains for their brand of conservatism by 
mobilizing support among evangelical Christian and Catholic voters.  In a frequent 
narrative, however, social conservatives and Christian conservatives had only become 
involved in politics recently, as the nation took a sharp turn to the left.  They were not 
professional politicians with an ax to grind or a thirst for power, in this framework.  They 
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simply wanted to defend the moral system that most Americans supported and that had 
been accepted as the natural order until recently.  
In a 1986 interview, New Right leader Paul Weyrich offered a representative 
articulation of this narrative.  The movement’s base, he argued, “is comprised largely of 
people who, for many, many decades, were very quiet politically.”  Weyrich defined a 
“cultural conservative” as “someone whose main concern is family, neighborhood, 
community and church.  These are people very much wrapped up in their children and the 
family network. They are mainly ethnic blue-collar people who have worked in the same 
factory or the same job for a long period of time.”  Cultural conservatives were forced to 
speak out, Weyrich argued, because they could no longer live quiet and contented lives 
by keeping to themselves. The tide of recent events—sexual education in schools, the 
Roe v. Wade decision legalizing abortion, the Engel v. Vitale decision banning prayer in 
public schools, acceptance of “homosexual affirmative action”—“cause[d] these people 
to feel that they were under siege.”648 
“Siege” suggests a distant, external authority exerting its power to reshape local 
or private space—home, school, church, neighborhood—against the wishes of locals.  In 
this framework, new liberals were unwilling to allow ordinary Americans to live their 
lives and raise their children the way they saw fit; they sought instead to impose the 
views they considered best, regardless of consent.  The power of the “Big Media,” for 
many, lay in its ability to break down the barriers citizens had built to keep out dangerous 
material, to “pour violence and filth and anti-Americanism into our homes and places of 
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work,” as Richard Viguerie charged.649  This understanding of liberal power also came 
through particularly clearly on education issues—textbooks with liberal bias, liberals 
“distributing sexual propaganda to our third and fourth graders.”650  This emphasis on the 
power of the new liberalism to break down barriers suggests a key continuity across 
issues of race and sexuality.  From busing to integration (North and South) to sex in the 
media, illegitimate power is understood as distant, external, and imposed against the 
wishes of locals without consent. 
 
3. White workers pay for new liberal programs and get nothing in return 
In 1985, pollster Stan Greenberg conducted a study in an industrial suburb north 
of Detroit that yielded one of the most influential portrayals of white working class voters 
in the post-civil rights era.  Macomb County, Michigan was a former labor-liberal 
stronghold where Ronald Reagan had won roughly two-thirds of the vote in 1984, and the 
Michigan Democratic Party and the UAW had hired Greenberg to make sense of that 
result.  During focus groups with Macomb County Democrats who had voted for Reagan, 
Greenberg recalled, “we raised the race issue, and unbelievable emotion came pouring 
out.”651  The argument he put forward to explain these voters’ “defection” from the 
Democrats was straightforward: Macomb County’s white working class voters held a 
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“profound distaste for blacks, a sentiment that pervades almost everything they think 
about government and politics.”652  Macomb voters’ anti-black racism manifested in 
opposition to a range of liberal policies, in Greenberg’s account, but especially welfare 
and affirmative action.  They perceived “the special status of blacks as a serious obstacle 
to their personal advancement”—insisting that they had lost out on job opportunities and 
loans because of racial favoritism—and viewed government “as a black domain where 
whites cannot expect reasonable treatment.”  Macomb voters also saw themselves as 
heavily taxed but receiving nothing in return, “ignored by the government but forced to 
support social programs that did not benefit them,” for Greenberg.  In sum, “blacks 
constituted the explanation for their vulnerability, for almost everything that has gone 
wrong in their lives.”653 
Greenberg put forward a particularly extreme and explicit version of an argument 
that had been made consistently for twenty years prior to his Macomb study: the white 
working class received, or felt that it received, nothing from new liberal social policy 
geared only towards African Americans. This argument undergirded much discourse on 
Middle America (see Chapter 3).  It deeply shaped the politics of the 1980s and 1990s, 
including the efforts of Republicans to appeal to “Reagan Democrats” and the efforts of 
Clinton and the New Democrats to win them back.  Throughout the period, working class 
whites appeared consistently in elite public discourse as those most harmed by and most 
opposed to new liberal welfare and affirmative action policy.  In each case, what most 
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distinguished working class whites was the fact that they faced disadvantage but did not 
receive preferential treatment or assistance from the government. 
All of the arguments outlined below elided the central role of the stratified post-
New Deal welfare state in creating the postwar white middle class, as well as the 
assistance that white worker-actors received from government since the 1960s.654  
Homeownership is historically the chief means by which working class people can build 
wealth.  Under the New Deal Democrats, government-backed Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA) and Veterans Affairs (VA) mortgage programs excluded people of 
color but allowed whites of modest means to buy homes at low interest rates and with 
little money up front.  The GI Bill’s higher education benefits vastly increased the size of 
the professional class by allowing scores of working class servicemen, disproportionately 
white, to attend college.  The Wagner Act, the law most crucial in the growth of unions 
after the 1930s, did not exclude from government protection unions that kept out African 
Americans or permitted them only in the worst jobs.  Despite the prevailing caricature of 
1960s liberalism as a set of programs with “no appeal” for “ordinary whites,” whites 
(especially senior citizens) benefited considerably from Great Society programs, 
including Medicare, Medicaid, and federal money for education.  The extent to which 
white worker-actors benefited from government intervention was not only invisible to 
worker-actors—it was mostly invisible within elite public discourse as well.  Elite-level 
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arguments figuring white workers as victims of welfare and affirmative action relied on 
that invisibility. 
Affirmative action and the white working class 
When contemporaries argued that race-based affirmative action programs were 
particularly unfair to working class whites, they made two primary claims, focused on 
affirmative action in stable working class trades (construction, police and fire 
departments) and college admissions, respectively.  In the former case, arguments 
followed on the “burden of integration” pattern detailed above—those whites who had 
the least were asked to sacrifice the most.  White professionals were insulated from job 
competition, in this view, and as a result did not “have much to lose from black demands 
for equity in hiring. Most blacks had no hope of finding a place in the executive suites or 
faculty lounges; they were aspiring to blue-collar jobs, such as in the building trades, 
where color-blind hiring would have meant, among other things, that a white worker 
could no longer expect to pass his job along to his son.”655  As one white worker-actor 
wrote to the New York Times in defense of nepotism within unions, “Some men leave 
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their sons money, some large investments, some business connections and some a 
profession.  I have none of these to bequeath to my sons.  I have only one worthwhile 
thing to give: my trade…For this simple father’s wish it is said that I discriminate against 
Negroes.”656  Historically, family and community connections have been a significant 
source of cultural capital for white worker-actor men in particular, allowing them to 
access better-paying and more stable work.  Personalizing this system through the 
example of a (white) father wishing to pass his trade on to his son framed it in the most 
sympathetic and innocuous terms possible. 
The new liberalism’s critics also contended that race-based preferences for 
college admission placed white working class students at an unfair disadvantage. They 
too faced obstacles that professional-class whites did not face, in this view, but did not 
receive recognition or dispensation for them.  The 1980s and 1990s in particular saw a 
number of calls from both progressives and conservatives to increase class-based 
affirmative action measures.  Significantly, these arguments often came in the context of 
staunch opposition to race-based affirmative action.  Toward the end of a polemical 1979 
article identifying race-based affirmative action as unlawful racial discrimination, then-
University of Chicago professor Antonin Scalia emphasized his support for preferential 
measures for the “poor and disadvantaged”: “I am not willing to prefer the son of a 
prosperous and well-educated black doctor or lawyer—solely because of his race—to the 
son of a recent refugee from Eastern Europe who is working as a manual laborer to get 
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his family ahead.”657  This frequent device also appears, for instance, in Dinesh 
D’Souza’s 1991 book Illiberal Education, which compares “a black or Hispanic doctor’s 
son, who has enjoyed the advantages of comfort and affluence” to “the daughter of an 
Appalachian coal miner.”658  These arguments reflect an either-or, zero-sum frame 
consistently present on issues of race and class in this period.  The objective for a Scalia 
or D’Souza was not so much to call for more preferences for all disadvantaged 
applicants—affirmative action on the basis of class and race—as to undermine the claim 
that affirmative action programs should benefit prospective students of color, regardless 
of class. 
Criticism of affirmative action also provides further evidence of the consistent 
slippage between “white working class” and white working class men.  In order for the 
claim that affirmative action was harmful to the white working class to make sense, the 
benefits white worker-actor women drew from it had to go unmentioned.  Frederick 
Lynch, a conservative intellectual who helped to popularize the concept of “reverse 
discrimination,” derided new liberal understandings of power and disadvantage as a “a 
colorized version of Marx’s class struggle,” in which “white men (regardless of 
individual backgrounds) are regarded as a privileged modern-day ‘bourgeoisie,’ while 
women and people of color…are the oppressed ‘proletariat.’ Any mention of a white 
working class—once prominently represented in labor histories—is simply met with 
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more rationalizations or with awkward silence.”659  In this formulation, “white working 
class” and “white men” seem to be synonymous; “women” are a distinct group.  (Lynch’s 
reference to a white working class “once prominently represented in labor histories” is 
also suggestive—the fact that liberals had once been greatly invested in the welfare of a 
group they now derided, critics often noted, was further evidence that the new liberalism 
had lost its way.) 
Welfare and the white working class 
In the Trump era, there has been considerable attention paid to white working 
class people who depend on welfare and disability to support themselves.  Those working 
class white people who are in the labor force, some have suggested, are not angered only 
by distant others of color; their anti-government sentiment stems from direct experiences 
with whites in their community whom they perceive as undeserving and irresponsible.  
That hypothesis is mostly absent in late twentieth century discourse on welfare, which 
hewed almost universally to a black welfare recipient/white taxpayer binary.660  Since the 
mid-1960s, the dominant understanding in elite discourse had framed poverty and 
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government poverty programming as concentrated among African Americans in Northern 
cities.661  (“Welfare” in this context means Aid to Families with Dependent Children, or 
AFDC, the much-stigmatized program that provided cash assistance to low-income 
parents and was ended after Congress passed welfare reform in 1996.)  The chief 
objection to status quo welfare policy held that it incentivized immoral and irresponsible 
behavior (children born out of wedlock, single-parent families, drug use, criminal 
activity, able-bodied adults dropping out of the labor force) and allowed that behavior to 
continue indefinitely. Longstanding anti-black racist tropes were the central component 
of anti-welfare discourse.  The white working class, though, often played a supporting 
symbolic role. 
For contemporary elites, working class whites were deeply angered by welfare 
because they themselves worked hard for modest rewards, paid taxes, and did not take 
welfare.  What they had, they had earned themselves, in this framework.  For journalist 
Pete Hamill, “the working class earns its living with its hands or its backs; its members 
do not exist on welfare payments…Taxes and the rising cost of living keep [the working 
class white man] broke, and he sees nothing in return for the taxes he pays.”662  “Working 
class” people, sociologist Lillian Rubin wrote, were mainly “steady workers living in 
stable families; most of them asking nothing and getting nothing from the government 
programs that give welfare to the rich and the poor.”663 For critics of the new liberalism, 
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“work” above all defined the political identity of middle-income white workers.  Pollsters 
called them “working Americans,” the “working middle class,” or “the people who 
work.”  The concept of “work” was so heavily racialized that any individual associated 
with “work,” “working,” or “hard work” was assumed to be nonblack. 
The central villain in anti-welfare discourse was the black welfare recipient who 
took advantage of government largesse to live a luxurious lifestyle.  This figure was often 
opposed to a white worker.  One strident 1991 book included a sympathetic portrayal of a 
white public school teacher infuriated by her experience teaching in a predominantly 
African American school: “I would see the kids, whose families were on AFDC, walking 
around in designer jeans, silk shirts, alligator shoes. And I’m breaking my buns.”664  In 
national politics, Ronald Reagan provided the two most famous examples of the 
exploitative welfare recipient trope. During his 1976 presidential campaign, he featured 
in his stump speech the story of a Chicago “welfare queen” with “eighty names, thirty 
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addresses, twelve Social Security cards…She’s on Medicaid, getting food stamps, 
and…collecting welfare under each of her names.  Her tax-free cash income is over 
$150,000.” In another recurring story, he framed the food stamp program as enabling 
“some young fellow ahead of you to buy T-bone steak” while “you were standing in a 
checkout line with your package of hamburger.”665 
All of these anecdotes work by opposing mythic welfare privilege to real class 
disadvantage. In this framework, the injustice done to the white worker is twofold—
moral and economic.  Most simply, the white worker faces financial hardship as a direct 
result of shouldering the tax burden for welfare programming.  New Right activist Bob 
Whitaker riffed on the Marxian concept of “exploitation” in framing “today’s worker” as 
“exploited more by the welfare class than by the upper class.”666  More broadly, though, 
the framework turns on an understanding of morally right and morally wrong responses 
to economic hardship.  The proper response is to work hard (“breaking my buns”) and be 
disciplined in one’s spending (buying hamburger rather than T-bone steak).  The 
improper response is to exploit the system and spend extravagantly (“designer jeans, silk 
shirts, alligator shoes”).  For government to encourage immoral behavior is hurtful to 
those who follow the proper behavior, in this view. A journalistic profile of one voter 
framed the welfare system as “an insult to her parents’ work ethic.”667 For the “middle 
class,” Stan Greenberg argued, “the government’s sending its money to the undeserving 
was just a slap in the face.”  This language of physical harm (“slap in the face”) is 
suggestive; the “middle class,” in this framework, experiences a visceral wounding 
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because it perceives that its virtue and hard work go unrecognized and unrewarded by the 
wider society.  Work, in this context, is not just any remunerative employment.  It is hard, 
physical, boring, dangerous, low-paid.  The fact that a person continues to work despite 
limited material rewards is proof of virtue and perseverance.  Critics of the new 
liberalism placed the focus not on the causes of precarity but on the distinction between 
“deserving” and “undeserving” workers. 
Running through discourse on welfare, affirmative action, and the white working 
class are large and contentious questions about privilege, suffering, and restitution.  For 
critics of the new liberalism, liberals understood privilege and disadvantage in a way that 
elided the experience of white workers.  The white coal miner’s daughter D’Souza 
opposed to the black doctor’s son; the worker with nothing but his trade to pass on to his 
sons; the worker standing in line to buy hamburger instead of T-bone steak—for the new 
liberalism’s critics, these figures suggested that efforts to redress historic inequalities 
based on race and gender directly victimized struggling whites who had not derived much 
privilege from the existing system. 
 
Conclusion 
 One of the highest-profile speeches of the 2008 election cycle was Barack 
Obama’s “A More Perfect Union,” delivered in Philadelphia in March 2008.  “A More 
Perfect Union” was a major address on race in America, written as controversy around 
incendiary sermons given by Obama’s former pastor Jeremiah Wright threatened to derail 
his candidacy.  In one of the central devices in the speech, Obama describes in parallel 
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terms the anger and resentment held by both blacks and whites and typically only 
expressed in private; in each case, he suggests, the resentments are legitimate but 
ultimately limiting and counterproductive.  The primary argument in Obama’s discussion 
of white resentment reads as follows: 
Most working- and middle-class white Americans don’t feel that they’ve been 
particularly privileged by their race. Their experience is the immigrant 
experience—as far as they’re concerned, no one handed them anything; they’ve 
built it from scratch. They’ve worked hard all their lives—many times only to see 
their jobs shipped overseas or their pensions dumped after a lifetime of labor. 
They’re anxious about their futures, and they feel their dreams slipping away, and 
in an era of stagnant wages and global competition, opportunity comes to be seen 
as a zero-sum game, in which your dreams come at my expense. So when they are 
told to bus their children to a school across town; when they hear an African 
American is getting an advantage in landing a good job or a spot in a good college 
because of an injustice that they themselves never committed; when they’re told 
that their fears about crime in urban neighborhoods are somehow prejudice, 
resentment builds over time.668 
 
Most immediately, the speech suggests Obama’s familiarity with the discourse outlined 
in this chapter.  More broadly, it suggests the major imprint that the critique of the new 
liberalism’s treatment of the white working class continued to exert decades later.  
Busing had not been a major national political issue since the 1980s.  The 2000s saw 
considerably less emphasis than earlier decades on ethnic whites’ immigrant history.  
However, when the politician who would become the first African American president 
sought to frame “the resentments of white Americans” as “grounded in legitimate 
concerns,” he turned to these former mainstays. 
 In this speech, as he has elsewhere, Obama made the standard progressive 
argument that white working class anger is mistakenly focused towards people of color 
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rather than corporate elites (“justified, but just misdirected,” as phrased in a more recent 
interview).  Exploited by conservative politicians, he argued in the Philadelphia speech, 
“these white resentments distracted attention from the real culprits of the middle-class 
squeeze,” including “a Washington dominated by lobbyists and special interests” and 
“economic policies that favor the few over the many.”  The history detailed in this 
chapter suggests that the problem of misdirection (“distract[ing] attention from the real 
culprits”) is not only a product of white worker-actor racism and nativism and the 
conservative elites who exploited it.  It is deeply embedded in a longstanding elite-level 
critique of the new liberalism’s relationship to the white working class. 
 First, perhaps the most significant recurring pattern in this discourse centers on 
political actors deploying white disadvantage to undercut claims made by or on behalf of 
marginalized groups. Arguments against race-based affirmative action programs 
identified them as unfair to working class white students.  Because professional-class 
women benefited more than working class women from efforts to bring about workplace 
equality, in this framework, those efforts were actively harmful to non-elite women.  
Cash welfare for low-income parents was unjust because those with slightly higher 
incomes struggled to make a good living working full time. 
Second, while (white) working class disadvantage was very prominent in this 
discourse, there was considerably less focus on its causes.  Employers and workplace 
issues rarely appeared.  In anti-welfare discourse, taxes were more prominent than wages 
as a source of financial hardship.  In some cases, the de-emphasis of workplace issues 
reflects the belief that unionized (white) workers no longer faced significant injustice at 
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work—it was at home and in the neighborhood where they had no agency.  In other cases 
(as with socially conservative critics of the feminist movement), critics implied that blue-
collar workers could not expect to find agency or fulfillment at work, so home life was 
most important to them. 
 Ultimately, though, it is essential to stress that all the common arguments 
positioning working class whites as victims of liberalism play on real disadvantage.  Not 
all whites were (or are) uniformly powerful.  European immigrants faced discrimination 
and greater class disadvantage than native-born whites.  Lower-income white students 
faced disadvantages in accessing elite colleges.  Working class Americans of all 
backgrounds worked long hours at multiple jobs and wound up with incomes marginally 
higher than the poverty level.  The challenge for progressives is to mainstream a 
framework for talking about these issues that does not invoke resentment of “identity 
politics,” welfare, or the attention paid to other people’s pain. 
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Concluding Chapter 
 In a 2015 piece framing “America’s white working class” as “a dying breed,” 
Washington Post columnist Harold Meyerson recalled “a time when the white working 
class was the subject of happier tales.” The “white worker of the mid-20th century was 
the protagonist of the American saga,” he reminded readers.  White working class people 
“were the linchpin of the New Deal coalition” and made up “the world’s most affluent 
and economically secure working class from the 1950s through the 1970s.”  It was in 
more recent decades that the story of the white working class had “grown relentlessly 
grimmer,” with Donald Trump’s candidacy the ultimate manifestation of its sense of 
“abandonment, betrayal, and misdirected rage.”669 
During and after the 2016 election, the white working class has once again moved 
to the center of the elite political imagination.  The reason is straightforward: for most 
professional political observers, especially those who lean liberal, Donald Trump’s 
success was a shock.  Because it ran counter to nearly all the conventional wisdom 
guiding political analysis, Trump’s rise prompted urgent elite efforts to understand and 
portray the motivations of his voters.  Those efforts have focused heavily on the white 
working class—a group once numerous, valued, and strong, for Meyerson and many 
others, but now bitter and marginal.  As this dissertation has stressed, elite engagement 
with the white working class as a social and cultural category has a history that is 
important to understand for its own sake.  White working class representation in the post-
Trump era provides further evidence for that claim. 
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This concluding chapter is divided into two parts.  The first follows the approach 
of a conventional conclusion, summarizing the major findings of the study and the major 
threads running through the narrative.  Placing issues of mediation and representation at 
the center of analysis opens up new ground for the study of white working class politics, 
this project has argued, and calls attention to the importance of understanding the white 
working class as a political symbol in the context of elite-level politics.  Part Two 
integrates points of emphasis from the study with new material in order to more directly 
address white working class representation in the era of Trump.  Both Trump supporters 
and Trump opponents are recognizably part of a pattern that has recurred consistently 
since the 1960s, in which the white working class represents rightful (for some) or 
illegitimate (for others) opposition to liberal values.  Important distinctions are apparent, 
however: trade, immigration, and globalization have changed elite perceptions of white 
working class grievances in important ways; the economic nationalism Trump has 
mainstreamed leverages the white working class against establishment Republicans as 
well as liberals; demographic change and the experience of the Obama presidency have 
altered how Democrats view the political importance of the white working class.  
 
I. Summary of Analysis 
 The dominant approach in existing literature on white working class politics 
focuses on understanding the culture, identity, or political views of the white working 
class, too often understood as a homogenous group.  This project has sought to intervene 
in existing literature by stressing themes of representation and mediation: how elites have 
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studied and talked about the white working class, especially through the news media, and 
why that work has mattered.  It retells a familiar historical narrative, the rise and fall of 
New Deal liberalism, putting the representation of the white working class at the center 
of the analysis. 
The white working class as a foil 
This dissertation has stressed the importance of analyzing claims made about 
white workers in relation to the intellectual influences and strategic objectives that bear 
on elite political contestation.  Perhaps the clearest takeaway from the project is that, 
crudely put, the white working class as a political symbol is or can be what elites want or 
need it to be in a given period.  The white working class has served as a ready foil or 
symbol for a wide range of political claims on the right, the left, and the center; it has 
been positioned as a champion of progressive and reactionary views, a foil to corporate 
elites and liberal elites. Because the white working class is such a ready foil, the texts 
produced by journalists, pollsters, and others characterizing the politics of white workers 
often say as much, if not more, about the political aims and cultural contexts of their 
authors as they do about the people being studied. 
The significant changes in the symbolic role played by the white working class 
reflect broader shifts in elite public discourse and political contestation.  In the 1930s, 
when the (white) worker appeared as a central symbol of the need for economic reform, 
the Depression exerted a major imprint on elite public discourse, with business leadership 
discredited and Marxian ideas respectable.  In the 1950s, when Cold War-era political 
imperatives encouraged an emphasis on mass prosperity and the superiority of the 
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American economic system, the (white, male) worker predominantly appeared in elite 
public discourse as proof of that system’s success.  The still-powerful image of the 
secure, affluent mid-century (white) worker cannot be understood outside that Cold War 
context, which rendered class politics deeply dangerous and pushed contemporaries 
towards glowing assessments of the economic status quo.  The transition of the (white) 
worker from a predominantly liberal to a predominantly conservative symbol is rooted in 
changing understandings of what these terms meant, as defending a set of moral and 
racial norms once taken for granted by many “liberals” became marked as 
“conservative.” 
The importance of elite public discourse 
This project has sought to stress the importance, for analysis of white working 
class politics, of looking at contestation within media and public discourse.  In particular, 
I have emphasized the dynamics through which competing elites’ claims coexist, 
intersect, and reinforce one another, how the same basic frame can support competing 
claims. That dynamic is particularly evident in the decades after the 1960s, when both 
liberals and conservatives consistently drew on the conservative (white) majority/liberal 
(white) elite frame in their analysis.  It is also evident in the 1950s, when both organized 
labor and organized business emphasized the secure middle-income lifestyles of (white, 
male) workers and their families.  Elites have often held to shared views of the political 
world that cut across conventional ideological distinctions, the chapters suggest. When 
competing elites’ claims have overlapped, alternative understandings of white working 
class politics have gained less visibility. 
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Similarly, in understanding elite-level political discourse about the white working 
class, it matters very much which elites have become broadly recognized as 
representatives of white workers.  Bourdieu’s concept of the spokesperson suggests that a 
non-elite group can only speak in a dominant political space through agents who can 
believably claim to represent it.  Looking at the changing characteristics of elite voices 
understood to be speaking for white workers in national politics provides a useful twist 
on the familiar story of white workers’ turn from liberalism toward conservatism.  The 
history of the American white working class and the history of organized labor in 
America are intertwined in many ways; one noted relatively infrequently is the 
importance of organized labor in speaking for (white) workers in elite public discourse.  
From the mid-1930s to at least the mid-1960s, most elites regarded labor officials as the 
preeminent voices for the group contemporaries called “workers” or “the workingman.”  
Since the 1960s, conservative politicians—especially Richard Nixon, George Wallace, 
Ronald Reagan, and Donald Trump—have taken that role.  In recent decades, unions’ 
influence in elite public discourse has declined substantially, and no left-of-center force 
has replaced them, leaving conservatives relatively uncontested in their claims to speak 
for white workers. 
Speaking about and for unitary groups is a key part of democratic politics; as 
Bourdieu notes, it invests political claims with the power that comes from clarity and 
simplicity. Claims to speak for white workers have been consistently bolstered by the 
specter of essentialism haunting the discourse on white working class politics. Over many 
years, in liberal, left, and conservative writing, journalistic writing and academic writing, 
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there has been a consistent tendency to identify the white working class as a more or less 
homogenous group with uniform political views. During the New Deal era, the tendency 
to view (white) workers as a unitary group helped to obscure their nonliberal views; since 
the 1960s, it has worked to obscure liberal views.  Pointing out the essentialism 
characteristic of elite discourse about white working class people does not mean denying 
the prominence of conservative, anti-liberal, nativist, racist, sexist views within the 
group, and it cannot be an excuse to soft-pedal the consequences of those views.  What is 
needed is a language that recognizes their prominence and power but does not rely on 
rigid understandings of an exceptional white working class to explain them. 
The tensions embedded in a (white, male) working class 
One of the basic tensions in a history of white working class representation 
centers on the conflicting work done by a class category marked as white, and often as 
male.  Dominant views of white working class masculinity and white working class 
femininity have overlapped substantially; both have centered on the home, the close-knit 
family, and distrust of the outside world.  However, white working class women have 
been significantly less central to the discourse than men, and they have often been 
defined within it through their relationship with men—not as workers so much as 
workers’ spouses or daughters. In the midcentury period in which the (white) worker 
stood closest to the symbolic center of society, the triumphalist tenor that marked much 
discussion of labor relations was based on an image of the “worker” as a white male 
breadwinner whose wages allowed his wife to stay at home, while one of the period’s 
prominent studies of (white) working class women was titled Workingman’s Wife.   
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Because white working class-ness has been strongly associated with traditional 
masculinity and femininity, racial grievance, and economic liberalism, the (white) worker 
cannot be read as an unproblematic symbol for either liberals or conservatives.  The 
(white) worker was most prominent as a liberal symbol in a period where the problem of 
industrial modernity—how economic security could be maintained in an industrial 
society—was the central theme in elite public discourse.  For left-of-center 
contemporaries, this problem was by no means unique to or limited to white workers; it 
touched the lives of all Americans, especially the vast majority who lacked power or 
wealth.  However, the dominant liberal understanding of the history of US capitalism 
focused on the predominantly male and European-descended urban industrial workforce, 
without integrating slavery, settler colonialism, or segregation.  Liberals placed the 
(white, male) industrial worker at the center of their vision of society in part because 
urban wage workers exemplified the conditions of instability endemic to the modern age, 
in part because their political economic position accorded them potentially vast economic 
power, and in part because they could be positioned as deserving, ordinary Americans 
who sought the economic gains necessary to achieve normative family life.  The (white) 
worker conveyed the need for change, but also respect for and continuity with past 
American ways. 
In and after the 1960s, increasing numbers of professionals framed what had been 
viewed as normative, middle class American ways of life as narrow and harmful, 
especially for women and children.  That white workers continued to prize those ways of 
life could now be read as a sign of inferiority.  In the same period, white workers were 
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explicitly defined against African Americans, understood as threatened by additional 
change and most concerned with defending the tidy houses and secure middle-income 
lifestyles they had gained since the Depression.  However, even as the white working 
class became a predominant symbol of cultural traditionalism and anti-black backlash, 
the dominant understanding of white working class identity remained grounded in 
economic liberalism. The period in the late 1960s in which the alienation of the white 
working class became a central theme in elite discourse (Chapter 3) saw explicit criticism 
of the economic order rarely seen since the 1940s.  For decades, conventional wisdom 
among conservative political operatives prescribed emphasizing cultural issues and 
minimizing the natural liberal advantage on economics.  As conservatives have gained 
the benefits (electoral and symbolic) of white worker-actors’ votes, they have 
increasingly had to answer for their economic wellbeing—a reckoning made clear in the 
Donald Trump candidacy. 
The thin line between normativity and inferiority 
 Perhaps most of all, the white working class’s utility and flexibility as a political 
symbol can be attributed to the intersection of white and working class, subordinate class 
status and membership in the dominant racial group.  Whiteness conveys a sense of 
power, privilege, normativity, and averageness; working class can convey an underdog 
positioning and a salt-of-the-earth authenticity as well as cultural or intellectual 
inferiority.  Over the period between the 1930s and 1990s, elite representations of the 
white working class have been marked by both normativity and inferiority, with the 
boundaries between the two porous and neither far from view at any given time.  Even as 
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1930s and 1940s leftists placed a great deal of hope in (white) workers as a force for a 
more progressive future, they retained serious concerns about these workers’ 
susceptibility to misinformation and demagoguery.  The striking workers praised by 
leftists were not unique or intellectually gifted; they were numerous, brave, and dedicated 
to their cause.  In the post-civil rights era, as Chapters 3 and 4 argued, the same basic 
understanding of the politics and culture of Middle America can support inflections 
appealing to multiple political perspectives—an anxious, narrow-minded majority 
holding back needed change; a majority committed to rightful traditions abandoned by a 
misguided elite.  Ordinariness and majority status invite everything from praise to 
condemnation to indifference, depending on the context. 
This thin line between normativity and inferiority continues to be apparent in 
post-Trump white working class representation.  Trump’s praise for white working class 
people as America’s best citizens is profoundly patronizing (“I love the poorly 
educated”…“the smart, smart, smart people that don’t have the big education”).  
Meanwhile, condescension is often embedded in calls for liberals to stop condescending 
to the white working class.  For Joan Williams, a law professor whose 2017 book White 
Working Class is dedicated to combatting “class cluelessness in America,” “many habits 
of the professional elite—from artisanal religion to a life of self-actualization—require a 
college education. America doesn’t provide that, so we need to take the working class as 
we find them…Many of our truths just don’t make sense in the context of their lives.”670  
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The claim that “a life of self-actualization” is only possible with a college education is a 
particularly egregious manifestation of “class cluelessness.” 
Recent elite analysis of the white working class—like Williams’, for instance—is 
generally marked by a sense of immediacy, of scoping out an uncharted political world.  
However, many of the patterns evident in the post-Trump period (the period beginning in 
late 2015 when it became clear that Trump had a real chance to win the Republican 
nomination) are evident in the history of white working class representation from the 
1930s to the 1990s.  It is important to understand the rise of Trump and the conversations 
around it in that context. 
 
II. Situating the Trump Voter 
Throughout Donald Trump’s 2016 campaign and presidency, the dominant elite-
level view has understood support for Trump as concentrated within the white working 
class. The least nuanced versions of the argument have implicated a homogenous white 
working class viscerally drawn to Trump’s rhetoric and willing to follow him anywhere. 
More nuanced versions (relatively speaking) have understood alienated white working 
class people as his core supporters, those most moved by his campaign. “At the core of 
Donald Trump’s political success this year are the grievances of a sizable and now vocal 
block of disaffected voters, many of them white and working-class,” Dan Balz of the 
Washington Post wrote in March of 2016.  For Balz, Trump “and so-called Trumpism 
represent an amalgam of long-festering economic, cultural and racial dissatisfaction 
among a swath of left-out Americans who do not fit easily into the ideological 
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pigeonholes of red and blue, right and left.”671 For a Columbia Journalism Review 
contributor writing shortly after the 2016 election, “the revolt of the white working class 
that ushered in the Age of Trump” was “the biggest political story of our lifetimes.”672 
Elite public discourse of the period has evinced an intense interest in intellectual 
work portraying the pain of the white working class.  Perhaps the highest-profile account 
of white rural poverty in the post-Trump period, J.D. Vance’s Hillbilly Elegy, has been 
optioned for a Hollywood movie, with Ron Howard attached to direct.  Journalistic 
portrayals of Trump voters, especially white working class people living in depressed 
small cities and towns, appeared consistently throughout Trump’s candidacy.  The 
pervasiveness of the genre is aptly captured in a Washington Post contributor’s parody of 
“the flood of journalists who went to Real America to see how the Trump supporters are 
getting along”: “In the shadow of the old flag factory, Craig Slabornik sits whittling away 
on a rusty nail, his only hobby since the plant shut down…Lydia Borkle lives in an old 
shoe in the tiny town of Tempe Work Only, Ariz., where the factory has just rusted away 
into a pile of gears and dust.”673 Journalistic explorations of white working class Trump 
supporters do conflicting work—they suggest that journalists and elites are bound by 
their professional and democratic duty to sympathetically portray Trump voters’ concerns 
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378 
 
(to a degree that they have rarely done with working class voters of color); they imply 
that Trump support and American racism live in spaces utterly foreign to professional-
class urbanites. 
Attributing Trump’s rise to a “revolt of the white working class” has been the 
clear dominant interpretation throughout the period.  However, several studies and 
multiple articles in political media have pushed back on this argument. A fivethirtyeight 
analysis of exit polling in Republican primaries found that Trump supporters had a 
median income of $72,000, above the national median income of $56,000 and the figure 
for Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders voters (around $61,000).674 Two Gallup 
researchers (drawing on data from roughly 125,000 Gallup interviews) found a mean 
household income of $81,898 for voters viewing Trump favorably and $77,046 for those 
who did not.  In this study, higher incomes predicted support for Trump even among non-
Hispanic whites; education and occupation-based variables were more supportive of the 
conventional wisdom, with workers in skilled blue-collar occupations more likely to 
favor Trump and college-educated voters and professionals less likely.675  According to 
Edison Research general election exit polling, Trump won nearly every subcategory of 
white voters: 62% of white men (+31% over Clinton), 52% of white women (+9), 48% of 
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whites with a college degree (+3; Trump was +14 among men in this category and -7 
among women), and 66% of whites without a college degree (+37).676  These results are 
consistent with the existing quantitative literature on white working class politics, in 
which income consistently shows the most liberal “white working class” and education 
the most conservative. 
The clearest takeaway from this data is that attributing Trump’s rise to the white 
working class is at best an incomplete interpretation.  Certainly some evidence supports 
the conventional wisdom.  Democrats did somewhat better among whites with a college 
degree than they generally have, while Trump outperformed his recent predecessors 
among whites without a college degree.677  Though nonvoters and the minority of voters 
who opposed him should not be overlooked, by any reasonable measure, the majority of 
white working class voter-actors who voted in the 2016 election voted for Trump.  
However, in the case of Trump (as it does more generally), the frame of white working 
class exceptionalism works to obscure the continuity and consistency of whites’ attitudes 
across the sociocultural distinctions so often emphasized in elite public discourse.  Trump 
enjoyed broad-based support among white voters across income groups, regions, and 
educational categories. Any argument that Trump was the choice of “working class,” 
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“lower-income” or “struggling” Americans requires excluding all nonwhite voters from 
those categories; even when analysis is confined to whites, it is not clear that his voters 
struggled more economically or suffered more from deindustrialization. 
The key question, then, is why the “white working class revolt” frame remains 
dominant even though easily available data undermines or nuances it.  Many of the 
reasons are deeply rooted in a longer history of white working class representation: sixty 
years of similar constructions of the white working class have left a heavy imprint on 
elite-level political analysis; many of the people attending Trump rallies manifested in 
their speech, dress, and self-presentation what professionals easily identify as low 
cultural taste; racialized and gendered understandings of class identify as typical 
“workers” those working class people most likely to support Trump, white men.  From a 
more present-oriented perspective, the dominant elite-level view of the Trump voter can 
be usefully understood (drawing on the elite consensus frame developed in Chapters 3 
and 4) by looking at the intersection of conservative claims on behalf of white workers 
and liberal efforts to understand and respond to Trumpism.  Trump has placed the white 
working class at the symbolic center of his appeal to a degree not seen in decades, 
adopting an oppositional, underdog positioning that differs significantly from 
conventional conservatism.  Liberals differ most substantially on whether or not they can 
or should work to win the white working class back to their side; much as they did in the 
1960s and after, liberals have found populist conservatives’ claims to speak for white 
workers persuasive. 
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Conservatives and the white working class in the Trump era 
The ideology that has come to be called “Trumpism” differs from recent 
conventional Republican and conservative politics in its pessimistic tenor, the 
oppositional posture it takes towards establishment Republicans as well as liberals, and 
its emphasis on nationalist over libertarian principles. Crucial in all of these respects is 
the central symbolic position it accords to the “American worker,” the “working class,” 
and the “middle class”—all ostensibly race-neutral terms consistently used (as this study 
and others stress) to describe blue-collar whites. 
Since at least the Reagan presidency, white working class voters have made up an 
increasing share of the Republican base, but Republicans and conservatives have seldom 
placed (white) workers at the center of their economic vision of America.  To be sure, 
some conservatives have pushed back on messaging that comes across to non-elite 
Americans as exclusive; some have also contended that the party elite’s favored 
economic policies skew to the wealthy.  Since 2000, Tim Pawlenty has championed 
“Sam’s Club” (as opposed to “country club”) Republicans; Rick Santorum, Mike 
Huckabee, and columnists Ross Douthat & Reihan Salam have called for conservative 
policy geared more explicitly around the needs of the white working class.678  The 1990s 
saw considerable opposition in elite-level politics to the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) and trade liberalization generally.  Opponents—ranging from the 
AFL-CIO and labor-liberal legislators to dissident conservatives like Ross Perot and Pat 
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Buchanan—argued that free trade advantaged corporations and highly educated workers 
but harmed less skilled workers, further incentivizing corporations to disinvest in 
domestic production and move domestic manufacturing jobs to low-wage countries.  The 
most obvious forerunner to Trump at the presidential level is Buchanan, a longtime 
political commentator and former Nixon and Reagan aide who ran for president in 1992, 
1996, and 2000.  Buchanan’s runs paired hardline cultural conservatism with an emphasis 
on “looking out for America first”; like Trump, he emphasized the suffering of displaced 
(white) workers, the “forgotten men and women who work in the forges and factories and 
plants and businesses” of the nation.679  
Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, however, the dominant view in both major 
parties—advocated by Bill Clinton, Barack Obama, both Bushes, Alan Greenspan, and 
nearly every White House economic advisor—held that trade liberalization was good for 
the country.  More measured arguments generally stressed that globalization was an 
inexorable force and that the United States would fare worse by disengaging with the 
world; the new economy would disrupt industries and disadvantage some workers, but 
the majority would benefit from cheaper goods made possible by imports and job 
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opportunities made possible by exports.  Less measured arguments recalled the 
triumphalism of the post-World War II period in suggesting that the new economy 
promised near-universal gains.  Generally, when white workers have appeared as a 
central political symbol for conservatives since the Reagan era, they have been positioned 
within a broadly drawn cultural mainstream—“Middle America,” “real America,” or 
Sarah Palin’s “small town America”—identified as the moral core of the nation.  These 
tropes imply authenticity and superiority over coastal liberals, but not a sense of 
economic dislocation. The dismal view of modern America central to the 2016 Trump 
campaign presented a deep disjuncture from conventional politics in both major parties. 
The nationalist/populist conservatism advocated by the strategists and 
intellectuals gathered around Trump is distinctive in part because it centers an 
unambiguously white working class more explicitly than any dominant ideology in recent 
American politics.  In the narrative of recent history that undergirded Trump’s 2016 
campaign, particularly as put forward by former Trump administration chief strategist 
Steve Bannon, the position of the (white) working class exemplifies what has gone wrong 
in America in recent decades.  Power has been held by an economic elite—represented in 
the establishments of both major parties—unconcerned with the wellbeing of fellow 
citizens and entirely disconnected from life as lived by the majority.  Deindustrialization, 
in Trumpism’s narrative of recent American history, is most emblematic of the deep 
injustice that resulted.  “One by one, the factories shuttered and left our shores, with not 
even a thought about the millions upon millions of American workers left behind,” 
Trump stated in his inaugural address.  “The wealth of our middle class has been ripped 
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from their homes and then redistributed across the entire world.”680  For Bannon, the way 
“the industrial base in this country has been eviscerated” amounts to “an economic hate 
crime on the working class people in this country,” perpetrated by and for the benefit of 
“the elites in the ascendant economy in Silicon Valley, Wall Street, Hollywood, and 
Washington, DC.”681 
The economic nationalism Trump has mainstreamed champions white workers in 
a way that blurs the economics/culture binary central to elite analysis of white working 
class politics since the 1960s.  In a longstanding analysis shared by figures from Richard 
Nixon to Thomas Frank, conservatives win when they convince white working class 
voters to put their cultural grievances above their economic interests, and liberals win 
when they bring economic issues to the forefront.  This conventional model does not 
apply when, as advocates of Trumpism argue, the dominant liberal and conservative 
politics are intertwined and have both consigned America’s most deserving citizens to 
economic and cultural marginalization.  Put differently, anti-libertarian and nativist 
elements are both central to Trumpism, and they are inseparable. 
First, central to economic nationalism’s critique of libertarianism is the stress it 
places on the importance of national identity and borders.  In Buchanan’s framework, 
“the country comes before the economy, and the economy exists for the people…In the 
proper hierarchy of things, it is the market that must be harnessed to work for man and 
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not the other way around.”682 The argument here is not simply that an economy exists to 
serve human needs, but that libertarianism subordinates cultural cohesion and identity to 
the dictates of the market.  Globalization and immigration harm the economic prospects 
of native-born workers, in this view; they also introduce difference and hybridity into the 
nation, which only functions as it should in a climate of cultural homogeneity.  For 
Buchanan, “A nation is more than a consumer cooperative; it is a people, separate and 
apart, with its own destiny and history, language and faith, institutions and culture.”683  
Similarly, for Steve Bannon, “A country is more than an economy. We’re a civic 
society”…“We are a nation with a culture…and a reason for being.”684 
Economic nationalism appeals to white supremacists because it valorizes 
homogenous constructions of identity and culture defined against a corrupt 
internationalism. Many of its advocates have expressed explicit concern about threats 
posed to American identity and sovereignty by the shrinking of the white majority and 
Latin American immigration; discussions of shadowy networks of “globalist” 
international elites evoke longstanding anti-Semitic tropes.685 Crucially, though, 
economic nationalism also draws respectability from the basic democratic or populist 
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frame stressing that the needs of the “people” come before the needs of elites.  The claim 
that “the economy exists for the people” has been the basis of liberal argumentation for 
decades (the tension, obviously, lies in how “the people” are understood), and some 
liberals have interpreted Trump’s victory as a repudiation of neoliberalism and a 
vindication of their own views.  Part of the danger and power of populism lies in that 
tension—because the underdog-populist frame is so flexible and familiar, it offers white 
nationalists and their apologists an opportunity to mainstream their claims. In a striking 
and now-infamous article dedicated to introducing “establishment conservative[s]” to the 
alt-right, Milo Yiannopoulos and his co-author frame alt-right thought (in which “culture, 
not economic efficiency, is the paramount value”), as a useful and legitimate corrective to 
conservatism chiefly focused on open markets and economic growth.686  Nativist or anti-
immigrant claims are typically framed in a way that emphasizes the victimization of 
vulnerable native-born Americans.  In a prominent narrative on the right, capitalists 
seeking cheap labor and liberal politicians seeking easy votes pursue a loose immigration 
policy at the expense of lower-skilled native-born workers, who face fewer job 
opportunities and depressed wages as a result.687 
Second, in economic nationalist discourse, the same complex of elites is held 
responsible for both the economic and the cultural dislocation suffered by (white) 
workers.  The economics/culture binary depends on an opposition between 
liberal/cultural (journalists, professors) and conservative/economic elites (Wall Street and 
                                                           
686 Allum Bokhari and Milo Yiannopoulos, “An Establishment Conservative’s Guide to the Alt-Right,” 
Breitbart, March 29, 2016. 
687 Publius Decius Mus, “The Flight 93 Election,” September 5, 2016, 
http://www.claremont.org/crb/basicpage/the-flight-93-election/. 
387 
 
employers).  That opposition has blurred, however, as constructions of the economic elite 
shift toward a more urban, cosmopolitan, global-oriented image.  In a 1996 article, 
conservative columnist Samuel Francis argued that globalization would render 
conventional distinctions between “right” and “left” irrelevant.  “The fundamental 
polarity in American politics and culture today,” Francis claimed, pitted “a deracinated 
and self-serving Ruling Class” against “Middle American groups…constituting both the 
economic core of the nation through their labor and productive skills as well as the 
culturally defining core that sustains the identity of the nation itself.” As corporations 
disinvested in rural America, moved manufacturing overseas, and did business across 
borders, rootedness in the local community and the nation became a threat, in this view; 
the “economic interests as well as the cultural habits and ideologies of the Ruling Class 
drive it toward globalization—the managed destruction of the nation, its sovereignty, its 
culture, and its people.”688  These elites—for Bannon, “people in New York that feel 
closer to people in London and in Berlin than they do to people in Kansas and in 
Colorado”—have no sense of social responsibility or affinity with the nation and its non-
elite citizens.689 
The blurring of the economic and cultural elite also manifests in the argument that 
conventional distinctions between Republican and Democratic politicians are 
unimportant when all have interests tied up in the same insiders’ game. The 
mainstreaming of this view poses a serious challenge for Republicans identified with the 
“establishment.”  In an emerging frame, populist conservative outsiders seek real reform 
                                                           
688 Samuel Francis, “From Household to Nation,” Chronicles, March 1996. 
689 Gwynn Guilford and Nikhil Sonnad, “What Steve Bannon Really Wants,” Quartz, February 3, 2017. 
388 
 
on behalf of the struggling (white) working class, while the party establishment is 
beholden to the Republican donor class and the interests of the Washington, D.C. 
“swamp.” Steve Bannon, campaigning for the populist primary challenger of a sitting 
Alabama Republican senator, framed the race as a test of “who is sovereign—the people 
or the money.”  “They think you’re a pack of morons,” he told an Alabama audience.  
“They think you’re nothing but rubes. They have no interest at all in what you have to 
say, what you have to think or what you want to do.”690  Alabama, of course, is the home 
state of Bannon’s forerunner George Wallace, whose stump speeches consistently 
stressed the disdain elites held for his supporters: “They have looked down their noses at 
the average man on the street too long”…“They look down their noses and call us pea 
pickers and peckerwoods and lint heads and rednecks”…“Your thoughts are just as good 
as theirs.”691  By “they,” Wallace meant liberals, intellectuals, “pointy-headed 
professors”; Bannon meant Republicans as well. 
*** 
Republicans and conservatives who support Trump gain from the perception that 
they represent the (white) working class, the “American worker,” the “forgotten people.”  
Like generations of conservatives before them, they can claim to represent an underdog 
group against an elite. That benefit comes at the cost of being repeatedly forced to defend 
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themselves against charges of racism (at least for those who do not welcome those 
charges) and of enabling an unqualified misogynist and bigot.  For many of the elites who 
oppose Trump, framing his rise as a “revolt of the white working class” makes strategic 
sense as well.  Populist liberals who hope to see fundamental economic reform point to 
Trump’s victory as evidence that the electorate has rejected the power structure, that 
white working class voters will choose liberal populism if Democrats offer it.  Other 
liberals see Trump as evidence that Democrats should devote their resources to more 
progressive constituencies, voters of color and college-educated whites; in this view, 
efforts to regain white workers will push the party to the right, not the left.  In the present 
day, as has generally been the case for many years, prevailing symbolic constructions of 
the white working class are problematic and disadvantageous for liberals. 
 
Liberals and the white working class in the Trump era 
Among liberals, two predominant lines of argumentation emerged to explain 
Trump’s victory.  Distilled into a few words, they centered on neoliberalism and white 
supremacy, respectively.  Many observers integrated the two into one narrative, in which 
economic deprivation and racial/cultural grievance were interlocking forces driving white 
workers (especially in depressed rural areas) to Trump.  Consistently, though, 
racism/sexism and “economic anxiety” (a phrase so common one columnist described 
Trump voters as “Economically Anxious™”692) were framed as competing explanations.  
From one perspective, Trump’s white working class supporters were primarily motivated 
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by legitimate anger at Wall Street, the political establishment, and the trade deals that had 
gutted their communities.  “Millions of Americans registered a protest vote…expressing 
their fierce opposition to an economic and political system that puts wealthy and 
corporate interests over their own,” Vermont senator Bernie Sanders contended.  Trump 
“won the White House because his campaign rhetoric successfully tapped into a very real 
and justified anger.”693  Other liberals criticized this perspective for overlooking or 
excusing the rank bigotry that had undergirded Trump’s rise.  Trump supporters were 
certainly angry, in this second view, but their anger was not legitimate and should not be 
legitimated.  For Salon’s Amanda Marcotte: “The Trump revolution was driven by white 
men who are watching women and people of color making gains that put them closer to 
equality. They are rebelling at the erosion of the sense that white men are better and more 
important than everyone else, simply because they exist.”694 
Conflicting views of Trump voters’ motivations have shaped liberals’ arguments 
about how best to move forward in the aftermath of Trump’s victory.  Some have 
advocated bringing the white working class closer to the liberal vision of America; others 
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have advocated the opposite.  The debate liberals have had in the wake of the 2016 
election can be understood as the latest manifestation of a recurring debate they have 
been having since the late 1960s: how to address what Chapter 3 called the “problem of 
the white working class,” the political challenges posed by white working class voters’ 
support for race-baiting conservative candidates.  Since the late 1960s, liberals have put 
forward three basic prescriptions: 1) move to the left on economic issues, 2) move to the 
center/right on cultural issues, or 3) build the coalition around groups other than the white 
working class.  The developments of the last ten years have seen an increase in the 
influence of arguments #1 and #3 and a decrease in the influence of #2. 
The primary path advocated by Bill Clinton and the New Democratic movement 
(#2) centered on tempering the party’s association with cultural liberalism, “big 
government,” and “special interests”—feminists, African Americans, LGBTQ people—in 
order to regain the alienated white voters key to any conceivable electoral majority.695  
Through the 1990s, this approach was dominant in the party, credited by its advocates for 
Clinton’s 1992 and 1996 victories.  In recent years, however, Black Lives Matter, 
Occupy Wall Street, and other liberals and leftists have been heavily critical of many of 
the signature achievements once touted by the Clinton administration, particularly 
NAFTA, Wall Street deregulation, welfare reform, and punitive criminal justice policy.  
New Democrats’ influence within the party has dwindled significantly. Notably, 
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advocates of both of the predominant post-Trump responses to the problem of the white 
working class define themselves against the Clinton years.696 
#1: Move left on economic issues 
In one perspective prominent in post-Trump analysis, Democrats can succeed 
with white working class voters (and other non-elite voters as well) by developing a 
stronger economic program. Some who make this argument assume that what is needed is 
simply a shift in messaging or emphasis, while others have called for a substantial 
departure from existing economic policy.  Particularly in the aftermath of the netroots 
movement, the Great Recession, and Occupy Wall Street, the Democratic Party has seen 
the rise of an increasingly vocal populist left-liberal wing critical of the party’s turn 
towards neoliberalism since the 1970s and calling for serious reform on financial 
regulation, consumer protection, and trade policy.  For these Democrats (most notably 
represented in national politics by Bernie Sanders and Massachusetts senator Elizabeth 
Warren), the Democratic Party’s failure to strongly champion the interests of workers 
against the economic elite is partly to blame for Trump’s rise, and the party must respond 
by changing how it operates.  For Elizabeth Warren, “We should hear the message loud 
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and clear that the American people want Washington to change...The entire electorate 
embraced deep, fundamental reform of our economic system and our political system.”697 
For liberals in this camp, Trump’s victory can be very easily read as vindication.  
This is partly because an outsider candidate promising to upend the system foregrounded 
issues—particularly trade and campaign finance—that these liberals have urged the 
Democratic Party to address for years.  It is important to note, though, that there is a 
degree of overlap in how liberals and populist conservatives have understood the story of 
the white working class in postindustrial America.  Many liberals share with populist 
conservatives a basic frame of decline from a mid-twentieth-century apex, and that 
overlap should encourage some pause and reflection. 
One of the predominant narratives in contemporary liberal politics centers on 
what might be called “the decline of the middle class.”  “From the end of the Great 
Depression to about 1980,” in a typical account, “America built a middle class unlike 
anything known on earth,” with organized labor strong and business guided by a sense of 
social responsibility.  Beginning in the late 1970s, however, economic elites went back 
on the basic bargain they had made with workers.  “Productivity kept going up,” but as 
“corporate executives and stockholders began taking greater shares of the gains,” 
“workers…[were] left behind as wages stagnated.”698   
This narrative situates the insecurity and inequality of the present day against the 
backdrop of a more egalitarian past—most often the world of the midcentury blue-collar 
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middle class.  A recent account of deindustrialization’s impact on Lancaster, a small Ohio 
city heavily dependent on the glass industry, includes this representative treatment: 
People worked hard, but most believed they’d made a fair deal. You could walk 
off the high school graduation stage on Saturday and walk into a plant on 
Monday, where you could stay for the next forty years.  The company would 
make you a mechanic, a millwright, an electrician, a machine operator, a mold 
maker, a salesman. You’d do bone-wearying work, but there were the perks, too, 
like the company softball, baseball, golf, and bowling teams; the company choir 
and drama clubs; the insurance and pension.  You’d never get rich, and you’d 
bitch about management and fat cats, but you could buy a little house on the west 
side, then maybe over on the east side or out in the country, and maybe a boat to 
fish from on Buckeye Lake. You could get married. You could pay for your kids 
to attend decent state universities.  Best of all, you could stay in the town where 
your kid’s fourth-grade teacher had taught you, too. If you bought in, obeyed the 
rules—spoken and unspoken—paid your taxes, loved your town and your 
country, that was the bargain on offer.699 
 
When elites in the late 1940s and 1950s put forward a similar vision of the good life for 
workers, they saw that lifestyle as evidence that Americans had found an equitable 
resolution to the pressing problems of industrial society.  For present-day liberals, the 
same imagery now serves as a testament to the greed of those who left that equitable 
resolution behind in pursuit of selfish gains. 
It is not difficult to understand the appeal of the “decline of the middle class” 
narrative: it suggests a better America, within living memory, undone by a clearly 
identifiable set of antagonists.  In twenty-first century politics, however, an unmarked 
“middle class” in decline cannot be an unproblematic symbol for liberals.  The 
midcentury period’s growing middle class was built on the back of the New Deal’s 
                                                           
699 Brian Alexander, Glass House: The 1% Economy and the Shattering of the All-American Town (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 2017), 31. 
395 
 
stratified welfare state700, with the “bargain” promised to workers only available to 
whites (to some degree, only white men, and in their case the benefits were often 
overstated, as Chapter 2 argued). The “decline of the middle class” narrative struggles to 
integrate Americans whose families were held out of the middle class, and any declension 
narrative where relative equality erodes after the 1970s inevitably runs up against other 
narratives of twentieth-century America that center women and people of color more 
explicitly.  Nostalgic evocations of the 1950s in particular can suggest many things, often 
simultaneously: common purpose; union strength and respect for workers; relative 
equality; cultural traditionalism, homogeneity, or cohesion; segregation; single-income 
households with breadwinning fathers and stay-at-home mothers; Judeo-Christian values; 
close-knit neighborhoods, well-behaved children, and tidy streets; discreet public 
discourse free of sustained conflict and controversy.  Certainly this history is not lost on 
liberals who invoke the cultural memory of the midcentury period.  It is important, 
though, to grapple with the question of how and to what extent the period can serve as a 
model (and, perhaps simultaneously, a cautionary tale) for twenty-first century politics. 
#3: Leave the white working class in the past 
 At the other end of the spectrum is the view that white working class voters are 
unwinnable for Democrats and liberals.  In this view, white workers’ drift to the right has 
been congealing for decades, and they are opposed to or lukewarm toward crucial liberal 
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values; efforts to pursue them will harm Democrats’ core constituencies, with issues like 
criminal justice reform, abortion rights, and immigration reform tossed aside in the 
pursuit of the Democrats’ white whale, the elusive white swing voter.  Instead, for many 
liberals, Democrats should build their coalition around the “people of color and 
progressive Whites” who “comprised the Obama coalition”701, especially the 
communities of color who make up the staunchest Democratic voters. 
It is important to stress that decentering white workers in the progressive coalition 
has only appeared politically feasible for a short time.  The argument appeared in the late 
1960s and early 1970s among Democrats tied to the New Politics movement but did not 
survive George McGovern’s drubbing at the hands of Nixon in 1972.  Through the mid-
2000s, the dominant view held that Democrats could not win at the national level without 
support from moderate and blue-collar whites.  In the final months of the 2008 
Democratic presidential primaries, Hillary Clinton argued explicitly that she would be a 
stronger nominee than Barack Obama because Obama did not have the necessary support 
among “working, hard-working Americans, white Americans,” by which she meant 
whites without a four-year college degree, the group pollsters call the “white working 
class.”  When the remark proved controversial, Clinton defended herself by referencing 
the conventional wisdom that “these are the people you have to win if you’re a Democrat 
in sufficient numbers to actually win the election. Everybody knows that.”702 
For many liberal observers, the Obama presidency dethroned this truism.  
Although the “Democratic decline among older and blue-collar whites has continued,” 
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journalist Ronald Brownstein argued in 2015, Obama “triumphed twice anyway by 
assembling a more consistently left-leaning coalition centered on millennials, minorities, 
and socially liberal whites, especially college-educated and single women.”703 This 
“Obama coalition,” understood as an outgrowth of fundamental demographic change, has 
also been called the “coalition of the ascendant” or the “rising American electorate”—
meaning its constituencies, unlike the white working class, are growing as a share of the 
broader electorate.  In more measured versions of the argument, the growing percentage 
of voters of color augurs well for Democrats and poorly for Republicans, but Democrats’ 
weaknesses among working class whites will leave them vulnerable in the near future, 
especially at the state and local level. In the least measured versions, Democrats’ 
advantage with “rising” constituencies will simply make them the dominant party. 
In this framework, the white working class often serves as a receding reactionary 
backdrop to emerging, forward-looking groups: “a more highly educated and diverse 
constituency,” “a coalition of transformation…comfortable with demographic and 
cultural change,”704 valuing “multiculturalism,” “inclusion,” and “openness.”  Though 
Trump’s victory put a crimp in the triumphalist tenor of the “coalition of the ascendant” 
narrative (pushing Democrats to recognize that long-term demographic change does not 
prevent short-term catastrophe), it also reinforced an understanding of the white working 
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class as hostile to change, “dreaming of a past that no longer exists.”705  For nearly all 
observers, Trump has only sharpened the cultural divide wracking the country.  As New 
York Times columnist Michelle Goldberg argues: “America is now two countries, eyeing 
each other across a chasm of distrust and contempt.  One is urban, diverse and outward-
looking. This is the America that’s growing. The other is white, provincial and culturally 
revanchist. This is the America that’s in charge.”706 
Concerns about Democrats centering white working class voters are well founded, 
especially given the connection between the pursuit of “Reagan Democrats” and the 
party’s move to the right in the 1980s and 1990s.  The prospect of writing off the white 
working class should also raise concern.  Neoliberal policy can be advocated through the 
language of social conservatism, as in welfare reform; it can also be legitimated through 
the language of multiculturalism, diversity, and change.  Certainly many liberals skeptical 
of the white working class are well aware of this and have opposed the neoliberal turn 
within the party; what follows should be read as a general argument about the pitfalls of a 
common way of seeing white workers.  First, some formulations of the “rising” America 
(like Goldberg’s above) flatten the power differentials within the urban liberal coalition.  
The “provincial” common adversary works to blur together the interests of working class 
people of color and the interests of urban professionals, without bringing up jobs, wages, 
affordable housing, or any of the fundamental sticking points in urban politics.  This 
works in part because the interests of voters of color can be much more easily read as 
noneconomic than the interests of the white working class.  Working class whites are 
                                                           
705 Ruy Teixeira, “Trump’s Demographic Coalition Won the Battle. It’ll Still Lose the War,” Vox, 
November 15, 2016. 
706 Michelle Goldberg, “Tyranny of the Minority,” New York Times, September 25, 2017. 
399 
 
likely lost to Democrats, one 2017 New Republic contributor contends, and the party 
should respond not by “emphasizing class over culture” but by “playing on the turf of 
culture and identity” to appeal to “low-income minorities”—whose concerns in this 
account center on “culture and identity,” not “class.”707 
It’s also important to stress that the left-behind white worker makes for an ideal 
failed neoliberal subject—too stupid, racist, and shortsighted to adapt and succeed in the 
modern economy.  The firm association between white workers and backlash politics 
makes their discontent with the status quo easiest to dismiss as a bigoted aversion to 
“change.”708  Rather than “accepting some ‘personal responsibility’…for their low 
standard of living and destructive lifestyle,” one liberal contends, “the wrongly 
romanticized white working class is flocking to a candidate who allows them to blame 
other people for their problems.”  The fact that “high school dropouts who have stopped 
filling out job applications” faced poor economic prospects should not, in this view, 
obscure the reality that “the American economy is doing rather well.”709  The liberal gibe 
that prosperous blue states’ taxes subsidize social services for poorer red states is 
intended as a rebuke to conservatives who define “makers” against “takers,” “taxpayers” 
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against “tax eaters”; instead, it replicates exactly the same logic.710 In the discourse 
detailed in this project, white workers’ happiness and wellbeing has frequently been 
employed as a primary yardstick for the health of the society as a whole.  That practice is 
symptomatic of the imbrication of whiteness and understandings of the democratic 
public.  Without losing sight of that history, it is essential to recognize the clear danger in 
suggesting that white workers’ disadvantage does not primarily reflect societal injustice, 
that it is primarily an indictment of white workers themselves. 
 
Elite talk about the white working class: Moving the conversation forward 
The issues most often raised in elite discourse about the white working class—in 
recent months and for decades prior—go to the heart of American political economy and 
Americans’ political consciousness.  They far exceed the agency of any single actor, no 
matter how powerful.  A better public discourse is only a very small corner of the vast 
structural and ideological problems elites grapple with through talk about the white 
working class; it is naïve to suggest otherwise.  With that said, it is possible to identify a 
few consistent sticking points that consistently militate against a more nuanced 
discussion of the role of the white working class in American politics. 
First, the narrow understanding of class that has long informed US politics makes 
it more difficult for elites to see women and people of color as class subjects and to 
understand their political claims as “economic”; it also makes it difficult for elites to see 
white working class people as having “cultural” concerns.  When pundits describe the 
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political views of white working class voters, “cultural” or “social” issues often serve as 
euphemisms for racism, sexism, or nativism; in a common left-of-center line of 
reasoning, “culture” is the sphere owned by the right, and a “cultural” appeal to white 
working class people is synonymous with the racialized populism of Donald Trump and 
his forebears.  This understanding of “culture” is unnecessarily limiting.  If class is 
understood as about cultural identity as well as economic position, recognition as well as 
redistribution—and it should be—the discussion can be broadened considerably.  As Lisa 
Henderson argues, “the practice of class recognition…matters in the formation of selves 
and solidarity in ways that an analytic emphasis on redistribution alone cannot 
capture.”711  The argument that liberals have historically succeeded by “encouraging 
white workers to vote their wallets” is a limiting reading; it misses the importance of a 
sense of solidarity, of being treated like a human being, of a sense of being understood 
and valued.  Rather than looking to economics to trump culture, it is important to 
consider the many ways culture does, can, and/or should shape politics. 
Also limiting is the enduring critique of “identity politics” that has often 
accompanied criticism of liberals’ neglect of the white working class.  In a controversial 
2016 New York Times piece and an ensuing book, Columbia University professor Mark 
Lilla called for “The End of Identity Liberalism,” which he deemed a divisive politics 
rejected by the “demos,” particularly those voters “living between the coasts.”  For Lilla, 
“liberals…threw themselves into the movement politics of identity,” in the process 
“losing a sense of what we share as citizens and what binds us as a nation”—in other 
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words, a shared identity.712  For the argument that liberals need to “go beyond identity 
politics” to make any sense at all, the term “identity” must be restricted to those forms of 
affiliation the critic finds problematic.  Often, the fundamental argument is that liberals 
turned off white workers by appealing too narrowly to minority constituencies.  
“Republicans have been trying to divide us, and we as Democrats came along and 
affirmed their divisions,” Ohio congressman Tim Ryan alleged in a 2017 speech. “We 
said, ‘If you’re African American, I’m going to talk to you about voting rights. If you’re 
a Latino, I’m going to talk to you about immigration. If you’re a woman, I talk to you 
about choice. If you’re gay, I talk to you about LGBT rights.’”  In the same speech, Ryan 
called on Democrats to “focus like a laser beam on the waitress with two kids. On the 
factory worker. We lost them to Trump”713—in other words, make specific appeals to 
working people (whom Ryan implicitly renders as white Trump supporters) as a group. 
The question is not whether identity should figure in politics—it will no matter 
what—but which identities should be put forward.  The challenge for (white) workers’ 
liberal advocates is to articulate their claims in a way that supports other coalition 
members’ claims instead of undermining them.  Criticism of “identity politics” does the 
opposite, relegating issues of race, gender, and sexuality to the ostensibly superficial 
realm of “identity.”  Calls for Democrats to respond to an explicitly white working class 
tend to steer all involved toward emphasizing white over working class.  However, it is 
possible to bring workers, including white workers, closer to the symbolic center of elite 
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discourse without stepping into the well-trod territory of white (working class) 
victimization. Calls for elites to respond to an explicitly multiracial, multiethnic working 
class—in other words, the actually existing working class—are comparatively rare in 
elite discourse.  While the racialization of terms like “worker,” “work” and even “hard 
work” (see Hillary Clinton’s “working, hardworking Americans, white Americans”) 
certainly presents a steep challenge, more clearly articulating a progressive working class 
identity inclusive of white workers and working class people of color is an essential step 
in bringing about a better elite public discourse. 
Since the 1960s, liberal discourse on white working class politics has frequently 
been characterized by “either-or” frames and false binaries that imply liberals must 
choose class or race, class or gender, white workers or the “Obama coalition,” the white 
working class or Black Lives Matter.  These zero-sum frames reflect the history of white 
working class representation more than the needs and views of worker-actors. To be 
clear, it is naïve to suggest that real tension and friction do not exist; nor am I making the 
argument that all workers have identical interests.  As Stuart Hall concisely put it, “social 
collectivities have more than one set of interests; and interests can be and frequently are 
contradictory, even mutually exclusive. Workers in a social system have both the interest 
of advancing and improving their position and advantages within it and of not losing their 
place.”714  The “either-or” frames that recur in analysis of white working class politics 
rely instead on a view of groups as separate entities with opposing interests and views. 
Conventional analysis does not provide a discursive place for the Democrats and liberal-
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leaning people who make up a sizable percentage of the white working class, the LGBTQ 
white working class people who make up a sizable part of the LGBTQ population, even 
the women who make up the majority of white workers.  A better elite public discourse 
on white working class politics must recognize actually existing heterogeneity and 
include seemingly “out-of-place” people in the picture along with conservative men. 
Finally, present-day elite discourse evinces a clear and profound difficulty seeing 
or positioning white working class people as part of the American future.  In both liberal 
and conservative discourse, the white working class is almost always positioned as 
symbolic of a past that contemporaries hope to recapture or move beyond.  Promises to 
“Make America Great Again” are only the most obvious example.  A consistent 
narrative, especially among liberals, holds that the white working class is effectively 
“dying out.”  “The only way of addressing their plight is a form of political hospice care,” 
one scholar argues. “These are communities that are on the paths to death. And the 
question is: How can we make that as comfortable as possible?”715  Whatever happens in 
the coming decades, the United States will still have a working class majority, and white 
workers will comprise a sizable segment of that working class.  Generations of elites 
have employed the white working class as political symbol, and that history has 
privileged the political use of the subject over the subject itself.  It is time for elites to 
take stock of the history of white working class representation and move beyond it, to 
engage with working class people of all backgrounds as people with opinions and 
experiences rather than as political backdrops or foils. 
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